REPRESENTING LOCAL PLACES AND RAISING VOICES FROM BELOW

Edited by Toshio MIZUUCHI

REPRESENTING LOCAL PLACES
AND RAISING VOICES FROM BELOW

CONTENTS

■ Preface

The subtitle of this book, 'Japanese contribution' and 'geographical thought' do not seem to fit the main title. The following list of this series lets us know that they had started nearly a quarter century before.

1: *Geographical Languages in Different Times and Places*. Edited by Ichiro SUIZU, Kyoto University, Japan, 1980.
2: *Languages, Paradigms and Schools in Geography*. Edited by Keiichi TAKEUCHI, Hitotsubashi University, Japan, 1984.
3: *Cosmology, Epistemology and the History of Geographical Thought*, Edited by Hideki Nozawa, Kyushu University, Japan, 1986.
4: *Indigenous and Foreign Influences in the Development of Japanese Geographical Thought*. Edited by Hideki Nozawa, Kyushu University, Japan, 1989.
5: unedited
6: *Social Theory and Geographical Thought*, Edited by Hideki Nozawa, Kyushu University, Japan, 1996.
7: *Nation, Region and the Politics of Geography in East Asia*, Edited by Toshio MIZUUCHI, Osaka City University, 1999.

I, as an editor, believe that every contribution to this book goes far beyond the traditional style of geographical studies. We should be glad to know that, during the past quarter century in Japan, many younger talented geographers have emerged and are tackling both with the challenging theoretical and empirical themes. Yes, it is partly true, but we also fear the loss of common ground for the geographical academy in Japan due to the scrap-and-built plan of university system. Amidst the trans-disciplinary wave in the human-social sciences, the ideas and knowledge of geography might become popular among other disciplines, but geographers themselves always feel uneasy, studying in a very small office of geography, and sense how big and profound our field is. In any case, the name of this title expresses our motif that we have to break through thinking and act critically in order for our insight to penetrate into the real world,

I would like to express my gratitude, first, to Professor Yoshihara (urban sociologist) who organized the study group for theory of space. He kindly introduced us to Raphaella who contributed her brilliant papers about Jakarta's urban community. Other papers were mainly produced through our encounters at the conferences of International Critical Geography Group (ICGG) and East Asian Regional Conferences in Alternative Geography (EARCAG). We still keep in mind the statement made at the first EARCAG in Korea, which advocated that Asian scholars must work to extend our understanding of the role of space in Asian development. Along this line, we Asians might find the concepts developed in the West insufficient in understanding our peculiar settings. I hope this collection of papers contributes to the promulgation of the Asian theoretical and empirical message to the world.

Toshio Mizuuchi

Globalization and Local Cities:
Focusing on Cities in Tohoku Area[1]

YOSHIHARA, Naoki[*]

In this paper, several issues that emerge during analysis on local cities in globalization will be observed by focusing on local cities in Tohoku area. In the first part, the author will observe the context of review on modernity which is brought about by globalization, by clarifying the social connotation of locality / 'individuality of place' through reexamination of 'central - local' framework. In the next part, the author will focus on local cities in Tohoku area, to clarify the strong connection of 'peripheral Tohoku local cities' with the mechanism of modernity, while observing how is the 'far and away Tohoku society' changing inside the wavering nation state, and how it shows in the present form of Sendai as a regional core city. And based on the above arguments, in the last part, while exploring the issue on theory of typologies of cities in post nation-state, the author will once again observe the contents of meaning of locality.

I. Globalization and Locality

Along with the progress of globalization, social connotation of locality, which can no longer be captured in the conventional frame work of 'central-local' converged on nation-society, is being widely talked about. If we look back, for a considerably long period of time, modern city has been positioned inside the framework of the above-mentioned 'central-local,' which is after all the structure of modern nation-state.

 'Modern nation-state dissolved herself in the movement of "uniformity and accumulation" that led various opposite factors in the composition of labor force which took shape inside a national economy, into one "central". Furthermore, an illusion called communal society was formed inside the mechanism of nation-state, and various movements of discriminating or classing in the society were integrated towards the "nationalization of civil society (Saito Hideharu)." In this "nationalization of civil society," the so called "civilian public sphere" occupied an important position. ... and as "integrating institution" (Yazaki Takeo) or "knotting institution" (Suzuki Eitaro) which appeared on such "civilian public sphere," city functioned more than just as a media' (Yoshihara, 2000: 25-26).

 Also, according to Marxist discourses which posited city as the 'cohesive point of market relations' (Lenin - Otsuka Hisao - Shimazaki Minoru), city was put inside the context of modernity basically. And when it comes to local city, local city placed itself as being integrated into the 'central' metropolitan area in a subordinating position, while placing its feet firmly in the

[*] Tohoku University, JAPAN   n-yoshi@sal.tohoku.ac.jp

context of modernity. Consequently, it was usual to place 'local' as 'peripheral' or 'inferior.' Such composition was accelerated by a series of post-war regional development, and the supporting factor for this was no other than the 'local/periphery's motion of getting caught inside the merciless centripetal force of the central' (Yoshihara, 1997: 73).

However, globalization has made an inroad upon the foundation of modern nation -state/national economy, and this brought about a new 'local' = locality which can no longer be contained in the aforementioned circle of 'central-local', 'center-periphery'. In other words, this is the 'local' = locality which emerged as the paradox of globalization, or what McGrew points out as the five consequences of globalization, namely 'universalization vs. particularization,' 'homogenization vs. differentiation,' 'integration vs. fragmentation,' 'centralization vs. decentralization,' 'juxtaposition vs. syncretization,' in which linkage to place and locale serves as the mutual base (McGrew, 1992: 74-75) [2]. There are of course some arguments, such as David Harvey's, which identify the above-mentioned paradox of globalization and localization as an effect of differentiation by capital. However, there is one important point to be emphasized, i.e. while in some parts it resonates the argument which tries to reinstate the 'diverse local' which has been denied by modern nation-state, there emerges a stand point which tries to discover new development factors in local cities.

Some recent arguments on cities in Tohoku area give emphasis for example on 'individuality of place' (Takahashi Hidehiro) or 'social bases inherent in city' (Hashimoto Kazutaka). Incited by the argument mentioning city's 'original individuality' as the 'local indigenous asset' (Sasaki Masayuki), Takahashi captures 'individuality of place' as a totality of ' human resources or subjective factors in the economic development of local cities ... ... "psychological climate which can be said also as   "local character," or natural, social historical "original unity", or "the society's natural environment a industrial climate" (Takahashi, 2002). These arguments have some affinity with the once flourishedly argued theories of indigenous development or localism, but it also shows strong critical recognition of those theories as having some sides which in the end they were merely an 'imposed spontaneity,' or 'passive spontaneity' (Kainuma Makoto). In any case, the social connotation of locality which specifies cities in Tohoku area, is now being reconsidered as 'historical, geographical, social, cultural, informational /intellectual individuality or characteristics of local cities' (Takahashi, 2002) amidst the progressing 'homogenization vs. differentiation' and 'homogeneity vs. diversity' that accompany the process of globalization.

This paper will not question the theoretical aspect of the above arguments. The important thing is that those arguments do not merely conclude 'cities in Tohoku area as periphery,' which sees 'local' as a 'place for central government to implement its policies,' or as 'place for central government to gain its profit' (Uehara Senroku). And based on the arguments that saw 'cities in Tohoku area as peripheral', the next part of this paper will explore the way local cities have been understood up to the present, and theoretical result from such point of view on local cities.

II. Cities in Tohoku Area as Periphery

Ishimoda Tadashi once mentioned Tohoku area as 'remote and inferior region, which was ruled by the oldest form of feudal system, 'and' colony of central's culture through the history,' (Ishimoda, 1952 & 1953). Ishimoda's emphasis was of course on the fact that 'after Meiji Restoration, the above mentioned Tohoku area freed itself from feudalistic isolation, and was engulfed in the progressive movement of a united Japan's nation building ' (Ishimoda, ibid.). Still, it is also unmistakable fact that after Ishimoda, Tohoku area keeps to be recognized as 'inferior Tohoku, and 'peripheral Tohoku' with image of a remote area. However, it is also difficult to easily consider all of those images emerged merely from a prejudice. For example, during the period from the Russo-Japanese War in which Japan's modernity achieved 'the first core' until the Taisho era, it can not be denied that the urbanization of Tohoku area fell decisively far behind which then led to phenomenon of 'backward Tohoku'. In relation to this slowness in urbanization, Kawanishi Hidemichi discovers that at the beginning of Meiji era the city of Sendai, Akita, Yonezawa in Tohoku area were among 30 cities and comprised 10%, but not long before the Sino-Japanese War only Sendai remained, and after the Russo-Japanese War until Taisho era the rank was getting lower (Kawanishi, 2001: 189-190).

While Tohoku society was carrying out one role as 'local,' and 'periphery', the composition of 'central-local' and 'center-periphery' structure was passing through a period of more than half century and reached its peak during the high economic growth period, or the period when Japan's modernity reached a certain critical phase. As we have observed in the above paragraphs, Japan's postwar development policy has built the skeleton for local cities, and determined their social configuration. In the case of cities in Tohoku area, three cities, i.e.Hachinohe, Sendai port, Joban Kouriyama, were appointed as new industrial cities, and in the New National Comprehensive Development Plan, lake Mutsuogawa emerged as large-scale industrial development area. However, the above mentioned development policy resulted in the rapid progress of population decrease in rural area, and stimulated the characters of source area for labor supply which was hierarchical and discriminative. Referring to two monographs compiled by Watanabe Sake and Haneda Shin, we can see that even though the number of migrant workers from Tohoku area reached its peak during economic high growth period, and was decreasing in the later half period, the center point for post war migrant workers in Japan had always been the demand and supply pipe from Tohoku rural areas to Keihin areas (Watanabe & Haneda, 1977 & 1987). Needles to say that cities in Tohoku area had served as intermediary for the positioning of discriminative and hierarchical labor composition at the lower level, in which the above mentioned migrant workers was incorporated into national economy through modern nation-state hegemony. From other point of view, it can be said that, as relations with various factors in the higher level strengthened 'peripheral cities of Tohoku area' continued to bear the image as remote area, which was then reorganized profoundly.

III. Change in the far and away Tohoku society

Starting from description in the above paragraphs, we should once again focus on one point, as can be seen as follows. The phase which supports independence of place as urban space, combined with the carrying out of communicative role of cities in Tohoku area and also with the

above mentioned continuing existence of image as remote area and its reorganization process, underwent a change from stratum of folkways that was hiding at the base of 'individuality of place', which has been observed in the above paragraphs, to stratum of modernity which is backed by skillful 'dialogue' between power and capital. For a long period of time Tohoku area has, in fact, been supported by thickly layered stratum of numerous folkways and 'shared illusion' which emitted from the stratum. The terms 'stratum of folkways' and 'shared illusion' are based on statement from Uchida Ryuzo (Uchida, 1998), but if we pickup the world as thought by Yanagida Kunio, there will be more than we can count. In folklore, such things are taken as shamanism about 'the honored' and 'the cursed.' However, if we try to give shape to those terms, it will be the 'gloominess ' of Tohoku area. The author once explained this character, based on description by Omura Ryo and Ishikawa Takuboku.

