Nation, Region and the Politics of Geography in East Asia

Edited by Toshio MIZUUCHI

■ Preface

This book was published as a research project conducted under the auspices of the Ministry of Education, Science, Sports and Culture, International Research Program, 1998, and Fukutake Science and Cultural Foundation, Research Program of 1997. The subtitle of this book indicates the tradition of this research project and its history. The titles of this series of publications are as follows:

1: *Geographical Languages in Different Times and Places*. Edited by Ichiro Suizu, Kyoto University, Japan, 1979.

2: *Languages, Paradigms and Schools in Geography*. Edited by Keiichi Takeuchi, Hitotsubashi University, Japan, 1981.

3: *Cosmology, Epistemology and the History of Geographical Thought*, Edited by Hideki Nozawa, Kyushu University, Japan, 1986.

4: *Indigenous and Foreign Influences in the Development of Japanese Geographical Thought.* Edited by Hideki Nozawa, Kyushu University, Japan, 1989.

5: unpublished

6: *Social Theory and Geographical Thought*, Edited by Hideki Nozawa, Kyushu University, Japan, 1996.

These books mainly dealt with the many aspect of history of the geography such as Japanese geographical thought from ancient times, the history of map making, vernacular geographical knowledge and images. Their interests also expanded to the geographical thought and history of academic geography in foreign countries. The English (including some articles written in French) publication of this kind of geographical knowledge was internationally evaluated in partnership with the Commission on the History of Geographical Thought organized in the International Geographical Union.

In the latest volume of No. 6, some research members tried to tackle the spatial theoretical studies in the current geographical debate in order to adapt them to developing an original view in their fact findings. They are also in the forefront of the stimulating research field of space and society in Japan. The two strong streams of the studies on geographical thought and those on space and society are now articulated in this volume. They also lead us to focus on the issues of nation state building, state intervention, geographical imaginations and discourse, colonialism and geopolitical concerns.

The title of this volume using the term East Asia is a statement advocating that Asian scholars must work to extend our understanding of the role of space in Asian development. Along this line, we Asians might find the concepts developed in the West insufficient to understand our peculiar settings. This recognition owes much to the fruitful discussions in the first meeting of the East Asian Regional Conference in Alternative Geography held in Kyong-ju, South Korea in January 1999, and its organizer, Professor Byung-Doo Choi of Taegu University and Prof. Fujio Mizuoka of Hitotsubashi University. This meeting demonstrated that many Asian scholars have already started to develop new spatial concepts to understand their own spatial experiences. It is my pleasure to thank Prof. George Lin from Hong Kong for contributing his paper to my book after this meeting.

I also thank Prof. Sang-Jung Kang, who made a very instructive speech, and the cordial offer of translation by Prof. Takashi Yamazaki.

Toshio Mizuuchi

Geography and Buddhism in Tsunesaburo Makiguchi's Thought[*]

Keiichi TAKEUCHI[**]

In this paper, I have no intention of considering the relationship between geography and religion *per se*, since for one thing, I don't think that it would be possible to do so. Moreover, a relationship between geography and religion should be considered only either in a specific social, historical and ideological context, or in the case of a specific person. Here I focus on one such specific person, a non-academic or outsider geographer, Tsunesaburo Makiguchi (1971-1944). Tsunesaburo Makiguchi is now well-known as the founder of the Soka Gakkai (literally "Value-Creating Association), one of the most active and militant of the Buddhist sects to be found today, and one which also exercises a remarkable influence where the contemporary Japanese political scene is concerned. What is less widely known is that the young Makiguchi was a geography teacher at the Teachers' Training School in Hokkaido, and his first book--*Jinsei chirigaku (Geography of Human Life)*--was published in 1903, preceding the establishment of academic geography in Japan (Takeuchi and Nozawa, 1988). In fact, the first Department of Geography at an Imperial University was founded in 1907 at Kyoto and the first Chair of Geography was created at

the Imperial University of Tokyo in 1911 (Noma, 1976). It was under the strong influence of the Orthodox Nichiren sect, known as the Nichiren Shoshu, that Makiguchi, in the year 1930, founded the Soka Kyoiku Gakkai (Association of Value-Creating Education); after his death in prison in 1944, and consequent upon the defeat of Japan in World War II, this association was to become the Soka Gakkai, by which name it has since been known. After the publication of the *Geography of Human Life*, he published books on geography education, such as *Kyoju no togo chushin to shite no kyodoka kenkyu (Considerations on Homeland Studies as the Integrating Focus of School Education)* in 1912 and *Chiri kyoju no hoho oyobi naiyo no kenkyu (Studies on Methods and Content in the Teaching of Geography)* in 1916. There is no question that the works of Makiguchi came to be recognised as pioneering writings in geography and geographical education; but basically, it was because of his position as founder of Soka Gakkai that his works were published, accompanied by exhaustive annotations[1].

Here, the problem is whether or not some embryonic questions arise with regard to Buddhist influences, especially that of the Orthodox Nichiren sect, in Makiguchi's geographical writings before 1930, and whether it is possible to discover any geographical discourses in his religious writings (Saito, 1996). Before examining these problems, however, I shall present a brief outline of Makiguchi's life.

1. Makiguchi's Life

He was born in 1871 in a desolate fishermen's village on the coast of the Japan Sea, in Niigata

** Department of geography, Komazawa University
taktaktm@ma.kcom.or.jp

Prefecture. Consequent upon the divorce of his parents in 1877, he was adopted by a distant relative, Makiguchi Zentayu, who operated a small shipping agency. In 1885, he went to Hokkaido and there, while working as a house-boy, he graduated from the Teachers' Training School of Hokkaido in 1893, and subsequently taught at the elementary school attached to the Teachers' Training School. From his student days, he had always been deeply interested in geography, and in fact, in 1896, at the age of twenty-five, he passed the examination for the Teacher's License for the Teaching of Geography at Secondary Schools. At that period, teachers of secondary schools were recruited from among graduates of universities and Higher Normal schools. In the case of geography, due to the lack of geography courses at university level, secondary school teachers were mainly recruited from among primary school teachers who had passed the above examination. There were a large number of aspirants to this examination, which generally took a number of years of successive attempts to pass[2]; Makiguchi's success in passing at so early an age was therefore unusual and indicative of his exceptional ability. In 1897, he was appointed teacher of geography at the Hokkaido school from which he had graduated. In 1901, however, he resigned from this position and left for Tokyo. The circumstances of his resignation are not clear; some researchers suggest that his sympathy with the dissident students protesting the militarist trends in education as practised at the school prompted him to resign in a gesture that also expressed his own personal disagreement with the educational policy (Ishinokami,1993). In studying geography, moreover, he felt the lack of systematic treatises on human geography in Japan, and upon arriving in Tokyo, devoted himself to the task of writing one himself, in order to remedy this lack. Consequently, in 1903, he visited Shigetaka Shiga, who was then teaching geography at Tokyo Semmon Gakko (the present Waseda University) and who was the well-known author of *Nihon fukeiron (Japanese Landscape)* published in 1894, and asked him to revise the voluminous manuscript that had resulted from his efforts. Complying with Shiga's suggestions, he shortened the manuscript somewhat, and published the results as the above-mentioned *Geography of Human Life* with an introduction by

Shiga, a volume which, the latter's recommendations notwithstanding, still ran to a thousand pages. There already existed some short treatises on geography published by Shiga in 1889 and Kanzo Uchimura in 1894; Makiguchi's book was, however, considerably more voluminous, comprehensive and systematic, covering, as it did, all fields of human geography. In Tokyo, in order to support himself and his family, Makiguchi held down various jobs, including editing and part-time lecturing. It was not until 1909 that his appointment to the post of head of the teaching staff of an elementary school in Tokyo provided him with a source of steady income. Life in Tokyo afforded him many new opportunities enabling him both to broaden and deepen his geographical studies. In 1909, for instance, he made the acquaintance of Kunio Yanagita, founder of the so-called Japanese folklore school, and hence had chances to conduct numerous field studies in many rural parts of the country with him and/or under the sponsorship of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, where Yanagita served as a senior official.

In 1910, Yanagita commenced the holding of regular study-meetings, called *kyodo-kai*, literally group or association for home-land studies, at the home of Inazo Nitobe, a specialist in agrarian history interested in Japanese folklore; Makiguchi, too, was an active member of the *kyodo-kai*[3].

In 1912, he met a young teacher, Jogai Toda, who later became a close collaborator of his within the association he founded, and which after World War II was to become today's militant Buddhist association, the Soka Gakkai, and Toda its first president. In 1928, Makiguchi had become a follower of the Orthodox Nichiren sect. After that, the activities he pursued in collaboration with Toda, while nominally consisting of a renovative educational movement, at the same time constituted a fanatic religious movement based on an original interpretation of the Nichiren doctrine. Their activities encountered the opposition of political circles of ultra-nationalist and Shintoist persuasions, and in 1932, at the age of sixty-one, Makiguchi was compelled to resign from the last post he was to hold, that of elementary school head teacher. Increasing emphasis had come to be laid on at tennoism based on a nationalistic form of Shintoism, which in the 1930s and, particularly, the 1940s, held the *tenno* and the

imperial family to be direct descendants of the supreme deity in Japanese mythology. Makiguchi categorically rejected the paying of allegiance to a Shintoist cult of this sort, thus incurring the wrath of the military group and the ultra-nationalist political body (Saito, 1978); subsequently, in 1943, by reason of his rejection of tennoist Shintoism, Makiguchi was arrested and in the following year, at the age of seventy-three, died of old age and malnutrition in a Tokyo prison[1].

2 Geography and the Geographical Education of Makiguchi

The title of his book of 1903, *Jinsei chirigaku*, was very new at that period, and nobody has ever used the term since. Actually, in 1889, in the first issue of *Chigaku Zasshi (Journal of Geography)*, Bunjiro Koto, then professor of geology at the Imperial University of Tokyo, in his paper on the meaning of geography, used the terms *jinrui chirigaku*, that is, anthropo-geography and *jimmon chirigaku* or human geography. Makiguchi was perfectly aware of the existence of these terms; as it was, in the preface to *Jinsei chirigaku* or the *Geography of Human Life*, and also in Chapter Thirty-three of the first edition[5], he explained his reasons for and the appropriateness of adopting this particular term for his title, underlining the necessity, where education in geography was concerned, of integrating fragmented regional descriptions. For Makiguchi, the systematisation of fragmented geographical descriptions hinged on the relationship between man and the physical environment, explained from the viewpoint of human activities or human experiences. The key concept of the *Geography of Human Life* was the importance of geography in school education and the role of human activities or human experiences in the explanation of the man-nature relationship. It is very understandable that he adopted the man-nature paradigm in geography, as in nineteenth-century academic world, both pre- and post-Darwinian, the man-nature paradigm clearly predominated. In fact, in Chapter Thirty-three, he cited Carl Ritter when defining geography, and moreover, emphasised the fact that the uniqueness of geography consisted in the systematic and theoretical explanation of the man-nature relationship from the viewpoint of daily practices in human life. We are able to discover numerous discourses common to both

Makiguchi's geography and contemporary humanistic geography.

At the same time, his anthropocentric understanding of the man-nature relationship prepared the way for the further development of his utilitarianism, which was later to be formulated more explicitly. It should be pointed out that academic geographers have never understood the significance of Makiguchi's term *jinsei chirigaku*. Immediately after the book appeared, Takuji Ogawa's review of it, which appeared in *Chigaku Zasshi* (Ogawa, 1904), criticised the use of this term because the contents of the work in question, in fact consisted of cultural or human geography, and also the term *jinsei chirigaku* itself seemed inordinately strange. In 1978, Hisaya Kunimatsu, graduate of the Imperial University of Tokyo and a prominent academic geographer, published a book on Makiguchi's *Jinsei chirigaku* (Kunimatsu, 1978), which constituted the very first study carried out by an academic geographer on Makiguchi's geography. In his work, Kunimatsu recognised Makiguchi's acceptance of the concept of the nineteenth-century paradigm of geography realised through the reading of translations of Western geographical writings[6], and recognised moreover, that the leitmotif of Makiguchi's *Jinsei chirigaku* was the importance of geographical education. But he has never understood that Makiguchi had been greatly influenced, since his period as a young teacher of geography, by the Pestalozzian method of direct observation. Only from the Pestalozzian viewpoint with regard to geographical education can we properly comprehend Makiguchi's reasons for utilising the term *jinsei chirigaku*[7].

Part Three of *Jinsei chirigaku*, which comprised almost one thousand pages and treated economic and political activities of human beings on the earth's surface, can rightly be considered the most important part of the book. In the eighth edition, published in 1908, Makiguchi added one chapter dealing with the sentimental attachment of the social group to the locality. This new chapter was somewhat short, but it is to be noted that with its addition, Makiguchi's geography took on a more humanistic orientation. We have also to note that from the first edition, Part Three also constituted an extremely systematic treatise on economic geography and settlement geography. Makiguchi hardly ever read foreign literature in the original languages and we have to admire his

thorough knowledge of agriculture and industrial location theories acquired almost solely through the reading of translations of Western works. He did not cite the name of von Thünen, but he explained, albeit with some errors of understanding[8], the theory of isolated state, something which was rather exceptional even in Western geographical writings. In his explanation of industrial location, Makiguchi made particular note of the complicated relationship between transportation costs of raw materials and products. *Jinsei chirigaku* was, in spite of general neglect on the part of academicians, widely read, and up till 1909, ten editions successively appeared. Most of the readers were aspirants to the examination for the Teacher's License for the Teaching of Geography at Secondary Schools; much evidence exists testifying to the fact that for them, this book was necessary reading. Makiguchi published two books on geographical education in 1912 and 1916, respectively. He prepared yet more developed considerations on geographical education with the intention of having them published as a volume of a series of works entitled *Soka kyoikugaku taikei*, literally, "Value-Creating Pedagogy". We cannot know how much and what he wrote for this volume, however; the manuscript was confiscated by the police in 1943, at the time of his arrest on charges of disrespect towards Shintoism and offences against the Maintenance of Public Order Act, and has never been found. *The Considerations on Homeland Studies as the Integrating Focus of School Education* of 1912 was a clear manifest of the emphasis he placed on homeland studies and on the reconstruction or reorganisation of the school curriculum based on direct observation, along Pestalozzian principles, of the environment of the pupils. Already in 1890, the *Imperial Rescript on Education*, which emphasised a centralised, nationalistic type of school education, had been promulgated, and Makiguchi's position was challenged by this centralised, nationalist line of thinking. His book, meantime, reached ten editions by 1933; and in the 1930s, when the Ministry of Education recommended the pursuit of homeland studies in the frame of a nationalistic reappraisal of the national territory, Makiguchi flatly stated in the preface to the tenth edition of his book that his homeland studies had nothing whatsoever in common with the brand of homeland studies recommended by the Ministry of Education. In the book, he categorically expressed his opposition to the dominant trends in school education, which persisted in maintaining that the sublime purpose of school education was the formation of people as imperial subjects devoted heart and soul to the emperor; while Makiguchi, too, declared that the target of school education was the creation of the nation, he meant this in the sense of people as citizens rather than subjects. According to the dominant idea, geography education had to aim at, first of all, the formation of identity with the national territory through the learning of geography. But Makiguchi insisted that homeland studies as he saw them were based on a pedagogical philosophy which held that school education should primarily be useful, where the lives of the children or the happiness of the pupils were concerned. This sort of utilitarianism was already implicit in the *Geography of Human Life* and was stated more explicitly in Makiguchi's writings during the 1930s, after he became a follower of Nichiren Shoshu. The *Studies on Methods and Content in the Teaching of Geography* of 1916 differed somewhat in character, the larger part of this particular work being based on lectures he gave at re-training sessions for teachers, in his capacity of veteran teacher and headmaster. The contents of the book are chiefly given over to the practical knowledge and techniques of geography education in the frame of the school curriculum imposed by the Ministry of Education; but still, some discussions proper to Makiguchi appear, such as the insistence on homeland studies as a preparatory stage of geography education in elementary school. It should be noted here that, after all, Makiguchi was by no means free of the circumstances in which Japan found herself at that period. Hence it will be found that he not only incorporated the geography of Korea and Formosa into the geography of Japan in Chapter Thirty-five, titled "Geography Education in Countries under the Influence of the Japanese Empire", but unequivocally recognised Japanese hegemony over the northeastern part of China, the Russian Far East, Mongolia and the Pacific islands comprising a former German colony; what is more, he even saw fit to declare that the Chinese were racially inferior to the Japanese.

3. *Soka kyoikugaku taikei* ("Value-Creating

Pedagogy") and Buddhism

Six volumes of the *Soka kyoikugaku taikei*, consisting of a general and systematic presentation of Makiguchi's methodology pertaining to school education, were published between 1930 and 1934. Makiguchi projected further volumes in the series, which were to treat teaching methods in school subjects and various aspects of school management; but these volumes of a practical nature never materialised, mainly due to the social and political climate of Japan at that time, under which Makiguchi himself and the Soka Kyoiku Gakkai (Association of Value-Creating Education) suffered persecution. Makiguchi presumably wrote the manuscript of the four published volumes during the second half of the 1920s. In the meantime, in 1928, he professed his faith in the Nichiren Shoshu, to which he had been introduced by Sokei Mitani, a headmaster like himself. On the occasion of the publication, distinguished scholars such as Inazo Nitobe and Kunio Yanagita, companions of the homeland study group, contributed recommendations, as did a number of politicians holding ministerial posts. The circumstances, however, being entirely different from the time of the publication of the *Geography of Human Life*, for which work Makiguchi had asked for and received revision and recommendations from outstanding geographers of that period, there were no academicians in pedagogy who welcomed Makiguchi's new work. As it was, the volumes comprised the first systematic writings on school education written by a school teacher: apropos of this fact, we have first of all to take into consideration the many problems which school education faced in Japan at that time—financial difficulties in schools brought on by the world economic crisis, the increasing burden of military expenditure, increasing state control and uniformisation of school education, as well as inequalities where the obtaining of higher education opportunities were concerned. A pragmatist in one sense, Makiguchi forthrightly criticised the impotence and inability of academic specialists in pedagogy when it came to solving these problems. In the preface to Volume I, he wrote, "Criticism means nothing to me as I am now—I am losing my sanity, as it were, as I look upon ten million students now facing difficulty in getting into schools, trouble in passing examinations and problems in finding work after graduation". In Chapter Five of

Volume I, where he treats "value-creation" in education, for the first time he cited passages from the *Lotus Sutra*, and after this continued to do so quite often in following chapters. In previous writings, Makiguchi's concept of value was a subjective or relative one, or in terms of economics, he relied on the theory of marginal utility; but observing the perpetual instability and confusion of the Japanese society of that period, he felt the need for an absolute standard of values, and wrote "One of Nichiren's major writings, *Rissho ankokuron* [*On Securing the Peace of the Land through the Propagation of True Buddhism*] provides an appropriate standard for the appraisal of values in this contemporary world of *Mappo* (Latter days of the Law), beset as it is by the wavering of judgement on the part of people and the uncertainties of life". I believe it to be necessary that, in order to understand Makiguchi's motive in writing the *Soka kyoikugaku taikei*, and also his conversion to the Orthodox Nichiren Sect, both writing and conversion have to be viewed in the social context of Japan at that period, that is, a context made up of the social instability and economic deprivation of the majority of the Japanese people, and the imposition of a nationalistic Shintoism in the sphere of intellectual life. In the six published volumes, there appeared a large amount of Buddhist terminology he had not hitherto used, but which he now found necessary in order to propound the spiritual ramifications involving his new faith; but his pedagogical thought remained unchanged from that found in his previous writings. He was always a rationalist and pragmatist where the methodology of school-teaching and school management was concerned, and he consistently remained anti-ultra-nationalist and anti-militarist: in fact, in Volume III of the *Soka kyoikugaku taikei*, he proposed the strengthening of the autonomy of the school and the adoption of a more open system with regard to the formation of school teachers, a system that would prove operable beyond the confines of the Teachers' Training School system. As stated previously, the utilitarianism of Makiguchi always gave priority to the kind of utility that benefited the lives of children, and happiness as the ultimate goal of education; and after conversion to the Orthodox Nichiren sect, he continued to give priority to the happiness of the people. At the same time, however, he increasingly quoted the *Lotus Sutra*, stating that all people should find succour by

embracing the teachings of Nichiren. In this way, his utilitarian view with regard to the man-nature relationship, as expressed earlier in the *Geography of Human Life*, not only continued to remain after his conversion to the Orthodox Nichiren sect, but also properly constituted a significant reason for that conversion: he had difficulty propagating his teaching ideas *per se*, under the prevalent social and political oppression, but those ideas were kept alive by being transposed, as it were, into an alternative mode, involving the discipline of the spirit. As it happened, this motivated the Japanese people, living out their lives in socially and economically deprived circumstances, to adhere to his teachings. I wanted to understand the intellectual itinerary of Makiguchi in the social and cultural context of Japan before World War II. In this sense, an appraisal of the movement known as the Soka Gakkai after World War II, directed first by Makiguchi's first follower and colleague, Josei Toda, and currently by Daisaku Ikeda, and also considerations as to whether or not the postwar Soka Gakkai movement has seen the continuation of Makiguchi's thought, comprise problems entirely different from that of considerations of Makiguchi's thought, which was the result of his struggle with the reality of pre-war Japan.

4. Conclusive Remarks

My conclusions with regard to this paper are as follows:

1) We can observe a certain continuity in Makiguchi's intellectual attitude and activities throughout his lifetime, a certain pragmatism, so to speak, or a readiness to realise in concrete form, what he felt had to be done. When he was young, he felt the necessity for a treatise of human geography, especially to aid the aspirants to the Teacher's License for the Teaching of Geography in Secondary Schools, and consequently succeeded in publishing in a comparatively short period of time, the voluminous *Geography of Human Life*. Moreover, his second book was published with the practical purposes of promoting and diffusing homeland studies. When he felt the critical nature of the situation in school education under the increasing governmental control of the 1930s, he founded the Soka Kyoiku Gakkai in order to promote school education having as its

primary aim the happiness and well-being of school children. This pragmatic or utilitarian spirit has certainly been inherited by the Soka Gakkai movement after World War II. In fact, among the many Japanese Buddhist sects, which generally gave more importance to the attaining of buddhahood and happiness in a Buddhist heaven, only the Soka Gakkai gave importance to the realisation of Buddhist ideals in this world, for which purpose the political arm of the Soka Gakkai movement was brought into being.

2) His conversion to the Orthodox Nichiren sect can in the main be explained as having been due to the difficult social and political situation of Japan at that time, in which he met with difficulty in promoting his renovative movement with regard to school education. It was only in 1934, six years after his conversion, that in Volume V of the *Soka kyoikugaku taikei*, he categorically declared it necessary to depend on the Buddhist law rather than human law, and that the ideological basis of his "value-creating pedagogy" (*soka kyoikugaku*) consisted in the teachings of the *Lotus Sutra*.

For Makiguchi, belief in the *Lotus Sutra* brought about a kind of transcending of human power; nonetheless, under no circumstances did he abandon the rational logic involved in the modern sciences, and it was on the basis of this idiosyncratic logic that he presented a very original interpretation of the *Lotus Sutra*. His resistance against the nationalistic Shintoism naturally derived from his attitude, which gave supremacy to the *Lotus Sutra*, but was at the same time, based on his acceptance of the rational logic of the modern sciences.

3) The fact of his death in prison has become a kind of legacy in the Soka Gakkai movement after World War II, or in other words, he became a martyr in the invented tradition of the Soka Gakkai. We have to note, however, that the Japanese society represented by Makiguchi, and that in which Soka Gakkai saw the expansion of its followers to its present enormous numbers, was totally different. Makiguchi conducted his resistance against the then predominant power of the establishment of his day; Soka Gakkai after World War II has always been a reformist movement in the frame of conservative political trends. But at the same time, paradoxically, Makiguchi's teachings, which insisted on the necessity of human endeavour in attaining material and spiritual well-

being, found its most fertile soil in the socio-economic condition of the Japan of the rapid economic growth period of the 1950s and 60s, a period corresponding to the rapid expansion of the Soka Gakkai movement. In that period, many of the common people of Japan held that the more one worked, the more one received, and the more their standard of living conditions improved.

Chronological Table for Tsunesaburo Makiguchi
(Items between parentheses refer to pertinent events occurring in Japanese society)

1871: Born 6 June in Niigata Prefecture, and named Choshichi Watanabe
Establishment of modern local administration systems (involving the abolition of clans and establishment of prefectures)
Establishment of the Ministry of Education

1877: Adopted into the Makiguchi family
Establishment of the Imperial University of Tokyo

1885: Transferred to Hokkaido, where his uncle lived, and worked as house-boy at the police headquarters of Otaru

1889: Transferred to Sapporo, following the director of the Otaru police headquarters
Enrolled in the Teachers' Training School of Hokkaido

1893: Changed his first name to Tsunesaburo
Graduated from the Teachers' Training School of Hokkaido and appointed teacher at the elementary school attached to the above training school; at the same time, appointed part-time lecturer at the above training school

(1894: Sino-Japanese war)

1895: Married Kuma, second daughter of the Makiguchi family

1896: Passed the examination for the Teacher's License for the Teaching of Geography at Secondary Schools

1897: Appointed teacher of geography at the Hokkaido Teachers' Training School

1900: Worked as dormitory supervisor of the above school, as well as continuing to teach there; at the same time, served as headmaster of the attached elementary school

1901: Dismissed from all of the above posts and went to Tokyo

1902: Visited Shigetaka Shiga, famous as a journalist and lecturer in geography, at the Tokyo Semmon Gakko (the present Waseda University) and asked him to revise his manuscript *Jinsei chirigaku (Geography of Human Life)*

1903: Publication of *Geography of Human Life*

(1904: Russo-Japanese war)

(1907: Establishment of the Department of Geography at the Imperial University of Kyoto)

1909: Appointed principal teacher at the Fujimi Elementary School in Tokyo Made the acquaintance of Kunio Yanagita, founder of the Japanese folklore school, and accompanied the latter in the carrying out of field work in Yamanashi Prefecture

1910: Yanagita founded the *kyodo-kai* study group and Makiguchi frequented the regular monthly meetings held at the home of Inazo Nitobe. Entered the Ministry of Education and engaged in the compilation work of geography school textbooks

1911: On the introduction of Yanagita, engaged in field surveys of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce in Kyushu
(Establishment of the Chair of Geography at the Imperial University of Tokyo)

1912: Publication of *Kyoju no togo chushin to shite no kyodo-ka kenkyu (Considerations on Homeland Studies as the Integrating Focus of School Education)*

1913: Appointed headmaster of Higashimori Elementary School in Tokyo

(1914: World War I; Japan declared war on Germany)

1919: Transferred to headmastership of Nishimachi Elementary School in Tokyo

1920: Met Jogai Toda, then a young teacher, who later became Makiguchi's collaborator in the activities of the Soka Kyoiku Gakkai

1922: Appointed headmaster of Shirogane Elementary School, an elite school of that time

(1925: Establishment of the Association of Japanese Geographers)

1928: Became a follower of the Orthodox Nichiren sect

1930: Founded, in collaboration with Toda, the Soka Kyoiku Gakkai (Association of Value-Creating Education)

Began to publish the *Soka kyoikugaku taikei* (System of Value-Creating Pedagogy)

1931: Appointed headmaster of Niibori Elementary School in Tokyo

Japan entered into conflict in northeastern China (Manchuria); beginning of the so-called Fifteen-Year War

1932: Retired from the above headmastership, ending his career as teacher of elementary schools

Began to give lectures in various parts of Japan on his pedagogical methods

1934: Publication of Volume VI of *Soka kyoikugaku taikei*

1939: First general assembly of Soka Kyoiku Gakkai held

1943: Sixth and last general assembly of Soka Kyoiku Gakkai

Arrested at Shimoda for reason of his rejection of the national Shintoist cult; almost all the members of Soka Kyoiku Gakkai were also arrested

1944: 18 November, died in a Tokyo prison of malnutrition after sixteen months of imprisonment

1945: Defeat of Japan in World War II

1946: Reconstruction of the Soka Kyoiku Gakkai under the official name of Soka Gakkai

1950: Official establishment of the Soka Gakkai by Jogai Toda

1951: Official nomination of Toda as President of Soka Gakkai

Notes

1) All the reprinted editions of Makiguchi's works, and also the studies on Makiguchi after World War II, were published by Soka Gakkai-affiliated publishers such as Daisan Bunmeisha.