"As Omura Ryo once said, on one hand, the darkness side of Iwate rural area often said as the Tibet of Japan, is discovered as 'severe labor, poor living ... ..., with village community's rules giving restrictions to the people's individual freedom' where 'the people had been left behind several hundred years to make their start, and they make strenuous effort to catch up with the rest, ' these people 'work and work through the season of spring ... when the pomegranate they planted starts to bloom, then comes the summer, then goes the autumn, follows by the winter when the village is buried under the snow,' these people are by no means inferior if compared to they who 'live a prosperous life due to good geographical condition, and come from wealthy family'. The phrases of Omura clearly brings out the darkness dragged by Tohoku society for a long period of time. It is also obvious that the darkness of rural area half contributed to the cause of such condition. Furthermore, Ishikawa Takuboku, native of Tamayama Mura said in his poem that 'my sickness was caused by the far and away. I closed my eyes and I feel it.' Ishikawa's 'far and away' is side by side with poverty and severe labor. However, at the same time it suggest a certain flexibility that is locked in the heart of the darkness of Tohoku society, which is not converged in the poverty, and is deeply rooted in the climate characteristic of the area. This also becomes the foundation of 'shy' character that we can see in each work of Dazai Osamu" (Yoshihara, 1997:74-75)

Recently there seems to be a tendency among studies on Tohoku area, to once again give a form to the 'gloominess' of Tohoku society, where urban and rural have been weaving a world together (regarding this meaning, the author gives attention to technique of the studies on Tohoku area. However, this paper will rather elaborate recent development, i.e. the abstraction of 'far and away' = 'gloominess', in parallel with the above mentioned decolorizing and homogenizing in 'individuality of place' by Takahashi. Certainly in this abstraction process we can see that a series of scenarios of a 'gap correction' have been planted from outside or from the top, and in cooperation with this there has been a slogan of 'breaking away from backwardness' from the 'periphery,' and they have cultivated a 'result' of self-praising among technocrats of the bureaucracy. But at the same time, we should not forget that in this case the afore mentioned continuing existence of image as remote area is still being reorganized, and it is in itself supported by a certain capital overflow. Because, as we have observed, it is not until such capital flow intervenes that the 'far and away' = 'gloominess' character is 'opened' from the stratum of folkways, towards the abstract stratum on one hand and image flow on the other

hand, and along with this, it also makes such character loses its autarchy [3]. Needless to say that the world of tales of old Japan condensed in The Tales of Tono (Tono Monogatari), the collapse of folk custom, and not less important is the growth in number of 'shutter-down roads' which is now becoming the feature of small local towns, all are deeply connected to the above mentioned lost of autarchy.

Ⅳ. The Change of Sendai as a Regional Core City

In this part, we will now observe configuration of cities in Tohoku area, in which the above mentioned change into 'far and away Tohoku society' had been the foundation.

As we all know, during the period of high economic growth, there was a rapid urbanization (in term of population), with a striking population concentration mainly into three metropolitan areas. At the same time regional core cities also showed rapid growth. Afterwards, having gone through 'the age of decentralization' there was an advancing move towards 'concentration into one pole, Tokyo', but during this period only regional core cities maintained a relatively high population growth. And when it comes to cities in Tohoku area, in 1995 number of cities that showed increase in population (compared with 1970) reaches to 43 cities among 63 cities, and number of cities which were loosing population is 20 cities. The interesting point is, 8 out of 10 cities in Akita prefecture which was highly dependent on agriculture, forestry, fishery, and on structurally depressed industries were experiencing a lost in population, whereas in Iwate prefecture 8 out of 13 cities were undergoing the same lost (it is represented in Kamaishi city and Oga city which suffered respectively 28% and 18% of decrease in population). This shows that a change in the structure of industry brings direct consequence to the city's decline. On the other hand, there are cities that enjoy high increase in population, such as Kitakami city (80% increase), Sendai city (42%), Tagajo city (35%), Natori city (33%), also Morioka city (32%). Even though we should also consider the effect from annexation of neighboring municipalities (cities, towns, villages), the enlargement of greater Sendai area which includes Tagajo city and Natori city, is remarkable. In this connection, we should once again give attention to the rapid growth of Sendai as regional core city, which has caused the above mentioned condition.

The factor, which caused Sendai's rapid growth, is the rise of (city) centrality. The index often applied to measure this centrality is focused on the width of wholesale market-region with its wholesale selling amount. Figure 1 points out ranking of cities based on wholesale selling sum, in which we can see that together with Fukuoka city, centrality of Sendai as regional core city shows a remarkable rapid increase (Hino, 2001a: 13). Another index for centrality is accumulation of branch offices. Sendai has been for a long time described as 'city of branch offices economy,' whose head offices are in Tokyo or Osaka, and they started advancing to Sendai after 1950s (Yoshida, 1972). In 1972, percentage of branch offices for wholesale business, which had their head offices in Tokyo or Osaka, had already reached 45% in Sendai (Hino, 2001a: 13). This in itself points out that while Sendai is incorporated into the system of 'central-local' and 'core-periphery' whose unit is one national economy /labor organization, the city also bore the function of wide area where regional block served as its territory.

However, regarding this centrality or territory, since 1990s the character as 'city of

branch offices economy' began to show a considerable change. The change can be seen in the trend of branch offices accumulation in Sendai, in which the city itself is positioned amidst a whole decline of Tohoku cities which are compelled to make reductions, or as being pointed out in Table 1, i.e. on one hand the rise in number of branch offices from Tokyo enterprises shows a sharp curtailment, while there is an increase in number of branch offices from enterprises inside the regional block itself . And as Hino Masateru so aptly points out, 'a certain character as foothold' is being developed, and this character is different from the 'centrality of regional block' that has been shut into a circle of 'central-local' (Hino, 2001b: 30). Such formation of character as foothold/reorganization of territory can be considered as acute manifestation of regional core cities' 'self-initiated reorganization of space, in connection with, or by mediary of world core cities' Iyotani, 1993:104）which is becoming stronger along with the progress of globalization, and also as a 'miniature copy that elaborates the development process of hierarchy-making concerning various city, in which world core cities become the nucleus' (Iyotani, ibid.). In any case, in the new development of branch offices Sendai, which seems to be 'lone winner' city among Tohoku cities, we can catch a glimpse of the globalization's shadow, which is mediated by the development of media technology.

Table 1   Increasing rate of local enterprise and enterprise in other regions of regional core cities in 1986-96   (%)

enterprise	Sapporo	Sendai	Hiroshima	Fukuoka
total	39	44	29	40
local company	39	40	29	39
enterprise in other regions[1]	38	49	30	43
Tokyo enterprise	31	43	23	37
enterprise inside the regional block[2]	25	79	18	66

source : Hino (2001a : 16)
note : 1) indicates enterprise whose headquarter is located inside the regional block
       2) indicates enterprise whose headquarter is located with other municipalities inside the regional block

V. The Ever-Changing Locality

We can see in the above paragraphs that combined with the abundant entry of media technology, at present, the hierarchy/territory composition which forms the foundation of Tohoku cities contains configuration of cities which is not necessarily bound inside a chain of system of monistic 'central-local' which is used to be the supporting factor in formation of space of nation-state. Needless to say that the intervening factor in this case is the borderless capital flow, and mechanism of modernity, which makes abstraction of folkways stratum while resonating such capital flow. However if we are going to thoroughly discuss this matter, there will not be enough space in this paper. Yet there is one point that the author wants to add to the above explanation, that is, in the afore mentioned phase of reorganization of hierarchy/territory, the logic of localism or indigenous development which retain the residue of Fordism, is no longer

adaptable. Locality which enters the range of progressing globalization, has its side of de-territorialization that symbolizes diverse areas, and at the same time posses the side of re-territorialization that is liberated from the metaphor which predominantly symbolizes the myth of 'nature of place'. In the end, locality turns over globalization. And consequently, the characteristic of locality which is stimulated by globalization lays in the fact that while the characteristics is based on the afore mentioned autarchy which is the underground of the stratum of folkways, it does not necessarily return to the latter [4].

To be added as the last remarks, the author will lightly touch upon the subject of genealogy in urban sociology which is directly connected to the above explanation, but the question will not be on the formation of local city theory as one genre in urban sociology. Rather, concerning thesis on analytical axis for local cities, the question is more on the number of accumulation of theory that can serve as reference for study on local cities, and whether there is a kind of genealogy of study. Regarding this point, we must focus on typologies of cities. In fact, in the field of urban sociology and region and community studies, there have been a number of scholars who make lucid and systematical genealogy on typologies of cities, and therefore in this paper the author does not want to make another unnecessary repetition. However, to roughly make a summing-up, the conventional typologies of cities has put emphasis on structural determinant or on organizational constraint, which tends to focus on each city as being integrated to 'central' or 'core', or to treat the transition in city's differentiation and configurational structure which is based on historical development of city, as a mere additional of 'the whole.' Contrary to this, structuring and self-organizing side of local cities, or the way each city defines/redefines 'the whole' are being neglected. In the end, each city's 'social relations which reflect the city's historical stock, city's culture (living in every day life and culture), the unique characteristic formed by the city itself, or the actors of the city etc..... are being set aside' (Ajisaka, 1999: 11). In addition to this, we still have not obtained typologies of cities, in which the dynamics of globalization and locality are largely covered, where convergence and distanction repeatedly intertwine and form layers, at the phase of post nation-state, which is not integrated into only one nation-society.

Reexamining typologies of cities, will naturally question the perspective of urban comparison. Even though there is not enough space in this paper to discuss the matter thoroughly, if we still want to grope for the horizon which connects comparative study to study on local cities, not only that we maintain the heretofore main stream perspective which attaches each local cities to classification of city's scale or to strata-making, by making full use of statistics or data from the government, but we also should consider comparative study which applies 'different/diverse' method to observe and to rearticulate each city/ local city's realities.

Notes

1) This paper is based on the author's presentation in the symposium of Japan Association on Urban Sociology, held in Hokkaido University on July 8, 2001.The author would like to express his gratitude to the moderator and panelists of the session for their valuable comments. For a more detailed theoretical base for this paper, see (Yoshihara, 1999).
2) These paradoxical results of globalization originally come from the characteristics of 'modernity'

pointed out by Baudelaire, C. as follows. 'The painter of modern life……is the transient, the fleeting, the contingent; it is the one half of art, the other being the eternal and the immutable.' (Quoted from Harvey (1989, 10)).

3) This so called autarchy serves as the base of what Polanyi, K. calls as 'economy of subsistence,' and Illich, I. points out as 'conviviality,' and the recent issue in environment theory puts it as 'commons.'

4) Regarding this point, the author does not see locality as 'pure native culture.' In this connection, Smith, P. mentions that the present 'conceptualization of the "local" 'has a tendency towards 'ontologically discernible space that exists as purified "inside", understood as clearly distinct from the transnational flows of ideas, information, financial transactions, religious and cultural movements, media images, and people' (Smith, 2201: 102). Smith mentions such stance as 'privileges the local as a space of "authenticity" '(ibid., 103)

References

Ajisaka, Manabu. 1999 *'Toshi hikaku no shikaku'* (view point for comparison on cities) in Ajisaka, Takahara (eds.) *Chiho toshi no hikaku kenkyu* (Comparative study on local cities), Horitsu bunka sha.

Harvey, D. (1989) *The Condition of Postmodernity*, Blackwell

Hashimoto, Kazutaka. 2000 'Jo' (Introduction) in Hashimoto, Yoshihara (eds.) *Toshi shakai keikaku to toshi kukan* (Urban planning and urban space), Ocha no mizu shobo.

Hino, Masateru. 2001a 'Chiho chusu toshi ni okeru seicho ryoku no sa no kizashi' (On discrepancy in growth ability of regional core cities) in Nihon tokei kyokai (ed.) *Tokei* (Statistics) vol.52 no.6

Hino, Masateru. 2001b 'Shiten haichi no ricchiron teki kosatsu' (A thought on branch offices arrangement from the viewpoint of location) in Fukuoka toshi kagaku kenkyujo (ed.) URC *Toshikagaku* (URC urban science) vol. 47

Ishimoda, Tadashi. 1952 & 1953. *Rekishi to minzoku no hakken* (Discovery on history and people) first and second, Tokyo daigaku shuppankai

Iyotani, Toshio. 1993. *Henbo suru sekai toshi* (Transforming world cities), Yuhikaku

Kawanishi, Hidemichi. 2001 *Tohoku - tsukurareta ikyo* (Tohoku - made-up foreign land), Chuo koron sinsha (chuko shinsho)

McGrew, A. 1992 'Global Society?,' in Hall, S., Held, D. and T. McGrew(eds.) *Modernity and Its Futures*, Polity Press

Smith, M.P. 2001 *Transnational Urbanism; Locating globalization*, Blackwell.

Takahashi, Hidehiro. 2002 'Chiho toshi ni okeru naihatsuteki hatten to sono bunseki shiten' (Indigenous development in local cities and its analytical perspective) in Takahashi, Imano (eds.) *Toshi kino no kodoka to chiiki taio* (Advancement highly of cities functions and local respond), Tohoku daigaku shuppankai

Uchida, Ryuzo. 1998 'Shihon no chiso: shintai, kukan zo no henyo' (Stratum of capital: change in bodily and spatial image) in *10+1* no.14

Furuta, Hiroshi. 1972 'Koiki chushi toshiron josetsu - Sendaishi wo jirei to shite' (Introduction to theory of larger area core city - study on Sendai) in *Chigaku zashi* (Journal of Geography) vol. 81

Yoshihara, Naoki. 1997 'Seiki tenkanki to tohoku shakai' (Turning Point towards the 21st century and the Tohoku society) in Tohoku shakaigakkai (ed.) *Shakaigaku nenpo* (Annual reports of the Tohoku Sociological Society) no.26

Yoshihara, Naoki. 1999 'Modanity no kukan to "bashosei" ' (The space of Modernity and 'locality') in *Tohoku kagaku gijutsu tanki daigaku kiyo* (Bulletin of college of science and technology) vol. 5

Yoshihara, Naoki. 2000 'Toshi no ITka no yukue' (IT and its future in the city) in *Toshi mondai kenkyu*

(Journal of Municipal Problems) vol. 52 no. 12

Watanabe,Sakae and A. Haneda (eds.) 1977 *Dekasegi rodo to noson no seikatsu* (Migrant workers and rural life), Tokyo daigaku shuppan kai

Watanabe, Sakae and A. Haneda (eds.) 1987 *Dekasegi no sogo kenkyu* (Comprehensive study on migrant workers), Tokyo daigaku shuppan kai

The Historical Transformation of Poverty, Discrimination, and Urban Policy in Japanese City:
The Case of Osaka

Toshio MIZUUCHI*

Abstract: Osaka is a city that has pursued capitalist urban development most explicitly in Japan. Accordingly, this city has suffered inevitable urban and social problems caused by capitalist development. In order to cope with these problems, Osaka has promoted the most progressive urban policy. This paper discusses 1) the history of problems of poverty and discrimination in Osaka and 2) the development of urban policy in the context of such particular urban history.

I. Stages of capitalism and urban growth

The histories of cities have been intertwined with stages of colonialism, imperialism, and industrial capitalism. For example, the governing principle of capitalism has provided the urban space with a built environment composed of towns of laborers and bourgeoisie, factories, ports which send off various products, and streets and canals which connect these locations.

The built environment has two characteristics, which are 1) fixed capital and 2) consumption fund. Different groups of people have impacted these characteristics at different historical times. This has depended on who has initiated the collective consumption and who has enforced urban policy. Such distinct historical stages have been embedded in the urban space of various cities, while producing different kinds of cities. The diverse typologies of cities include an imperial capital (*Teito*), a capital of a nation-state, an industrial city, a colonial city, a metropolis, and cities of developing countries.

The competitive industrial capitalism in the nineteenth century produced the working class as an international social group. Cities represented places that generated the contexts for the coexistence of and the confrontation between the impoverished working class and capital.

In the twentieth century, cities were dominated by monopolistic capitalism intertwined with the structure of Fordist production. Within the structure of the wartime economy, total war regime, and New Deal planning policy before WWII, cities controlled by the state created the basis for the urban spatial development. After WWII, the state control of cities remained in the

cities, generated through the welfare state system of mixed economy of Keynesianism.

The depression ignited by the oil crisis drove the Thatcher government of Britain and the Reagan administration in the United States to deny Keynesianism.   In the context of neo-conservative competition, cities as places that draw functions of management, re-industrial urbanization, and spectacle consumption were appreciated.

II. Impoverished urban areas and urban social movement in the 19th century industrial capitalism

1. Poverty and discrimination in 19th century cities

This section first discusses the transformation of urban space during the period starting from the last stage of the feudal system and ending with the rise of industrial capitalism in the 19th century.   In the cities of industrial capitalism, the poor shared the social status opposed to that of a small number of citizens who controlled the urban politics and economy.   Urban poverty in the context of industrial capitalism represented 1) economic poverty and 2) feudal and classist marginality and poverty determined by social status and ethnicity.

Figure 1   Osaka in the early 19th Century (Late Edo Era)
Source: base map is 'Zoshu Kaisei Sesshu Osaka Chizu, 1806)

Poor urban residents placed at the bottom of the class stratification occupied particular urban space. Until the beginning of the 19th century when various commercial activities encouraged the urbanization, the residential segregation generated within the class structure was further intensified among the class of merchants and craftsmen. The class system and communities produced the poverty. We cannot calculate this kind of discrimination in monetary terms or within the criteria of poverty under industrial capitalism.

During the Edo period in Japan, cities established their entities as castle towns (*joukamachi*) in terms of scales and functions. The closed-door policy caused the market to become isolated from the rest of the world. Active transportation of commodities at the domestic level, however, helped castle towns to construct a basis for growth as commercial cities as well as industrial cities that encouraged the development of manufacture and craft works. At the same time, in the context of the class system composed of four social classes – samurai warriors, farmers, craftsmen, and merchants –, castle towns operated the segregation policy which spatially isolated the outcaste communities. Planned land-use controlled the processes of discrimination and poverty inherent in a classist society. Urban poverty of the outcaste was created in the limited urban space produced through the classist social processes as shown in the Figure 1.

Poor vagrant laborers were spatially constrained within the cheap inns quarters in such big cities as Edo (Tokyo) and Osaka during the Edo period. In the Meiji Restoration period, urban space experienced drastic transformation along with revolutionary changes in the spatial and social structures. The living space shared by the factory laborers, the increasing number of urban miscellaneous jobs workers, and manufacturers unable to adjust to the progress of technology became the 'slum' area. Accordingly the view to the underclass, previously hidden behind the rigid class system, became more explicit in conjunction with the processes determined by the capitalist principle of competition in the Meiji period.

2. How did industrialization produce the space of poverty in cities?

In the case of Japan, the huge gap of political systems between the Edo and Meiji periods conveyed a unique transformation of the process of urbanization. At the end of the Edo period, the political leadership of the provincial government (*Han*) administration in the feudal age lost its power. At the beginning of the Meiji period, empty space in cities was enlarged because of the decrease in the population of samurai warriors. Empty space in the urban area was enlarged, and therefore, the scale of cities was reduced toward the 1890s. Beginning in the 1900s (the Meiji 30s), the population of cities started to grow. There were three main factors which promoted urban growth in the Meiji period. The first factor was administrative urbanization developed in prefectural capital cities. The second was industrialization initiated by private entrepreneurs. The third was urbanization, which supported the infrastructures for the military demands represented by the construction of army and navy facilities as well as those for the imperial expansion to East Asia regions.

How did urban poverty arise in the context of Japanese urban space? The emergence of urban poverty made the historical past of the marginalized societies in cities, previously hidden behind the feudal class system, spatially visible. The congregation of the urban miscellaneous jobs workers generated through the mechanism based on feudal classism which had kept the

marginalized population as well as the concentration of female laborers in dormitories built in the context of the development of large scale spinning industry, produced the residential space for the urban poor in various ways.

Gennosuke Yokoyama, with his remarkable reports of 1899 entitled *The lower strata of society in Japan* addresses the urban issues in this historical period.   Other writers including Bungo Sakurada and Gengoro Matsubara reported their exploration into the 'slums'.   The expression 'slums' used here represents the mixture of perspectives of the lower class born out of modernization and images toward the traditionally marginalized societies in cities.

3. Discovery of 'slums' and social improvement movement

Osaka was a pioneering modern city that experienced industrialization at an early stage.   Unlike other cities sharing the castle town origin, the industrialization promoted by the spinning industry and the rapid urbanization in the vicinity of the traditional city area emerged in the 1880s.   According to Gennosuke Yokoyama, Nagamachi in Nipponbashi and Imamiya in its vicinity represented typical cases of rapid urbanization.   This kind of residential space was established in close relation to the geographical concentration of middle and small-scale industries and diversified urban laborers.

The spinning industry, which formed the basis for the early development of industrialization in Japan was separated from the center of cities and built adjacent to the space of the lower class, as the female spinning workers lived in dormitories.   Figure 2 illustrates this geographical situation.

Given such social, geographical and historical contexts, a local improvement movement emerged among the bureaucrats in the Ministry of Interior, who cared about the underclass people and societies.   This local improvement movement originally aimed at dealing with the unstable local communities after the Japan-Russian War.   Eventually, however, this movement made the problems of the underclass visible to policy-makers.   They started pursuing urban social policy based on the survey that focused on urban societies and that was conducted in various areas, making it routine work in the Taisho period.

For example, city officials in Tokyo and Osaka carried out statistical research on underclass people in 1912.   The social survey was conducted in Shitaya, Koishikawa ward, the cheap inns quarters in the whole city of Tokyo and the jurisdiction of Namba Police, towns of typical urban miscellaneous jobs workers and minor factory workers in Osaka as shown in Figure 2.   Inspired by the 1912 study, many other urban social survey projects were performed later in the Taisho era.   Surveys were focused on three types of underclass societies, including 1) outcaste Burakumin ghettoes, 2) residential areas of minor factory workers, and 3) districts of daily laborers.   The central and prefectural governments placed the underclass population under 'surveillance' through their urban social survey projects.