2) The system pertaining to the Teacher's License for the Teaching of Geography at Secondary Schools was first established in 1885 and remained in force until 1945. After 1935, most geography teachers were recruited from among the graduates of the newly-established courses of geography at private universities, but prior to that, the system played an important role in the recruitment of geography teachers. Detailed studies of the system have been made in Sato, 1988.

3) This study group, the *kyodo-kai* and the Japanese folklore school exercised a considerable influence on the formation of early academic geography in Japan. In fact, Michitoshi Odauchi, one of the most influential among the academic geographers, his position as teacher at a private university notwithstanding, was a regular member of the *kyodo-kai*. Moreover, Hikoichiro Sasaki and Sadao Yamaguchi, two younger graduates in geography at the Imperial University of Tokyo, maintained close relationships with Kunio Yanagita; but because of the early death of these two brilliant figures, the scholastic legacy they might have bequeathed to post-World War II academic geographers failed to materialise (Takeuchi, 1984).

4) His death in prison was not an exceptional occurrence. Under the ultra-nationalist and militarist regime that prevailed from the 1930s until Japan's defeat in World War II in 1945, a large number of intellectuals of both socialist and liberalist persuasions were arrested and died in prison due to torture and other forms of maltreatment.

5) In the eighth and revised edition of *Jinsei chirigaku* published in 1908, the parts from Chapter Thirty onwards underwent a great deal of revision. Most of Chapter Thirty-three of the first edition was rewritten and additions were made to Chapter Thirty-five in the eighth edition.

6) No book of Western geography was translated in total before 1920 in Japan. Excerpts from the geographical writings of Western specialists, such as Arnold Guyot or August Meitzen, and numerous other conventional textbooks of geography were introduced or translated frag-

mentally by Yukichi Fukuzawa, Kanzo Uchimura, Inazo Nitobe and others; and judging from the descriptions to be found in Makiguchi's *Jinsei chirigaku*, it is obvious that he had made an exhaustive study of these translated writings.

7) The Ministry of Education sent three young scholars to the United States to study teachers' training systems in use in that country. Among them, Hideo Takamine studied at a teachers' training college at Oswego, N.Y., a centre of the Pestalozzian teaching method. After returning to Japan, he introduced the Pestalozzian teaching method, especially that aspect of it pertaining to geography teaching, in the curriculum of teachers' training schools in Japan. The legacy of Pestalozzian methods was especially strong around the end of the nineteenth century at teachers' training schools in Nagano and Hokkaido (Nakagawa, 1978).

8) It is generally considered that Makiguchi obtained his knowledge of von Thünen's theory from the *Nogyo honron (Treatise of Agronomy)* of Inazo Nitobe published in 1898. T. Ohji, however, very precisely examined Makiguchi's presentation of von Thünen and came to the conclusion that Makiguchi learnt von Thünen's theory from the textbook of agricultural economy of Tsunejiro Imazeki, published in 1892, rather than Nitobe's work (Ohji, 1982).

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Representing nature and nation:

National-Land Afforestation Campaign and the production of forest in the 1960's~1970's Japan

Koji NAKASHIMA*

Prologue

The city I am talking about (Tokyo) offers this precious paradox: it does possess a center, but this center is empty (Barthes, 1982, p.30)

What Barthes called 'empty center' is the place of '*Kokyo*' (Imperial Palace) in Tokyo. That is a kind of sanctuary where '*Tenno*' (Emperor) lives, concealed beneath foliage and protected by moats. That is the place which is both forbidden and indifferent, where nobody can see inside, and around which the entire city turns. As Barthes (1982) notes, it hides the sacred 'nothing'. However, the color of this empty center is neither blank nor transparent. As Barthes (1970) correctly described as 'la verdure', it is green[1]. 'Empty center' of Tokyo is both concealed from view and identified by the green nature.

As Figure 1 shows, there still remain several other forests than '*Kokyo*', like green islands in the central area of Tokyo. They are '*Shinjuku-gyoen*' (Shinjuku Imperial Garden), '*Akasaka Gosho*' (Crown Pince's palace), '*Meiji-jingu*' (Meiji Shrine), '*Meiji-jingu-gaien*' (Outer garden of Meiji Shrine), '*Hamarikyu-teien*' (Garden of Hama detached palace), '*Ueno-koen*' (Ueno Park) and '*Shizen Kyoiku-en*' (National Park for Natural Study). As Japanese writer Inose (1992) notes, most of those green islands were once, and even now partially are possessed by *Tenno* and the Imperial Household[2]. That is to say, 'they are the detached estates of the "empty center"' (Inose, 1992, p.67).

Japanese historian Amino said that it is prob-

lem that there remains nature only in *Kokyo* and shrine in contemporary Tokyo (Amino et al., 1988). He quotes an interesting episode that in the forest preservation movement in *Zushi*-city (Kanagawa Prefecture) against the plan of constructing US army residence in the forest, one political-economist proposed to bring the tomb of (a former) *Tenno* to that forest. This political-economist said to Amino, 'If we could do so, our nature would be absolutely protected'. Amino was surprised at this proposal by the political-economist who had been a more radical leftist than Amino himself (Amino et al., 1988, p.260-261). This political-economist appropriated the taboo that the place of 'God' should be preserved without any interruption. In other words, the *Tenno* has remained as 'God' in the mentality of nature preservation. Thus this episode suggests the subtle connection between human-nature relation and the symbolic *Tenno* system in contemporary Japan.

This paper reviews the history of the representation of nature in the National-Land Afforestation Campaign in the 1960's ~ 1970's Japan, and aims to show an aspect of the relationship between nature and nation in modern Japan. The National-Land Afforestation Campaign is not just an activity to afforest a mountain but a national campaign to produce a new meaning and value of environment through the construction of 'second nature' (Lefebvre, 1976). As Harvey (1996) notes, the meaning and value of environment are diverse according to the positions of subjects who talk about an environmental issue. In the typical discourses by the wartime Japanese naturalists and historians on Japanese culture, an affiliation and a harmony with nature were understood as traditional and national features of Japanese culture

* Department of Geography, Kanazawa University
koji331@kenroku.ipc.kanazawa-u.ac.jp

Figure 1 'Empty center' and the forests in Tokyo

① Kokyo (Imperial Palace)   ② Akasaka Gosho (Crown Prince's Palace)

③ Shinjuku Gyoen (Shinjuku Imperial Garden)   ④ Meiji-jingu (Meiji Shrine)

⑤ Meiji-jingu gaien (Outer garden of Meiji Shrine) ⑥ Hamarikyu-teien

(Garden of Hama detached palace) ⑦ Ueno-koen (Ueno Park)

Modified from 1:50,000 Scale Topographic Maps 'North-West Tokyo', 'North-East Tokyo', 'South-West Tokyo' and 'South-East Tokyo'

(ex. Wakimizu, 1939; Takase, 1942; Fujiwara, 1942). Though such a nationalistic environmentalism seems to have disappeared in the postwar Japan (Yasuda, 1992), it does not mean that nature became essentially a non-political and neutral object. In spite of its appearance of neutrality and purity, representation of nature have articulated with national and cultural-political issues in contemporary Japan.

Particularly, as described above, the connection between nature and *Tenno* seems to have become intimate in contemporary Japan: an emphasis of the profile of Showa *Tenno* as a botanist living with nature, the annual attendance of *Tenno* and Kogo (Empress) at the national afforestation festival, and the enactment of *Midorino-hi* (Green Day) which was formerly a birthday of Showa *Tenno*, to name just a few. The more Showa *Tenno* became a non-political existence under the symbolic *Tenno* system, the more he came to be connected to the nature as a non-political and a neutral object.

The paradox of the 'empty center' shows this ambiguous connection between *Tenno* and nature: the center subsists as a neutral and silent place which does not irradiate any political power but exerts an invisible centrality to the entire movement of the city. As Barthes (1982) notes, the system of imaginary (l'imaginaire) is spread circularly around an empty subject. The green islands remaining in the midst of Tokyo subsist both as actual places which are consumed as neutral and non-political object for rest and recreation and as imaginary places where the meaning and the value of nature and the nation articulate each other.

What is the 'midori'?

'The National-Land Afforestation Campaign' is an English name of '*Kokudo Ryokka* Undo' in Japanese. However, according to Japanese forestry expert Tezuka (1990), we don't have any English word strictly equivalent to the word '*ryokka*' (緑化). Though '*ryokka*' is generally translated as 'afforestation' in English, its straight meaning is 'to make green.' The letter 緑 is pronounced '*midori*' in the Japanese reading which means 'green.' However '*midori*' does not only mean the green as a color, but also represents 'nature' in general. Therefore '*Ryokka*' does not only mean 'to make green,' but also implicates 'to produce and preserve nature.'

Table.1 Place of the '*Midori*'

Rank	Place to be imaged	Percent.
1	Mountain, Hill	80.2%
2	Highland, Grassland	50.4%
3	Park	45.4%
4	Rice field, Crop field	39.3%
5	Street	25.1%
6	Shrine, Temple	24.0%
7	Riverside, Seashore	22.0%
8	Tropical forest etc.	20.0%
9	Garden, Veranda	18.0%
10	Slope or Cliff near the residence	9.4%

(Including plural resposes)
Source : Prime Minister's Office (1994)

Table.2 The merits of the '*Midori*' to be expected

Rank	Contents of merits	Percent.
1	To create a flavor and to make people feel relaxed	78.0%
2	To clean the air and to ease the noise	51.7%
3	To secure the habitat for birds and animals	50.5%
4	To prevent the disaster like flood and landslide	47.9%
5	To absorb the carbon dioxide and to prevent the global warming	44.7%
6	To secure the place in the shade of a tree for rest and recess	42.9%
7	To secure the place for wondering and relaxation in the forest	42.4%
8	To secure the water resource by maintaining the forest	33.3%
9	To arrange a scene around the facilities like buildings and roads	20.4%
10	To secure the place of refuge in the case of a disaster	17.1%
11	To secure the place for sports and recreation	16.2%
12	To produce the timber	13.7%

(Including plural responses)
Source : Prime Minister's Office (1994)

It is after the establishment of the National-Land Afforestation Promotion Committee (NLAPC) in 1950 that the word 'ryokka' has become generally used in Japan (Tezuka, 1990, pp.51-52). The name of the afforestation campaign commonly used in the prewar Japan was 'airin' = 愛林 which means 'to love the woods'. While the main activity of the prewar 'airin' campaign was an afforestation in the sense of the forestry, the postwar 'ryokka' campaign includes extensive and diverse activities such as the nature preservation, the tree-planting campaign in the city and so on.

According to the public opinion poll on the afforestation promotion[3], images of the 'midori' people hold are very diverse. As shown in Table 1, while most people image the nature like 'Mountain, Hill,' 'Highland, Grassland,' a considerable rate of people image the artificial and urban environment like 'Park,' 'Rice or Crop field,' 'Street,' 'Shrine, Temple' and 'Garden, Veranda.' Thus the 'midori' reminds people of the diverse environment ranging from wild and far-off nature to the ordinary and familiar environment. And as shown in Table 2, the expected merits of the 'midori' are also diverse, ranging from 'To create a flavor and to make people feel relaxed' to 'To produce the timber.'

However, generally speaking, people commonly seem to expect positive and gentle characters to the 'midori'. The words like 'feel relaxed,' 'ease,' 'rest and recess' and 'place of refuge' implicate a gentleness and a familiarity everyone feels easy to accept. In other words, the 'midori' does not only have any negative meaning but also is easy to be accepted by everyone. Whether they are the leftist or the rightist, the liberalist or the nationalist, everyone are willing to admit and accept the 'midori.'

Heritage of the Empire: Forest of *Meiji-jingu*

Figure 2 is a photograph of the gateway to the shrine of *Meiji-jingu* where big 'Torii' stands marked with the emblem of chrysanthemum flower, which is the family crest of the Imperial Household, and where the deep forest forms a subtle and profound prelude to the sanctuary. And Figure 3 is an outside view of this forest many people can look from the main road. We can see two signboards on which impressive phrases are

put down:

Praying in the forest of God

Make your solemn supplication in the greenery sanctuary

Safety of the family, driving away an evil, prosperous trade, and success in the examination

Any kinds of supplication are served at any time

Meiji-jingu

(Right signboard)

Meiji Memorial Hall[4] warmly watches the future

(Left signboard)

The forest of *Meiji-jingu* is considered not as an ordinary forest but as a sacred forest where God is enshrined. However, as the left signboard and a last phrase of the right signboard suggests, the shrine seems to try to be opened and familiar to all the people. In fact many people including foreign tourists visit *Meiji-jingu* and worship God everyday. Thus we can find sacredness and familiarity simultaneously in the forest of *Meiji-jingu*.

Meiji-jingu was constructed in honor of Meiji *Tenno* (Emperor Meiji) in 1920 deifying Meiji *Tenno* and *Shoken-kotaigo* (Empress Dowager Meiji) as the enshrined deity. Its area including *Meiji-jingu-gaien* (Outer garden of Meiji Shrine) is more than a million square meter. In the midst of Shibuya ward crowded with office buildings, forest of *Meiji-jingu* occupies broad area by its deep green. Forest of *Meiji-jingu* was never naturally grown. It has been made of the trees donated from all over the domain of the Empire including Sakhalin, North and Northeast China, Korea, Okinawa and Taiwan (Meiji-jingu Gojunenshi Hensan Iinkai, 1979). The items of trees planted in the forest of *Meiji-jingu* were 95,559 trees donated, 15,951 trees of native kinds, 8,222 trees transferred and 2,840 trees purchased (Meiji-jingu Keidai Sogochosa Iinkai, 1980). Thus 78.0 percent of all trees planted were donated ones.

In constructing *Meiji-jingu*, the Cabinet organized the Research Committee for Enshrining whose member included three forestry experts, Seiroku HONDA, Yoshitaro KAWASE and Itsuto FUKUHA. At first this Research Committee proposed to plant the needle-leaved trees in forest of

Figure 2 The big 'Torii' standing on the gateway to the shrine of *Meiji-jingu*


Figure 3   Impressive Signboards: outside view of the forest of *Meiji-jingu*

Meiji-jingu like Japanese cedar, Japanese cypress, Japanese hemlock, fir tree, Japanese yew and so on. These trees were expected to form a subtle and profound shrine forest composed of straight and well-proportioned big trees to make scenic beauty of nature (Meiji-jingu Keidai Sogochosa Iinkai, 1980, pp.7-8). However, as these kinds of trees were vulnerable to the polluted air of Tokyo, this forest plan was changed to another one which was to plant evergreen broadleaf trees like chinquapin, oak, camphor tree as the main trees of the shrine forest[9]. According to the "*Meiji-jingu on-keidairin'en keikaku, kan*" (Garden planning of the shrine forest in Meiji-jingu, final edition)[6], those trees were considered to 'be suitable for climate and *fudo* (natural features of country) of the *kyodo* (home country), to be strong to various disaster or disease, and to form a subtle and profound shrine forest through a natural renewal without any caring (Meiji-jingu Keidai Sogochosa Iinkai, 1980, pp.8-9, parentheses mine).

In this change of the trees to be planted, we can find two basic concepts of the forest planning of Meiji-jingu. One is to make 'a scenic beauty of nature' (*tennen no fuchi*). Though most of trees in the forest of Meiji-jingu were artificially planted, the forest of Meiji-jingu had to be constructed as if it were a natural forest. For it was the necessary conditions of subtlety and profundity of the shrine forest that the beauty of the forest is not artificially produced but endowed by the natural power beyond the human ability.

The other is to 'be suitable for climate and *fudo* of the *kyodo*'. What was required of the forest of Meiji-jingu was not an universal nature, but the national nature which was deeply rooted in Japanese *fudo*. The evergreen broadleaf trees like chinquapin, oak, camphor tree were regarded as 'the native species proper to the temperate zone like Tokyo' (Meiji-jingu Keidai Sogochosa Iinkai, 1980, p.8).

A technical expert of the Ministry of Home Affairs, who was engaged in the maintenance of the forest of Meiji-jingu during 1925-1935, retrospects and describes the forest of Meiji-jingu: 'At the beginning of planting, we had expected, in twenty-five years to make a little scenic beauty of shrine forest , and in fifty years to form a thick forest handed down from our ancestors, ···now fifty years have passed, there is no knowing that the forest of Meiji-jingu was made of trees

planted and donated by the nation, and every worshiper regards it as a natural forest mainly composed of beautiful evergreen broadleaf trees handed down from our ancestors' (Meiji-jingu Keidai Sogochosa Iinkai, 1980, pp.9-10). Two basic concepts of the forest planning of Meiji-jingu seem to survive fifty years and be embodied in the scenery of the present forest. 'Therefore,' he concludes, ' I am sure that this (to preserve the forest of Meiji-jingu) is an important patriotic movement for Japan as a cultured nation having a peaceful Constitution, in order to protect and preserve nature and natural environment in the national land' (Meiji-jingu Keidai Sogochosa Iinkai, 1980, p.27, parentheses mine).

Remarks on the forest of Meiji-jingu suggests us a subtle connection between nature and the nation. It is not just a heritage of the past Empire, but the dynamic process of making meanings and values of nature and the nation through the production of a specific scenery of nature. We examine that process in the following chapters.

Nature for the memory: Meiji Centennial and the National-Land Afforestation Campaign

1968 was the year in which Japan marked the centennial of the Meiji Restoration. A lot of events, projects and festivals were held in memory of the Meiji Centennial by the national and local governments, and private groups. Among the memorial projects conducted by the national and local government, national-land afforestation and related projects were important ones. The prospectus of the Meiji Centennial Memorial National-Land Afforestation Campaign says:

> The significance of conducting the National-Land Afforestation Campaign as the memorial project of the "Meiji Centennial" is, as well as to remind of the root of the development in the last hundred years, to develop further the good point of the nation that is an abundant sensibility to the *midori* even amidst the recent tendency to praise a machine civilization, and thereby to proceed for the new century (Prime Minister's Secretariat, 1969, p.290).

As suggested in this text, the Japanese nation is regarded as more sensible to nature than other nations. We can find similar remarks in other

projects. NLAPC requested a Japanese composer Toshiro Mayuzumi to produce a symphony for memorial forests as a part of the Meiji Centennial Memorial National-Land Afforestation Campaign. Mayuzumi chose four poems from the ancient Japanese anthology '*Man'yoshu*', and composed a voice symphony '*Mori*' (The Forest) using poems as the words. He said:

> I think that the basic idea of "*ryokka*" is <to love>: to love the trees, to love the forest, and to love the nature. Those loves will develop into the love for the national land, the love for the nation and the great love for the human beings. And it will ultimately return to the love for ourselves. In that meaning, I used the 'poems' as texts, which are composed of the contemplation on nature and the affiliation to the forest Japanese nation have retained since ancient times (Mayuzumi, 1968, pp.7-8).

This kind of remarks is generally found in many other texts on the National-Land Afforestation

Campaign of those days as well as in the texts of the wartime intellectuals. Of course, there was no rational and logical relationship between the national-land afforestation and the Meiji Centennial. However, by connecting such different activities, it became possible to embody a history of the nation in the form of nature. In other words, the Meiji Centennial Memorial National-Land Afforestation Campaign made it possible to reify the history of a hundred years of modern Japan in a concrete form of forests as if it were as part of an eternal tradition of Japanese nation since ancient times. It reminds people of collective memory of the nation not by a political propaganda but by a scenery of nature with an appearance of neutrality and purity.

The projects of Meiji Centennial Memorial National-Land Afforestation Campaign are diverse and abundant (Table 3). We review some of those projects, and try to suggest an actual relationship between the nation and nature represented in the scenery.

Table.3   Contents of Meiji Centennial Memorial National Land Afforestation Movement and other related projects

Project Name	Auspices of Project	Remarks
Ryokka slogan, poster and badge contest	NLAPC	First prize: '*Hyakunenno kinenni bokuno kono naegi*' (This seedling, also me in memory of the centennial)
Distribution of the *ryokka* Leaflets	NLAPC	'A guide to the Meiji Centennial Memorial National Land Afforestation Movement'
Memorial afforestation	Forestry Agency	Provision of afforestation subsidies to local governments, schools and other groups
19th National Festival of Afforestation	NLAPC and Akita Prefecture	At Mt. Omoriyama, Akita Prefecture, 14,500 people and *Tenno* and *Kogo* attended
Memorial symphony '*Mori*'	NLAPC	Performed on the Shibuya Public Hall, broadcasted by NHK, and recorded by Toshiba Records
Ryokka monument	NLAPC	Constructed at Yoyogi Park in Tokyo
Memorial Forest Park	Ministry of Construction	Constructed at the Musashi Hill, Saitama Prefecture
Memorial Forest Park	Local government	Ten parks at seven prefectures and three cities
Forest of Meiji	Forestry Agency, Ministry of Health and Welfare	Constructed at Mt. Takao-san Hachioji-City, Tokyo
		Constructed at Mt. Mino-san Mino-City, Osaka
Forest of Nation	Forestry Agency	Constructed at eight areas of the national forest
Prefectural Forest	Local government	Constructed by twenty one local governments
Trees of Prefectures	NLAPC and Governor's National Conference	Planted at *Kokyo Higashi Gyoen* (Imperial Palace East Garden)

Source : Prime Minister's Secretariat (1969)

Figure 4   Distribution of the forest produc...

● *Meiji no mori* (Forest of Meiji)   ○ *Showa no mori* (Forest of Showa)

◆ *Shinrin Koen* (National Forest Park)   ◇ *Shinrin Koen* (Prefectural or Municipal
                                                Forest Park)

■ *Kokumin no mori* (Forest of the Nation)

Figure 4   Distribution of the 'forest' produced during 1960's∼1970's

Reification of the history: *Meiji no mori* (Forest of Meiji) and *Showa no mori* (Forest of Showa)

'*Meiji no mori*' was founded as a joint project of the Forestry Agency (the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries) and the Ministry of Health and Welfare. It aimed to develop a place for field recreation where the forest would be preserved and people could be in close contact with nature, and to provide it for the city dwellers lacking in nature ('*Kokudo Ryokka*', 1967, vol.2, no.1, pp.13-14). Two national forests and surrounding areas, Mt. *Takao-san* (Hachioji City, Tokyo) and *Minoo* (Minoo City, Osaka), were chosen as '*Meiji no mori*' (Figure 4) .They were also designated as seminational parks: '*Meiji no mori Takao*' seminational park and '*Meiji no mori Minoo*' seminational park. These '*Meiji no mori*' have two different characters, one is a character as a natural park which is furnished with pavements, open spaces, educational facilities and exhibition facilities, and the other is a character as the forest where people are enlightened, educated in, and can practice, forestry. The Ministry of Health and Welfare was responsible for the former, and the Forestry Agency the latter.

Though the Forestry Agency had conventionally played an important role in the postwar National-Land Afforestation Campaign, in the project of '*Meiji no mori*', it was the Ministry of Health and Welfare that had taken the conceptual initiative. Michio Ooi, the chief of planning section of national park bureau in the Ministry of Health and Welfare, described the concept of '*Meiji no mori*' as follows:

When we designed '*Meiji no mori*,' our central concept was the embodiment of the purest

function of the natural park, a function to make use of the good point of nature by the unification of human and nature (Ooi, 1968, p.13).

He summarized the contents of '*Meiji no mori*' project into three points, (1) to preserve and protect nature remaining and to restore a part of the nature already lost, and thereby to recover the beauty and the fascination of nature in the suburbs of metropolis, (2) to convey the scientific, cultural and spiritual meaning of nature to people, and to ensure the effects of the intercourse between human and nature, (3) to exclude uncontrolled tourist exploitation and to establish the place for healthy field recreation, and thereby to show a model of a natural park that is to be (Ooi, 1968, p.14). As suggested in this summary, nature is regarded as an object not to be exploited but to be preserved, whose value is neither economic nor material, but a cultural or spiritual. And the recreation is understood as the embodiment of the unification between human and nature. In those days when 'recreation' was translated as '*kyuyo*' (rest or repose) in a Japanese dictionary, '*Meiji no mori*' project clearly defined 'recreation' as the unification between human and nature.

Furthermore, what is crucial in this project is 'to show a model of a natural park that is to be'. Since the late 1960's, a lot of natural parks have been established all over the country, for example, *Kenmin no mori* (Prefectural Forest), *Shimin no mori* (Municipal Forest) and *Ikoi no mori* (Recreational Forest). Common feature of those natural parks is an emphasis on the recreation in nature and the intercourse between people and nature. The project of '*Meiji no mori*' provided a model of contemporary natural parks.

Table.4 *Summary of 'Showa no mori' (Forest of Showa)*

Town or Village	Prefecture	Vestige of *Tenno*	Area (ha)	Ownership
Matsuo Village	Iwate	Site of the 25th National Festival of Afforestation in 1974	46	Communal
Inawashiro Town	Fukushima	Site of the 21th National Festival of Afforestation in 1970	56	Communal
Daigo Town	Ibaraki	Site of the 27th National Festival of Afforestation in 1976	47	Communal
Fujioka Town	Aichi	Site of the 30th National Festival of Afforestation in 1979	256	Communal
Iwade Town, Uchita Town	Wakayama	Site of the 28th National Festival of Afforestation in 1977	50	Communal
Kobayashi City	Miyazaki	Site of the 24th National Festival of Afforestation in 1973	50	Communal
Ebetsu City	Hokkaido	Site where Showa Tenno had visited in 1936 and 1954	1604	National Forest
Amagi-yugashima Town	Shizuoka	Site where Showa Tenno had visited in 1930 and 1954	1195	National Forest

Source : Documents of the Forestry Agency

In 1976, after eight years of 'Meiji no mori' project, 'Showa no mori' (Forest of Showa) was established in memory of the 50th anniversary of the throne of Showa *Tenno* (the Emperor Showa). In the memorial project of 'Showa no mori,' eight forests which once had some relation to Showa *Tenno* were designated as 'Showa no mori' (Figure 4). Six of them were the sites of the National Festival of Afforestation in the last decade where Showa *Tenno* himself planted the memorial seedling in the festival. Other two forests were the 'honorable' sites where Showa *Tenno* had visited before (Table 4). The purpose of the establishment of 'Showa no mori' was to arrange the forest which had close relation to Showa *Tenno* and to create the recreational place where people could be in closer contact with nature ('Kokudo Ryokka', 1976, vol.11, no.5, p.4). Contents of the project are (1) an afforestation and an organization of the forest into 'forest of bird', 'forest of insect' and 'forest of mushroom' in order to cultivate the thought of nature preservation, (2) a construction

of the road for the user to walk around the forest, (3) a construction of recreational facilities like camp sites, playing zones, open spaces and a forest museum. Those contents of 'Showa no mori' were schematized as a model of 'Showa no mori' by the Forestry Agency (Figure 5). As shown in this schema, centering around the trees planted by *Tenno* and *Kogo*, various recreational facilities like a camping site, playing zones and cycling roads are arranged. This schema shows, as well as a model of 'Showa no mori,' a prototype of other natural parks like Prefectural Forest and Municipal Forest and so on. For example, the arrangement of recreational facilities in Prefectural Forest are quite similar to this model. Centering around some monuments or exhibition center, camp sites, open spaces, resting places, walking (cycling) roads, observatories and other recreational facilities are arranged. Thus 'Showa no mori' inherited and developed the model of a natural park that 'Meiji no mori' had proposed.