The residential space of the Japanese urban poor can be apparently divided into the following two categories: 1) ghettos historically occupied by outcaste Buraku people and 2) cheap inns quarters for day laborers whose tradition originated in the feudal era.   As mentioned before, the urban built environment since the feudal age represented the core of the poor sections of cities in the modern period.

Since the Taisho period, people from colonized Korea migrated to the urban areas of minor

factories, neighboring these ghettos and cheap inns quarters, and giving them an additional characteristic of the spatial division among ethnic groups.   Along with the concentration of certain ethnic groups was the collective migration of people from Okinawa.

Figure 2   Osaka in the later Meiji Era

Source: base map was drawn in 1907-1909, by the Dept. of Army Ordnance Survey

The characteristics of the built environment in Japanese inner cities reflect the 'dark' age when urban planning was not institutionalized.   Many areas, which used to be paddy fields and footpaths between these fields, were urbanized without planning.   Accordingly, many of these areas were too small for hosting houses, whereas the widths of many roads, which used to be the

paths between rice fields, were too narrow.   In the case of Osaka City (Figure 2 and 3), the area along the current JR Osaka Loop Line represents a byproduct of such unplanned urbanization. The urban built environment that surrounds the old castle town of Osaka city with the shape of a ring reminds us of the Burgess's concentric circle structure.

With the enforcement of the 1919 City Planning and Land Readjustment Act, the legislation of urban planning was institutionalized.   Since 1919, urban suburbs that were to be institutionally planned gradually emerged along with the inner cities developed without planning.

Urban planning represents the state intervention into the urban processes.   The advent of urban planning transformed the production of urban space in the context of industrial capitalism. This transformation took place during the period from the end of Taisho to the beginning of Showa.   Before then, cities were formed under the control of 'invisible hands' of a market, dominated by industrial capitalism.   In contrast, the state intervention in the form of urban planning constructed and controlled the urban built environment, which could not be fully managed within the structure of market mechanism.

4. Urban social movement in the pre-war days

The state intervention in urban planning symbolized the start of the above-mentioned urban social policy.   At the same time, a rice riot, one of the largest urban social movements in Japan, took place throughout the nation in 1918.   Urban residents participated in the movement on the streets, taking direct action and using force.   Actually, urban social movement had already started when angry residents burned and attacked the mansions and facilities of the involved parties in order to express their opposition against the Japan-Russia peace contract and to demand the overthrown of the Katsura administration.

The growth of heavy industry encouraged by the wave of prosperity induced by WWI expanded the number of working class.   As a result, the labor union movement became powerful, receiving support and guidance under the influence of Sodomei (National Trade Unions Confederation).   Labor unions in the urban industrial areas of machinery and assembly processing factories and metal works initiated contentious labor negotiations concerning the wage increase, the rights of collective bargaining, and the shortening of working hours in the second half of Taisho.   In 1921, workers in a shipyard of Kawasaki Heavy Industries and Mitsubishi Shipbuilding led the street type urban social movement in Kobe.

Moreover, the Zenkoku Suiheisha (National Levelers Association) aimed at the emancipation and liberation of outcaste Buraku people's ghettoes (*Buraku*) and Buraku peoples was established in a Buraku in Kyoto in 1922.   Since Buraku were growing around the poor-quality housing areas in cities, the Buraku liberation movement included characteristics of urban social movement.   The impact of the Zenkoku Suiheisha was larger in the development of urban social movements in Western Japan than in Eastern Japan.

III. The public intervention in urban poverty through the production of space

1. Start of urban planning and social policy

The Ministry of Interior and large city governments reacted sensitively to the intense urban

Figure 3 Osaka in the early 1930s
Source: base map was drawn in 1929-1932, by the Dept. of Armyy Ordnance Survey

social and labor movements. Osaka City published 260 issues of the famous 'labor survey report,' the later known as 'Osaka survey report of department of social affairs', for twenty years from 1919 to 1942. The subjects of the report included salaried workers, teachers, merchants, factory workers and various city workers as well as the urban areas of law-standard housing and underclass residential areas. The survey clarified the general states of labor and

living and repeatedly conducted. These reports also addressed the low rent, and high percentage of poor quality housing and foreigners in the inner city, illustrating the residential segregation promoted inevitably through spatial processes dominated by industrial capitalism. Figure 3 typically shows the distributions of low-standard housing and target areas of these social survey.

Hajime Seki, then the celebrated Osaka Mayor, was a pioneering mayor for the introduction of urban social policies. He accomplished a great deal in locating public cheap inns, settlement houses, public housings etc. in the area, that were suffering from serious social problems. In other words, Seki tried to develop a built environment that would encourage the reproduction of the labor force. At the same time, the mayor planned the efficient construction of cities on a large scale, having a vision to establish high-speed transportation facilities such as subway and suburban residential districts.

In order to deal with the capitalist processes regarding the spatial production of cities, not only did Seki choose a passive method such as enlarging roads to reconstruct the city, but he also decided to pursue planning projects to develop the transportation network between the suburbs and inner cities. This would eventually turn the city into a healthy and good residential area for factory and white-collar workers. This policy was aimed at keeping the urban poverty, which was the cause of social unrest, within the inner city and not allowing it to reach the suburbs.

In order to deal with the shortage of housing in cities around the middle of the Taisho period, the central government started to supply small-scale public housing in the form of model projects. In 1924, the Ministry of Interior established *Doujunkai*, which actually played the role of a national housing corporation to resolve housing problems. The establishment of this public corporation established the public housing improvement for salaried and factory workers, while demolishing the 'slum' areas. This policy came to fruition with the enforcement of the Low Standard Housing Clearance and Improvement Act in 1927. The subjects of this law included fourteen low standard housing areas located in six major cities in Japan. These communities existed among the urban Buraku, the day laborers' area, and the residential area of urban miscellaneous jobs workers in inner cities. With the enforcement of this law, old and small houses were demolished and reinforced concrete apartment houses were newly built. This housing policy, however, did not resolve the fundamental problems of underclass structure, underlying the urban space.

The government enforced the Relief Act in 1932, while refining the system of district committee (case worker). As a result, the government encouraged the registration of the poor and the sick in communities, so that the individuals would be able to receive low-income subsidies and assistance from the national government. This project offered individual assistance to those who needed help.

The Amalgamation (*Yuwa*) policy for Burakumin into ordinary Japanese people and district improvement projects for Buraku conveyed community based policy with spatial impacts. These projects specifically addressed the needs for settlement halls with meetinghouses, bathhouses, and nurseries as well as developed public housing construction and street widening programs. The government implemented these projects in approximately twenty Buraku, some of which were located in cities.

2. Laborers movement, construction of urban space and residential segregation

The National Trade Union Confederation, in which big corporation labor unions took initiative, was reorganized as a moderate corporation union in the 1930s. Consequently, the union movement was isolated within the factories and companies without maintaining connections with urban policy. However, in the election of the House of Representatives which took the form of a popular election in 1928, leftist Diet men were elected, receiving support from the labor unions. Electoral zones where factory workers dominated the majority of the votes emerged in inner cities.

Thus, the prosperous working class represented by manufacturers established its status in cities in the 1930s. These laborers lived in relatively good tenement row houses, which were geographically separated from lower-class society.

With an increase in the white-collar workers, middle class people started living in the suburbs, which promoted residential segregation even further. More and more houses were built in the suburbs along the private electric railway lines, broadening the daily milieu of the cities. Thus the urban segregation among scattered suburbs, the densely built-up inner cities, and the 'slums' inhabited by the lower class, were intensified in big cities in Japan in the 1930s.

3. Urban built environment under total war

The 1930s brought the centralized local administrations, initiated by the Ministry of Interior and prefectural offices, under strong state control. The government initiated the management of intra city street networks and land readjustment with the urban planning techniques cultivated through the rehabilitation projects after the devastating Kanto Big Earthquake of 1923. Many municipalities followed the standardized planning manuals in Japan.

After the Manchurian Incident in 1931 and the Sino-Japanese War starting in 1937, Japan rushed into total war. The production of the urban built environment, therefore, was initiated in munitions cities that were pursuing new industrialized urban planning projects. In the Manchurian capital city, Shinkyo (literally meaning new capital, and currently called Changchun), and Haerbin, Japanese people became involved with urban planning projects in order for ideal planning, which could not be practiced in Japan to materialize.

The national land-planning project has emphasized the idea of decentralizing the urban population and industries since 1940. The above-mentioned new munitions cities were the first model cities to represent the new industrial towns outside large cities such as Sagamihara, Kanagawa prefecture, and Hirohata, Hyogo prefecture. These cities followed the national land planning, developing standardized street blocks and housing projects. Moreover, the standardized corporation housing estate emerged around munitions factories in local towns.

The munitions facilities promoted the demand for a massive construction labor. Especially during wars, the Japanese labor force did not fulfill the needs of the military government and therefore, importing laborers from the Japanese colonies abroad became necessary. As a result, temporary lodgings and camps for Koreans and Chinese neighbored the factories and big construction sites all over the nation.

These lodgings and camps had tremendous impact on the postwar urban built environment

largely due to the failed postwar compensation programs and the political-economic disorder in the Korean Peninsula. After WWII, many of these laborers stayed in the existing camps, lodgings and squatting places, forming ethnic enclaves and causing squatter problems. In Uji-city, Kyoto, for instance, residents of a Korean enclave called Utoro, were to be evicted after more than fifty years since the end of WWII.

North and Middle Part of Osaka City in 1947   taken by US Air Force at 20 August, 1947

The black shaded areas, where black roof tile of wooden houses reflected were remained without bombing. In the lower photo, especially, vastly white areas of burnt ruins were highlighted against the non-destructive areas. Compulsory removal zone was also detected.

Middle and South Part of Osaka City in 1947   taken by US Air Force at 26 April, 1947

Figure 4   Disastrous damage after air bombing of 1945

Toward the end of WWII, buildings were transplanted by people out of the cities in order to avoid bombing and densely populated urban areas were developed. As a result of the intense bombings, residential segregation in the urban areas disappeared.

4. Dominance of poverty and the post- war recovery

US bombings from March to August 1945 burned more than a hundred towns, destroying the majority of big and medium sized cities.   The US army conducted indiscriminate bombardment, emphasizing that these attacks would destroy the urban inner areas where the residential, commercial, and industrial functions were mixed.   This, the US bombardment, thus, deprived the cities not only of the systems of production but also of the built environment for the residents.   Indeed, many citizens lost their lives.   The strategic bombings devastated nearly all of the inner cities as shown in Figure 4.

Ironically, however, the destruction presented the cities with opportunities to develop new land readjustment projects, to broaden roads, and to create parks.   The city reconstruction became a project regarding the war rehabilitation in about 115 cities for more than ten years starting in 1946.   The thorough standardization of streets and urban blocks encouraged the post-war economic restoration.   These projects, however, were limited to war-damaged areas, and did not have direct connections with the subsequent large-scale industrial development on the waterfront and in the interior parts of the nation in the 1960s.

5. Postwar poverty in cities – the third nationals (victorious Koreans and Chinese), black market

Urban poverty gained new dimensions through the development of a project regarding the post-war recovery.   Urban poverty produced black markets, houseless, homeless people, and street children.   The concept of being illegal did not mean much because of the collapse of the safety net due to the political chaos and hyper-inflation.   The residences and shops in urban squatters, built during the state of anarchy, represented the new elements of the urban built environment.