1 Entrance road 2 Principal road 3 Cycling road 4 Walking road 5 Educational road
6 Sports road 7 Parking place 8 Administrative house 9 Refuge hut 10 Resting hut
11 Exhibition center 12 Playing field 13 Camp site 14 Observatory 15 The forest of
'Oteue' (The forest of trees planted by *Tenno*)

Figure 5   The model of 'Showa no mori' (The forest of Showa)
Source: Reprinted from *Kokudo Ryokka* Vol.11 (1976), No.5, p..5

As a character of a forest suited for a natural park have become clearer, a connection between the forest and *Tenno* have also become strong. As

shown in Table 4, eight forests of 'Showa no mori' had already been marked as the memorial places where Showa *Tenno* had visited before.

Therefore, to establish 'Showa no mori' at such memorial forests was meant to reinforce the connection between the forest and Showa *Tenno*.

We can see a similar connection in other cases. Since 1977, NLAPC has conducted the National Festival of Silviculture which *Kotaishi* (the Crown Prince) and *Kotaishihi* (the Crown Princess) attend every year. Most of the sites of that festival have been the places where the National Festival of Afforestation had been held before. In that same place, *Kotaishi* and *Kotaishihi* manure the trees *Tenno* and *Kogo* had planted before. In other words, the seedlings *Tenno* had planted before were inherited by 'the future *Tenno*' (*Kotaishi*) again at the same place (Nakashima, 1998). Such a continuity and repetition of the festivals at the same place made the connection between *Tenno* and nature stronger.

As suggested in two types memorial forests, *Meiji no mori* and *Showa no mori*, the history of Meiji and Showa has been fixed and reified in the forms of forests with the memories of *Tenno*. By enjoying the recreation at such forests, people have come into closer contact both with nature and nation.

Consuming nature: the forest for mass-recreation

Until the mid 1960's, the main purpose of National-Land Afforestation Campaign was to develop the forestry and to produce more productive forests. However since the late 1960's, an importance of the campaign has shifted from a development of the forestry to the nature preservation and the greening of cities (Nakashima, 1998). As described in the previous chapter, the forest produced through the National-Land Afforestation Campaign has also shifted its meanings and roles in accordance with the National-Land Afforestation Campaign. In short, such a shift can be described as a shift from the forest for production to the forest for consumption, or a shift from the economic forest to the non-economic forest.

Furthermore, such a shift included an expansion of the number of people who consumed the forest for recreation. Change of the National-Land Afforestation Campaign has led not only to a qualitative change but also to a quantitative change of the number of forests produced. Since the late 1960's, various forests have been produced all over the country (Figure 4). They pro-

vided, as well as the places for mass-recreation, the nature to be consumed by the nation. Nature is no longer a naively given environment, but an object constructed nationally. This chapter exemplifies such recreational forests as nationally constructed nature.

1. Shinrin Koen (Forest Park)

During the late 1960's ~ early 1970's eleven *Shinrin Koen* (Forest Park) were constructed by the Ministry of Construction and local governments. They were one national forest park and ten prefectural or municipal forest parks (Figure 4). Like '*Meiji no mori*', they were founded as part of the Meiji Centennial Memorial Projects. In its prospectus, the Ministry of Construction explains the aim of *Shinrin Koen* as follows:

> This project of the Meiji Centennial Memorial Forest Park aims to commemorate the Meiji centenary and, in addition, to recover the nature largely inside and around cities lacking in the nature and to construct the forest park to remain forever as a memory, in order to secure places where city dwellers losing the nature could revive the humanity through the '*midori*' (Prime Minister's Secretariat, 1969, p.305).

Here the forest is defined as 'places where city dwellers could revive their humanity through the *midori*.' However, what is the humanity to be revived? Why could the *midori* revive the humanity? Without any clear explanation, the forest or the *midori* was interpreted as a heal-all for a loss of the humanity. Meanings and values of nature are completely transformed from a forestry resource for the industrialization and the modernization to a cure for a loss of the humanity as a result of the industrialization and the modernization.

One national forest park is located at the *Musashi Hill* (Saitama Prefecture), the northern suburb of the Tokyo metropolitan area about 60 kilometers distant from the center of Tokyo. In deciding its location, an easy access from Tokyo within one hour through the *Kan-etsu* Expressway was considered as an advantage. 'Considering these issues, it (the *Musashi Hill*) would hold an advantageous location to be able to meet the demand for a one-day recreation' (Prime Minister's Secretariat, 1969, p.302, parenthesis mine). The

forests produced in this project of *Shinrin Koen* were no longer a natural nature located at the mountain, but an artificial nature located at the city suburb. In other words, what was needed for the forest is not a wild and raw nature remote from the city but a familiar and tamed nature easily accessible to the city.

What was needed for the forest is not only the role of healing. The prospectus above quoted clearly prescribed to build a memorial square which would symbolize the Meiji Centennial Memorial Park and to organize a monument, a flower garden, a fountain and a pond etc. in the memorial square so as to coordinate it with its surrounding landscape (Prime Minister's Secretariat, 1969, p.305). The forest park was needed both as the place of healing the loss of the humanity and as the place of memorizing the history of nation.

2. *Kokumin no mori* (Forest of the Nation)

Kokumin no mori was founded by the Forestry Agency as part of the Meiji Centennial Memorial Project. *Kokumin no mori* consist of eight national forests each in the jurisdiction of one of the Regional Forest Offices of Sapporo, Akita, Maebashi, Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, Kochi and Kumamoto (Figure 4). Most of those forests are located near a large city or a local city and endowed with advantageous traffic conditions. The Forestry Agency explains the aim of *Kokumin no mori* as follows:

> We aim to improve the national forest towards an excellent forest where a large number of the nation can enjoy its benefit forever, to preserve it so as to hand it down to posterity, to make the nation recognize an effect of the forest through a utilization of it, to promote the afforestation of national land and to spread the knowledge on the forestry, and to contribute to the beautification of the home country and the nourishment of love for it (*Kokudo Ryokka*, vol.2, no.2, p.16).

The management of the national forest had formerly focused on the development of the forestry. However, the project of *Kokumin no mori* introduced a recreational usage of the forest into the management of the national forest. For example, in the forest of each *Kokumin no mori*, five districts were arranged, (1) conservation area: to be preserved from tree-cutting and to be conserved with the present scenic beauty, (2) scenic area: to be controlled so as to maintain the scenic beauty of the forest, (3) special afforesting area: to be afforested as the memorial forest and the exhibition forest for spreading the knowledge on the forestry, (4) roadside area: to cut down and to plant trees for the use of the roads, (5) facility area: to construct recreational and scenic facilities (*Kokudo Ryokka*, vol.2, no.1, p.14). The items of the recreational facilities are the camp site, the skiing ground, the public square, the mountaineering route, the walking road, the parking lot, the nest box and so on. Thus the project of *Kokumin no mori* mainly focused on the recreational role of the national forest. Nature of the national forest was preserved as the place to be observed, touched and played by the nation. In other words, nature was preserved so as to be consumed by the nation.

3. *Kenmin no mori* (Prefectural Forest)

Kenmin no mori was also founded in memory of the Meiji Centennial by prefectural governments. During eight years starting from 1967, twenty *Kenmin no mori* were created all over the country.

However arrangements of the facilities were almost the same as that of *Kokumin no mori*: monument, visitors' center, public square, camp site, walking (cycling) road, exhibition forest and so on (*Kokudo Ryokka*, vol.5, 1970–vol.7, 1972). Most of them were constructed rather for the recreational use of the forest than for the development of the forestry.

While *Kokumin no mori* was supposed to be used by the nation, *Kenmin no mori* was supposed to be used by the inhabitants of each prefecture. Just like the state provided the nature for the nation, the prefectural governments provided it for the inhabitants, and the municipal government did as well. In fact, a large number of municipal forests were founded by local governments after *Kenmin no mori*. They were for example, *Shimin no mori* (Citizens' Forest), *Chomin no mori* (Townsfolks' Forest), *Sonmin no mori* (Villagers' Forest). From the state to the village, each scale of government produced its own nature and provided it for each scale of inhabitants. *Kokumin no mori* for the nation, *Kenmin no mori* for the

inhabitants of prefecture, *Shimin no mori* for the citizen, *Chomin no mori* for the townsfolk, *Son-min no mori* for the villager. Production of the forest was always accompanied by the inhabitant's identity. Who could consume the forest? Who could enjoy the benefit of the forest? And whose nature is it? The production of *Kenmin no mori* implicates such questions.

Furthermore, the forest has been no longer a given natural resource, but a social resource produced and provided by the state and local governments, as well as water supply, electric power, gas supply, roads, school, hospital and so on. Those social resources enable the inhabitants to live healthy, comfortable and convenient lives. The forest was also incorporated into such social resources with people could live a healthy and recreational lives, and thus 'revive the humanity,' the humanity of the nation of sound body and mind.

National event and the 'network of sacred forest'

Since the late 1960's, as described above, various forests have been produced all over the country. Those forests were not only used for the recreational purpose, but also appropriated for the place of a national event. Table 5 shows the history of the National Festival of Afforestation since the 1970's. Since the 1980's most of the festivals have been held at *Shinrin Koen* or *Kenmin no mori* and other public forests. Before the 1970's, most of the festivals were held at a mountain or a hill not particularly prepared. However, as the various public forests were produced all over the country, the National Festival of Afforestation come to be held at such a public forest.

Table 5   The National Festival of Afforestation since the 1970's

No.	Year	Prefecture	Theme	Remarks
21	1970	Fukushima	Forest of the successor	
22	1971	Shimane	Multipurpose development of the forest and the environmental afforestation	
23	1972	Niigata	Preservation of the prefectural land, Creation of the greener environment	
24	1973	Miyazaki	Protection and creation of the nature	
25	1974	Iwate	Creation of the affluent *midori* harmonizing the nature with the industry	*Kenmin no mori* (Prefectural Forest)
26	1975	Shiga	Creation of the home country full of the *midori* and the water	
27	1976	Ibaraki	Raise the nature, Protect the land	
28	1977	Wakayama	Raise the green home country all together	
29	1978	Kochi	Creation of the home country and prevention of the disasters by the *midori*	*Shinrin koen* (Forest Park)
30	1979	Aichi	Connect the village and the city through the *midori*	
31	1980	Mie	The *midori* and the sun, affluent livelihood	*Kenmin no mori* (Prefectural Forest)
32	1981	Nara	Construction of the city in which the cul-tural heritages are protected by the *midori*	
33	1982	Tochigi	The *midori* to be planted, to be raised and to be protected	*Kenmin no mori* (Prefectural Forest)
34	1983	Ishikawa	Protect and raise the tiny *midori*, and affluent home country	*Shinrin koen* (Forest Park)
35	1984	Kagoshima	Let's inherit the shinning *midori* towards 21st century	Forest of the natural education

36	1985	Kumamoto	Diffuse the *midori* culture	Everybody's Forest
37	1986	Osaka	Trust the future of the city to the *midori*	Daisen Park
38	1987	Saga	Let's enhance the power of the *midori*	Ureshino Sports Park
39	1988	Kagawa	Now, the intercourse between the human and the *midori*	*Shinrin koen* (Forest Park)
40	1989	Tokushima	The *midori* of the relaxation, to the future	*Shinrin koen* (Forest Park)
41	1990	Nagasaki	The affluent *midori*, it's the energy for tomorrow	*Shinrin koen* (Forest Park)
42	1991	Kyoto	Fill the earth's future with the *midori*	Prefectural forest for the intercourse
43	1992	Fukuoka	We like this town and this *midori*	
44	1993	Okinawa	Let's raise the *midori* of the earth and the affluent future	*Shinrin koen* (Forest Park)
45	1994	Hyogo	Affluent mind with the *midori* of the forest	Forest of the intercourse with nature
46	1995	Hiroshima	Creation of the forest which we can see the peace from the universe	Central Forest Park
47	1996	Tokyo	Livelihood the forest supports, *Midori* the city raise	Metropolitan Forest, Marine Park, reclaimed land

Source : Kokudo Ryokka Suishin Kikou (1990), Tokyo Metropolitan Government (1996)

The main event of the National Festival of Afforestation is '*Oteue*' (hand-planting) by *Tenno* and *Kogo*. The trees they had planted were carefully raised and protected, and the area centering around those trees were marked with monument and fences (see Figure 5). Thus the public forests have been endowed with the sacred hallmark by the National Festival of Afforestation. It is no longer an ordinary forest but a sacred forest.

Furthermore those sacred forest has been marked with '*Oteire*' (manuring) by *Kotaishi* (the Crown Prince) and *Kotaishihi* (the Crown Princess) in the National Festival of Silviculture. As noted in the previous chapter, most of the sites of the National Festival of Silviculture were the same places with those of the National Festival of Afforestation (Table 6). In that festival, the forest has been endowed with the sacred hallmark again by *Kotaishi* and *Kotaishihi*.

Table 6   The National Festival of Silviculture since 1977

No	Year	Prefecture	Theme	Remarks
1	1977	Oita	Creation of the home country full of the *midori*	Site of the 9th National Festival of Afforestation in 1958
2	1978	Akita	Let's create the green home country by way of silviculture	Site of the 19th National Festival of Afforestation in 1968
3	1979	Fukuoka	Let's raise the home country full of the *midori* and the water	*Kenmin no mori* (Prefectural Forest)
4	1980	Fukui	Let's create the affluent future by the *midori*	Site of the 13th National Festival of Afforestation in 1962
5	1981	Niigata	Let's raise the *midori*, the human and the affluent mind	Site of the 23rd National Festival of Afforestation in 1972, Prefectural Forest of the Youth
6	1982	Nagano	Let's diffuse the *midori* raised by an affluent mind	Site of the 15th National Festival of Afforestation in 1964

7	1983	Toyama	Bright future in the *midori* to be raised	Site of the 20th National Festival of Afforestation in 1969, Prefectural Park
8	1984	Iwate	Power to the *midori*, Dream to the future	Site of the 25th National Festival of Afforestation in 1974, *Kenmin no mori* (Prefectural Forest)
9	1985	Chiba	Let's enlarge the circle of love to raise the *midori*	Site of the 4th National Festival of Afforestation in 1953
10	1986	Miyazaki	Let's raise the affluent forest and the culture of the wood	Site of the 24th National Festival of Afforestation in 1973
11	1987	Hokkaido	Creation of the forest by connecting the planted dreams	Site of the 12th National Festival of Afforestation in 1961, *Shinrin Koen* (Forest Park)
12	1988	Yamagata	Power and dream to the home country by way of silviculture	Site of the 11th National Festival of Afforestation in 1960, *Kenmin no mori* (Prefectural Forest)
13	1989	Ibaraki	May a breath of *midori* reach to the future	Site of the 27th National Festival of Afforestation in 1976, *Ikoi no mori* (Forest of relaxation)
14	1990	Yamana-shi	Let's raise the affluent *midori* to be connected to the future	Site of the 1st National Festival of Afforestation in 1950
15	1991	Shimane	May the circle of the silviculture develop to the world	Site of the 22nd National Festival of Afforestation in 1971
16	1992	Kochi	The home country is a place of departure for the *midori* of the earth	
17	1993	Mie	The affluent *midori* which brings the grace and the gentleness	Site of the 31st National Festival of Afforestation in 1980, *Kenmin no mori* (Prefectural Forest)
18	1994	Ishikawa	Have an affluent tomorrow by raising the *midori* hand in hand	Site of the 34th National Festival of Afforestation in 1983, *Shinrin Koen* (Forest Park)
19	1995	Shiga	The shinning water and the affluent *midori* in the home country	Site of the 26th National Festival of Afforestation in 1975, *Kenmin no mori* (Prefectural Forest)

Source : Kokudo Ryokka Suishin Kikou (1990), *'Kokudo Ryokka'* vol.27 (1991)~32 (1996)

As shown in Table 5 and 6, the word *'midori'* has always been used in the themes of both festivals. 'Home country full of the *midori*,' 'the affluent *midori*,' 'raise the *midori*.' The meanings of the *'midori'* are various: for example the nature itself, the trees or the color of green. But the word has been consistently used in the themes. The word *'midori'* has been connected to the National Festival of Afforestation, the National Festival of Silviculture and *Tenno* who is an essential hero of the festival.

The public forest produced since the late 1960's was not just a social resource to be consumed by the citizen, but also the stage where national event was conducted and the hero *Tenno* obtained an identity of *'midori.'* Therefore those forests have been distinguished from other ordinary forests and preserved as valuable and precious nature.

Production of the public forests like *Shinrin Koen* or *Kenmin no mori* all over the country did not only provide nature as an object of recreational practices, but also organized the 'network of sacred forests' (Ooiwa, 1993) where the hallmark of *Tenno* was engraved all over the countryland.

Japanese political scientist Sakamoto (1989) defines, as well as the National Athletic Meet, the National Festival of Afforestation as 'a circulating-type of event system' which could periodically objectify the legitimacy of the symbolic *Tenno* system. That is to say, various public forests are interpreted as 'the constructed stages where an integration of the nation could be expressed' (Sakamoto, 1989, p.262). The nation and nature are inseparably intertwined each other through the production of forests.

Epilogue

In the summer of 1997, I had an opportunity to observe the 39th Natural Park Festival at Handa Plateau in Oita Prefecture. That festival is held every year at national parks or seminational parks in each prefecture[7]. On one day of July, I could attend that festival as one of the spectator (even the spectator could not attend without the invitation letter!). The place of the festival was located in the midst of Aso-Kuju National Park, and surrounded with beautiful grasslands and forests. Going through the gate with the slogan 'Can you

see the heart of nature?,' I saw a large crowd of people waiting the opening of the festival. Soon a black painted high-class car entered into the meeting place with an excited announcement 'Here comes the Prince and Princess Hitachi!' Then bustle and confusion occurred in the crowds. Most of the spectators stood up and cried the name of the Prince and Princess Hitachi with waves of their hand. Women standing beside me talked with each other excitedly 'Did you look at Princess Hitachi? She's so beautiful!' They looked so excited and delightful. Then I became aware that the real hero and heroin of this festival were Prince and Princess Hitachi. They did nothing other than offering their congratulations in the ceremony. However their existence enabled a transformation of the crowd's experiences in the green nature from a local and private one to a national and public one.

Most of the forests examined in this paper were produced during the late 1960's and the early 1970's. It has already been two or three decades ago. Even now, however, a subtle connection between nature and the nation is still continuing in each forest all over the country. And such a connection evolves in the more non-political and innocent modes of representation. Certainly nature itself does not have any political or nationalistic roles. However when nature was represented through a campaign or a movement like the National-Land Afforestation Campaign, it would carry a national implication.

When we say 'Let's preserve the *midori*,' the meanings a word *midori* connotes are manifold. As suggested in prologue, the *midori* is manifested in both of the discourses of the leftist and the rightist. What the *midori* means depends on the structure of the place where the *midori* is represented, and on the position of subjects who talk about the *midori*. We have examined such structure (of the forest) and position (of the NLAPC and other governments) in this paper. Those structure and position are ones of the hegemonic place and subject in contemporary Japan. However those place and subject have also been contested by other places and subjects which have different structures and positions from those of hegemonic ones. Protest or opposition movements against the National Festival of Afforestation at Okinawa (in 1993) and Fukuoka (in 1992) suggest potentials for 'other natures' which has been

excluded from the 'Nature' for the nation.

'Empty center' Barthes (1982) called is not limited to the place of *Kokyo*. It also suggests the place of the forests all over the country which are both the neutral resources for recreational practices and the imaginary places where a symbol of the nation is objectified into the concrete form of nature. Because of its appearance of neutrality and purity, nature has not been critically considered. Perhaps, as well as 'empty center,' nature itself does not irradiate any power, but gives to the nation an invisible and empty centrality around which they are obliged to turn forever.

It is necessary for us to examine what we Japanese have left unreflected in the depth of nature since 1945.

Notes

1) Though Barthes (1970) described *Kokyo* as 'demeure masquee sous la verdure', in its English edition (Barthes, 1982), the word 'la verdure' is translated as 'foliage', and the nuance of 'green' has been erased.

2) Public name of Ueno park is 'Ueno-onshi-koen' (Ueno Imperial grant park) which was once the Imperial estate and bestowed on Tokyo-city in 1924. '*Shizen Kyoikuen*' was also the Imperial estate and bestowed on the Ministry of Education in 1949.

3) This public opinion poll was conducted in January 1994 by the Prime Minister's Office. Three thousand of people over 20 years old were randomly sampled, and the rate of effective responses was 69.4 percent.

4) Meiji Memorial Hall, now used as a wedding hall, formerly was the place where Emperor had an audience with a foreign envoy, and where the Meiji Constitution was deliberated.

5) Forest planning of *Meiji-jingu* the Committee for Enshrining proposed was succeeded by the Department of Construction of *Meiji-jingu* in the Ministry of Domestic Affairs, and the latter changed the kinds of trees to be planted.

6) This document was written by Takanori Hongo, a technical expert of the Department of Construction of *Meiji-jingu*, dated 20 October 1921. However I could not find this original document, and quoted its contents from Meiji-jingu keidai sogochosa iinkai (1980, pp.8-9).

7) The Natural Park Festival is a central event of the

'living with nature' campaign advocated by the Environment Agency (Prime Minister's Office). The festival consists of the ceremony, camp fire and the field recreation. The Crown Prince and Crown Princess attend this festival every five years and Prince and Princess Hitachi attend other years.

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Development Policies and Spatial Integration in Japan from 1868 to 1941[*]

Toshio MIZUUCHI[**]

I. Introduction

This study tries to clarify the reasons for the successful progress of Japanese modernization after the Meiji Restoration of 1868 and the swift achievement of an economic and geopolitical advantage over the other Asian countries. From several reasons, the author proposes that the proper execution of development policies, which facilitated the flow of transportation and communication, might be the key factor in the successful modernization of Japan (Mizuuchi, 1994). From a geographical viewpoint, this mechanism can be illustrated by analogy to the logic of spatial integration. This spatial mechanism of modernization has attracted little attention from historians, economists and political scientists. Therefore, the concept of spatial integration should be more thoroughly explored as the ideological motivation to promoting the modern development of Japan.

In examining development policies historically, the following five policies should be considered for this geographical ideology of spatial integration: 1) the policy of river and flood control and water resource management, 2) the policy of road construction and maintenance, 3) the policy of harbor construction and maintenance, 4) the policy of railway construction, and 5) the

policy of city and regional planning. As Lefebvre (1990) showed, space acquires its existence as a concrete abstraction when it becomes the bundle and cluster of networks and paths, so that spatial integration corresponds to the socio-spatial process of eliminating time conflicts of movement between two places by the construction of modes of rapid and mass transportation and communication (Mizuuoka, 1992). In other words, the geographical ideology legitimizes the efficient and balanced investment of capital toward the construction and maintenance of infrastructure, the efficient networking of the flows of peoples and goods and the equal provision of services. Such an ideology plays a crucial role in achieving the homogeneous equity of the spatially integrated nation-state.

From this viewpoint of spatial integration, the above policies 2), 3), and 4) are particularly worthy to note since they were pursued by the leadership of the central government in the early period of the Meiji Era by establishing long-term construction and maintenance plans. If we follow the conventional academic understanding of the development policies in Japan, the first planned development policy was generally thought to be the postwar national comprehensive development plan established at the beginning of the 1950's (Kawashima and Kamozawa, 1988). Instead, the author would like to propose a new understanding of the advent of planned development policies in Japan. Such work had already started at the beginning of the 1910's, and this highlighted the planning principle in elucidating the actual contents of each development policy. In the analysis of spatial integration, different principles can be found in the decision-making processes of development policies. The following two principles

** Department of Geography, Osaka City University,
mizuuchi@lit.osaka-cu.ac.jp

were especially influential: that of pursuing economic rationality and that of making much use of political interest, which was mainly derived from political parties, central government technocrats, military authorities and local politicians (Ariizumi, 1980). The phrase 'Gaden Intetsu' (pursuing one's own interest by forcibly introducing a railroad forcibly in one's locality) is often used when we talk about the selfish manner of local politicians. However, few studies have been conducted to provide a comprehensive picture of the Japanese development policy in the prewar days.

Regarding the specific form of modernization in Japan, the policy of river and flood control and water resource management was at the center of the development policies. Even if this policy did not directly contribute to spatial integration, it was inevitable for the central government to maintain inter-regional networks and communication. Unfortunately, the current geographical studies from a political economy approach have not paid little attention to development policies such as flood control and disaster relief works, probably because such natural disaster is so common in monsoon-stricken Asia. In spite of this academic neglect, development policy is a very important issue in the study of nation-state building; it must be examined to clarify the operating mechanism of the policy that was so effective in legitimizing central government intervention and winning the public loyalty to the nation-state of Japan.

II. The transition of capital formation and government investment

Generally, capital formation indicates the degree to which public and private sectors individually invest money in the construction and equipment of various infrastructures. By using the estimation of capital formation (Emi, 1974), government investment in pursuing development policies can be calculated. The following figures illustrate the historical transition of capital formation in both the public and private sectors for the purposes that are directly related to the outcomes of development policies. Using several line graphs to illustrate the trend of capital formation by the central government, local government and private sector, the author points out the general characteristics and individual features of these

transitions.

Each figure shows investment shares calculated as five-year running averages. Figures 1 and 2 show the strength of the government's role in investment to the total built environment in Japan. The values of the government share as an indicator of state intervention act differently between construction and equipment investment. In the case of construction, as shown in Figure 1, investment for military use is generally very small in the three small rises of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, and the Second World War. Government investment in the non-military sector is characterized with two phase of swellings: the first one is seen after the Russo-Japanese War in the late 1900's and the beginning of the 1910's, and the second one is observed in the 1930's. Both periods are very crucial to understanding the timing of and reasons for the different types of state intervention.

The first phase clearly reflects a shift in the domestic policy of the central government. In particular, the Ministry of Home Affairs took the initiative in this political shift from promoting the policies of manufacturing industries at the beginning of the Meiji Era to promoting investment in infrastructure (Nakamura, 1998). After the Russo-Japanese War, this ministry launched the so-called 'Reform Movement of the Province' to heighten the loyalty of the ordinary people who were distressed by the economic depression and the failure of a total victory in the war. This movement provided both a heightening of the moral of the people and the introduction of public works projects. This series of public works projects was characterized by long-term plans for river and flood control, harbor construction, and networking the national railway.

The second phase of the government share's swelling in the 1930's is assumed to be typical state intervention to regulating the effects of economic depression by making huge investments in public works. At the beginning of the 1930's, the Relief Works for the Unemployed, as well as the Current Relief Works for Regional Rehabilitation started mainly as road construction and repair(See Table 1). These projects developed the strict policy of direct responsibility of the central government in implementing public works and produced the system of fixed subsidy rates according to each public work.

Figure 2 illustrates the same trend, but the military share acts much more dynamically in the case of equipment investment than in that of construction. It is also noted that a significant increase in the share of private sector at the turn of the 1910's to 20's is very clear. At this moment, the Japanese economy had given the industrial concerns the confidence to compete with the Western powers. This domination of private power in the Japanese economy caused government intervention to widen in the following two ways: the policy of controlling industrial activities and that of promoting local infrastructures.

Let us now discuss capital formation by the central government, local government and private sector. Figure 3 shows the transition of shares of construction investment by the central government. After the Nationalization of Private Railways Law of 1906, nearly half of the central government investment was thrown into railway construction (transportation) during the 1910's and 20's. This value vividly shows that the priority of infrastructure policies is firmly set on swift construction of the national railway network. The share of public works has two peaks at the beginning of 1910's and at the middle of the 1930's. These peaks individually reflect the two intervention phases of the central government.

Examining in detail the types of the public works investments, Figure 4 shows the degree of the central government's responsibility for the provision of each infrastructure. The share of riparian, which means investments in river and flood control dominates from half to two-thirds of the total investment in public works, with two peaks

and a gradual decrease during the 1920's and the last half of the 1930's, respectively. As mentioned, river and flood control in important in the Monsoon climate of Japan. Therefore, the central government most swiftly acted to take up river and flood control works as a national project by the enforcement of a related act at the end of 1890's. The first peak of the riparian share reflects the enforcement of this act. The second peak coincides with the establishment of the long-term plan of river and flood control projects at the beginning of 1910's.