The enforcement of the Alien Registration Ordinance in 1947 reflected and intensified the deficiency in the post-war policy regarding the treatment of foreigners, impacting on the lives of minority groups in the context of urban spatial development.   People originally from the colonized nations automatically lost their citizenship and rights to have access to the public sector.   As a result, they could not participate on at all in the decision-making processes of urban policy.   They lost rights to public housing as well as an access to the loan provided by the Housing Loan Corporation.   In addition, the government did not officially recognize the schools and classes for Koreans and Chinese.   While the liberation movement of the Buraku received large-scale public funds for the initiation of their own urban development projects, foreign residents in Japan were expected to work with self-reliance and self-help alone.

The operation of urban planning as a part of the project of postwar rehabilitation avoided the issues of ethnicity and poverty.   The mass media reported the cities' eviction of black markets in front of the stations, explaining that the objects of the regulation were the third nationals. The government tolerated the temporary use of the squatter barracks as a space for the future streets that were developed through urban planning as a part of the postwar rehabilitation program.   Consequently, the space for temporary markets and residence in front of the station demerged.   The urban redevelopment policy in later years targeted these squatter barracks area

as a harmful environment to be evicted and renewed.

Osaka cities, for instance, tried to place a large number of homeless and orphans into temporary shelters. From the end of the 1940s to the beginning of the 1950s, these people were institutionalized under the name of protection. In this way, severe urban poverty seemed to be erased from sight. Some governmental projects dealing with problems of unemployment among the low-income population concealed the poverty, even though these projects were terminated in the 1970s.

6. Postwar rehabilitation project and painful experiences of city people

Urban planning represents the authoritative operation of the reorganization of urban space and built environment. Countless numbers of small landowners and tenants were forced to move under the land readjustment projects. This relocation of sites and blocks used to be centered around the physical readjustment of blocks, which did not include the management of buildings constructed on the block. The residents at that time, and even now, suffered from this project. In reality, the residents themselves were not allowed to participate in the city planning. In many cities, almost half of the land, owned by the residents who did not have sufficient knowledge, was merged into the public land under the land readjustment projects.

The dissatisfaction, distrust, and resistance among the residents did not grow powerfully into the postwar urban social movement. However, many years later, after the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake of 1995, the government recognized the significance of the residents' participation in urban development in the context of the rehabilitation planning projects.

IV. Fordist urban development and the spatial resistance of urban societies

In the late 1950s, the postwar rehabilitation projects were almost over. Accordingly, urban development was promoted within the system of Fordist accumulation processes. The government provided the cities with selective and strategic funding for the urban built environment, and therefore, the urban space was further divided. The residential segregation in the historical context of prewar industrial capitalism led to an accumulation of housing and social problems in the inner cities. During the postwar high-growth period of the Japanese economy, these problems proliferated among the suburbs.

The well-zoned 'suburbs of hope' produced around the inner cities in the pre-war period in Showa represented the frontier of the production of cities before the bombings. Figure 4 apparently show the existence of well-planned area surrounding the city center and inner city where air bombing had severely attacked in 1945. The rehabilitation projects were focused on the redevelopment of inner cities. During the postwar high-growth period, urban sprawls were produced around the outside of Osaka city.

In the Osaka Metropolitan Region, the governmental funding for the development of an urban built environment was directed strategically toward the industrial complex of heavy manufacturing and new towns. In the civic center and sub-civic center of the cities, large-scale private capital allowed for the materialization of skyscrapers, which symbolize world cities. Private capital strength produced the well-organized urban built environment which covered a

wide range of cities. The Urban Redevelopment Act enacted in 1969 legally supported this process. In other places, however, the production of the small-scaled built environment depended on the 'invisible hands' of the small-scale market mechanism.

The phenomenon of relative poverty appeared to be expressed specifically in 1) inner cities for which the large-scale public and private investment was severely limited during the high-growth period and 2) suburbia within the urban sprawl which did not experience urban planning. The area for cheap wooden tenement houses in Tokyo was produced through the same mechanism.

1. Buraku and Dowa project

The temporal squatters' barracks quarters, which appeared as the byproducts through the processes of the postwar rehabilitation projects, were the cause of the most fundamental problem in urban spatial construction. In the 1950s, when people started to say that the postwar period was over, the problems of slum and squatter became apparent.

The enforcement of the Housing Clearance and Improvement Act in1960 was aimed at improving the poor condition of urban housing. Accordingly, the squatter clearance and the construction of improved housing for the postwar rehabilitation were pursued. One of the most notable projects was an urban reorganization program known as a 'national' Dowa Project (assimilation project) in the protest and request movement among Burakumin. Burakumin, who had experienced 'poverty' and discrimination in the severest way, became empowered in the liberation movement and struggles against the government during the high-growth period.

A grassroots movement started in Osaka in 1957, when the Burakumin in the squatter area in Nishinari-ward began demanding new housing for compensation for their eviction, because the restoration project was aimed at evicting them and using the area for roads and streets. Since the beginning of the campaign movement for the acquisition of business chance, which was aimed at supporting the economic independence of Buraku people, the Council for the Promotion of the Dowa Project had been trying to develop a better relationship with the government. The council made a clear division between the liberation movement and the processes of negotiation with the government. Consequently, the government decided to build apartments specifically for the Dowa district (Buraku) residents. The national movement aimed at solving Dowa problems was so successful that the government enacted the Law of Special Measures for Assimilation Projects in 1969. Accordingly, housing improvement projects in Dowa districts were promoted for the duration of 28 years. This was a unique case in which certain urban regions received a large amount of the national fund as the provision of consumption fund.

2. Yoseba and Doya towns

During the high growth of the Japanese economy, construction laborers who supported the basis for the production and distribution of the built environment, formed their residential areas called Doya towns (cheap inns quarter for day laborers). Doya towns was popularly known as Sanya in Tokyo, Kamagasaki in Osaka, Kotobuki in Yokohama, and Sasajima in Nagoya. Urban social movement accompanied by direct action as riot emerged in Sanya in 1960 and in Kamagasaki, Osaka in 1961. Although the government was aware of the existence of Doya and

the need to improve their conditions at that time, the appearance of these problems was different.   Laborers in Doya towns initiated the urban social movement in the form of 'riots' on the streets which reminded the general public of the rice riots in the past.

With regards to Kamagasaki, Osaka, the city and prefecture governments established the 'Airin' policy in 1966 (Airin ironically means 'lovely neighborhood'), which implemented specific program for each different local area.   The main focus of the policy was to improve the conditions of labor, welfare, and public security.   Ironically, however, the 'Airin' policy resulted in further isolating and pinning Doya town in one specific place of Kamagasaki (see Figure 6). A big construction boom just before the opening of the 1970 World Exposition in the Senri area, a northern suburb of Osaka, brought single male laborers from all over the nation into Kamagasaki.   Facing the management of a large amount of day laborers, the Airin Labor, Welfare and Medical Center was established in 1970, and Kamagasaki became a town for these single male construction workers.   As a number of riots occurred and the antagonism among mafia, extremists, labor unions, and police escalated, Doya towns rapidly grew and the population of single male workers dramatically increased.

Figure 5   Osaka Metropolitan Region in the 1990s

Figure 6   Osaka in the 1990s

3. The development and disappearance of the progressive local governments

The progressive local governments emerging in cities in the 1970s energized the anti-pollution and welfare movements.   This epitomized the friction between the Liberal Democratic Party on one hand and the Socialist and Communist Parties on the other.   This friction reflected the ideological opposition during the Cold War period on a global scale.   Those who led the progressive local governments had a vision of increasing the number of such governments and reforming the Japanese economy and social system within a socialist regime.

The actual policy of the progressive local governments was designed to enhance the public welfare, utilizing the growing revenue of local tax during the high-growth period.   Moreover,

this represented the Fordist urban policy as well. As the leader's slogan for the election 'protection of life and living' indicated, the standard of living indeed improved and the strict regulation on pollution resolved some urban environmental problems. At the same time, however, the issue of poverty became rather invisible. As the middle-class population increased under the growing Japanese economy, the majority of the residents became conservative.

Prospering Japan, in which the majority of the population could be categorized as belonging to the middle class, created a city landscape of suburbia. Bed-towns in the suburbs, where so-called 'business fighters' took a daily break, and expressways connected the central cities, were embedded in this stereotyped landscape. Ironically enough, the progressive local governments created social unity under the Fordist capitalism. At the same time, they received severe criticism from those who shared neo-conservative ideologies for not encouraging the efficiency of non-competition among cities.

4. Inner city problems

The government recognized the decline of the inner city as opposed to the homogeneous growth of suburbia in the late 1970s. The government considered the decline to be a part of the global-scale problems in relation to the decline of big cities.

The growing industry of processing and assembly in the inner city of Tokyo was strongly linked with the pioneering industry in the Keihin (Tokyo-Kawasaki-Yokohama) industrial region, playing an important role as a proliferating industry. Therefore, inner city problems were not given much attention. On the other hand, in Osaka and Kobe, where heavy industries and material manufacturing industry were growing in the waterfront area, policy makers recognized serious inner city problems. These problems included a decline in and aging of the urban population, de-urbanization and decrease in tax revenue due to the abandonment of factories and transferring of industrial capital out of the inner city. The policy makers tried to deal with individual problems independently, and therefore, they could not develop an agenda to resolve the underlying issues as a comprehensive urban problem. However, the inner city problems became invisible when the urban finance improved with the arrival of the bubble economy at the turn of the 1990s.

5. Protests raised by ethnic groups and their accomplishments

When Vietnamese refugee boats arrived in Japan in 1975, the notion of 'nation-state with a border' in relation to the global society became more visible. It disclosed the indifference and unconsciousness among Japanese people toward foreigners' rights.

The ethnic enclave was reproduced in Ikuno-ward as shown in Figure 6, Osaka city, that was traditionally dominated by 'zainichi' people; Korean residents in Japan. The wooden tenement housing for working-class people was there, while the number of public housing to which the 'Zainichi' people had no access had never been constructed. 'Zainichi' people in Ikuno-ward were mainly involved with the labor intense domestic industry in the production of sandals etc.. This situation was a clear contrast to that of the Dowa district; Buraku, located in a southwestern Osaka inner city, where large-scale national funding drastically transformed the residential environment.

While the first-generation of 'Zainichi' people tried to develop their own businesses without demanding rights as Japanese citizens, the second and third generation peoples insisted on their fundamental rights as permanent residents. Their movement addressed the severe reality regarding the violation of rights of foreigners who were permanent residents of Japan and they demanded institutional change. They refused to be fingerprinted not necessarily because of the ideological antagonism between South and North Korea, but because their demands derived from their daily lives. In the 1990s, 'Zainichi' people finally won rights for access to public housing and pension. Moreover, they are now entitled to become government employees.

The urban enclave in Taisho-ward in Osaka city, dominated by those who were from Okinawa, shared a similar situation. The Association of people from Okinawa prefecture used to convey conventional big-name politics, represented by the existing town council, city office, and dominant figures. This organization led the process of creating an Okinawa community in Taisho-ward (see Figure 6). Instead of this organization, however, in the 1970s under the influence of the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese administration, grassroots activists addressed the problems of Okinawan squatters and accomplished a successful housing movement in the same way as the one initiated by the Dowa district people. Although grassroots Okinawan activists learned tactics from the Buraku liberation movement, they emphasized their unique historical and social experiences of discrimination. At the same time, growing struggles to preserve cultures brought Eisa, a folk dance festival, to this district, attracting those who love Eisa from all over Japan.