The share of harbor construction is stable in its transition around twenty percent with two small increases in the 1900's and at the beginning of the 1930's. Modern-style harbor construction started with the rivalry between the cities of Kobe, Yokohama and Osaka, and the central government took the initiative by the introduction of a system of prioritized major harbor construction in 1907. This system was revised in 1922 to allow construction of harbors in outlying areas with the aid of the central government, which is clearly shown by the increased share in Figure 4.

The transition of the share of road and bridges is characterized by one significant increase in the 1930's. The importance of road construction was recognized very late by the central government, whose stress on national networks of transportation was for a long time concentrated on the construction of railway. This increase corresponds to the start of the construction of a national highway network under the direct supervision of the central government, partly owing to the ongoing relief works for the unemployed in the 1930's.

**Figure 1. Shares of Domestic Capital Formation:
Construction Investment by Government and Private Sector**
Source: See Emi (1971).

Figure 2. Shares of Gross Capital Formation:
**Equipment Investment by Government and Private Sector**

Figure 3. Shares of Central Government Construction
**Investment**

Figure 4. Shares of Central Government Public Works
Construction Invetment

In Figure 3, investments in rehabilitation works for natural disasters greatly fluctuated, especially in the late 1920's. This simply reflects the huge rehabilitation works after the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923. In the latter half of the 1930's, each share of investments by construction type nearly converged, and the share of military investment grew rapidly. This equalization of the investment activity among each infrastructure in the hands of the central government indicates reaching point of the prewar national domestic policy providing infrastructure along the line of state monopolistic capitalism. It should also be noted that the central government was accustomed to heavily intervening in the provision of infrastructure nationwide, and its manner of administration persisted in the postwar regional development policy.

Let us now focus on local government. Figure 5 shows the simple tendency of the share of each type of infrastructure investment. Including government, the "Building" item mostly involves school house construction. The "Transportation and Public Utilities" item indicates the management of streetcars, buses, retail suppliers of electricity and gas, etc. The increase in the share of transportation and public utilities in the latter half of the 1910's reflects the adoption of this type of public service by metropolitan governments (Mizuuchi, 1991). Sixty to eighty percent of the total investment by local government is in public works. Although the fluctuation progresses along with that of the central government, each share of public works investment by local government is completely different from the case of the central government. The decreasing share of riparian works for river and flood control indicates the increasing responsibility of the central government in this area. On the other hand, the share of roads and bridges gradually increased to two-thirds of the total public works by local government. Among the infrastructures, construction of roads was placed as the last priority in the public works strategy of the central government, and all roads except national highways continued to be handled by local government. The gradual increase of this share corresponded to the ongoing city planning projects and promotion of intra-city highway networks by prefectural governments. The water works share increased in the 1920's and at the beginning of the 1930's. This service

was fully adopted by almost every municipality, each of which is qualified as a healthy workable city to gain the people's loyalty to the municipal government.

Lastly, let us examine the case of the private sector. Figure 7 illustrates the fluctuating transition of each infrastructure. It is worth noting that investment in the production of electric power is left as the last large-scaled infrastructure free from central government intervention. After the enforcement of the Nationalization of Private Railway Law, large investments in the construction of private railways were switched to the attractive potential of hydro-power stations. A huge amount of money was invested in the construction of power stations, so its share rapidly grew to forty percent. It also increased the inefficient competition between private companies, which led the central government to take control of this industry at the end of the 1930's.

III. The history of development policies in the prewar days

Table 1 shows the history of the five development policies and lists the events and legislation related to these policies. As early as 1873, the ordinance on the maintenance of rivers, bridges, roads and harbors was implemented. This implementation amounted to the central government declaring its authority in such maintenance. However, it did not operate with effective financial and technical support. Rather, the slogan of 'shokusan kogyo' (promoting and introducing industries) actually meant the central government's initiative to introduce manufacturing factories and mines through the hand of the Ministry of Industries. This policy soon failed at the beginning of the 1880's after the dissolution of this ministry because of the lack of entrepreneurship by the public sector and the economic depression of 1883 (Sakano, 1996). The first railway construction between Tokyo and Yokohama in 1872 was also a kind of propaganda play to show national pride in joining civilized society.

We should give more attention to the legislation of the Law for River and Flood Control of 1896 and the Law for Erosion and Sediment Control of 1897 (Nishikawa, 1969). These two laws had been implemented to meet the strong demands of the local governments that had to invest great amounts of money in improving river.

Figure 5 Shares of Local Government Construction Investment

Figure 6 Shares of Local Government Public Works Construction Investment

Figure 7 Shares of Gross Private Fixed Capital Formation

Table 1. Chronology on Public Works Policies in Japan 1872-1941

	River and Flood Control / Water Resources Development	Roads	Harbors	Railways (Transportation)	City and Regional Planning
In charge of	Min. of Home Affairs / Min. of Posts and Tele-communications	Min. of Home Affairs	Min. of Home Affairs	Min. of Railways / Min. of Home Affairs / Min. of Posts and Tele-communications	Min. of Home Affairs
1872		Road Sanitation Ordinance			
1873	Improvement and Maintenance of River, Harbor and Road Ordinance		Improvement and Maintenance of River, Harbor and Road Ordinance		
1885				Establishment of Cabinet bureau of Railways	
1888					Tokyo Urban Improvement Ordinance
1890				Street Railways Ordinance	
1891				Strategy for Railways Construction	
1892	Conference of Public Works	Conference of Public Works	Conference of Public Works	Railway Construction Law / Conference of Railway Construction	
1896	River and Flood Control Law				
1897	Erosion and Sediment Control Law				
1898					
1900				Private Railways Law / Railway Business Law	
1906				Nationalization of Private Railways Law	
1907			Council for Harbor Construction / System of Prioritized Major Harbors Construction		
1908				Establishment of Agency of Railways	
1909		Council for Road Improvement			
1910	Special Council For River and Flood Control / The First Plan of River and Flood Control			Narrow Gauge Railways Law	

Year					
1918					Council for City Planning
1919		Roads Improvement Law / Council for Road Improvement / Local Railways Construction Law		Local Railways Construction Law	City Planning Law / Urban Building Standard Law
1920		The First Plan for Road Improvement		Establishment of Min. of Railways	
1921	Law For Reclamation of Publicly Owned Water Surface / The Second Special Council for River and Flood Control / The Second Plan of River and Flood Control	Street Railways Law / Subsidy System for Road Improvement	Law For Reclamation of Publicly Owned Water Surface	Street Railways Law	
1922			System of Prioritzed Local Harbors Construction	Revised Law for Railway Construction	
1923					Establishment of Agency for Imperial Tokyo Rehabilitation
1924					
1925			Special Council for Harbor Construction		Establishment of Semi-governmental Housing Corporation
1926		Plan for Local Highway Network			
1927					Sub-standard Housing Reform Law
1930					
1931	Relief Work for the Unemployed	Relief Work for the Unemployed / Law for Automobile Transportation Business	Relief Work for the Unemployed		Relief Work for the Unemployed
1932	Current Relief Work for the Regional Rehabilitation / Subsidy System for the Local River Improvement	Current Relief Work for the Regional Rehabilitation / Five Years Plan of Road Improvement for the Promotion of Industries	Current Relief Work for the Regional Rehabilitation / Subsidy System for the Local Harbor Improvement		
1933	Conference of Public Works / The Third Plan of River and Flood Control	Conference of Public Works / The Second Plan for Road Improvement	Conference of Public Works		
1934	River and Flood Control Law Revised				
1937	Research Council For Water Resource Utilization	Five Years Plan of Road Improvement for the Progress of Industries			Air Defense Law
1938	Law for Electric Power Control / National Electric Power and Distribution Company Law			Law for Regulation of Land Transportation Companies	
1939		Plan for Road Pavement		Research Commission of the Trunk Railways Construction	Industrial New Town Planning Project
1940					City Planning Law Revised
1941				Imperial Tokyo Rapid Transit Authority Law	Housing Corporation Law

Source: See Nihon Doboku Gakkai (1973).

1		Sapporo
2		Otaru
3	Hokkaido	Hakodate
4		Asahikawa
5		Kushiro
6		Aomori
7	Pacific Sea	Morioka
8		Sendai
9	Tohoku	Fukushima
10		Akita
11	Japan Sea	Yamagata
12		Tsuruoka
13		Mito
14		Utsunomiya
15		Maebashi
16	Kanto	Takasaki
17		Chiba
18		Tokyo
19		Yokohama
20		Niigata
21		Takada
22	Hokuriku	Toyama
23		Kanazawa
24		Fukui
25		Kofu
26	Mountainou	Nagano
27		Matsumoto
28	Chubu	Gifu
29	Tokaido	Shizuoka
30		Nagoya
31		Tsu
32		Otsu
33		Kyoto
34	Kinki	Osaka
35		Kobe
36		Nara
37		Wakayama
38		Tottori
39	San-in	Yonago
40		Matsue
41		Okayama
42	San-yo	Hiroshima
43		Shimonoseki
44		Yamaguchi
45		Tokushima
46	Shikoku	Takamatsu
47		Matsuyama
48		Kochi
49		Fukuoka
50		Moji
51		Saga
52	Kyushu	Nagasaki
53		Kumamoto
54		Oita
55		Miyazaki
56		Kagoshima
57	Okinawa	Naha

Annotations within figure: Nationalization of Private Railway Law; Revised Law for Railway Construction; Railway Construction Law; Taisho Era; Showa Era

Figure 8 Years of railway opening and connection to Tokyo for major cities

Note: The left side column of '/' indicates the opening year of railways, and that of '*' indicates connection year to Tokyo.

Therefore, the Ministry of Home Affairs, for the first time, directly engaged in improving rivers and selected fourteen major rivers as targets of urgent improvement. It should also be noted that the national railway network and the term of its completion were determined by the stipulations of the Law for Railway Construction of 1892 (Un-yu keizai kenkyu center, 1988). Due to the lack of national government funds for the construction of railways, private companies could be allowed to participate in such construction. An epoch-making policy for the railway issue was the promulgation of the Law for Nationalization of Private Railways in 1906, and through the enforcement of this law, most privately owned railways were swiftly bought by the central government within two years between 1906 and 1907. There were a lot of discussions about the merits and demerits of this nationalization. However, most influential was the requirement from the military authority, who had experienced administration of mass transportation in emergency situations during both the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars. New efficient systems of direct transportation and unified traffic fares were introduced. In addition, the independent Agency for Railways was established in 1908, which was later promoted to the Ministry of Railways in 1920. The spatial integration by the construction of the national railway network was thus strengthened through legislation and projects.

Figure 8 shows the diffusion of the railway to the major cities and plots the opening year of railway operation and the year of railway connection to the capital city of Tokyo. Before the enforcement of the Railway Construction Law of 1892, the Tokaido and Tohoku rail lines were already completed. Soon after the enforcement of this law, the Tokaido line was extended toward to the westernmost city of Honshu Island, Shimonoseki. The Shin-etsu line, which already connected the North Kanto district with Tokyo via Takasaki, was extended to the Japan Sea area of the Hokuriku district through the mountainous central Japan area of Nagano Prefecture. Before the Taisho Era (1912-1926), every prefectural capital except Naha in Okinawa benefited from railway service.

In the post-Russo-Japanese War days in the beginning of the 1910's, significant changes in the political and social arenas had occurred. It was also the period in which the central government decided to substantially intervene in the development of the national land. In addition to the nationalization of private railways, two new policies appeared with the presentation of the long-term plans by newly established councils, one for river and flood control and the other for harbor construction, that were authorized by the central government. The Council for River and Flood Control was founded in 1910 and the Council for Harbor Construction was founded in 1907. The former council's first plan was to improve twenty major rivers within twenty years through a project in the hands of the Ministry of Home Affairs. The Council for Harbor Construction had selected four major ports (Kobe, Yokohama, Tsuruga and Moji-Shimonoseki) as targets of direct construction of the Ministry of Home Affairs as well as 37 major local ports to be handled by local governments with central government subsidies (Un-yusho kowankyoku, 1951). The remaining provincial ports were left as the local government's responsibility. This selection decided the priority of port construction and ensured the intensification of the nodal ports of import, export and domestic inland transportation.

The great socio-economic transformation appeared during the boom in the First World War. In this period, the central government, for the first time, established road construction policy and city planning on its own initiative (Nihon doro kyokai, 1977). The establishment of this road policy had been sought as early as the late 1890's in the preparation for a road construction law. In 1919, this law was at last promulgated. It classified all the major roads into national and prefectural ones and decided who financed their construction. A series of ordinances regarding road construction determined the technical standards of street construction which brought about the advent of a modern-style street system. In the same year of 1919, the City Planning Law was also enforced. Intra-city construction in the urbanized areas was authorized by the prefectural governments under the guidance of the Ministry of Home Affairs. The second river and flood control plan was also established in 1921 to start the improvement of another fifty major rivers within the next ten years. Major local ports whose construction was authorized by the subsidy of the central government also began construction in 1922. Owing to the law for railway construction, the trunk lines of the national railway were nearly completed. In addition, the ruling political party of Seiyu-kai

took the initiative in revising the railway construction law in 1922 in order to introduce the national railway into local provincial regions.

In the implementation of a series of the development policies in the 1920's, long-term plans were successively established to strengthen traffic networks, ensure transportation flows and preserve land. The construction of the national railway, the improvement of the major rivers and the construction of the four major harbors were directly supervised by the central government. Nevertheless, most projects related to these development policies were in the hands of local governments. The progress of these works was irregular since the amount and the rate of subsidy from the central government were not fixed except for disaster relief works. The Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923 and the prolonged economic recession in the 1920's urged the decision of the central government to implement several public works with financial aid at a definite rate of subsidy. In addition, this earthquake also produced the group of technocrats who could perform several urban public works through their experience in the rehabilitation projects following the disaster of the Great Kanto Earthquake (Ishida, 1987).

Under these circumstances at the beginning of the 1930's, relief works for the unemployed started to be utilized in 1931 for several public works such as road improvement in local regions with aid at the definite rate of subsidy. The dominant political parties of 'Seiyu-kai' and 'Minsei-to' took full advantage of this subsidy system to fulfill their regional interests in attracting local electorates (Mitani, 1967). Therefore, the presentation of by the ruling party the plan for public works was very influential in the domestic political arena of the 1930's. At the same time, a negative tendency began to arise as the basic principle of public works policy was turning away from rational political decision-making when the new cabinet took power from the former ruling party.

In the face of the evil of party politics and the war crisis between Japan and China after the "independence" of Manchuria in 1932, there was desire for a more powerful organization to regulate and promote public works in a more rational manner. In 1933, the Council of Public Works was established in order to develop another ten-year plan for river and flood control, harbor construction and road maintenance and construction. Through this successful council meeting, public works were effectively regulated and standardized at a fixed rate of subsidy.

After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the central government decided to introduce the regulatory system for rationalizing economy and to select important public works to be carried out intensively. For example, the Comprehensive Regional Plan for the Tohoku Region was established to combine flood control, the production of hydro-electric power and the introduction of manufacturing industries. The Newly Industrial Town Planning Projects (1939) were also noted in its pioneering works on new town construction. The central government, which became free from party politics in the wartime, also decided to regulate electric power and distribution companies and local private transportation companies. Along the lines of this economic regulative regime, semi-governmental bodies such as the Housing Corporation (1941), the Imperial Tokyo Rapid Transit Authority (1941) and the National Electric Power and Distribution Company (1938) were established as a result of the central government intervention.

IV. Summary

This analysis draws a very rough sketch of the history and political background of government intervention in the provision of infrastructure. It is necessary here to reconsider the features of Japanese state intervention in prewar days. In this paper, state intervention is discussed with reference to each development policy and described by analogy to spatial integration through the networking and efficient location and balanced investment of many types of infrastructures. These types of infrastructures can be redefined as social overhead capital or built environment, which serves the smooth capitalistic accumulation and reproduction of labor power.

In the discussion of state intervention in geographical studies, it is very easy to remember the theoretical discussion of the two circuit model of capital accumulation and the related role of the state in this mechanism by the guidance of David Harvey's work (Harvey, 1985), and that of Derek Gregory's (1994) 'eye of power', which is the phrase he used to illustrate the colonization process of everyday life by the state and the economy.

At this juncture, the author has to state his difference with Harvey's conceptualization of

state intervention. It is necessary to realize that the state building of modern Japan was strongly characterized by a development-oriented policy, or more correctly, a catch-up-oriented policy by the strong initiative of talented and well-organized technocrats in the central government. Kent Calder (1988) calls this exact state profit-distributive, which is a condition that permits the equal distribution of profits satisfying both regional and socially stratified demands. Chalmers Johnson (1982) also discusses the characteristic of Japanese developmental state intervention as being motivated more by the nationalist catch-up ideology than by economic reason.

Yujiro Hayami (1995) explains that this type of state intervention is rooted in the ideology of developmentalism, which cannot coexist with marketism. This developmentalism is realized by the comprehensive public strategy of catching up with the Western countries by making large-scale public investments in infrastructure that can serve the construction of industrial capabilities. Thus, the concept of spatial integration, which guarantees the legitimacy of public investment by the central government, seems to be a mirror of the moralistic desire by the Japanese people for national development. This type of state with a strong belief in the developmentalism should be considered very differently from the regulative state that Harvey based his work (Suehiro, 1998).

Japanese political scientists assert that in the modernization process of Japan since the Meiji Restoration the central government established an abstract but rigid state purpose, which has been commonly shared in this relatively long period. Takashi Itoh (1993) calls it Kokuze (state ideological slogan) to become a Western advanced country. Takashi Mikuriya (1996) examined this type of state purpose and been cited a specific feature of Japanese state intervention, which has always been ready to make successive efforts to enforce individual planning and integrating them as shown in Table 1. Behind this process, NIRA (1989) pointed out three reasons for state intervention such as investments in networking type of infrastructure: catching up with Western civilization, an exodus from the poverty with the amelioration of regional differences, and war.

The author shows no quantitative evidence for the issue of spatial integration except a figure illustrating the diffused network of railway line.

Further analysis will need to be obtained through scrutinizing the quantitative and descriptive evidence for the degree of spatial integration, networking and the level of equity of the provision of infrastructure developed in each of the development policies. Several important points should be noted to evaluate each development policy: 1) the timing and extent of government intervention, 2) the form of financial support, 3) socio-political background, 4) real output and its effect, 5) comparison with the policy for the former Japanese colony, and 6) continuity and discontinuity between the prewar and postwar development polices.

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Nationalism, Regionalism, and the Place of the 'Folklore'[1]*

Naoki OSHIRO**

Introduction

This research is concerned with the experiences of people in Okinawa (or 'Ryukyu')[2] in the modern era in the light of the concept of 'folklore' ('minzoku' in Japanese). Okinawa is a peripheral district of 'Japan', the nation state(Fig.1). Due to the geographical location of their islands, like the Ainu (the aborigines in Hokkaido), Okinawans have had different experiences from those of the 'majority' of people in Japan. This research is particularly focused on folklore because it is a socio-cultural construction which is closely related to Hobsbawm's concept of 'invention of tradition' (Hobsbawm, 1983) rather than the natural product of a modern nation-state.

The process of the substantiation of folklore as a socio-cultural construction can be understood as the process of the contingent articulation of various discourses. For example, the concept of folklore/ minzoku has a positive connotation to the 'genre de vie' of the people. However, when it is given a negative implication, minzoku is called 'dozoku'. Although both minzoku and dozoku refer to the same thing, genre de vie, these characteristics have been interpreted positively or negatively depending on the particular political and social context at any given time. It is important to note that the

concept of minzoku/ folklore is inseparable from the representation of the domain of a nation-state. Without this geographical representation we cannot discuss the diffusion or distribution of folklore.

As Benedict Anderson (1983) says, the boundaries of a nation-state must draw a closed curve within which difference and multiplicity or diversity would be absorbed into homogeneity and oneness or uniformity. The form of the articulation of geographical representation with folklore is found in a map of the distribution of folk traditions. In a map, the difference and multiplicity of folk tradition is presented as concentric circles tracing a gradual movement of folklore from the center to the margins over time.

In Okinawa it was in the Taisho era that minzoku/ folklore came to be seen positively. However, at the same time, Kunio Yanagita established Nihon Minzoku-gaku (Japanese Folklore Studies) which marginalised the folklore of Okinawa in a same way that Okinawa is positioned on the map of Japan[3].

I will outline the representation of the folklore of Okinawa and how it has changed over time.

Historical background

First, I would like to touch on the historical details which need to be understood. Since the 17th century the kingdom of Ryukyu (Okinawa) had been politically influenced by Satsuma-Han ('han' meaning a feudal domain), and therefore had been included in the shogunate feudal domain system[4]. However, Ryukyu was already part of the Chinese 'Sakuhou' system, and, therefore, it was influenced by two systems at the same time. When the Meiji government was

** Department of Geography, Kobe University
oshiro@lit.kobe-u.ac.jp

Photo 1　　Angama ritual in Ishigaki
Nmi (left) and Ushumai (right) with their dancing band (back)
Source: Okinawa Taimusu Sha ed. 1991. *Okinawa no Matsuri* (Rituals in Okinawa), Okinawa Taimusu Sha, p.182

established in Japan, the kingdom of Ryukyu was forced to cut off its relationship with China and in 1879 it was compelled to become a full part of Japan and to lose its individual identity (Ryukyu-syobun). Consequently, Ryukyu became part of the unified jurisdiction of the nation. After that, the kingdom of Ryukyu became Okinawa Ken ('ken' meaning a prefecture) as a component part of the nation-state of Japan. The systems or forms of administration, legislation or land administration were very different from those of other prefectures. The government set up a transitional period of changing the old customs to the new until the land management system or land ownership system project was finished in 1903. During the transitional period, the system of education and conscription were operated in the same way as the rest of the prefectures.

In Japan, the modern school system or the military were the places where the pre-modern 'bodily manner' or 'way of life' was institutionalised (Fujitani, 1994), but in Okinawa, the pre-modern norm had been allowed to continue officially during the transitional period. Therefore, the conscious creation of membership of the nation was in a different context from that of other prefectures. For example, when the Sino-Japanese War occurred during 1894-95, there were many ex-samurai of the former Kingdom of Ryukyu who deeply believed and stated that 'the yellow warship will come from China to save the Ryukyu'. In 1905, after the Russo-Japanese War, Shigetaka Shiga, a geographer with a nationalistic mind, visited Okinawa, and the next year in Tokyo he stated 'still, the people of Ryukyu have something different deep in their heart' (Shiga:1906, Takara:1980).

In this context, especially in primary school, the Okinawan aspects of vernacular way of life was suppressed, for example dialect, mo-asobi (young people's after school singing and musical games), male topknots, female tattoos, Ryukyu style clothing and bare feet, in order to create an idealised or imagined 'real Japanese people'. 'Huzoku Kairyo Undo' (a reform movement aimed at changing Okinawa to Japan) developed in the late 1880s to the early 1900s when the land project had finished and teachers, born in Okinawa, had been brought up as Japanese (see Gima1985; Oguma, 1998). Inheritance of the Okinawan way of life was seen as negative and

its characteristics were codified like a table of wrongs or sins. In particular the way of life or demeanour which had been adopted by Okinawans, but was characterised by the Japanese as dozoku (uncivilized local customs), became the object of correction to assist the full Japanese assimilation process. Of course Okinawan people did not change to Japanese people immediately although their peculiarities had been identified and also the education system organised to correct this. Chofu Ota, a typical intellectual at the time in Okinawa, said 'the pressing need for Okinawans is to assimilate thoroughly with people in other prefectures, they should even sneeze like people in other prefectures'. There must be a voluntary conversion of consciousness. That is to say it must be people themselves who aspire to be 'Japanese' (Tomiyama:1994,1997).

Nationalism and the 'folklore' of Okinawa

The time had come for negativity about the peculiarities of the Okinawans to change to a more positive view point. In 1921, the inclusion of Okinawa in Japanese folklore studies was stimulated by Kunio Yanagita's trip to Okinawa. According to Murai (1992), Yanagita had changed his interest to the southern islands (of Japan) to heal his broken heart. Yanagita had proposed the 'middle farmer promotion' policy as a policy for colonial Korea which had been rejected. Consequently, Yanagita confronted his senior official at the time and resigned his career as a senior public official in 1919. Yanagita was devastated by the colonial policy for Korea which resulted in the 'San-ichi' movement (a protest movement against imperial Japan). From 1920, he travelled through Japan from north to south as a staff member of Asahi Shinbun-sya (a newspaper publishing company), and compiled his travel writing from that trip experience in a book entitled Kainan Shoki (travel essays of the southern sea region). After this time Okinawa, the southern islands, would come to occupy an important position in his research.

There were several studies on Okinawan folklore before Yanagita began his research. In 1906, Fuyu Iha, who is seen as a father of Okinawan Studies, graduated from the Imperial University of Tokyo and, back in his home, Okinawa. He continued his studies while he

worked at the prefectural library[2]. Yanagita came to Okinawa ten years after Iha's first book Ko Ryukyu ("Old Loochoo") was published. However these two people did not adopt the same stance on Okinawa as an object of study. Yanagita projected the temporal distance over the spatial distance and described the situation in Okinawa as a mirror for modelling the relationships of diffusion between the cultural center and its periphery in the nation-state of Japan, while Iha was still experiencing the political-academic fact that he himself as an Okinawan native was on the periphery, and explored the peculiarities and differences of Okinawa for articulating the 'Japanese-Okinawan same ancestor theory' (see Tomiyama, 1997).

Father of Yaeyama studies

After the studies by Iha and Yanagita, people who recorded and commented on folklore were mainly school teachers. In the Okinawan case, they also wrote county history and geography under the 'Chiho Kairyo Undo' (reformation movement of rural districts), and contributed some articles to Kyodo Kenkyu (1913-17) which was edited by Yanagita and Toshio Takagi. Some teachers then sent manuscripts to Robata Sosho which was a series compiled by Yanagita after the cessation of Kyodo Kenkyu. On the one hand, they oppressed dozoku (uncivilized local custom) by playing a role in educating Okinawans to be 'good Japanese', on the other, they collected and reported the local folklore. From this fact, we can see some contradictions within their position. As Gregory wrote elsewhere (Gregory, 1995a,b), inspired by Said (1978, 1993), this is exactly the complex and multiple appearance of a situation in which space, power and knowledge are related to one another. Therefore we see that plural subjects, which appear depending on a situation, are kept in one body. This is illustrated in the next case.

Eijun Kishaba, who guided Iha and Yanagita respectively in Ishigaki Island, the southern part of Okinawa, was inspired by them and started his career as a folklore study scholar beginning with folksongs. Later, because of his considerable excellent contributions, he came to be called 'father of studies on Yaeyama'. In 1924 he wrote Yaeyama Min'yo Shi (folksongs of Yaeyama), one of the series of Robata Sosho. Be-

fore retirement age he resigned his post as a school master to make way for his junior. As one of the intellectuals in Yaeyama, he took on managerial positions for Yaeyama county and managed administrative or cultural works. He negotiated with authorities on folk affairs. An incident occurred in 1931 in which Kishaba was active. 'Angama' is a kind of ancestral ritual with two people putting on masks like an old man and woman and simulating their ancestors performing with music and dancing while another group wearing flowers and covering their faces with towels tour houses in a village. This event was claimed to need control by police to prevent an affray by youth as had happened in the previous year. Against this, Kishaba supported Angama in newspapers and at a meeting with the police(Photo.1)[5].

In 1938, astonishingly, Kishaba appealed for the abolition of the Angama ritual and he was positively involved in 'Yaeyama Jinja' construction movement for promoting Yaeyama county. 'Jinja' is a shrine which represents the national system of Shinto. There were only a few shrines in Okinawa district. In the original plan of construction of Yaeyama Jinja, 'Sansho Gongen', a facility of Shinto-Buddhist synthesis, was selected for the construction site. However, Kishaba and the others who involved in the Yaeyama Jinja construction movement proposed Utaki, a place in which people pray to their 'kami' (ancestors or spirits), for an alternative site for the construction of Yaeyama Jinja. There were Utaki in the Yaeyama islands similar to others in the Okinawan region. What is important here is this conjuncture that occurred as he knew the folklore well and supported it. Utaki is fundamentally a local sacred space enshrined by the priestess and people and could not represent a national symbol within a village. Therefore, by its very nature in its original institution it could not be a facility at the county level. Though the movement of overriding Utaki with Jinja had happened several times since Ryukyu-shobun, Utaki could not be a focus of prayer for an area greater than a village. But Kishaba himself was the person who plotted to change ritual forms from Utaki to Shinto style. Eventually, 'Oishigaki Utaki' became a site for Yaeyama Jinja.

A Shadow of Man in the *Utaki*

In Utaki in Ishigaki island the most sacred place is called 'Ibi'. In 1945, just after the second World War, there was a man who at this place burnt 'Goshin-ei' (a picture of the Emperor). This is an extreme example of the alteration of sacredness of sacred space[7]. It is taboo that men enter Ibi, and the fact that he burnt the Goshin-ei in this very sacred place could not have occurred without the condition of that place being specifically changed and fitted into the narrative prepared by the nation-state. Utaki, which is itself a singular sacred place, had also been caught up in the web of the national Shinto system restructured under the regime of the Emperor over the whole Japanese geographical scale, and into the system of national territory, where Okinawans could not experience a real religious hierarchy. Although Utaki is not Jinja, it had come to be represented as Jinja rhetorically. Because of its 'planeness' which represents holiness, while most people continued to pray to their ancestors or spirits, it had also become a place of burning Goshin-ei. While Utaki Integration Movements under the initiative of administrators were failing all along the line, ironically, some people positively altered their gaze to Utaki as Shinto space. This fact indicates just one aspect of the permeation of 'Japanization' or 'nationalization'.

Regionalism in Okinawa and the role of "folk affairs" in this recent development

Since the late 1990s, there have been increasing movements towards regionalism in Okinawa. These movements were sparked off by a rape incident by U.S.soldiers, and developed into the revision of the "the Japan-U.S.Status of Forces Agreement". Okinawans advocated removing the US bases in Okinawa. A prefecture referendum supported the removal which brought the prefecture into disagreement with the varying opinions of the Japanese.

Hereafter, I'd like to touch on aspects of socio-cultural characteristics which interact with political characteristics, and to see how the "folklore", or specific characteristics of "Okinawan" vernacular, as outlined above, are now represented.

The oppression which worked specifically on Okinawans such as "Fuzoku Kairyou Undo (Custom Reformation Movement)" in the Meiji 30s (late 1890s to around 1907) or "Seikatsu Kaizen Undo (Lifestyle Improvement Movement)" in the Showa 10s (the mid 1930s to the mid 1940s), as previously discussed, was relaxed after the Second World War under U.S.military governance[8].The U.S.stressed individuality of Okinawa/Ryukyu on purpose, because it hoped to cut off the strong affinity between Okinawa and Japan. This is the reason why the U.S.used the term "Ryukyu" instead of "Okinawa" which indicates its inclusion in Japan. However, when the restoration movement towards Japan was rising and articulating its agenda, as a reaction to U.S.governance, the pressure by the Japanese government to become "Japanese" began to reoccur in the same way as it had before 1945 in Okinawa. "Hogen-Fuda" is a good example of the suppression by the Japanese government on Okinawan culture at this time. It was a punishment plaque which was hung around the neck of a student who was pointed out for speaking dialect as a warning to others.

Vernacularized Rock 'n' roll

Eiichi Miyanaga is a person who became a legend to many people. He was educated during the restoration period and experienced the oppressing restrictions on the Okinawan dialect in school. Later he became a famous drummer of the legendary rock 'n' roll band "Murasaki(purple)" who used to play at Koza city. He now explores styles of rock 'n' roll music adopting the musical scale and dialect of Ryukyu in his songs. Murasaki frequently played for U.S.soldiers at music clubs in Koza during the Vietnam war. Murasaki sang in English and their style of music performance was hard rock. At that time in the Japanese popular music scene where there were still many popular pop music groups, Murasaki were unique and pioneers in introducing a hard rock style into Japan[9]. Although Murasaki disbanded in 1978, Miyanaga continues to play his music with other bands. It is interesting that Miyagawa, who did not sing in Japanese, now combines with "Ryukyu Kobudo Taiko"(Ryukyu style drum band but it is a version of invented tradition or fake-lore cf: Yagi,1994) using Okinawan dialect and music scale (NHK-ETV on air, 1992).

The context of change in which such a case

occurred is, I think, the rising state of cultural activism in Koza city. (It changed its name to Okinawa city after an administrative merger.) Okinawa city is located in the middle part of Okinawa island at a distance from Naha, the capital city and administrative and business center of Okinawa prefecture. Formerly, before 1945, Koza was a rural region and urbanized in the post war era as a local town for near the U.S.Kadena air-base whereas Naha was a neighboring town of Shuri, the former capital of Ryukyu Kingdom[10]. It can be said that Koza is the nearest thing to America in Okinawa. So, it is not surprising that a rock 'n' roll band such as Murasaki was born and was active in Koza rather than any other place in Okinawa. But Koza has also been the Mecca of Okinawan folk music since the end of the World War II. Many musicians who are active and still leading figures are living and playing in Koza. The agents of the recent boom in Okinawan popular music, such as Shokichi Kina who was known by his song: "Hana (flower)" or "Hai-sai Ojisan", Rinken Teruya who is the leader of the famous "Rinken Band", and Sadao China who produced 'Ne-nes' are all their sons. The character of their music is mixture of Okinawan folk music and western popular music. Only ten years ago, this trend would not have possibly happened in Okinawa. It seems to me that such music is produced in the very culturally mixed city of Koza rather than in a place which adheres to "tradition" or "authenticity" like Shuri or Naha. Here we can see the context of the background in which Miyanaga changed his attitude and adopted Okinawan dialect and musical scale[11].

Additionally, in the middle district of Okinawa island around Koza, performing "Eisah", which is a version of the Bon (ancestral ritual) dance with collective singing and drumming, is very popular. Eisah was originally simple. Although it was formally a folk performance, it has developed an expressive style and become more lively and stirring. Eisah has come a long way from the so-called authentic style. It can be said that these developments are characteristic of "folk" activities in Koza in which the traditional is not preserved in an old form but arranged creatively[12].

Objectification of cultures

As previously discussed, attitudes towards Okinawan folklore have been changed from negative to positive, and the other way around. Yanagita and his "folk studies" positively interpreted the folk affairs in Okinawa, but came to be represented negatively in the pre-war era, and as Muneyoshi Yanagi and his "Mingei Undo" (folk craft movement) valued the Okinawan "traditional" style of life but were oppressed in war time, then the reverse view of both situations re-emerged. Therefore the Koza case illustrates the concrete version of a paradigm shift. If you are self absorbed in your own culture, your view of life will not change. If you take a step back, and look at your culture from a distance, you take a very different view.   As Ota stated, "Objectification of culture" will become possible. According to Ota, this means building up cultures as new operational objects based on selected and interpreted elements [of the old] (Ota:1993, p.391).

Hence we see that singers, whose fathers are singers of Okinawan folk music, adapt folk music to include elements of western popular music. Conversely, Miyanaga absorbs his Okinawan music heritage into western music. These two show reverse directions. In the past, the audiences for each were never the same, but now people listen to both musical developments. The vernacular connects both streams into one hybrid style. The audience for the music is not isolated to Okinawan people only on the islands of Okinawa. The musicians now play across the world due to the "World music boom" which occurred in Japan from the late 1980s.

Today, we can see a sort of transition in the commitments to, and representation of, the particular vernacular style around Okinawa prefecture. I think that some parts of this, for example regionalism, reflect these attitudes either consciously or unconsciously. In the past, the "folk" (affairs) or "folklore" were confined by the extremes of a negative or a positive understanding, but, in the present, this has been separated from these opposing axes and displaced. After all, in Okinawa, we now find a place where the differences, changing tradition or authenticity, negotiate with each other and create an alternative place for "folklore" and view this positively[13].

Notes

1) The first part of this text is based on Oshiro (1998a).

2) The term "Okinawa" used here refers simply to the prefecture of Okinawa. However this term is embedded in an extensive historical and political background, which will be addressed later in much detail. At this point, however, it is important to take into account that the term "Okinawa" also connotes the island Okinawa where the former capital Shuri is located. Used in this sense the term "Okinawa" includes those surrounding island groups, Amami, Miyako and Yaeyama, all of which were under the hegemony of Okinawa. In other words the imaginative political relationship that existed between Okinawa and these other island groups is now a political actuality that has Okinawa placed in a central and controlling position.

3) For more information on the process of establishment of Japanese folklore studies, founded by Yanagita, see Yanagita Kunio Kenkyukai (1988).

4) Araki(1980) and Kinjo(1978) examined the problem of so-called "Ryukyu Shobun" (annexation by Imperial Japan).

5) I drew the biographical account of Huyu Iha (or Ifa) mainly from Hokama (1979) and Kano (1993).

6) Information on Kishaba's work on folklore comes form pre-1945 newspapers such as "Sakishima Asahi Shinbun" "Yaeyama Shinpo" "Kainan Jiho". These newspapers have been re-published in "Ishigaki-shi shi" (The history of Ishigaki City series).

7) This case can be found in Makino(1972).

8) Nishihara (1976) provides a deeper understanding in his detailed account "Seikatsu kaizen undo" (life reform movement) of the Showa 10 era.

9) For information on the relationship between Koza city and rock'n'roll music, see Okinawashi Kikakubu Heiwa Bunka Shinkoka (1994). This book is a collection of interviews with representative musicians of rock'n'roll in Koza city after 1970s, providing some insight into the similarities and many differences they have.

10) For more information on the formation of the city of Koza, see Tasato (1971); and on the whole of the urban geography of Okinawa prefecture, see Domae (1997).

11) Okinawa Kokusai Daigaku Bungakubu Shakaigakka Ishihara Zeminaru (1994) presents a detailed analysis of contemporary musical conditions in Koza city. Kumada (1998) analyses so-called "Okinawan pop", that is music of second or third generation post-war Okinawan "Min-yo" singers and suggests that it is possible to denote the following characteristics: a) "heterogeneity of styles", forming a pastiche of various musical elements taken out of context, b) "Okinawan new romanticism" expressing in song an unrealistic idealised utopian "Okinawan" image, and c) "fluidly interwoven ethnicity" in which ethnic values are made up of an interwoven matrix of various unrelated elements in constant flux, unlimited by restraints of temporal or spatial relationships.

12) In post-war years "Eisah" developed into a more ostentatious form, which has since been used for physical education in schools. See Okinawashi Kikakubu Heiwa Bunka Shinkoka (1998).

13) I have discussed the subtle differences between various discourses on the "Okinawa-Japan" politico-cultural axis. See Oshiro (1998b).

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Statism, Regionalism, and the (Re)Production of Space in Post-reform China

George C. S. Lin[*]

In a provocative article on the restructuring of social sciences, Peter Taylor identified a significant intellectual movement in which the course of social sciences was believed to have increasingly shifted away from state-centric orthodoxy toward non-state-centric heterodoxy consequent upon the growing importance of globalization (Taylor, 1996). He also observed that the questions of space and place were often neglected in the mainstream inquiry of social sciences and that the eminent process of globalization would facilitate geography as a spatial science to become an integral part of the heterodoxy of social knowledge. While it remains questionable whether the transition from "embedded statism" to non-state-centric thinking can be completely attributed to the process of "globalization", it seems quite obvious that reassessment of the concept of nation-state has recently occupied a prime position on the research agenda among social sciences, not least in China studies.[*]

A cursory survey of recent scholarship on China's post-reform development could easily identify the popularity of the state-society paradigm. Much has been written on the new central-local relations of the socialist state (Jia and Lin, 1994; Chung, 1995; Wong, 1991; Oksenberg and Tong, 1991), on the possibility of an emerging civil society (Chamberlain, 1993; White, 1993; Gold, 1990; Nevitt, 1996), and on the mechanism of interplay between state and society (Perry, 1994; Rosenbaum, 1992; Walder, 1995a; Goodman and Hooper, 1994). While these efforts have undoubtedly enhanced our understanding of the dynamics

of China's social and economic transition, they have shed little light on the spatial implications of change in the political, social, and economic spheres.

There are commendable attempts to assess the causes and consequences of spatial transformation in post-reform China (Pannell, 1990; Fan, 1995; Linge and Forbes, 1990; Goodman, 1989). With few exceptions (Yang, 1990; Huo, 1994; Lyons and Nee, 1994; Goodman, 1994; Paine, 1981), such attempts have been seldom related to the inquiries on the changing nature of the Chinese political economy. Moreover, the relationship between the functioning of the socialist state and the process of spatial restructuring remains controversial and vague. It has actually been an issue of unresolved debate between those who continue to describe a pivotal role played by the socialist state (Huang, 1996; Huo, 1994; Yang, 1990, 1994; Fan, 1995; Solinger, 1996) and others who argue that the central state no longer actively and directly intervenes in local developmental affairs (Wang, 1994, 1995; Naughton, 1987; Walder, 1994; Ma and Lin, 1993).

Given the existing intellectual context, this paper attempts to investigate the changing relationship between the role of the Chinese socialist state in policy making and the process of spatial restructuring. For the purpose of research, the whole period of socialist development is divided into two main phases using the 1978 economic reforms as a historical watershed. This arbitrary division is made with an understanding that there is noticeable continuity between the two phases and that there are considerable historical fluctuations within each phase. The changing function of the state is examined through an analysis of different development policies including the alloca-

[*] Department of Geography and Geology, the University of Hong Kong, gcslin@hkucc.hku.hk

tion of financial resources among the seven macro regions as classified by Chinese geographers (Lu, 1990; Figure I). The concept of space used in this study refers specifically to the geographical organization of production activities, the restructuring of human settlements, and the changing urban-rural relations. The process of spatial restructuring is assessed mainly by using data on the regional distribution of gross domestic product which have recently been made available by Chinese statistical authorities. The approach adopted in this study focuses on the general patterns of change at the macro level rather than on specific policy issues, detailed historical fluctuations, or varied local particularities. Inevitably, such an approach might miss out certain important details of the complex subject. The justification is that both the functioning of the state and restructuring of the space economy are highly sophisticated processes whose intricate relationship cannot be comprehended without necessary omission of certain historical details and local particularities.

This paper has three parts. It begins with an overview of the theoretical context which leads to the identification of several unresolved issues. This is followed by a comparison of different development strategies adopted by the Maoist and post-Mao regimes. The geographic outcome of implementing different development strategies is then assessed and compared. Findings of the research and their theoretical implications are discussed in the final section.

Spatial Restructuring in Socialist China: State Articulation or Disarticulation?

Transformation of the Chinese space economy is conventionally understood as a process driven mainly by the socialist state who has the power to manipulate spatial arrangement of population and economic activities according to its political and ideological ambitions. The role played by the socialist state is perhaps most noticeable in the process of urban and regional development. Influenced by the Marxist doctrine of anti-consumerialism, the socialist state under Mao was committed to the transformation of the function of Chinese cities from "consumers" to "producers" (Lo. 1987; Pannell, 1990, Chang, 1981). The outcome of this exercise had been the dominance of manufacturing activities in employment and output structure of most cities and towns (Pannell, 1989; Lin and Ma,1994). The number and size of urban settlements were also effectively limited by the socialist state. Not only was the state able to curb further expansion of cities and towns, it could also remove urban residents from large cities from time to time and have them relocated in the remote countryside for political or ideological purposes. The result had been a peculiar pattern of what Forbes and Thrift called "polarization reversal" (Forbes and Thrift, 1987). Despite China's remarkable record of industrialization, urban population growth had remained abnormally slow for decades until recently.

The Chinese experience of limited urban growth has been identified by scholars as a "unique case" because it contradicts the normal theoretical expectation of a paralleled relationship between industrialization and urbanization. Early writers attributed the Chinese practice of limiting urban growth to the state's ideological conviction of "anti-urbanism" (Ma, 1976; Murphey, 1976; Cell, 1979). This ideological explanation was contested by others who contended that the root cause of limited urbanization lies in the imperative of the state to minimize the cost of urban service provision so that necessary capital be reserved for rapid industrial development (Kirkby, 1985; Chan, 1992). While the two interpretations differ in perspective, they share a common fundamental belief that there is a powerful and unitary socialist state capable of manipulating urban affairs for its political and economic pursuits (Lin, 1994).

In a manner similar to urban growth, China's regional development is often seen as a spatial process effectively shaped by a socialist state committed to the ideal goal of equity and egalitarianism. It has been well documented that the socialist state under Mao was deeply concerned of the existing regional disparity between the advanced coastal zone and the underdeveloped interior (Wu, 1967; Huo, 1994: 188; Wu.1987; Yang, 1990; Hsu, 1991). Enormous and painstaking efforts were made by the state to overcome regional inequality and promote balanced economic development. Concrete actions included the transfer of financial resources from advanced regions in the eastern coast to backward areas in the west (Yang, 1990; Nee, 1989; Lardy, 1978; Hsu 1991), forced migration of intellectual and technical personnels from coastal cities to remote areas

(Bernstein. 1977), frontier extension of railways to stimulate economic growth of regions in the west (Leung, 1980), and concentrated capital investment in some isolated areas of the interior (Naughton, 1988; Cannon, 1990). The thrust of the state for equalized regional development has

been variably interpreted to honour the socialist principle of equity and egalitarianism (Wu, 1967; Yang, 1990; Hsu, 1991, Pannell. 1990), to ensure national integrity and social stability (Leung, 1980), or to protect industrial facilities

Figure 1 Geographical division of the people's Republic of China
(Source: Lu. 1990, p. 31: Lin, 1997, p. 15)

from possible military attacks by international powers (Kirkby, 1985; Cannon. 1990; Naughton. 1988. Common to all assertions is the argument that regional development is a product of state articulation.

The pivotal role played by the central state is believed to have extended into the post-Mao even after major institutional changes were made in the late 1970s. Although the development strategy adopted by the post-Mao regime is significant

different from those of its predecessor, it is generally believed that the central government has been responsible for the introduction of rural economic reforms and the open door policy (Goodman, 1994; Yang, 1990; Hsu, 1991). Not only was the central state credited for bringing about a "quiet revolution" in which economic reforms preceded political change and through which steady growth was achieved without the pains of "shock therapy", it was also regarded as the driving force of a "hidden hand" which, on the one hand, promoted rapid economic growth in selected regions with greater comparative advantages and, on the other hand, miraculously reduced regional inequality by enforcing well-design equalized fiscal and tax policies (Goodman, 1994; Huo. 1994:198; Fan. 1995:444).

The concept of a powerful and unitary state capable of manipulating China's spatial development has faced increasing challenges in recent years as a result of structural change taking place in the Chinese political economy. Important questions have been raised by those who stress the political consequences of the implementation of the reform program. Many studies have suggested that institutional changes that have been made since the late 1970s essentially represent a bold attempt of the central government to decentralize the power of decision-making as a means to stimulate local enthusiasm and arouse individual incentive (Yeh, 1984; Ash, 1988; Zhao, 1994; Naughton, 1994; Walder, 1995b). Although the decontrol of the centre may not necessarily jeopardize the effectiveness of central control (Shue, 1988; Yang, 1994; Huang, 1996), it is generally agreed that decentralization of decision-making has favoured local governments, that the capacity of the central state has been eroded, and that the state system has become increasingly fragile or fragmented in which the central state can no longer monopolize local developmental affairs(Wang, 1994, 1995; Jia and Lin, 1994:8; Walder, 1994, 1995b). The practice of fiscal reforms for instance, has significantly reduced the scope of state intervention in the control and management of financial resources although it has helped tap the latent potentials of local governments and enterprises in revenue generation (Wang, 1994; Naughton, 1987; Wong, 1992). Similarly, rural economic reforms and the opening to the outside world have brought into play free market forces which are operated more di-

rectly by local governments and enterprises than by the central state (Jia and Wang, 1994; Walder, 1995a, Smart, 1995). The combined result of decentralization, marketization, and globalization has been a new central-local relation in which local governments and enterprises no longer play a passive and obedient role. The economic manifestation of the reorganized central-local relation has been a new mechanism of what Jean Oi calls "local corporatism" in which local entrepreneurial cadres play decisive role in the developmental process (Oi, 1992, 1995; Lin, 1995; Walder, 1995b; Naughton, 1994; Liu, 1992).

The perceived instrumental role played by the central state in the design and implementation of the reform program has also met challenges. It has been revealed that many reform initiatives were actually originated from the grassroots level of the countryside (Liu, 1992; Ash, 1988), that the central state has not really had any "blueprint" or long-term strategy to guide the reform, and that the post-reform leaders only act passively according to changing circumstances (Naughton, 1995). The rapid expansion of a market economy and the opening up of the country to the outside world are seen as a result of state "disarticulation" (Naughton, 1995; Lin, 1997). The phenomenal growth of industries and numerous small towns in the countryside is interpreted as spontaneous, self-driven, and unplanned which owes little to active state intervention (Ma and Lin, 1993). The long-standing perception of the socialist state as a powerful "invisible hand" promoting "equalized regional development" has also been seriously questioned. Informative studies by Zhou, for instance, have revealed that the declared commitment of the socialist state to egalitarianism and spatial equity has been primarily rhetorical without effective actions, that the extent of inter-provincial resource transfer has actually been much less than what was generally perceived and that the central state has not effectively redistributed resources among provinces as has been commonly imagined (Zhou, 1996:580, 1993:174).

The competing interpretations identified above raise several important theoretical questions for further investigations. Has the function of the socialist state changed as a result of economic reforms instituted in 1978? Is the process of post-reform development a product of state articulation or disarticulation? Assuming that there is a cause-effect relationship between institutional reforms

and spatial restructuring, how has the functional change of the state altered the developmental landscape at the national and regional level? Is it still tenable to perceive the socialist state as a powerful and unitary entity? Is it still adequate to use the conventional framework of coast-inland-border regionalization for the assessment of China's spatial restructuring? To answer these questions would involve intensive investigations of some of the most sophisticated relationships which are extraordinarily difficult to unfold. The following section attempts to disentangle these complex relationships by first examining the changing political settings, particularly development strategies adopted by different political regimes, and then analyzing the consequences of spatial restructuring in different political context.

The Political Setting:
From Maoist Plan-Ideological Regime to Post-Mao Market-Regulatory Regime

To unfold the complex political settings that have evolved in socialist China, it may be necessary and useful to draw upon the conceptual framework developed by Dahrendorf (1968), Johnson (1982), and Henderson and Appelbaum (1992). The framework broadly classifies various political-economic systems into four main types: plan-ideological, plan-rational, market-ideological, and market-rational. It is generally believed that the system of state socialism that dominated pre-reform China fit well into the "plan-ideological" quadrant of the framework (Oi, 1995: 1134; Dicken, 1994: 114). After political reforms were instituted in 1978, China has endeavoured to develop a "socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics." While the transformation of the Chinese political economy is far from completion, there is growing evidence to suggest that a new developmental mechanism similar to the market-rational or market-regulatory system is taking shape.

More specifically, the system of state socialism that existed in China before the reforms was characterized by, among many other things, a centrally planned economy dominated by public ownership and the undivided power of a Marxist-Leninist party committed to the promotion of the Communist ideology (Kornai, 1992: 361). The centrally planned system was established to ensure that the central state maintain an absolute

control of the national economy. Under this system, the state monopolized economic affairs ranging from the setting of production targets through the supply of raw materials to the marketing of products. Theoretically, this system should enable the state to make rational and efficient utilization of natural and human resources. In reality, however, the system suffered from bureaucracy of the party and the government.

The second feature of the Maoist system of state socialism is the noticeable influence of the Communist ideology on national and regional economic development. Despite historical fluctuations and occasional shifting of emphasis, national economic development under the leadership of Mao had been guided by a principle that emphasizes on political correctness (*hong* or redness) rather than technical expertise or professionalism (*zhuan* or expertise). The idea was essentially derived from the Communist guerrilla warfare experience which demonstrated that a Red Army of peasant folk equipped with primitive weapons but strongly imbued with revolutionary zeal could eventually defeat the nationalist troop that was empowered with superior machine guns, tanks, and a modern airforce. It was believed that the key to military victory was not weapons but the correct ideology that infused the people who operated the weapons (Mao, 1937). Similarly, the key to successful economic development should not be technical know-how or modern machinery. Instead, it must be the correct Communist ideology that could indoctrinate the general mass and transform it into a tremendous source of energy sufficient to conquer the nature and change the world (Eckstein, 1977: 46).

Emphasis on correct Communist ideology has significant implications for Chinese urban and regional development (Wu, 1967; Ma, 1976; Murphey, 1976; Lo, 1987; Pannell, 1990). One of the important tenets of classic Marxism is to restrict trade and commercial activities because, in the Marxist version, commerce is an activity of "unproductive exploitation" in which a portion of the surplus value yielded by manufacturing is appropriated (Solinger, 1985). Commercialism is linked with capitalism and discriminated by the Chinese Communists. Geographically, Marxist-Maoist negativism against commerce means that those regions such as East and South China where the tradition of trade and commercial production was strong would suffer the most as they were

unable to perform those economic functions in which they have comparative advantages.

Following the industrialization practice of the Soviet Union under Stalin, the Maoist regime adopted an economic strategy that seeks high rates of industrial growth at the cost of agricultural development and urban consumption (Lardy, 1978; Eckstein, 1977). Industry, particularly heavy industry (resource extraction and manufacturing of heavy machinery), was identified as the leading economic sector in the national economy that should be given priority in the allocation of state capital investment. This growth-oriented and heavy- industry-based investment strategy was translated into a spatial development approach in favour of regions such as North and Northeast China where industrial resources are rich and the tradition of manufacturing is strong (Wu, 1967; Pannell, 1988). Moreover, to finance an ambitious industrialization program that aims at high growth rates and focuses on the capital-intensive sector requires high domestic savings. It means that urban consumption has to be kept low and rural to urban migration has to be restricted because the state was unwilling to invest in the urban sector for the provision of urban facilities to accommodate new urban dwellers. The result has been a peculiar pattern of slow urbanization despite significant industrial growth and a settlement system in which cities and the countryside are artificially separated (Kirkby, 1985; Chan, 1992, 1994).

The system of state socialism established by the Maoist regime essentially represents an attempt to centralize decision-making for the sake of social stability and national integrity. Although central policies might sometimes meet local resistance and the state might not always be able to "reach" effectively the grassroots of the administrative hierarchy (Shue, 1988), the system was established in such a way that the central state had an active role to play in national and regional development. Centralized decision-making appeared to be a logical response of the socialist state to a hostile international environment in which drastic political crises often had to be made and implemented instantly to cope with emergent political and economic crises. Rigid control of the state had, however, left little room for local initiative and individual creativity. Apart from working to satisfy the needs of the central state, local governments and individual enterprises had

little incentive to raise productivity or to engage in those economic activities for which they had special skills or comparative advantages. Moreover, economic decisions made at the top level according to the needs of the central state were often unsuited to local conditions and insensitive to constant changes in actual market demand.