The bubble economy gentrified inner cities, whose land represented an object of investment and speculation. Apartment and office buildings were built, changing the urban landscape previously dominated by gray and flat houses. In current Osaka, a global city, the areas of North and South Koreans and Okinawa people do not continue to produce stigma any more but symbolize something attractive because of their ethnic and cultural flavors. Furthermore, Dowa districts have moved into the public limelight, because they have developed pioneering projects and welfare for the aged and handicapped as an experimental example of the urban regeneration projects.

6. Rough sleepers and citizens' autonomy

The rapid growth of the rough sleepers population in post-bubble Osaka reflects the fragility of economic prosperity in a global city. As the restructuring of corporations and firms has promoted the neo-conservative economy in recent years, homelessness is now prevalent by the urban space of Osaka, especially around city parks, along riverbeds, and under expressways. The fundamental cause of this problem is the flimsy safety net system, which has made urban poverty visible.

When rough sleepers started to live in Osaka Castle Park and Nagai Park, a controversy was developed. The discussion among the governmental and citizens' organizations, whose visions were limited by the precedent and fixed ideas was going nowhere. It was apparent that a mature discussion that would seek a practical resolution would not develop.

Nevertheless, homeless policy was eventually developed. The local government conducted a survey on their living conditions, pursued various projects concerning tent-shelters, support

centers, and employment, and issued a special legislature. Finally, the Special Measures Act for the Support of the Independence of Homeless People was enforced last summer in 2002.

The debates on homeless problems raises questions regarding the goals of citizens' organizations that may potentially deal with issues that have not been taken care of by the government. Citizens should not simply claim their rights to receive the benefits of governmental assistance or to criticize the government. It is necessary that they practice the political processes of governance together with the government. While having independent visions, citizens should participate in the processes of producing urban policy and built environment. The time has come when citizens should develop the public sphere, which has been created and maintained by the government.

Bibliography

Eguchi Eiichi ed. (1990), *Nihon Shakai Chosa no Suimyaku* (Genealogy of Japanese Social Survey), Horitsu Bunka sha.

Ishida Yorihusa (1987), *Nihon Kindai Toshi Keikaku no Hyakunen* (One Hundred Years' of Modern Japanese City Planning), Jichitai Kenkyusha.

Kamagasaki Shiryo Center (1993), *Kamagasaki* (Kamagasaki: its History and Present Conditions), Sanichi shobo.

Kamo Toshio (1995), *Nihon gata Seiji Sisutemu* (Japan's Political System), Yuhikaku.

Kojita Yasunao (1991), *Nihon Kindai Toshishi Kenkyu Josetsu* (The Study of Japanese Modern City), Kashiwa Shobo.

Koshizawa Akira (1991), *Tokyo no Toshikeikaku* (Urban Planning in Tokyo), Iwanami Shoten.

Nakagawa Kiyoshi (1985), *Nihon no Toshi Kaso* (Japanese Urban Underclass), Keiso Shobo.

Mikuriya Takashi (1996), *Tokyo* (Tokyo: The Capital City Supercede the Nation State?) , Yomiuri Shinbun sha.

Miyamoto Kenichi (1977), *Daitoshi to Konbinato, Osaka* (Osaka Metropolitan Region and Industrial Complex), Keiso Shobo.

Mizuoka Fujio ed. (2002), *Keizai Shakai no Chirigaku* (Geography of Economy and Society), Yuhikaku.

Osaka Jinken Hakubutsukan ed. (2001), Ezu no Sekai to Hisabetsumin (The Reality of Picture Map and Outcaste People in Japan), Osaka Jinken Hakubutsukan.

Osaka Toshi Kyokai (1989), *Machi ni Sumau* (Living in the City: History of Urban life in Osaka), Heibon sha.

Sato Shigeru (1995), *Jokamachi no Kindai Toshi Zukuri* (Modern Development of Japanese Castle Towns), Kajima Shuppan kai.

Shibamura Atsuki (1998), Nihon Kindai Toshi no Seiritsu (The Establishment of Japan's Modern City), Shorai sha.

Sugihara Kaoru. Tamai Kingo eds. (1986), *Taisho, Osaka, Slum* (Taisho Era, Osaka, Slum; Another Story of Japanese Modern History), Shin Hyoron.

Tanaka Hiroshi (1991), *Zainichi Gaikokujin* (Foreigners Residents in Japan), Iwanamai Shoten.

Tokyo Metropolitan Government (1994), *A Hundred years of Tokyo city planning*, Tokyo

Metropolitan Government.

Uchida Yuzo (1993), *Dowa Chiku no Machizukuri ron* (The Study of Urban Rejuvenation Project in Dowa District), Akashi Shoten.

Zenkoku Shigaichi Saikaihatsu Kyokai (1991), *Nihon no Toshi Saikaihatsu shi* (History of Urban Redevelopment in Japan, Jutaku Shinpo sha.

Geographical Features of Social Polarization in Seoul, South Korea

Seok-Hoi YIM*

In recent years, Korean society has obviously trended toward polarization since the 1997 financial crisis. Mass-unemployment, decrease of real income and accumulation of income inequality by the financial crisis and the following economic reform has caused the economic base of the middle class to collapse. At present, such a collapse of the middle class results in the rapid growth of social polarization in Korea. Particularly, the social polarization and the spatial phenomena related to it appear more definitely in Seoul, which is the largest metropolis as the capital city.

In this context, this study focuses on how social polarization is related to spatial polarization. It could be said, that social polarization consists of not just occupation or income related matters but is made up of more comprehensive matters, including lifestyle, recognition and attitude of regional difference, public service and investment, educational environment and so on. This paper is broadly divided into two sections. The first section depicts the general economic situation after the financial crisis in South Korea. Second, spatial characteristics of social polarization in Seoul are examined.

I. Social Polarization and the 1997 Economic Crisis in South Korea

1. Deepening income disparity and social polarization

The Korean economy experienced the worst crisis due to the shortage of foreign currency at the end of 1997. The Economic growth rate recorded -5.8% in 1998 with the rapid contraction of domestic demand. The Minus record of economic growth rate is the first one after 1980. In particular, the decreasing rate is the largest amount since the 1960s, when the Korean economy entered a period of high growth due to rapid industrialization. Thus, mass-unemployment occurred and household income decreased significantly. Real income in 1998 diminished by -3.2%, compared to the previous year. Now, the Korean economy is almost completely recovered from the crisis. Real income also is recovered to nearly the level before the crisis. Korea's GDP per capita recovered to $9,770 in 2000.

However, despite such economic recovery, the disparity of real income between social classes has expanded more and more. The serious economic crisis led to the decrease of income and the reduction of consumption, but the effect of the economic crisis is uneven by social class and it concentrates on a specific class. Almost all income groups experienced a decrease in income

* Daegu University, SOUTH KOREA   shyim@daegu.ac.kr

during the economic crisis. However, the lower the income level is, the more the income decreases.

Moreover, as Table 1 shows, while the bottom 80% of the income group experienced a decline in income, the income of the top 20% increased during the same period. Accordingly, the income share rate of the top 20% increased. On the contrary the income share rate of the bottom 80% went sharply down (see Table 2). It is especially noted that the income share rate of the middle class declined more than the lower class. In particular, it is said that the weight of middle and low strata among the middle class was significantly reduced.

Table 1. Income Variation Index by Income Group (the year of 1996 = 100)

.

Income group	1997	1998	1999	Change		
				1996-1997	1997-1998	1998-1999
Top 20%	120.9	127.7	132.4	20.9	5.6	3.7
20～40%	126.6	122.4	120.8	26.6	-3.3	-1.3
40～60%	104.5	100.8	98.4	4.5	-3.6	-2.3
60～80%	90.1	84.3	81.3	-9.9	-6.4	-3.6
Bottom 20%	91.8	82.3	75.4	-8.2	-10.3	-8.4

Source: Hong, S. M. and Min, J. H., 1999, *Shrinkage and Rebuilding of Middle Class in the Age of IMF*,

Table 2. Income Share Rate by Class

	1991～1997(%)	1999～2001(%)	variation(%)
High class(top 20%)	37.6	40.2	2.6
Middle class(medium 60%)	53.9	52.3	-1.6
Low class(bottom 20%)	8.4	7.5	-0.9

Source: Song, T. J., 2002, Growing gap between income and consumption for the middle class, *Weekly Economy*, 676, 6. (http://www.lgeri.com/project/lgeri003/view001)

It can be seen through the trend of consumption that Korean society has been seriously polarized since the 1997 financial crisis. First of all, consumption of luxury goods is rising. This means that the shift of wealth is reflected in the consumption pattern. Even during the year 1998 in the deepest swamp of the financial crisis, the spending by the lowest 20 percentile group declined by 9.8%, while for the top 20 percentile group the rate of decline was far less with only 0.6%. Thus, consumption spent by the top 20 percentile group increased greatly as soon as the Korean economy began to recover from the financial crisis. The growth of consumption of luxury goods such as golf instruments, furs, jewelry, etc. has been especially, remarkable. For instance, spending on golf instruments in 1999 increased by 357.6% over last year (Oh, 1999).

2. Is the solidification of social polarization temporary or not?

As a result, recent statistics inform us that wealth is concentrating on a specific class and poverty is generalizing with the contraction of the middle class in South Korea. There are two

approaches to such recent expansion of social polarization. One is that it is due to the financial crisis, and then it is temporary (Sohn, 1999). The other is that it is caused by structural factors, and then it is not temporary, on the contrary it would deepen in the future. In fact, it is not easy to predict the future situation precisely. However, it is a fact that the middle class had already contracted with the change of industrial structure from the early 1990s.

In the early 1990s, the Korean economy faced a serious crisis in the process of globalization due to the limit of domestic technology and the over-dependence on foreign technology (Kang, 1993). The Korean government and the capital pushed industrial restructuring in order to overcome it, and the industrial restructuring of the 1990s centered around technological innovation. The Korean economy has thereby gradually been transformed into a flexible accumulation system. However, on the other hand, this industrial restructuring brought about on increase in unemployment and unstable part-time jobs. As a result, income distribution has continuously deteriorated since the early 1990s. Accordingly the contraction of the middle class and social polarization had already progressed from the middle 1990s at least.

Industrial restructuring toward a flexible accumulation system and globalization accelerated after the 1997 financial crisis. Thus, the 1997 financial crisis can be viewed as an immediate cause of social polarization in South Korea. That is partly true. However, strictly speaking, social polarization after the 1997 crisis occurred as an extension of social polarization, which started in the early 1990s. The 1997 financial crisis was only a trigger for strengthening the trend of social polarization. In this context, the recent social polarization in South Korea is a structural matter, which results from increasing flexibility of capital and globalization of the accumulation system. Social polarization in Seoul, which is a global city of South Korea, can be also explained in the same way.