With a recognition of the deficiency of the Maoist plan-ideological approach, the post-reform government under the pragmatic leadership of Deng Xiaoping introduced a new system in which market forces could operate and decision making was decentralized to stimulate local and individual enthusiasm. To correct the inherited structural imbalance between arbitrary plan and actual market demand or between production and consumption, the new regime substantially reduced the scope of compulsory production plan and allowed a market economy to "grow out of the plan" (Naughton, 1995). Commodity prices that previously were set solely by the state are now free to fluctuate according to market demand. To avoid the possible chaos that might be caused by a sudden change in prices, the state permits a dual-track pricing mechanism (shuang gui zhi) to develop, in which a single commodity could have both a state-set price and a free market price. Enterprises are allowed to produce commodities that are demanded in the market after their state compulsory production targets are fulfilled. The result of freed market operation has been the formation of a distinct dual track economy characterized by the coexistence of the plan and market segments. The market segment, however, has been growing at a pace much faster than the plan segment because of its higher profitability, greater employment capacity, and better linkages to consumers. Geographically, the shift of emphasis from central planning to market oriented production means that regions such as East and South China which are traditionally good at trading and production of consumer goods can now grow at a pace faster than those in the north and northeast which are specialized in resource extraction or the manufacturing of capital-goods.

The reorientation of the economy from central planning to market coordination was accompanied by a decentralization of decision-making as a means to arouse local initiative and individual creativity. In the countryside, the socialist collective system was dismantled and replaced by an output-link contracted "household production

responsibility system" in which peasants are free to make production decisions so long as they satisfy an output quota contracted with the state. In the cities, a "fiscal responsibility system" was introduced to give local governments and individual enterprises concrete material rewards for better performance. An open door policy was implemented to grant greater autonomy to coastal cities and provinces for attracting foreign capital and promoting export. With these institutional changes, the central state no longer is actively and directly involved in local economic affairs. Instead, it has become reliant more on fiscal measures to monitor, regulate, and control regional economic development at the macro level. A significant economic consequence of this functional change of the state from direct involvement to indirect regulation has been a locally driven process of profound economic restructuring in which the emphasis of production is shifted from capital goods to consumer goods because the latter is generally considered to be a better option for the instant generation of income and employment. Moreover, decentralized decision making has enabled those geographic areas that have better capacity of independent development to grow at a pace faster than those that have long been dependent upon the direction and support of the central government.

Transformation of the Space Economy

The spatial imprint of the transition of the Chinese political economy from plan to market and from direct intervention to indirect regulation has been well documented (Yang, 1990; Linge and Forbes, 1990; Fan, 1995). In analyzing the transformation of the Chinese space economy, much attention has been directed to the changing distribution of population and economic activities among the coastal, inland, and border zones. While the three-zone division of the country has provided a useful framework for understanding the variation of major geographical features, it offers limited insight into the intricate dynamic of the interplay between reforms of the political economy and the process of spatial restructuring because spatial inequality among the three zones is actually a natural product of different physical environment which can hardly be altered by any political regime. A close analysis of the Chinese

space economy before and after the reforms suggests that the dynamic of spatial transformation, as a direct response to the transition from the Maoist plan-ideological regime to the post-Mao market-regulatory regime, is most noticeable in the changing relations between North and South China, between large cities and small towns, and between cities and the countryside.

The North-South Relation

Despite the Communist rhetoric of equity and egalitarianism, the spatial economy created by the Maoist plan-ideological regime was characterized by a striking disparity of development between regions in the north and the south. Influenced by both the Marxist ideology that favours material production over consumption and the Soviet practice of rapid industrial growth concentrating on heavy industry, the Maoist regime chose North and Northeast China as the target regions for heavy investment because these regions were endowed with rich mineral resources and inherited with an established economic infrastructure. It was reported that, of the 156 "key industrial projects" funded by the state in the First Five Year Plan (1953-57), 86 were located in the northeast and the north whereas none was found in South China (Chinese Academy of Sciences, 1987: 12, Ma and Wei, 1997). An analysis of data on capital construction investment (jiben jiangshi touzi) reveals that the bulk of state investment had gone to regions in the north and northeast for most of the years in the 1950s and 1960s (Table 1). By comparison, South China received the smallest share of capital from the state because its mineral resource was poor, its tradition in trade and commercial activities was undesirable to the state, and its frontier location was perceived to be vulnerable to potential overseas military attacks. There was a period in the late 1960s when the southwest received a significant share of state capital investment to fund the Third Front Project (Table 1; Naughton, 1988; Cannon, 1990). Central China also received an increased share of capital from the state in the late 1960s and early 1970s as a result of industrial consolidation and adjustment. Such historical fluctuations had not, however, significantly altered the disparity between the north and the south until economic reforms were instituted in the late 1970s.

Table 1   Capital construction investment in state-owned enterprises by historical periods(%)

	1st FYP (1953-57)	2nd FYP (1958-65)	3rd FYP (1966-70)	4th FYP (1971-75)	5th FYP (1976-80)	6th FYP (1981-85)	7th FYP (1986-90)	8th FYP (1990-95)
North	11.7	21.6	16.9	19.8	24.4	22.2	22.5	20.7
Northeast	22.5	15.5	10.3	13.3	14.2	12.6	14.0	11.0
Northwest	12.3	10.4	13.0	11.2	10.5	8.5	9.0	8.3
Central	11.4	14.5	15.3	15.8	15.8	11.9	11.7	13.7
East	7.8	11.9	8.1	10.2	12.7	15.5	18.8	18.9
South	5.5	7.6	6.4	7.4	8.5	11.7	15.4	18.7
Southwest	6.2	10.6	16.2	11.7	10.2	8.4	8.8	8.7
Unclassified	22.7	7.9	13.9	10.6	3.7	9.2	--	--
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: D. Lu(1990) p.31; China, SSB(1996b) pp.226-887.

Note: FYP stands for Five Year Plan. The unclassified category includes capital investment in those projects that are not area specific(e.g. ocean shipbuilding, aircraft development, testing of nuclear weapons, launching of satellites, army and navy development, etc.). For definition of the seven regions, see Figure 1

Figure 2 Provincial redistribution of gross domestic product in China, 1978-95 (Source: Table 3)

Figure 3 Annual growth of gross domestic product in China, 1978-95 (Source: Table 3)

Heavy investment in the north had given rise to an uneven production space in which regions in the north enjoyed an advanced level of development whereas those in the south remained underdeveloped. An analysis of data on per capita gross domestic product reveals that, in the eve of economic reforms, all provinces in the northeast and the two Special Municipalities in the north recorded a level of per capita GDP well above the national average (Table 2). By comparison, provinces in South China were all left behind by those in the north. Their production capability as measured by per capita GDP was significantly lower than the national average. Shanghai Municipality and the two provinces in the east also maintained an advanced level of production above the national average. However, the continued growth of the east had owed more to its inherited regional strengths than state articulation because the region had never received a large share of capital investment from the state for most of the Mao's years (Table 1). What the central state had been directly responsible for was, therefore, not so much the persistent gap between the east and west but the accelerated advancement of the north against a underdevelopment of the south.

If the legacy of the Maoist plan-ideological approach to national development was an uneven production space dominated by the northern industrial heartland, the spatial imprint of marketization and decentralized decision-making instituted by the post-Mao pragmatic regime has been a dynamic and converging landscape characterized most noticeably by the rapid upsurge of new economic regions in the south to challenge the dominant position held by the north. A well established tradition in market farming, commodity production, and international trade, plus close linkages with Hong Kong and Taiwan as well as Chinese emigrants overseas, has enabled South China to benefit tremendously from the ascendance of a pragmatic regime that tolerates the operation of market forces and allows economic exchange with the western capitalist world. In the Maoist era, South China was unable to develop a strong regional economy on the basis of its comparative advantages because of the rigid control of a radical regime that was in fear of the penetration of global capitalism and overseas military attack. With the emphasis of the economy shining from plan to market and from self-isolation to opening up, South China can fully utilize its re-

gional strengths and materialize its great potential for genuine development. An analysis of the regional variation in terms of per capita gross domestic product since the reforms clearly identifies South China as one of the most rapidly growing economic regions in the country. With the exception of Guangxi Province in the interior, provinces in the south have dramatically raised the level of per capita GDP from one that stood below the national average in 1978 to one above the upgraded standard in 1995. Their double digit growth rates also exceeded those of their counterparts in the north and the northeast (Table 2). The eastern region is in a similar situation and has been able to experience substantial growth owing to the practice of marketization and decentralized decision-making. While regions of the south and the east have vigorously upgraded themselves on the national economic landscape, regions of the north and the northeast have found it increasingly difficult to maintain their dominant positions in the national economy. The edge they had over the national average in per capita GDP has actually been substantially reduced since the 1978 economic reforms (Table 2). The production capacity of the north and northeast has not reduced in absolute terms. However, these regions have been left behind by those in the south and the east in terms of the growth of the regional economy.

The dynamic of the reorganization of the Chinese production space is more evident when the geographic distribution of GDP is scrutinized, Table 3 analyzes the changing distribution of GDP among the seven macro regions of the country during the period of 1978-95. Although regions in the north and the northeast exhibited an increased amount of GDP in the absolute terms, their share in the national economy has dropped. By comparison, the South China region has demonstrated the largest increase in terms of its contribution of GDP to the nation (Table 3). This pattern of spatial restructuring becomes even more obvious when the GDP proportional change and its growth rates for all provinces are mapped. With the exception of Xinjiang, provinces that have increased their share of GDP in the national economy area all located in the south and along the eastern coast (Figure 2). In a similar manner, provinces in the south and the east have demonstrated a GDP growth rate significantly higher than those in the north and northeast (Figure 3). Clearly, the process of spatial restructuring taking

place in the post-Mao era is characterized primarily by the upsurge of new regional economies in the south and the east. This is coupled by and contrasted with the slow growth and proportional drop of the traditional manufacturing heartland in the north and northeast.

Table 2 Changing per capita gross domestic product, 1978-95

	Per Capita GDP (Yuan / Person)		Percent (National Average =100)		Annual Growth
	1978	1995	1978	1995	1978~95(%)
North					
Beijing	1,248	13,073	331.5	270.8	8.8
Tianjin	1,150	10,308	305.5	213.5	7.4
Hebei	364	4,444	96.7	92.1	8.7
Shanxi	365	3,569	97.0	73.9	7.3
I. Mongolia	307	3,013	81.5	62.4	8.3
Shandong	327	5,758	86.9	119.3	10.6
Northeast					
Liaoning	677	6,880	179.8	142.5	7.6
Jilin	391	4,414	103.9	91.4	8.4
Heilongjiang	563	5,465	149.5	113.2	6.6
East					
Jiangsu	430	7,299	114.2	151.2	11.5
Anhui	242	3,357	64.3	69.5	9.1
Zhejiang	470	8,074	124.8	167.2	12.8
Shanghai	2,498	18,943	663.5	392.4	7.9
Northwest					
Shaanx	294	2,843	78.1	58.9	8.0
Gansu	348	2,288	92.4	47.4	7.0
Qinghai	431	3,430	114.5	71.0	5.1
Ningxia	354	3,328	94.0	68.9	6.6
Xinjiang	313	4,819	83.1	99.8	9.0
Central					
Henan	232	3,313	61.6	68.6	9.2
Hubei	332	4,162	88.2	86.2	7.7
Hunan	285	3,470	75.7	71.9	7.4
Jiangxi	276	3,080	73.3	63.8	9.0
South					
Fujian	273	6,965	72.5	144.3	12.1
Guangdong	367	7,973	97.5	165.1	12.3
Hainan	310	5,225	82.3	108.2	11.9
Guangxi	225	3,543	59.8	73.4	8.0
Southwest					
Sichuan	253	3,201	67.2	66.3	8.5
Guizhou	175	1,853	46.5	38.4	7.6
Yunnan	223	3,044	59.2	63.1	8.2
Tibet	375	2,392	99.6	49.5	6.3
National Average	376.5	4,828	100.0	100.0	9.9

Source: China, SSB(1996b) pp.173~174.

Table 3 Distribution of gross domestic product, 1978-95

	GDP(billion Yuan)		Percentage of Total (%)		Annual Growth (%)
	1978	1995	1978	1995	1978 ~95
Beijing	10,884	139,489	3.1	2.4	9.8
Tianjin	8,265	92,011	2.4	1.6	8.9
Hebei	18,306	284,952	5.3	5.0	10.2
Shanxi	8,799	109,248	2.5	1.9	8.8
I. Mongolia	5,804	68,192	1.7	1.2	9.7
Shandong	22,545	500,234	6.5	8.7	11.9
NORTH	74,603	1,194,126	21.5	20.8	
Liaoning	22,920	379,337	6.6	4.9	8.8
Jilin	8,198	112,920	2.4	2.0	9.5
Heilongjiang	17,438	201,453	5.1	3.5	4.8
NORTHEAST	48,596	593,710	14.0	10.3	
Jiangsu	24,924	515,525	7.2	9.0	12.8
Anhui	11,396	200,358	3.3	3.5	10.7
Zhejiang	12,372	352,479	3.6	6.1	13.8
Shanghai	27,281	246,257	7.9	4.3	9.1
EAST	75,983	1,314,619	21.9	22.9	
Shaanxi	8,107	100,003	2.3	1.7	9.1
Gansu	6,473	55,335	1.9	1.0	8.6
Qinghai	1,554	16,531	0.5	0.3	8.8
Ningxia	1,300	16,975	0.4	0.3	8.9
Xinjiang	3,907	83,457	1.1	1.5	11.1
NORTHWEST	21,341	272,301	6.2	4.7	
Henan	16,292	300,274	4.7	5.2	10.9
Hubei	15,100	239,142	4.4	4.2	10.5
Hunan	14,699	219,570	4.2	3.8	8.7
Jiangxi	8,700	120,511	2.5	2.1	10.4
CENTRAL	54,761	879,497	15.8	15.3	
Fujian	6,637	216,052	1.9	3.8	13.8
Guangdong	18,473	538,172	5.3	9.4	14.2
Hainan	1,640	36,417	0.5	0.6	12.3
Guangxi	7,585	160,615	2.2	2.8	9.9
SOUTH	34,355	951,256	9.9	16.6	
Sichuan	24,483	353,400	7.1	6.2	9.5
Guizhou	4,662	63,007	1.4	1.1	9.1
Yunnan	6,905	120,668	2.0	2.1	9.9
Tibet	665	5,598	0.2	0.1	8.3
SOUTHWEST	36,715	542,673	10.6	9.4	
Total	346,354	5,748,182	100	100	9.9

Source: China, SSB(1996b) pp. 165~169.

The relative decline of the regional economies in the north and northeast is mainly a reflection of their local conditions in a new national setting. In the Maoist era, the north and northeast were able to occupy a leading position in the national economy because their resource endowment and inherited manufacturing facilities were favourable to the Maoist plan-ideological regime for rapid industrial growth. These regions enjoyed prefer-

ential capital allocation from the state and were protected by the centrally planned system from free competition of the non-state sector. With the gradual reduction of the state commitment to regional development and the emphasis of the economy shifting from plan to market, the foundation based on which the northern industrial heartland was developed has been significantly weakened. Moreover, the north and northeast are inexperienced in the production and marketing of consumer goods although they have a strong tradition in resource extraction and machinery making. After three decades of manufacturing development directed and supported by the central plan, it is simply too difficult for the northern manufacturing heartland to "jump into the sea" (xiahai) of commodity production.

If the decline of the northern industrial heartland is a consequence of the state's changing attitude toward the planned economy, what then is the relationship between the accelerated growth of South China and the articulation of the state? Is the rapid expansion of new production space in the south a result of increased state investment? Data on state capital construction investment listed in Table 1 seem to suggest that the South China region has received a growing share of capital investment from the state since the 1980s whereas regions in the north and northeast have suffered from a reduction of state commitment. This pattern of change has led some scholars to argue that the post-reform government is implementing a "growth pole" strategy using the southern and eastern coast as "growth centers" for concentrated investment (Yang, 1990; Li, 1988; Cao. 1990). A close examination of the investment data reveals that the prevailing perception of an increased state involvement in the development of South China might have been oversimplified and misleading.

In the Chinese statistics, capital investment in the state sector normally consists of two major components, namely budgetary allocation from the central state and mobilization of fund by local governments. Statistically, these two components are grouped together and labeled as the "state" (kuojia) on the ground that they are both controlled by government organizations. In practice, however, they represent different sources of capital formation and are handled in very different manners. Figure 4 decomposes capital construction investment in China according to the

two sources of capital formation. During the years of 1953-79, capital formation under the Maoist plan-ideological regime was monopolized by the central state. There was no need at that time to differentiate the two components because local governments only contributed a tiny portion of capital and *state* investment was almost identical to *central state* investment. This situation has changed profoundly after the 1978 economic reforms. As Figure 4 has clearly shown, budgetary allocation from the central state has substantially dropped since 1979 and the balance has been made up by local governments through fund raising from various local and foreign channels. The bulk of "state" capital has now been provided and handled by local governments rather than the central state. Under this new situation, it would be oversimplified to interpret the role of the central state on the basis of the integrate data of "state" capital investment without making necessary differentiation of the various sources of capital formation and means of investment.

The complexity of capital formation can be further illustrated by the case of Guangdong Province. Although Guangdong has, like other provinces in the south and the east, shown an increased share of state capital investment in the nation since the reforms (Table 1), the bulk of capital has actually been mobilized by local governments through various domestic and international channels (Figure 5). It would be misleading to suggest that Guangdong Province has been selected by the central state as a "growth pole" or "growth center" to receive preferential and concentrated capital investment. From a financial standpoint, it appears that recent development in the South China region since the reforms has not been driven by any increased commitment or articulation of the central state. Rather, it has been

facilitated by the relaxation of state control which has freed the south to seek genuine development in its own ways.

The effect of the upward movement of the South China region on China's developmental landscape has been profound. It has fundamentally reorganized the spatial relationship between the north and the south and significantly reduced the unevenness of the space economy created by the Maoist regime. The surge of the regional economy of the south, which is essentially spontaneous and self-driven, has provided the key to solving the myth of a converging developmental landscape in post-reformed China despite the adoption of a new strategy which seemingly opts for efficient and uneven growth rather than balanced or equalized development (Fan, 1995, 1997; Lo, 1990; Huo, 1994).

Restructuring of the Settlement System

The transition of the Chinese leadership from the Maoist to post-Mao regime has found its way to restructure the settlement system. The uniqueness of urban policy in socialist China and its impacts on urban development has been well researched (Ma and Hanten, 1981; Kirkby, 1985; Pannell, 1990). Despite the existence of extensive documentation, the links between the changing nature of China's political economy and the reorganization of the urban system remains vague. Statistical data recently released by the Chinese authorities provide an important base for analyzing the relationship between the functioning of the state and restructuring of the urban system. Table 4 lists the composition of China's urban system for the three typical years of 1949, 1978, and 1995.

Table 4   Changing urban systems in China 1949-95

City Size	1949 #	1949 Population* (%)	1978 #	1978 Population* (%)	1995 #	1995 Population* (%)	Percent Change 1949-78 (%)	Percent Change 1978-95 (%)
<0.2million	102	25.5	93	14.1	373	21.3	-11.4	7.2
0.2~0.5million	18	19.8	60	23.4	192	29.0	3.6	5.6
0.5~1million	7	18.7	27	25.0	43	14.8	6.3	-10.2
≥1million	5	36.0	13	37.5	32	34.9	1.5	-2.6
Total	132	100.0	193	100.0	640	100.0		

* Population refers to non-agricultural population in city proper.
Source: China, SSB (1990) pp. 5 and 55; China, SSB (1996a) pp. 319, 326, 327; China, SSB (1996c) pp. 28-29.

Figure 4 Capital construction investment in China, 1953-95
(Source: China, SSB, 1996a, p. 142)

Figure 5 Capital construction investment in Guangdong Province, 1978-95
(Source: Guangdong Province, Statistical Bureau, 1992, p. 234; 1996, p. 264)

The urban system developed by the Maoist plan-ideological regime during the years of 1949-78 was characterized by a noticeable contrast between large and small cities. When the Communists took power in 1949, large cities with a urban (non-agricultural) population of 500 thousand or more accounted for 54 percent of the total urban population of all cities. This proportion had increased to 62 percent after three decades of development under Mao (Table 4). In contrast, the proportion of small cities with a urban population of less than 200 thousand had dropped from 25 percent in 1949 to only 14 percent in 1978. The

proportional increase of large cities admittedly included those medium-sized and small cities that had upgraded into the large city category. The fact remains, however, that the expansion of large and super-large cities had never been effectively curbed and the growth of small cities had suffered from insufficient upgrading of many market towns in the countryside despite the rhetoric of the Maoist regime to limit the growth of large cities and vigorously promote the development of small cities and towns.


CITY SIZE (Population)

Super-large (>=1 million)

Large (0.5-1 million)

Medium (0.2-0.5 million)

Small (<0.2 million)

0   10%   20%

36.0%
18.7%
19.8%
25.5%
1949

37.6%   34.9%
25.0%   14.6%
23.4%   29.0%
14.1%   21.3%
1978   ➡   *1995*

Figure 6 China's changing urban systems: Percent non-agricultural population, 1949-95
(Source: Table 4)

This revealed contrast between large and small cities is not surprising when it is linked with the plan-ideological nature of the Maoist political economy as identified in the previous section. The operation of a centrally planned economy had to rest upon a settlement system integrated by vertical linkages and coordinated by large cities that served as the control centers. The ambition of the Maoist regime for rapid industrial growth with an emphasis being placed on capital goods also necessitated an approach in favour of large cities because of their relatively advanced manufactur-

ing facilities, economic infrastructure, and a skillful industrial labour force. Moreover, large cities, especially those that served as provincial capitals, were seen as the crucial nodes for maintaining territorial integrity and were given priority for transport investment and railway extension (Leung, 1980). While the role of large cities had been strengthened by political, industrial, and transport developments, the growth of small cities and towns had suffered from the state's ideological commitment to anti-commercialism, which had effectively restricted the production and mar-

ket exchange of farm commodities in the countryside and thereby severely eroded the economic foundation of the towns (Skinner, 1985; Fei, 1986; Lin and Ma, 1994). The combined outcome of different approaches at the top and bottom of the settlement hierarchy had been a striking contrast between the continuous expansion of large cities and shrinking of small cities and towns. The picture of change becomes clear when the two settlement systems for 1949 and 1978 are depicted and compared (Figure 6).

The contrast between large and small urban settlements has been profoundly changed after the take-over of the post-Mao market-regulatory regime. As the state decentralizes decision-making to local governments and brings in free market forces to transform the economy, the previous rigid urban hierarchy organized by vertical linkages and political functionality had disintegrated and been replaced by a news system of cities shaped primarily by horizontal connections and economic exchange. One of the most remarkable consequences of this structural change is the rapid increase of the number of cities since the reforms, partly because rapid economic growth has created a great demand for urban functions, and partly because the central state has relaxed its restriction on the upgrading of towns into cities. During the years of 1978-95, the number of cities drastically increased from 193 to 640, among which the largest gain in terms of both number and population proportion occurred primarily in the two categories of small and medium-sized cities (Table 4). Obviously, many small cities have grown to reach medium-size and a great number of towns from the countryside has upgraded into the small city rank.

The remarkable expansion of small cities, plus the spectacular development of numerous towns that has already been well documented (Skinner, 1985; Fei, 1986; Tan, 1986; Lin, 1993; Ma and

Lin, 1994), has fundamentally restructured China's settlement system. Whereas large cities used to dominate the urban system because of the Maoist practice of city-based industrialization, small cities and towns have now picked up a large share of urban population and become the most rapidly growing component of the restructured settlement system (Figure 6). Super-large cities with a population size of over one million remain important economic centres. However, the functions they performed in urbanization and economic development have now to be shared with numerous small cities and towns that have been flourishing all over the country. The township and village industries, which are based primarily on towns, have become one of the most rapidly growing sectors in the national economy (Byrd and Lin, 1990; Ho, 1994). As for the absorption of the enormous number of surplus rural labourers recently released from agriculture as a result of increased productivity, small cities and towns have played a role no less important, if not greater, than that of the large or super-large cities. Table 5 analyzes the origins and destinations of migrants according to a nation-wide one percent sample survey conducted in 1987. During the years 1982-87, Chinese towns received over 39 percent of all migrants and 41 percent of all rural-urban migrants. Both figures are significantly higher than those associated with cities. Obviously, these towns have become the major destinations for most migrants especially rural-urban migrants. The phenomenal growth of towns, which is facilitated by the tacit laissez faire attitude of the central state from above and driven directly by indigenous forces of development from below, has created a new dimension of "town-based" urbanization to complement and balance up with the orthodox dimension of city-based urbanization.

Table 5 Origins and destination of migrants in China, 1982∼1987

	Places of Origin							
	Cities		Towns		Villages		Total	
Destination	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Cities	32,923	59.9	10,097	25.6	69,046	33.3	112,066	36.7
Towns	14,313	26.1	21,317	49.8	85,473	41.2	121,103	39.7
Villages	7,704	14.0	11,371	26.6	53,083	25.6	72,158	23.6
Total	54,940	100.0	42,785	100.0	207,602	100.0	305,327	100.0

Source: China, SSB, Department of Population Census (1988) p. 677.

Blurring the Urban-Rural Division

The ongoing process of spatial restructuring, as a result of reforms in the political economy, has extended beyond the reorganization of the conventional settlement system and created new forms of economic activities in rural-urban interaction in the vast countryside. In the Maoist era, the organization of economic activities was guided by a principle known as "agriculture as the base" (*nongye weijichu*) and "industry as the lead" (*gonye weizhudao*). Practically, the principle suggests that the purpose of agricultural production is to provide foodstuffs and raw materials for industrial growth in the city. This principle was translated into a developmental strategy which retained a large agricultural labor force in the countryside for food production to support the program of city-based industrialization. At the same time, cities were effectively protected from the influx of rural-urban migration for the purpose of urban manageability and social stability (Kirkby, 1985). By restricting rural-urban migration, the state managed to save the cost of providing urban facilities and public services to new urban dwellers. The combined result of a single-sided emphasis on foodgrain production in the countryside and protected urban growth was an invisible but effective "wall" that separated cities from the countryside (Chan, 1994). Despite the official rhetoric of reducing urban and rural differences, the urban-rural separation remained wide and deep for most of the Mao's years until economic reforms were instituted in the late 1970s.

The cause-effect relationship between the changing function of the state and the new form of rural-urban interaction has been a highly significant subject for investigations. However, as many scholars have correctly suggested, the issue remains ambiguous and elusive partly because of the difficulties of definition and measurement and partly because of the evolving and sophisticated nature of the subject matter (Pannell and Veeck, 1991). Nevertheless, existing data do provide considerable substance based on which the logical links between reforms of the political economy and formation of new rural-urban relations can be built.


Figure 7 Changing composition of agricultural output value, 1978-95

(Source: China, SSB, 1996a, p. 356)

The transformation of the space economy in the countryside has been facilitated by the relaxation of state control over the rural economy. Under the new pragmatic market-regulatory regime, peasants no longer have to produce whatever the state needs and hand over to the state whatever they have produced. Instead, they are free to engage in those economic activities which they perceive to be more profitable and for which they have better production skills. This has given rise to a distinct process of diversification and commercialization of the agricultural sector. Figure 7 depicts the restructuring of the agricultural sector for the country. Although the process of internal restructuring was not drastic, the trend toward diversification is noticeable. At the eve of the 1978 reforms, agriculture was characterized by a single-sided emphasis on farming which accounted for 80 percent of the gross output value. The dominance of traditional farming in the agricultural sector has been substantially reduced since 1978 to make way for more profitable non-farm activities such as livestock husbandry, forestry, and fishery. This process of agricultural diversification and commercialization is more remarkable in those regions where the tradition of market farming has been strong. In the Pearl River Delta, for instance, food grain production has dropped proportionally from 75 percent of the total agricultural output to only 49 percent during 1980-90 and non-farm activities have grown to take up the main of the agricultural sector (Lin, 1997:88). A similar pattern of agricultural restructuring has taken place in the lower Yantze Delta region (Ho, 1994; Veeck and Pannell, 1989).

A more phenomenal growth has occurred out of the agricultural sector. It involves the flourishing of millions of township and village enterprises in the vast countryside. These enterprises include all sorts of non-agricultural activities such as manufacturing, trading, transportation, construction, and services. They are mostly small scale, labour intensive, and rural-based. Their dramatic growth in the countryside has provided enormous employment opportunities to accommodate surplus rural labourers who have been released from the agricultural sector as a result of increased productivity. Table 6 examines the growth of township and village enterprises and analyzes the role they play in the rural economy. These enterprises had employed more than 28 percent of the total rural labour force by the year 1995 and contribut-

ed over 70 percent of the total rural social product by 1992.

Table 6 Township and village enterprises in China, 1978~95

		Employment		Output	
	Number (million)	Number (million)	As % of Rural Labor Force	Billion Yuan	As % of Gross Rural Social Product
1978	1.524	28.265	9.5	49.307	21.20
1980	1.424	29.996	9.4	65.690	23.50
1985	12.224	69.790	18.8	272.839	43.00
1990	18.504	92.648	22.1	958.110	57.70
1991	19.079	96.091	22.3	1161.170	59.20
1992	20.792	105.811	24.2	1797.540	70.81
1993	24.529	123.453	27.9	3154.070	/
1994	24.945	120.182	26.9	4258.850	/
1995	22.027	128.621	28.6	6891.520	/

Source: Editorial Committee(1992) p.133; China, SSB(1996a) pp 388~389; China, SSB(1996d), p. 35.

The restructuring of the rural economy, especially the explosive expansion of township and village enterprises, has powerfully reshaped the rural-urban relation and reorganized the production space in the countryside. As a great number of employment opportunities has been created outside the agricultural sector and within the rural areas, Chinese peasants are now able to engage in a variety of non-agricultural activities within their living sphere. In the words of local people, Chinese peasants are able to "leave the soil but not the village" (*litu bulixiang*) and "enter the factory but not the city" (*jinchang bujincheng*). The spatial consequence of this process of internal redistribution of occupations has been a new settlement form in which industrial and agricultural or urban and rural activities take place side by side. This new settlement form, called by Chinese scholars as "urban-rural integration" (chengxiang yitihua), does not fit into the conventional classification of "urban" or "rural" settlement, but it displays characteristics of both types. It is most visible in those areas extending between or around large metropolitan centers where rural-urban interaction has been most intensified (McGee, 1991; Ginsburg, 1990; Zhou, 1991; Lin, 1997).

The driving forces behind the new settlement form of "rural-urban integration" are complex. They include relaxed state control over the rural economy, development of a market mechanism, flow of transnational capital, and improvement of

the transportation infrastructure which "compresses time and space." Whatever the cause, the ongoing process of intensified rural-urban interaction has fundamentally altered the unequal relationship between industry and agriculture and between city and the countryside. The "invisible wall" created by the Maoist regime to separate city and countryside for ideological and strategic reasons has been torn down spontaneously by Chinese peasants.

Conclusion and Discussion

In recent years one of the most fervent issues for theoretical debates among social scientists has been the functioning of territorial states in the new sophisticated nexus of local-global interaction. As the trends toward globalization of the world economy and fragmentation of the state system continue, important questions have been raised concerning the adequacy of nation-state as an analytical framework and the sustainability of embedded statism that has dominated studies of social sciences over the past century (Taylor, 1996). The intellectual movement from a state-centric bias to a non-state-centric paradigm has found its way to influence contemporary China studies. While the reassessment of the nature of the Chinese socialist state has attracted growing scholarly attention from Sinologists, the links between reforms of the political economy and restructuring of the production space at the national and regional levels remain poorly understood.


Figure 8 A model for spatial transformation in socialist China

This study compares different developmental strategies adopted by the Maoist and post-Mao regimes and assesses their geographical consequences at a macro level. In the Maoist era, China's national development was manipulated by a radical regime that was committed to the promotion of the Communist ideology and reliant upon a centrally planned economy. This plan-ideological regime chose to focus on the rapid expansion of industrial production capacity as a means to maintain social stability and national security. The geographic consequence had been an uneven economic landscape despite the official rhetoric of egalitarianism and equalized development. Industrial production was highly concentrated in the north and northeast where major energy and mineral resources were found. The settlement system was dominated by a few large cities that served as centers of manufacturing production and key nodes for transmitting centrally made political decisions. Cities and the countryside were arbitrarily separated to ensure a sufficient supply of food grain and minimize the cost of supporting urban expansion.

With a recognition of the disfunctionalness and deficiencies of the Maoist regime, the post-Mao government adopted a pragmatic approach that allows for decentralized decision making and tolerates the operation of market forces in a socialist economy. The geographic outcome of the state's tacit laissez faire approach has been a new space economy characterized by the rapid expansion of production space in the south, the phenomenal growth of numerous small towns, and the blurring of urban-rural division in the rapidly urbanizing countryside. The spatial disparity between regions of the north and the south, large cities and small towns, and cities and the countryside, which the Maoist regime was unable to overcome, has been significantly altered by indigenous forces emanating from the grassroots of the national economy. Figure 8 highlights the key elements of the two processes of political and spatial restructuring as identified in this study and sketches the logical linkages between the two processes. As acknowledged in the outset, the transition from the Maoist to post-Mao regime has occurred in an evolutionary rather than revolutionary manner. There were also considerable historical fluctuations within both classified phases. The model presented here, therefore, only represents a simplified conceptual framework for understanding the sophisticated interrelationships between the changing functioning of the socialist state on the one hand and restructuring of the Chinese space economy on the other.

Judged in both the political and financial perspectives, the process of spatial restructuring in China since the reforms has been essentially a result of state disarticulation rather than increased state intervention. The spontaneous expansion of production space in South China, small towns, and the vast countryside has been facilitated by the relaxation of state control over local developmental affairs. Previous studies, which tended to see the recent growth of regional economies in eastern and southern China as a result of shifting emphasis of state capital investment from the interior to the coast, may have overlooked the changing composition of financing in which central budget allocation has actually contributed little to regional development since the reforms. The trend toward decentralized decision-making and localized financing as revealed in this study has raised important theoretical questions concerning the nature of the Chinese socialist state. The conventional wisdom of socialist development, which conceives a uniform and powerful socialist state capable of manipulating local political and economic affairs, may need fundamental re-evaluation in light of the growing complexity of the operating mechanism, particularly the changing role played by the central state, local initiatives, and global market forces. We need to know, for instance, if it is necessary to deconstruct the general concept of the socialist state and make distinction between the central state and local state, and between nation state and region state. We also need to know if it is necessary and useful to differentiate the power of the state to formulate policies from the genuine ability of the state to implement such policies. The complex mechanism of interaction between the central state, local initiative and global forces and its geographic consequences will be a highly significant topic that deserves further investigations.

Traditionally, transformation of the Chinese space economy was understood as a process of redistribution of economic activity and population between the coastal, inland and border zones. This study suggests an alternative that sees China's spatial transformation as a reorganization of spatial relationships between North and South China, between large cities and small towns, and

between cities and the countryside. The persistent developmental gap between the eastern coast and the western interior has been a natural result of different physical environments and can hardly illustrate the cause-effect relationship between state intervention and spatial restructuring. It is the shining emphasis of growth between the north and the south that provides the key to solving the mystery of an uneven space economy created by the Maoist regime despite the socialist rhetoric of equity and a converging national developmental landscape in post-Mao era when the state seemingly opts for efficiency and polarization. The restructured settlement system and changing rural-urban relations are another two essential elements that have significant implications for understanding the logical linkages between the functioning of the socialist state and the process of spatial transformation. While the artificial urban- rural separation and the sharp contrast between protected large cities and repressed small towns in the Maoist era could be attributed to the articulation of a peculiar plan-ideological regime, the genuine development of numerou1s small towns and rapid urbanization of the countryside have been driven primarily by local initiative without increased financial input of the central state. If the current trend of localization continues for an extended period of time, a new dimension of bottom-up development or "urbanization from below" may well develop to complement the orthodox dimension of city-based urbanization and eventually lead to a distinct pattern of dual-track development and urbanization (Ma and Lin, 1993; Ma and Fan, 1994).

To some extent, the Chinese experience of spatial restructuring since the reforms has shown interesting resemblance to the process of post-Fordist flexible specialization that has already taken place in North America and western Europe (Harvey, 1989; Massey, 1984; Scott, 1988, 1992). Both cases are facilitated by state disarticulation, growing marketization, and shifting emphasis from public welfare provision to privatization and industrial rationalization. They have both demonstrated a rapid expansion of new production space outside the traditional manufacturing heartland and are characterized by the growth of small-scale, self-motivated, and flexible economic activities. What makes the Chinese experience distinct from the western experience is probably the dual track nature of its operating mechanism, in which plan and market or state and non-state sectors coexist. The chief agent of industrial/spatial restructuring in the Chinese context has been mainly the low-tech and labour intensive sector whereas the leading edge of flexible specialization in the West has been high-tech industries and producer services. Moreover, the driving forces in the Chinese case appear to have emanated primarily from the countryside. This is in contrast with the American situation in which spatial restructuring has involved the relocation of firms from the metropolitan cores to selected suburban areas. It may be premature and even irrational to make hasty analogy between the processes of spatial restructuring in two different types of political economy. It seems reasonable to argue, however, that the logic of spatial restructuring, particularly the operating mechanism of interaction between central state, local initiative and global forces, may contain certain regularity and commonality that deserve further investigation. In the current age of globalized interdependent development, many issues of spatial restructuring in China are no longer isolated from the western capitalist world and can not be properly understood without making necessary connections with what has been taking place outside the country.

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Masao Maruyama and Imaginative Geography of the Nation[*]

Today's talk talks into

Sang-Jung KANG[**]

(Translated by Takashi YAMAZAKI[***])

Introduction: Masao Maruyama, why now?

I would like to talk about Masao Maruyama rather than a thesis of space today and to address two topics about his thought since it is related to the subject of space. First, there are significant differences and similarities over the meaning of space among those who argue about it from their own perspectives. Some define it as a methodological concept and others as a substance at the meta-narrative level. Second, there is a need to evaluate in what direction something vernacular or local is moving in the actual context of globalization. In these respects, my talk will have something to do with the subject of space.

My current work is to analyze the construction of discourses or media on China and Korea in the early periods of Japanese modernization in the Meiji era and the Establishment press published by Koreans and Chinese living in Japan in the total-war period of the 1930s. In this sense, Masao Maruyama is a secondary topic for my current work though I do not want to neglect him. However, I have been interested in him and decided to conclude my research on him within this year. So, I would like to talk about one of my three interests, Maruyama. Because my talk has not been completely elaborated and includes many contradictions and discrepancies, you may ask what I

want to say.

Although little time has elapsed since Masao Maruyama passed away, he ranks with Ryotaro Shiba who was a national novelist and also passed away recently. I am very interested in both of them because of this coincidence, and consequently discovered a minor theme to reinterpret the twentieth century Japan through Masao Maruyama. Although the central theme here is space, time or historicity is a companion to space. How space is related to time or historicity in the place of Japan and whether a category of Japan itself is *a propri* self-evident are also included in this reinterpretation of twentieth century Japan in spite of the ambitiousness of the theme. I have chosen Masao Maruyama for this purpose.

Before I begin, I would like to explain the overall framework for my current research. First, I would like to consider state reason and the nation, and nation-building or -poiesis, which is a modified verxsion of what I published in "*Rekishigaku kenkyu*" (historical research)[1]. I will talk about state reason later. Second, I am going to talk about the imaginative geography of the nation which I believe has something to do with geography and space. Third, I would like to consider wars and politics in the twentieth century. To put it concretely, I would like to refer to Masao Maruyama and Weber who was the greatest social scientist in the twentieth century. Fourth, and finally, in terms of the nation and intellectuals, I have chosen Masao Maruyama and Shigeru Nanbara who was Maruyama's teacher. According to these four components, I would like to consider ways to reexamine the history of Japan at the end of the twentieth century and at the demise of the

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** Institute of Socio-Information and Communication Studies, University of Tokyo, kan@isics.u-tokyo.ac.jp
*** Department of Geography, Colorado University, Ph.D. student, yamazaki@ucsub.colorado.edu

postwar period.

Maruyama and the state of Meiji

Today's talk falls into one of the before-mentioned components. What I would like to address is the reason why Masao Maruyama becomes problematic in terms of the subject of space, which is clear to me but not necessarily to you. Maruyama, in fact, wrote many reviews on Yukichi Fukuzawa beginning during the second world war until the time he passed away. I personally believe that the thoughts of Yukichi Fukuzawa and Masao Maruyama represent typical intellectual discourses in prewar and postwar Japan respectively. I think examining these two intellectuals can clarify the modernity of Japan lasting through the war as problematic.

In one of his reviews on Fukuzawa, Maruyama argues that a certain society in a certain period of time has its own discipline typical to the time and society and that the discipline in prewar Japan was established by Yukichi Fukuzawa. I think that the equivalent to it in the discursive space of postwar Japan is represented by Masao Maruyama, though this categorization is too academic. This is the reason I have chosen him.

Before I came here, a newspaper company asked me to watch the movie entitled "Pride". As I watched the movie, I could not help thinking of the issue of history and the nation. Why do it become an issue now? A group of cohesive people called nation, a geographical representation as a basis for the nation, a national land to sustain the nation, and a history or narrative for telling the history which is imprinted in the nation are discussed when the twentieth century comes to a dead end. A movie such as this is made when the postwar period is allegedly over. Issues over national history and narrative are being debated in the fields of social sciences, thoughts, and philosophy. When I consider these issues, Masao Maruyama gives me great insight into these issues.

There is another key person, Ryotaro Shiba, who we should examine in considering these issues. Popular novels have been read and loved by an astronomical number of people ever since the

prewar period. They still maintain deep-rooted popularity through visual media such as the *Nippon Hoso Kyokai* (NHK). I think the nationwide popularity and influence of Ryotaro Shiba as well as Maruyama has a symbolic meaning in this sense.

Although I wanted to think of these two intellectuals as key players, I would like to make Shiba a byplayer and talk mainly about Maruyama. If I dare to draw a clear line between the prewar and postwar periods on August 15, 1945, I can hypothetically argue that Maruyama's idea shifted from history to space across the line. Today I would like to talk about why the shift happened and what it implies. Both Maruyama and Shiba ascribe one of the origins of postwar Japan to the Meiji era. Exactly speaking, they ascribe it to the state of Meiji, not to the era of Meiji. While Maruyama published an article entitled *'Meiji kokka no seishin'* (the spirit of the state of Meiji)[2] in 1949, Shiba's posthumous manuscripts *"Showa toiu kokka"* (the state of Showa)[3] were recently published by the NHK. Before this Shiba published *"Meiji toiu kokka"* (the state of Meiji)[4], which became a best seller and has been reprinted so often that we cannot compete against his sales ability. Why were they obsessed by the state, especially by the state of Meiji?

Another aspect they share in common is the feeling towards the Showa era. Masao Maruyama developed his very radical and brilliant political analysis of the Fascist period of the Showa era and the era in general in one of his best sellers *"Gendai seiji no shiso to kodo"* (thought and behavior in modern Japanese politics)[5] published first by *Miraisha*. Shiba's essays on the era have also been published as *"Showa toiu kokka"*. For both of them, I think, the era of Showa was limited to the wartime period from the 1930s to the early 1940s. It was the era which was very abnormal and completely deviated from the modernity of Japan. As you know, Maruyama went to Pyongyang, or *Heijo*, as a common soldier and was finally bombed at Ujina in Hiroshima Prefecture. Ryotaro Shiba also went to Nomonhan as a common soldier of a tank corps. Although Maruyama was about ten years older than Shiba, they both had a similar experience of the war.

The eras of Meiji and Showa had their dark and bright sides. The postwar period of Showa

means to Maruyama and Shiba a return to the bright era of Meiji and gives them the impression of the Renaissance of the Meiji era. Although their backgrounds as an intellectual working in an imperial university and as a nationally popular novelist were different, they share so much in common that their perception of the postwar period of Showa seems to have become a national agreement and to have been established as a national narrative.

When I ask myself why it is like this, I realize that we usually accept the fact that since the Emperor's announcement of Japan's surrender and what Maruyama called 'the revolution of August 15', the period and space called postwar Japan have been separated from the prewar period and remained as such for more than fifty years. However, this seems to be a fiction which I have difficulty accepting.

As you know, in one of his articles Maruyama said that he expected the vacant fantasy of postwar democracy rather than the real existence of the Great Japanese Empire. The 'revolution of August 15' began with the Declaration of Humanizing the Emperor made by the Emperor Showa on January 1, 1946. The Declaration actually began with the Imperial Covenant of Five Articles given by the Emperor Meiji. Through these guidelines, the fanaticism of fascism in the Showa era and the military cliques and bureaucrats of the Ministry of the Interior who supported it were all ousted. Then the new Constitution was proclaimed after MacArthur's statement. As a result, the postwar democracy has been understood as the Renaissance of the Meiji era in the discursive space of postwar Japan. The Declaration by the Emperor Showa in fact manifested it. In this narrative, Masao Maruyama published his most famous article 'Chokokkashugi no ronri to shinri' (the logic and psychology of ultra-nationalism) in "Sekai" (the world)[6] and made his debut as an overwhelmingly influential intellectual in the discursive space of postwar Japan.

Although I cannot go into detail about this today because of limited time, between August 15 and MacArthur's statement Maruyama actually believed that it would not be necessary to abandon the Constitution of the Great Japanese Empire if it was partially modified. As far as I know, Maruyama believed that it might be possible to start the postwar period without modifying the

Emperor system if Tatsukichi Minobe's thesis of the Emperor as an institution was followed. After the Emperor died, Maruyama wrote in one of his reminiscences that he was in fact a liberal chief vassal for the Emperor. In this respect, in spite of the fact that he was one of the most liberal and radical intellectuals, he managed to undergo a Copernican change through the clearly external and heteronomous coercion of three principles of people's sovereignty, pacifism, and democracy. They were imposed on him by the General Headquarters as a super-constitutional force over the Emperor.

I wonder why he was like that. I presume that it was not until a series of events such as the Declaration by the Emperor Showa, MacArthur's statement, and the new Constitution of Japan were all present that the thesis of 'the revolution of August 15' was formulated in hindsight. Unfortunately, or as a matter of course, postwar Japan was able to change itself as a result of the collaboration of the power standing over the Constitution of the Great Japanese Empire, or over the power to write a constitution in Schmittian words, and the people enforcing the Constitution. It was not until the course of postwar Japan was determined that Masao Maruyama was able to emerge as a leading intellectual and critic in postwar Japan.

Individual and the nation during the war

Meanwhile, I began to get interested in what kind of discourse Maruyama held during the war. He wrote a very interesting article in the Midori-kai journal[7] published by the Faculty of Law of the University of Tokyo in the 1930s. He argues that fascism is a child of European civil society though it does not resemble its parent, that a European type of civil society therefore cannot oppose Japanese militarism, and that a civil society will ultimately turn into a Fascist state in a period of crisis since a civil society essentially takes the form of an authoritative state. Maruyama claims that it is necessary to create a completely new state regime for Japan and uses the word of 'new dialectic totality' in this context.

Maruyama laid his hope on the new regime led by Fumimaro Konoe in 1940, one year before the attack on Pearl Harbor and soon after the out-

break of the Japan-China war. The movement for this new regime included intellectuals such as professors in the Faculty of Law of the University of Tokyo, Kiyoshi Miki, and Hidemi Ozaki. Maruyama stated in one of his essays that he laid his hope on this movement for the new regime. He thought it necessary to completely eliminate vernacularism from Japan in order to win the total war in the 1940s. He thought it impossible to create a new state for the total war without eliminating patriotic parochialism, local intermediate organizations and a sense of belonging to them, and a sense of primary community, or simply, a sense of *Gemeinschaft*. In this new state, he argued, individuals and the state constitute dialectic totality.

I believe something cast a dark shadow on Maruyama's thought as well as on his later experience during the war. He had a sense of crisis in which Japanese nationalism could not build up a war regime as in Europe, nor could the total-war regime work as a whole because of very local, or vernacular, senses and interests in Japan. Maruyama thought a more modern nation-state should be created so as to be different from the totalitarian state in the Fascist period. In '*Fukuzawa Yukichi*'[8] he states clearly that individual independence leads to state independence and that free and autonomous individuals and state totality constitute, or provide a vision of, dialectic totality without contradiction.

Let me use a different analogy. Maruyama believed that the *aporia* in the modern Japanese state was the separation of individual and national consciousness, or of individuality and totality, and that the emancipation of subject, or subjective internality in his words, and nationalism were actually both sides of the same coin. In this kind of modernization, or in a modern society such as this, nationalism cannot help taking a distorted form. Maruyama's major concern was how to overcome it.

In this sense, Maruyama regarded the war period as a perfect opportunity to create the total-war regime. He thought that the years between the 1930s and the early 1940s in that regime could be an epoch-making period to end vernacular consciousness, elemental parochialism, familistic consciousness, or local decentralized interests which had sustained nationalism since the Meiji

era. This idea represented his sympathy with Konoe's new regime.

With an understanding of such an intention, it would be easier to read his "*Nihon seiji shisoshi kenkyu*" (a study on the history of Japanese political thoughts)[9]. What Maruyama tried to do in his three difficult articles in this book is what I have mentioned so far, that is, to trace individual consciousness back to Sorai Ogyu in the Edo period. He attempted to discover individual consciousness indigenous to Japan and its systematic channel leading to a nation as 'We' through external impacts. He demonstrated it well in "*Nihon seiji shisoshi kenkyu*" borrowing the discourses of several thinkers. On the other hand, Maruyama reviewed Fukuzawa, too. From my point of view, he shared fairly common discourses on the relationship between Japan and China with Kiyoshi Miki and Hidemi Ozaki who participated in *Showa Kenkyukai* (the Showa Study Group) though he emphatically denied it after the war.

The biggest problem for Japan in the 1930s to the early 1940s was *shina mondai* (China problem). When the way to create *toa shin chitsujo* (the new order of East Asia) became the biggest problem, Maruyama appeared to have thought that Japan should construct modern national consciousness through the before-mentioned total-war regime earlier than the rest of East Asia. This meant that the creation of the modern nation should be done by political resolution and not by nationalism in a cultural sense. We know examples of the latter as reviews of the Japanese and Japanese culture after the war. In Maruyama's words, the nation tries to become the nation, meaning the nation is created through an important resolution. Maruyama meant to create the will of the nation through democracy. He envisaged that as soon as Japan created its nation in the total-war regime it would support Chinese nationalism and build up a close connection with China through modern national consciousness. *Toa shin chitsujo* could finally be created on this relationship.

This is exactly what Miki thought. What Kiyoshi Miki considered in his many essays around 1940 is not Japanese consciousness which is known today through reviews of the Japanese or is sustained by local patriotism, but clearly national consciousness in a political sense for which

he continued to argue. Maruyama also believed that without national consciousness in a political sense China and Japan, having different cultural backgrounds, could never build up a connection in East Asia. This connection was based not on cultural but on political commonality. Focusing on this idea, he attempted to overcome crises in the 1930s and 40s. I interpret this as Maruyama's basic study on the history of thoughts during the war.

However, after the war his study started changing drastically. I would like to turn to the subject of space by referring briefly to the reason for the change. As you know, Maruyama contributed a bibliographical introduction to the fifth volume of Heibonsha's complete works of Koji Iizuka[10], who was one of the most famous economic or human geographers. He states in the introduction that he had a prejudice towards Iizuka's major field, economic geography, since he had already been influenced by the Marxist thesis of developmental stages and that he rejected it all the more strongly due to the atmosphere of those days that was full of territorial concepts such as *daitoa* (great East Asia) and gross land. He also writes that he was drafted as a common soldier on July 1, 1944 and went to the corps at *Heijo*, currently Pyongyang, in Korea. As a result Maruyama had no opportunities to exchange intimate words with Iizuka in the field of Eastern culture as far as he remembered.

Maruyama always had in mind an idea of history rather than of space. His idea was above all a thesis of linear and single-track developmental stages. In this sense, Maruyama always thought of a sequential order between Japan and China which can be called typical modernism.

From history to space: The change of Maruyama after the war

However, Maruyama's idea was gradually changing. It is interesting to know his most famous and best masterpiece "Nihon seiji shisoshi kenkyu" was written to rival Iwao Koyama's "Sekaishi no tetsugaku" (philosophy of the world history)[11]. It was the most famous work in the Kyoto School which was prevail the thesis of 'Kindai no chokoku' (overcoming modernity). It seems Maruyama felt himself as a rival of Tetsuo

Watsuji as well. Iwao Koyama's "Sekaishi no tetsugaku" was published by Iwanami Shoten in 1942 and included a very important chapter entitled 'Rekishi no kukansei to kukan no rekishisei' (spatiality of history and historicity of space).

In this chapter, Iwao Koyama describes how the world history can diverge from European history into histories and uses Japan as a counterpart to depict world history as histories. To use Japan as a counterpart, he refers to the special particularity of Japan in the world. In order to do this, he writes an ambitious chapter 'Rekishi no kukansei to kukan no rekishisei' and proposes, already at this level, a new regime as a mediator between history and space.

When Koyama launched the 'kindai no chokoku' thesis, he had already talked about the spatiality of history and historicity of space. Maruyama always had a sense of difference towards the issue of space. Michel Foucault mentions that while those who talk about space are reactionary, those who talk about history are progressive. In one of his essays Maruyama also expressed the same view. Since Maruyama was a typical young Marxist, he put more importance on history than on space.

However, when the war was over, Japan lost all of its colonies and returned to the early territory of the nation-state in the Meiji era. Japan decreased to that size through the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations. As I mentioned at the beginning of this talk, Maruyama came to believe that Japan returned to some period in the Meiji era. In other words, he thought that Japan developed from a pure form of the nation-state to create a new colonial space of the empire beyond the nation-state and was externally forced to decrease in size to the early nation-state through the defeat. He believed the early nation-state to be an authentic form of Japan, meaning that the discursive space of postwar Japan returned to the Meiji era. I believe that Maruyama concluded that the colonial space was a deviant, very transitional, and temporary phenomenon. Considering Japan in this scenario, he questioned whether it might be impossible to measure Japan's particularity with a modern scale. He started gradually looking for a key to Japan's particularity by referring to space, by thinking what spatial location Japan occupied, and by clarifying Japan's geo-cultural, *Geokurturich*, geographical or geopolitical position in

Wallerstein's terms.

In 1981 Maruyama gave a series of lectures at a university. The lectures were included in his collected lectures entitled *'Genkei, koso, shitsuyo teion'* (prototype, old layer, and persistent underlying tone)[12]. He stated in the lectures that in the field of political science *Geopolitik* such as Haushofer's emphasized geographical position and climate, that *Geopolitik* had disappeared from academic circles because it was used by the Nazis. In addition, he stated that Carl Schmitt applied the same perspective to his thesis in his famous "*Daichi no nomosu*" (the *nomos* of the earth)[13] and fought alone after the war though he was a war criminal. Although Maruyama refused to entirely accept *Geopolitik* or a perspective such as Schmitt's "*Daichi no nomosu*", he argued how the geographical, geopolitical or geo-cultural position of Japan had biased and convoluted Japanese culture or the prototype of temporal or historical consciousness inherent in Japan. This is mentioned in his famous article *'Rekishi ishiki no koso'* (the old layer of historical consciousness)[14].

Apparently, Maruyama began to suspect that modernization as an eternal revolution would have more contradictions through the rapid economic growth after the 1960s. He suspected it would not become positive so easily. He seemed to understand that space did not bring about the linear progress of history as he had thought during the war, but particularity which always interrupted and biased the progress. This understanding began to emerge in his thought in the 1950s or near the end of the 1940s. As shown in his reviews of Yukichi Fukuzawa, *'Kindai nihon shisoshi ni okeru kokka risei no mondai'* (the subject of state reason in the history of modern Japanese thoughts)[15], *'Meiji kokka no seishin'*, *'Kaikoku'* (opening the state)[16], or *'Rekishi ishiki no koso'*, the subject of space inherent in Japan continued to be in his thought. In his simple words, his tone of emphasis on the history of thoughts was shifting from a vertical to a horizontal axis, or from history to space.