3. Occupation is not a unique cause of social polarization

So far social polarization has mainly been approached in relation to occupational structure. Its basic logic is that occupational distribution among the population results in income inequality, and income inequality results in social polarization. There is an approach that social polarization is seen as a process bound up with the emergence of the so-called global city (Baun, 1997; Doring, *et al.*, 1996). That is to say, the occupational structure of major growth industries in global cities has created and contributed to the growth of a high-income stratum and a low-income stratum of workers. Ultimately, `global city' arguments focus on polarization within occupational hierarchy. Hamnett (1994a, 1994b) criticized this `global city' thesis, but his argument for `professionalisation' is also related to occupational structure.

Recent social polarization in South Korea is certainly connected with occupational structure including unemployment. Employment is separated into a small number of high-income professional jobs and a large number of low-income jobs by flexible strategies of capital, and there is a significant increase in long-term unemployment and part-time jobs in the process of economic reform.

However, there is a limit to explaining social polarization in South Korea with only `the global city' thesis or occupational structure. Polarization of occupation is one of the causes for income inequality. But asset inequality should be considered more problematic in Korean society,

because it is a major culprit in the deepening of income inequality. Inequality in asset ownership invites a vicious cycle between the rich and the poor. According to a report by Lee (2000), the Gini coefficient of wage income recorded an average of 0.286 after the currency crisis, while the Gini coefficient of asset income was a high 0.535 on average (see Table 3).

That is, inequality in wage income is lower than that in total income. In contrast, the degree of asset income inequality is much higher than that in total income. In addition, considering the fact that urban workers do not possess much, even if the Korean economy has more or less an equalized wage income distribution, it is difficult to completely solve the income inequality.

In particular, the inequality is the highest in real estate property such as land, buildings and homes. That inequality in land ownership is estimated using the 1998 land tax data. The Gini coefficient is 0.875, which is close to perfect inequality. The top 1% of the Korean population owns 41% of the land and the top 8.5% of the population owns 76% of the total land in the country. On the contrary, 54.5% of the adult population does not own land at all.

Table 3. The Gini Coefficient of income

	1997	1999
Wage income	0.283	0.286
Asset income	0.507	0.535

Source: Lee, S, W., 2000, *Asset Distribution & Rise in Income Inequality*, LG Economic Research Institute. (http://english.lgeri.co.kr/project/lgeri003.nsf/ economy/)

II. Spatial Processes of Social Polarization in Seoul

1. Impacts of the 1997 economic crisis on Seoul

Seoul is the capital and the largest metropolis in South Korea (see Figure 1). Though the geographical area of Seoul covers only 0.6% of South Korea, Seoul contains about a quarter of its population. Seoul is a true hub of the national economy, playing a key role in the free flow of national resources and capital. This is attested to by the fact that Seoul accounts for 48.3% of the nation's bank deposits and 50% of bank loans. Naturally, the vast majority of head and branch offices of banks, stock, and insurance companies are all concentrated in Seoul.

Seoul's economy was seriously damaged by the 1997 economic crisis. The employment in Seoul continued to decline throughout 1998. The largest decrease in employment occurred in the manufacturing sector. However, Seoul's economy quickly recovered from the crisis, relative to other metropolises in South Korea. Not only does Seoul have a stronger economic <u>basis</u> than other regions, but also since the early 1990s its economy was already restructured toward a flexible accumulation system, which centers around high-tech industry and production service industry such as FIRE. At the same time, globalization of economic activities has rapidly appeared in Seoul (Kang, 1993; Kwon, 1993).

However, Seoul is a metropolis where the gap between the rich and the poor is the largest in Korea. Because a number of unemployed people, such as immigrants from the countryside and

Figure 1. Study Area: Seoul

other cities, pour into Seoul in order to obtain better opportunities or jobs, there are more people of the under or lower class in Seoul than in any other city in South Korea. It is natural that social polarization is conspicuous in Seoul. The 1997 economic crisis made this characteristic of Seoul more prominent. Foreign direct investment has concentrated on Seoul and IT industries such as computer software and Internet businesses have developed rapidly. As a result, Seoul's economy has become more globalized and its industrial structure has become more flexible.

Table 4. Distribution of Employment by Occupation in Seoul   (*Unit: thousand*)

	2000	2001
Representative, high executive and official	154	177
Professional	416	462
Semi-professional and technician	735	683
Office employee	627	642
Worker in services	639	622
Worker in whole sale and retail	626	632
Worker in agriculture, forestry and fishing	9	7
Assembly worker and machine operation worker	690	677
Skilled laborer	278	282
Non-skilled laborer	384	403
Total	4,559	4,587

Source: KNSO, Seoul Local Office, 2001, *Principal Statistics in Seoul.*
(http://www. nso.go.kr: 7001/local/seoul/stat/stat3-5.cfm)

However, as mentioned above, social polarization in Seoul can not be sufficiently explained by industrial restructuring and/or globalization. Alone in the society whose real estate market is abnormal like South Korea, capital gain from real asset is more effective in raising income inequality. Capital gain of several billion dollars a year is only produced from the market for new apartment sales. Seoul has the biggest such market for new apartment sales. It does not mean that industrial restructuring or globalization is not important. It simply means that social polarization can not be properly explained without understanding asset income inequality.

2. Residential differentiation by social stratum

Spatial processes of social polarization primarily depend on residential differentiation. Residential differentiation in Seoul is based on the changes of urban character and occupational structure, and functional differentiation of space in response to those changes. Functional configuration of space in Seoul broadly has four types (see Figure 2).

The first type is a new industrial district such as Gangnam-gu and Seocho-gu, in which high-tech industries, production services etc. are concentrated. Seocho-gu, Gangnam-gu and Songpa-gu are developed according to plan (Surh, J. H., et al., 1992), and the high-income class is also concentrated in these areas. Seocho-gu, Gangnam-gu and Songpa-gu are the areas most segregated by professional, administrative and managerial workers (Han, 1989; Lee, 1997).

This area, the so-called GANGNAM is recognized as the residential spaces of the richin Seoul (Kim, 2000). The second type are old center in Seoul such as Jongno-gu, Jung-gu and Yongsan-gu. The number of residents in these areas is decreasing. The third type are traditional centers of manufacturing. Areas adjacent to the productive space of the third type became the residential space for the low-income class.

The fourth type is the typical residential area that developed a relatively long time ago and it includes the north districts of the Han river and some south districts of the Han river.

Real estate prices are practically one of the most important factors, which raise this residential differentiation. Prices of land and apartments in GANGNAM are much higher than in other areas. On averagely, the former is about 1.5 times larger than the latter (see Table 5 and Figure 3). Such high prices create a barrier preventing the low-income class from approaching these areas. The barrier results in a sort of spatial monopoly that transfers social polarization to spatial polarization. However, it is not just because of the cost of dwelling. High prices of real estate can also bring more capital gain from it. This is one of the important reasons why the high-income class is concentrated in GANGNAM.

3. Unfair urban structure of Seoul

An unfair urban structure of Seoul also contributes to the transfer of social polarization to the present spatial polarization. In fact, public investment into GANGNAM, the most segregated areas for the high-income class, is larger than that of any other area in Seoul. The construction of the subway is a typical example. The early construction of the subway was concentrated in GANGNAM. During the first stage of construction all lines of the subway were designed to pass through the area of GANGNAM. As a result, there were about 30% stations in total in the number 2 line and number 3 line from 1978 to 1994. In the beginning stage of spatial

Note: Names of 25 Gus in Seoul
1. Jongno, 2. Jung. 3. Yongsan, 4. Seongdong, 5. Gwangjin, 6. Dongdaemun, 7. Jungnang,
8. Seongbuk, 9. Gangbuk, 10. Dobong, 11. Nowon, 12. Eunpyeong, 13. Seodaemun, 14. Mapo,
15. Yangcheon, 16. Gangseo, 17. Guro, 18. Geumcheon, 19. Yeongdeungpo, 20. Dongjak,
21. Gwanak, 22. Seocho, 23. Gangnam, 24. Songpa, 25. Gangdong

Figure 2. Types of Functional Configuration of Space in Seoul

Source: Internal Data of REAL ESTATE 114 INC.

Figure 3. Average Price of Apartments in Seoul (2002)

Table 5. The Level of Land Prices by District in Seoul   (*Unit: thousand won/ ㎡*)

	1998	2002
Seoul	870	900
Jongno	920	940
Jung	1,100	1150
Yongsan	970	1,010
Seongdong	900	900
Gwangjin	980	1,020
Dondaemoon	950	980
Jungnang	830	840
Seongbuk	860	900
Gangbuk	780	820
Dobong	850	870
Nowon	800	850
Eunpyeong	770	810
Seodaemoon	830	860
Mapo	920	1,000
Yangcheon	820	830
Gangseo	780	790
Guro	840	830
Geumcheon	900	910
Yeongdeungpo	870	890
Dongjak	790	820
Gwanak	880	810
Seocho	1,230	1,300
Gangnam	1,450	1,550
Songpa	930	990
Gangdong	940	970

Source: Korean Association of Property Appraisal, Land Prices Database.
(http://member.kapanet.co.kr/index.asp)

polarization, this construction of the subway was an important inductive factor which brought about the concentration of the high and middle class in GANGNAM through improvement of the residential environment.

In this context, first of all, the educational environment is the most important factor of spatial polarization in response to social polarization. It is a very important matter for most Korean people who have a strong desire for better education. The so-called 8th school district, which includes Gangnam-gu and Seocho-gu, is broadly known as a primary school district in Seoul, because the Seoul metropolis government purposely transferred elite high schools from the north area of the Han river to GANGNAM.

Inequality in public and private investment over culture and performance facilities can be also an example of unfair urban structure that brought about spatial polarization. There are a variety of cultural and performance facilities such as movie theaters, museums, galleries, multi-performance halls, etc. in Gangnam-gu and Seocho-gu.

III. Concluding Comments

Polarization of Korean society has become more conspicuous since the 1997 economic crisis. Since the early 1990s, social polarization already emerged as an important research issue with globalization and the global city in the western advanced capitalist societies. Because social polarization has been recognized as a phenomenon connected with strategies for flexibility and globalization of capital in the process that fordist accumulation system, which faced a limit after the 1980s, rapidly transformed into post-Fordism.

In this context, the polarization of Korean society can also be seen as a result of industrial restructuring for global competition and globalization because socially polarized phenomena have appeared along with rapid globalization since the 1997 economic crisis. High-income professional employment in virtue of a knowledge-based economy has been increasing while the middle class was widely brought to ruin, and unemployment passed into a chronic state with the increase in part time jobs.

Seoul is typical of social polarization in South Korea, because it is globalized more than any other city in South Korea and has many professional knowledge-based industries. However, there are aspects that are difficult to explain only with the change of occupational structure and the inequality of wage income. In the Korean situation, the inequality of asset income, especially real estate, should be catch up considered. This matter is more important for the a spatial polarization in response to social polarization. High real estate prices reproduce not only disparity of asset income on a regressive scale, but also create a spatial entrance barrier against middle and lower classes.

In addition, the educational environment and the public investment in transportation and culture & welfare facilities are notable in the practical spatial processes of social polarization in Seoul. High real estate prices, an uneven educational environment, and unfair public investment are closely correlated with each other, and the integration among them is more of a determinant in the process of socio-spatial polarization at least in Seoul, South Korea.