Iwao Koyama compares Japan, Polynesia, the Korea Peninsula, and China in the famous part of his *'Rekishi no kukansei to kukan no rekishisei'*. His question is in what kind of place a new civilization is created as a result of the migration of older one. He argues it is at the spatial position of the Japan Islands that a place to create an inherent and historically new civilization can be found. His philosophical arguments show that Japan is an original *topos* completely different from the Pacific Islands such as Melanesia and Polynesia, a peninsula such as the Korea Peninsula, and the China Continent.

Maruyama makes exactly the same comparison as Koyama in *'Genkei, koso, shitsuyo teion'* though it is not clear whether Maruyama read Koyama's article. I cannot specify what Maruyama actually says since I do not have his article with me. Maruyama understands that the reason why the modernization of Asia was not realized in the Pacific Islands or island states but only in Japan can be explained through geographical, geopolitical, or geo-cultural comparison.

As I read it, I realized Maruyama said exactly the same thing as Koyama whom he most criticized. I believe Maruyama as well as Koyama probably read Watsuji's works very carefully. What Watsuji wants to say in his thesis of climate can be understood by reading his review of China. Maruyama extracts an archetype of something particular in Japan as *'tsugi tsugi ni nariyuku ikioi'* (continuous reproduction of driving force) from the mythological periods described in *"Kojiki"* (the records of old affairs) and *"Nihon shoki"* (the national history of Japan). In *'Rekishi ishiki no koso'*, he demonstrates well how particularity in Japan has continued to exist as a persistent underlying tone from the ancient to the modern and contemporary periods. He concretely explains that one of the major factors to sustain this mechanism is the spatial position, or *topos*, of Japan.

I think that this discourse overlaps in many ways with the particularistic interpretation of Japan and reviews of Japanese culture and the Japanese in postwar Japan. Like *"Bunmei toshiteno ie shakai"* (the family-oriented society as a civilization)[17] published in the 1970s, this is a kind of argument in which Japan is regarded as permanently self-evident and in which the spatial particularity of Japan's *topos* is related to an archetype of Japanese historical consciousness and is compared with Asia and Europe.

A limit of Maruyama's political science

In the end, Maruyama's postwar thesis on Japan shifted in the before-mentioned direction. From Maruyama's point of view, I wonder if he himself contributed to discourses creating the objects he had to criticize though his basic motivation was to critically oppose particularity emerging in the old layer of Japanese historical consciousness. I assume that he regarded Japan as self-evident and believed that its nation, its geographical representations, or its fundamental culture to create them maintained unbroken continuity. I wonder if he unconsciously repeated this rather modern discourse on Japan again.

Although Maruyama, in this respect, was the most modern intellectual, he was unconsciously affected by this meta-narrative discourse when he shifted to a spatial perspective. When we talk about Japan it necessary for us to critically reconstruct this meta-narrative discourse in a more historical context again. Otherwise, Maruyama's discourses over Japan would be absorbed in the ideological understanding of Japan. I personally believe that his position in his last years was almost on the edge of the absorption.

Masao Maruyama had thoroughly read German *Geopolitik* during the war and understood in his own way Watsuji's thesis on climate and Kyoto School's discourses over history and space. However, his major interest during the war was in how to build a modern nation. He believed that Japan was spontaneously producing relatively advanced elements of modernization in underdeveloped Asia or elements in the stagnant East. His vision was that Japan could take the lead in building a modernized nation and build up a closer connection with China.

However, the subject of space which had interested him less began to emerge clearly in his thought when he talked about Japan after the postwar rupture with China. This type of discourse can be found at the beginning of the Meiji era. Aritomo Yamagata proposed an argument at the first imperial assembly in 1890. His imaginative geography was represented by the boundaries of interests and sovereignty and was related to Imperial Japan. Imaginative geography such as this was expressed in domestic and international politics. Although Maruyama briefly mentioned this in *'Kindai nihon shisoshi ni okeru kokka risei no mondai'*, he stopped critically reconstructing a priori aspects of the nation again by contextual-izing them historically.

He states, for example, that what allows the Japanese and Japanese culture to exist is a historically profound principle. He explains the principle by stating that compared to other civilized countries, Japan has established an exceptionally homogenous society in terms of territory, nation, language, the mode of producing wet-field rice, and the form of settlements and festivals related to this mode. In addition, he states that Japan has maintained its society over a thousand years since the late Tumulus era.

As he mentions in *'Rekishi ishiki no koso'*, he assumes at the meta-narrative level that Japan, the Japanese, or Japanese ethnicity are very solid. He does not perceive geographical frontiers forming Japan. Therefore, he does not see how Okinawa or Ryukyu, Hokkaido, and vernacularity within Japan have been reconstructed, hidden, or oppressed in the process of nation-building.

When we now think of the academic national narratives of Masao Maruyama as well as Ryotaro Shiba and reconstruct them historically, it is almost impossible to find in Maruyama's academic works the answers to the following questions. How did the nation absorb, transform, and assimilate differences within it or on the edge of its frontier? How was diversity or incommensurability absorbed into the nation before homogeneity was formed within it ? What kind of heterogeneity did the empire meet when it expanded outward? What kind of cultural encounter did it achieve? Although the national territory and its imaginative geography has decreased to the size of current Japan following the demise of the empire, how is the encounter still applied to or alive in historical memories or other places within Japan?

In this sense, the political science of Masao Maruyama is typically that of nationalism. There are positive aspects and limits in his political science. When nationalism is being dissolved, I try to rediscover what discourses concerning the nation or nationalism have not yet been presented at both levels of history and space. I believe this work will provide historical materials in terms of considering how to outline a state, a supra-state or regional entity, and a sub-state or regional entity in a global era.

Beyond Maruyama

One of Maruyama's students, Taichiro Mitani, studies political history and holds a different perspective of him. Summarizing a hundred years of modern Japan, Mitani argues that these years were history made up of wartime regimes and postwar regimes, that Japanese democracy consisted fundamentally of postwar democracies, and, therefore, that all the regimes after the Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War, and the First World War were postwar democracies. We now think of current postwar democracy as the last democracy fifty years after the war.

However, it is clear that this history would not have existed without the revolutionary changes of the wartime regime though this mobilization regime was the period of the world war at the end of the 1930s. This is also the history of the constant spatial expansion of Japan's frontiers enclosing colonies. Postwar democracy is often a period which addresses the issue of postcolonialism. In the fourth postwar democracy, this issue was addressed for the first time though it was virtually frozen for the following fifty years. This effect of the Cold War can be explained from a historical and spatial point of view. After the frozen fifty years, the Cold War came to the end and thawed. The blind spots, which were overlooked in the discussion about the nation in the space-time of the Cold War, began to emerge. From this perspective, it is no wonder that the limits of Maruyama can be seen after the Cold War.

While the space-time expressed in terms of the nation is becoming obsolete, a global aspect and a local aspect confront and mix each other. I would also like to consider a regional aspect regarding this subject which may be what Maruyama could not understand. As Mitani says, colonization was in fact a violent form of regionalism. This regionalism was established only through the formation of the empire. In our time, three tiers of globalization, localization, and regionalization affect the space-time of the nation-state and compete with each other. In this respect, the issues of postcolonialism, the empire, the nation, and locality are intricately related to each other and raised before us. I believe discourses such as Maruyama's are not sufficient to grasp these issues.

Discussions

Questioner: I am Yamazaki from Yamaguchi Prefectural University. My major is political geography. As you mentioned, political geography was involved in geopolitics during the war. This has created the atmosphere in geography as well as in political geography where scholars do not talk about politics. Although this was also seen in Europe and America, the recovery in Japan has been delayed. In spite of the fact that a research meeting of political geographers was held in the geographical conference, only I came here today. The reason I am here is because I knew you are presenting. Ever since reading your article on imaginative geography citing Said in "Shiso" (thoughts), I also believe that no geographer has as excellent a geographical sense as you do. I have been following you in the media through discussion programs on TV and I am glad to have heard your stimulating talk today. However I am discouraged by the current situation in which geographers have not critically overcome the discourses by Watsuji and Koji Iizuka setting Maruyama aside.

Though my questions may not be related to what I just said, I have two. One concerns what you mentioned at the beginning and is written in the back of your handout. You talked about making a political, not cultural, resolution on more modern national consciousness. I would like you to elaborate a little bit more about this political resolution. The other question is related to what you mentioned near the end of your talk. As you said, Maruyama was searching for an image of Japan growing out of Asian stagnation with the intention of building a modern nation before the war. I am, however, wondering why Maruyama continued to internalize the afterimage after the war, or why he restored his discourses by regarding the topos of Japan as self-evident even after the war. Is this simply the afterimage from wartime, or were there any factors in the postwar period which made Maruyama maintain his discourses? I would appreciate hearing your opinions on these two points.

Kang: Thank you very much. I am not yet very clear about them, either. I would like to answer

the second question first though it might be very personal comment. A book entitled "*Nihon no shiso*" (thoughts in Japan) was recently translated in Korea by Jong-Sopp Choi, a famous political scientist of Ko-Ryu University. He commented on his translation in the *Han-Gyul* newspaper. Although he admired Masao Maruyama very much on one hand, he mentioned on the other that Maruyama's discourses on Asia were hard to be found. I agree with him. For me, it is very hard to understand his position on Asia from his reputation and writings, too.

This is probably not the matter of theory. As you know, Maruyama served in the war for a second time at Ujina near the end of the war. He was affected by the atomic bombing there and given a *hibakusha techo* (a notebook for medical records given to a victim of radiation sickness caused by the atomic bomb: translator) when he went to Hiroshima though he later refused to accept it. He tried not to talk about his history as a victim of the atomic bombing. In addition, the General Staff Office of Japan was located at Ujina at the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War. The Emperor Meiji, though he was said to have had relatively peaceful ideas, moved the Office to Ujina and stayed there in military uniform. Maruyama was there, too. This is a symbolic story.

I believe his father, Kanji Maruyama, had a great deal of influential on him. As you know, Masao Maruyama was born in Osaka. Osaka was under the strong influence of the Asahi newspaper. Kanji was a famous journalist and active as a journalist in the Korea Peninsula during wartime. In addition, Kanji had close relationships with other famous journalists, Sanzan Ikebe and above all Nyozekan Hasegawa. Masao also had a very close relationship with Nyozekan. Masao's first place for his military service was Pyongyang and he stayed there for three months. It seems very strange to me that he did not record anything in his diaries or other writings during that period. Although he must have had detailed information about the situation in the Peninsula from Kanji Maruyama, he mentioned very little about it. There was an absence during this period which I do not understand very well.

I believe Marxist developmental theory had a strong influence on him in the 1930s. He was quite affected by Wittfogel who wrote about Oriental despotism. It was not until Wittfogel made

Herbert Norman the object of an attack by McCarthyism that Maruyama began to criticize Wittfogel and his idea of Oriental despotism. I assume that at the levels of his personality and theory, Maruyama deeply internalized this way of thinking.

Although I have not yet begun this, I think it will be necessary to examine the relationships of journalists and men of letters with China and Korea in the future. When I read Nyozekan's "*London! London?*" in *Iwanami* Paperbacks, I realized that there were clearly Orientalistic discourses on China at the end of his book. Even Nyozekan as a liberalist wrote this. When Soseki Natsume stopped over at South East Asia before going to London, he was cheated when he bought a souvenir. He got very angry and wrote down what he said in his diary. It says people without their countries are vulgar. He wrote that those who were colonized and lost their countries were mentally vulgar while he knew well how miserable he felt when being treated like a dwarf due to his size in Europe. I think Maruyama may have has this type of complex, too.

Although I do not intend to make fun of Maruyama, there is an interesting story I would like to share. As I mentioned before, when he met Iizuka for the first time, he wrote that he had never met such a handsome Hollywood-movie-star-like man as Iizuka and that he kept staring at his profile. He also wrote that his father, Kanji, would say to him, "Masao, you are lucky to be born as a man" and that the fact that he was not handsome became his strong complex. He compared himself with Koji Iizuka as a 'modern boy' who looked like a handsome Hollywood movie star after the 1920s.

The following may sound silly but it is a famous story about Soseki. When Soseki went to London and looked for someone shorter than him, he eventually someone that turned out to be his own reflection in the mirror. In terms of this, I wonder what the Korea Peninsula looked like to Maruyama. Soldiers' letters or writings on the Sino-Japanese War which I have read offer the image that sanitary conditions were very bad and that it was much dirtier than they had heard. Nyozekan described the same way in "*London! London?*." As Soseki write in his essay of "*Man Kan tokoro dokoro*" (travel essay in Manchuria and Korea), his first comment was that it was

dirty. Most people say the same thing as their physical impression. In Riichi Yokomitsu's "Shanghai" on labor disputes in 1925, the concession of Shanghai was strongly expressed as the image of dirtiness.

Based on this physical impression, simplistic theses on developmental stages or Asia were supported in the 1930s. I argue that this tendency was especially strong in Marxism and that it continued to exist in a different form in Maruyama's thought even after the war. Later it appeared in his geopolitical and geo-cultural comparison between Japan and Asia. As Said says, it is true that Orientalism is a comparative study. I believe that Orientalism appears as comparison with different forms in Otsuka's comparative economic history or Maruyama's idea of comparative political culture. Therefore, it would be necessary to examine what was changed and what was not changed in intellectuals' discourses and thoughts during the time before and after the war. This is my tentative answer to one of your questions.

The answer to your first question regarding to 'resolutionism' might be very hard to understand. For example, Kiyoshi Miki said exactly the same thing as Maruyama in his essays and speeches in the 1930s and 40s. When he went to Manchuria, he emphasized *gozoku kyowa*. This means the co-operation of five nations and is similar to the current EU as a principle. Though more than 90% of the population were Chinese, the Japanese were domineering over other nations. They arrogantly believed Japanese culture was superior, rudely expressed Japanese parochialism, and formed their own groups at the exclusion of others. Miki believed these conditions would hinder the cooperation of the five nations and argued that the nation should be modern.

His position is similar to Maruyama's and both resemble the concept of 'nation' after the French Revolution. This meaning of nation states that the nation is formed through a resolution to become a French national, not through racial, ethnic, or cultural background. As long as the nation is defined that way, the concept is different from *Nation* in Germany. I believe this is along the lines of Jacobinist nationality. Enlightenmentist or Jacobinist nationality such as this consistently existed in Maruyama's thought. Without this nationality, it would have been impossible to engage the cooperation of communities from different racial, ethnic, and cultural backgrounds. This was without doubt the idea that East Asia should be joined together against the imperialism of the great powers over Asia.

In "Yabe nikki" (Yabe's diary) written by Teiji Yabe, one of Maruyama's advisors, Yabe wrote that he screamed "*Banzai!*" (cheers!) on December 8, 1941 when he heard about the attack on Pearl Harbor. He wrote he was exceedingly glad. I believe that Yabe's reaction was common to most of the academicians of imperial universities at that time and that Maruyama was no exception at all.

For Maruyama, there was a space of politics as a principle needed to overcome cultural, ethnic, and local differences. The space of politics was designed for the resolution to do this. Maruyama thought the nation could not be defined by culture or language. He understood the nation as a memorized or imagined community. Although the *ethnie* of the Japanese does exist as an ethnic basis for the community, it is still a cultural nation. In order to become a modern nation in a political sense, the problems of democracy and nationalism have to be solved. In this sense, Maruyama tried to revive a nation-state of Japan in the trinity of political resolutionism, democracy, and a nation. He believed that China, which could not form nationalism because of its internal sectionalism, should form Sun-Wenian nationalism under the influence of Japan as a revived nation and that both countries should establish a new order of East Asia as equal partners. I believe this is a kind of regionalism.

Maruyama actually referred to Sun Wen very often in the 1940s. In this sense, his resolutionist conception of a nation, as I mentioned just now, implies that politics appears as a common space beyond cultural, ethnic, and linguistic differences and that individuals make a resolution to become a nation spontaneously through democratic principles such as a referendum. As a result a new regime as well as a government and politics representing it is created. I believe this regime was Konoe's new regime for Maruyama.

Yamazaki: Thank you very much. I understand most of what you said. I wanted to hear your answers before making one more comment. Alt-

hough they are the ideas of the same person, there is a contradiction between resolution as a political community and Japan as *topos* in which Maruyama was caught after the war. While I am encouraged by your speech, I am discouraged to hear Maruyama was like this. Although Maruyama as an intellectual representing Japan argued the establishment of democracy and a political community, he could not overcome his limit at the personal level. I feel this implies very difficult problems for the future society. This is just a comment. Thank you very much.

Kang: I think so, too. I think there are significant contradictions. I suppose this was caused mainly by the dismantling of the empire. The textbook in geography used in *kokumin gakko* (national elementary schools) around 1937 explained that the Great Japanese Empire consisted of the Japan Islands and the Korean Peninsula and that 70% of the total population were Japanese and 30% were people in overseas colonies. Children going to *kokumin gakko* at that time had the fundamental assumption that the state of Japan consisted of the Islands and the Peninsula as its core areas. I think it is necessary to read Maruyama's narratives on the nation in the context of the dismantling of the empire. As Benedict Anderson says, if the tight skin of a nation is stretched outward in the form of an empire, the nation may necessarily encounter something different and its skin may be torn. Therefore, the empire always retains the possibility that the pure homogeneity of its nation is sometimes infringed upon and made hybrid. These issues were absorbed again within the tight skin of the nation when the empire was dismantled. The part which was not absorbed still remains as postcolonial issues such as Okinawa and Sakhalin.

Questioner: I am Hanada from the University of Tokyo. Before the war, Maruyama was critical of the idea of 'historicity of space' or 'spatiality of history'. In this case, Maruyama depended on an axis of history. However, you said his axis shifted from history to space after the war. It is true that he used spatial arrangement as a metaphor for his postwar analysis in his debut article *'Chokokkashugi no ronri to shinri'*. It is said that he wrote the draft of his article right after the war when he was in the suburb of Hiroshima. I remember that

he paid attention to space around that time. Why, then, did he put an importance on history when his country was an empire and shift it onto space after the empire was dismantled? How can it be explained?

Kang: It is a hard question. I don't understand it well, either. Judging from the postscripts of the Japanese and English versions of *"Nihon seiji shisoshi kenkyu"*[18], it seems that he realized something was missing after he finished the book. It seems that he felt the same way while writing about how modern thoughts were extracted from the establishment discipline of *shushigaku* (a near modern scholarly sect of Confucianism: translator) and from the process of dismantling the orthodox ideology. Although Maruyama did not clearly refer to it as space, it seems that the idea he started theorizing about in the 1950s after the war had already emerged in his mind when he wrote the last article in *"Nihon seiji shisoshi kenkyu"* in 1944. However, I think he had not yet clarified it as a form of space, as a horizontal axis to open the country as opposed to a vertical axis, or as 'cultural encounter' in his words. After he finished the article, Maruyama realized it was not that modern consciousness lacked in Japan but that it flew there like underground water. He repeatedly argues in the book that it is not that Japan lacked spontaneity to move to modernization but that the spontaneity existed in the establishment's ideology as a category of thought.

As you know, the first article in *"Nihon seiji shisoshi kenkyu"* starts with an argument on Hegel. If I use Hegel's words, it is clearly Hegelian historical philosophy. As you know, in his *"Historical Philosophy"* Hegel states China is an empire of continuity without change. Although Maruyama considers comparison here, he does not systematically conduct a comparative study in *"Nihon seiji shisoshi kenkyu"*. Needless to say, Maruyama does not mention Korean *shushigaku* in the book at all. While his argument moved from the study of Chinese classical literature by Sorai Ogyu through that of Japanese classical literature by Norinaga Motoori to Jinsai Ito's work, it is likely that Maruyama thought about how different they were from Confucianism as China's established ideology or from the neo-Confucianism (Korean *shushigaku*) such as Toegye Lee's. When considering how these studies

created an ideology encroaching the establishment from within in the orthodoxy of the feudal regime, I believe, he realized that his questions could not help becoming spatial comparison. After he finished the book he may have wondered why only Japan could established a national community which was different from China and Korea though this idea of national community is distorted compared to a nation as an *Idealtypus*. I think this question made Maruyama consider comparison which seems to have been one of his concerns.

Based on this concern, as you know, after the war Maruyama wrote about Katsunan Kuga who was active in the newspaper *Nihon*. He wrote that Japan finally returned to its authentic four Japan Islands. From there, he continued to think about what was original in Japanese modernity at the level of Asia. For example, though this is your specialty, Mr Hanada, Maruyama compared Goering in Germany and Japanese war criminals. I do not necessarily agree with him. In short, there are his famous arguments that while the Nazis had self-awareness as Fascists who experienced freedom and consciousness, the Japanese did not have free consciousness to take responsibility and that the Japanese war criminals, therefore, cried for their lives while Goering hung himself. Maruyama argues the reason the Nazis slaughtered Jews is that Fascism, emerging from the bottom and experiencing modern individual consciousness, regarded Jews as things, or a *Sache*. Compared to this, he concluded, Japan did not have even that. In this respect, Asian particularity is more clearly contrasted with an *Idealtypus* of European or modern thoughts. On the other hand, I believe, he always kept Japanese particularity in East Asia in his mind.

Hanada: Then, it became easier after the war to treat Japan as space since the empire was dismantled, decreased in size, and purified?

Kang: I would think so. This happened not only to Maruyama but also to Tadao Yanaihara who I studied to a certain extent and to Shigeru Nanbara who I wrote about earlier. I think imaginative geography of the Japan Islands, or the nation, was profoundly imprinted in their minds. When the Cairo Declaration did not recognize the territory of Japan lower than a particular north latitude, Okinawa was not included in Japan. I believe there was a broad national consensus that Okinawa and probably Sakhalin, could be separated from the inherent territory of Japan. I suppose reviews of Japanese culture as a comparative study was not so popular before the war as after the war. What do you think? It seems it is a rather postwar phenomenon that the media is so differentiated and reviews of the Japanese and Japanese culture flourishes so much. It is true that there were ideologists of Japanese nationalism such as Shigetaka Shiga and Katsunan Kuga but I think their ideologies were different from very ethnocentric cultural nationalism which is seen after the war. Therefore, as Mr. Hanada said, Japanese imaginative geography that Japan returned to its pure form and Japanese cultural purity may have stimulated comparison between Japan and others.

Questioner: I am Onjo from Kyushu University. I have just one question. There is a concept of transportation in the works of Yukichi Fukuzawa. I understand it had a significant meaning in his thought when worldwide flows beyond nations were emerging. Maruyama seems to argue about the nation without addressing transportation. What do you think about this difference?

Kang: That is what Mr. Yoshimi wrote about. About Fukuzawa's *minjo isshin* (the renewal of public affairs)?

Yoshimi: Yes, part of it.

Kang: Part of it. In Fukuzawa's idea of *minjo isshin*, the power of communication is in a word emphasized. He clearly understood transportation, communication, and the postage system were the powers of civilization. Fukuzawa was active around the 1870s and 80s when modern geography became connected to the state after the Franco-Prussian War. For Fukuzawa civilization meant the diversification of social communication and the exchange of diverse values of individuals through the communication. The progress of civilization meant to Fukuzawa that impartial political power and the interaction of diverse values in diverse social fields constructs a more plural soci-

ety. I think this is the 'human interaction' thesis in Maruyama's words. Fukuzawa and Maruyama both mention this. In Maruyama's words, this is the society where the mode of communication is diversified through spontaneous associations such as *Meirokusha* so that diverse values are shared.

However, Fukuzawa clearly states that the structure of a state is nationality. Civilization and the structure of a state basically make up a set. This is a basic condition even though the former ultimately goes beyond the latter. Maruyama also argues that modernity constructs an important political community of a nation and that social 'human interaction' among the people and their mode of communication are diversified in the community. For Maruyama, therefore, becoming a diversified and plural society is not contradictory to becoming an externally strong nation-state. For example, the idea of Pax Britannica or Pax Americana implies that an externally strong state can also be an internally weak society or state. Here the issue of the state as a community became important, which is based on the universal public law of the coincidence of a nation and a state.

This is illustrated well in the argument of *Staatsraeson* (state reason) in '*Kindai nihon ni okeru kokka risei no mondai*'. That a society becomes more diverse, I believe, is not contradictory to the idea that the society takes the political form of a nation-state and emerges as a strong state in the space of the international society. Fukuzawa, as well as Maruyama, believed the power of the state increased with the advance of civilization in society. As Foucault says, a state can become stronger by making use of domestic politics sustaining *Staatsraeson* or bio-power in any kind of field such as labor, reproduction, and education. I believe this was one of the fundamental assumptions used to sustain the idea of state reason in the modern state. Basically we have not yet formed a society which is not governed by the state in the modern society. Even though the nation-state is being relativized and very much weakened, we still depend on something established through the state. This issue, for Fukuzawa, is that a diversified society and a mode of communication and the idea of state reason complement each other like the head and tail of the same coin. For example, if we look at the democratic period in the Taisho era, we realize that the 1920s, the time when modernism was activated domestically, brought

about the severest society to the Korean Peninsula. While Americanism was very much advanced within the state in the 1920s, the severest colonial domination was carried out beyond its boundaries. This *aporia* cannot be solved by the ideas of Maruyama and Fukuzawa. Neither Maruyama nor Fukuzawa could believe that the enhancement of associational diversity and spontaneity would make it possible to transcend the communality of the state, though this may be possible in a future world. Maruyama writes in his "*Bunmeiron no gairyaku wo yomu*" (to read "An Introduction to Civilizations")[15] that this transcendency is impossible in the current situation.

I would prefer to examine how impurities and distortions, which were incommensurable between the frontiers of Japan and the nation within the Japan Islands, were historically disposed of in the process of homogeneous *Gleichschaltung* or standardization. Only by historically reconstructing, reexperiencing, and discovering how national history has been narrated through oppressing and hiding impurities and distortions, can we see the external colonies on the horizon of our thought. From this viewpoint, something invisible within the boundaries of the nation will become visible. I believe that without this process, we can hardly deal with the problematic of nationalism though this may not make an answer to your question.

Translator's notes

Notes

[1] The problematique of state reason in the thought of Maruyama Masao, *Rekishigaku Kenkyu*, 701, 1997 (J).

[2] *Meiji kokka no seishin*, Iwanami shoten, 1949 (J).

[3] *Showa to iu kokka*, NHK, 1998 (J).

[4] *Meiji to iu kokka*, NHK, 1989 (J).

[5] *Gendai seiji no shiso to kodo*, Miraisha, 1956, 57 (J).

[6] *Sekai*, 5, 1946 (J).

[7] The concept of state in the political science, *Midorikai Journal of Tokyo Imperial University*, 8, 1936 (J) .

[8] *Sekai rekishi jiten, volume 16*, Heibonsha, 1953 (J).

[9] *Nihon seiji shisoshi kenkyu*, Tokyo daigaku shup-

pankai, 1952 (J).

[10] *Iizuka Koji tyosaku shu, volume 5,* Heibonsha, 1976 (J).

[11] *Sekaishi no tetsugaku,* Iwanami shoten, 1942 (J).

[12] Genkei, koso, shitsuyo teion, *Nihon bunka no kakureta katachi, Dojidai library, 84,* Iwanami Shoten, 1984 (J).

[13] *Daichi no nomosu,* Fukumura shuppan, 1976 (J).

[14] *Nihon no shiso, volume 6, rekishi shiso shu,* Chikuma shobo, 1972 (J).

[15] *Tenbo,* 37, 1949 (J).

[16] *Koza gendai rinri, volume 11, tenkanki no rinrishiso (nihon),* Chikuma shobo, 1959 (J).

[17] Chuo koron sha, 1979 (J).

[18] *Studies in the intellectual history of Tokugawa Japan,* Princeton, 1974.

[19] Iwanami shinsho, 1986 (J).

Translator's notes

Book titles are [...] " Article titles are
indicated by "." [...] non- [...]

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[...]al, 1950, 57 (J).