Reference

Baun, S., 1997, Sydney, Australia: a global city? testing the social polarization thesis, *Urban Studies,* 34(11), 1881-1901.

Doring, D. *et al.*, 1996, Social polarization 1971-1991: a micro-geographical analysis of Britain, *Progress in Planning,* 45, 67-122.

Han, J. H., 1989, Residential segregation by occupation in Seoul, *Journal of Geography Education,* 21, 32-70.

Hamnett, C., 1994a, Social polarisation in global city: theory and evidence, *Urban Studies*, 31, 401-424.

Hamnett, C., 1994b, Socio-economic change in London: professionalisation not polarisation, *Built Environment*, 20, 192-203.

Hong, S. M. and Min, J. H., 1999, *Shrinkage and Rebuilding of Middle Class in the Age of IMF*, Hyundai Research Institute.

Kang, H. S., 1993, The change of Korean capitalism and Seoul's industrial restructuring in the late 1980s: Progress of flexibility and deepening regional inequality, in Korean Association of Space and Environment Research (ed.), *Studies of Seoul: Flexible Industrialization and New City, Society and Politics*, Hanwool, Seoul, 57-88.

Kim, W. B., 2000, *Cities, Space and daily life World,* Hanwool, Seoul.

Kwon, O. H., 1993, The Growth of service economy and spatial restructuring in Seoul, in Korean

Association of Space and Environment Research (ed.), *Studies of Seoul: Flexible Industrialization and New City, Society and Politics*, Hanwool, Seoul, 200-222.

Lee, K. S., 1997, The emerging multicenters and some implications of global change in the city of Seoul, Korea, *Journal of the Korean Geographical Society*, 32(5), 311-328.

Lee, S, W., 2000, *Asset Distribution & Rise in Income Inequality*, LG Economic Research Institute. (http://english.lgeri.co.kr/project/lgeri003.nsf/economy/)

Oh, J. H., 1999, *Sectoral differences in the Korean economy*, LG Economic Research Institute. (http://english.lgeri.co.kr/project/lgeri003.nsf/economy/)

Sohn, S. R., 1999, The polarization of Seoul stratum and local government's role shift, *Journal of Urban Studies*, 5, 1-19.

Song, T, J, 2002, Growing gap between income and consumption for the middle class, *Weekly Economy*, 676, pp.4-7. (http://www.lgeri.com/project/lgeri003/view001/)

Surh, J. K. *et al.*, 1992, Housing Problems and Housing Politics, in Korean Association of Space and Environment Research (ed.), *Studies of Seoul: Flexible Industrialization and New City, Society and Politics*, Hanwool, Seoul, 57-88.

The Existing Form of Urban Locality Groups in Jakarta:
Reexamining the RT/RW in the post-New Order Era

Raphaella D. DWIANTO*

Abstract

As the representative neighborhood association in Indonesia, the RT/RW is given the task and duty by the government of promoting and helping the integration of the people and the government, and at the same time it has comprehensively to manage the daily business of the community. This 'top-down' mechanism during the Orde Baru (New Order) era has been the main subject for studies of the RT/RW. However, after the collapse of the New Order administration, the local government system has been undergoing a reexamination, which in the end will also affect the RT/RW. This paper tries to observe the structural organization, activities and social characteristics of the leaders of some neighborhood associations in Jakarta in the post-New Order era. The analysis in this paper is based on field-work conducted after the end of Suharto administration.

I. Introduction

The neighborhood association, or RT/RW, is the representative locality group in Indonesia, and in the case of Jakarta it represents an urban locality group. In principle, all of the households in the area become members of their RT/RW, and the neighborhood association manages various community matters comprehensively. These include: maintaining an hygienic environment; preventing crime; holding events, marriage ceremonies or funerals; collecting membership fees and other dues from people; taking measures for the relief of the poor; promoting peace in the neighborhood; registering or making a record of residents; cooperating with the census and helping in the execution of general elections. While keeping a stratified interaction with other organizations in the area, such as the arisan (rotating credit association), the PKK (family-welfare group), the Karang Taruna (youth association), the Posyandu (community-based health care group), the RT/RW forms a structure at the grass roots of society.

Among earlier studies on the RT/RW, there is research by Sullivan, which considered Kalasan city in central Java [1992], and a study by Suwarno, which observed the neighborhood organization in Yogyakarta [1995]. Both studies agree that the RT/RW is integrated in a vertical relation with the government, and they position it as the smallest unit at the lowest rung of the local administrative system. However, even though both studies emphasize the significance of the spirit of gotong royong (mutual assistance) at the core of the RT/RW, they have differing interpretations. While

---

* Atma Jaya Catholic University, INDONESIA   rdwianto@fia.atmajaya.ac.id

Sullivan argues that this spirit is the product of a 'top-down' implementation, Suwarno sees the gotong royong as a sort of 'horizontal relation of loyalty'. Starting from his 'vertical relation' point of view, Sullivan then positions the RT/RW as important in serving as the foundation for the local administrative system. However, Suwarno sees it as an empowering organization for the people and a cooperative body for the implementation of government policy.

Other preceding studies on the RT/RW have tried to discover the origin of the neighborhood association in Indonesia. According to studies by Kurasawa [1992] and Sato [1994], the prototype of the RT/RW in Indonesia can be traced back to the period of the Japanese occupation, between 1942 to 1945, during which the neighborhood organization was integrated into a vertical relation with the Japanese military rulers of the time.

However, when the New Order era under the Suharto administration ended in May 1998, Indonesia as a country was, and still is, undergoing various changes and shifts, which ultimately impact in a variety of ways on the RT/RW, at the grass roots level of society. Relying on previous studies on the RT/RW, and on the result of field-work conducted after the end of the New Order era, this paper attempts to describe the existing form of the locality groups in the post-New Order era, via observation of neighborhood associations or the RT/RW, viewing the RT/RW as an organization of people assisting others in their daily lives. The field research for this paper was conducted on four occasions between December 1998 and August 2000, covering two residential areas in Jakarta.

II. The Area

The areas observed in this paper are residential areas located near the center of Jakarta: the Menteng Atas urban sub-district (kelurahan) and the Menteng urban sub-district (hereafter referred to as Menteng Atas and Menteng respectively), shown in figure 1. Menteng Atas is located in the urban district (kecamatan) of Setiabudi in the city region (kotamadya) of South Jakarta, and in 1996 it was thought to cover an area of 1.47km2. The majority of its population comprises people with low incomes. Menteng Atas has the highest population density among other kelurahans in the urban sub-district of Setiabudi, with a density of 5100 persons/km2. Due to the considerable number of laborers from the countryside and the seasonal workers who reside in the area, Menteng Atas is a multi-ethnic community with a mix of different cultural elements within this single area. On the other hand, Menteng is located in the urban district of Menteng in the city region of Central Jakarta, next to the CBD area, and in 1996 it covered an area of 2.44km2. The population of this old, exclusive residential-area consists of high-ranking government and military officials, and people who have retired from such positions. However, in recent years the area has been facing an aging problem, which is leading to a hollowing out phenomenon [Yoshihara et.al 1996: 115].

Urban residential areas in Indonesia, including those in Jakarta, are officially divided into three broad types: 'upper-income district', 'pocket development area', and 'slum settlement' [Sullivan 1980: 2-4]. An 'upper-income district' is a well-planned, well-serviced and equipped residential area, where every house is on a road and can be reached by car. Needless to say, the majority of the residents are in the upper-income bracket. About 10% of Indonesian city residents live in this type of residential area [Suyono 1976: 59-64]. Menteng is of this type. The second type, of the sort officially termed a 'pocket development area', can be distinguished by lines of permanent houses and commercial buildings arrayed along main thoroughfares, behind which is a labyrinth of alleyways jammed with 'permanent', 'semi-permanent', or apparently 'temporary' houses.   Unlike the upper-income districts, the houses in these areas cannot be reached by car or other means of

transport wider than an average human being. This old form of urban residential area can be found all over urban Indonesia, and the vast majority of Indonesian urban residents live in this type of area. Such 'pocket development areas' are planned, in certain broad, general aspects. Menteng Atas fits into this type, and is also known as a kampung (urban village) area. The third type of urban residential area is the 'slum settlement', which is usually found on the most marginal, unattractive land, and is often owned by the government. Generally, the bulk of people who live in these areas are those who have recently migrated to the city; they are very poor and disoriented, so that they are essentially marginalized and lead hand-to-mouth lives. In general, their settlements are also temporary, illegal, overcrowded and unhealthy, and deprived of the simplest urban amenities. Settlements of this type began to appear in the 1950s. In this paper, this third type of urban residential area will not be included as an object of observation.

Based on 1991 and 1996 statistical data, overall conditions in the 'kampung area' Menteng Atas and the 'upper-income district' Menteng can be seen in table 1. Even though the total population of Menteng in 1996 was slightly higher than that of Menteng Atas, the population density in the kampung area of Menteng Atas was much higher, due to the relative size of the areas—Menteng Atas covers only slightly more than half of the elite residential area of Menteng. Furthermore, there are more neighborhood associations or RTs in Menteng Atas in comparison with the more sparsely populated Menteng. This suggests that an area with a high population density needs to be equipped with more neighborhood associations in order to organize its community. Based on this, the significance of this sort of neighborhood association should be further observed. The next part of this paper will examine the general condition of RTs in both Menteng Atas and Menteng.

III. General Condition of RTs

A. The RT/RW and the Jakarta Local Administrative System
As the capital of Indonesia, Jakarta has a special status. The city is treated as a province in the administrative system, with a governor as its head. Under the governor, there are five mayors (wali kota) who serve as head of each of five city regions (kotamadya): Central Jakarta, North Jakarta, West Jakarta, South Jakarta, and East Jakarta. Each region is then divided into urban districts (kecamatan), with a camat as the head of each district. Under the camat, there are the heads of urban sub-districts (kelurahan), who are called lurah. These urban sub-districts are the smallest units in the local administrative system (see figure 2). Consequently, the RT/RW are not considered official units of the local administrative system.

According to a Decree of the Governor of Jakarta enacted on December 23, 1966, the RT/RW are recognized as organizations of the people which are positioned under the protection of the government, but they are not units in the government administrative system. The RT/RW are given the task and duty of promoting integration between the people and the government, of accepting and implementing all of the government's efforts and plans for the development of society, of preserving and promoting the Indonesian people's spirit of musyawarah mufakat (mutual consultation) and gotong royong (mutual assistance), of collecting dues and of making full use of any means available for the improvement of the living conditions of the people. By 1994 there was a total number of 28,981 RTs and 2,544 RWs in Jakarta.

B. The RT/RW in Menteng Atas and Menteng
As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the field research into Menteng Atas and Menteng

was conducted in December 1998 and August 1999, mainly in the form of questionnaires seeking information on the organizational structure, activities and social characteristics of the leaders of the neighborhood associations. Some further interviews complemented the research. From questionnaires distributed to 192 RT chiefs in the target areas, 179 replies were obtained.

Based on these replies, the present scale of RTs in Menteng Atas and Menteng can be outlined as in table 2. The 1966 Decree of the Governor of Jakarta provides that the number of households as members in any one RT should not exceed 40. Furthermore, according to the 1983 Provision of the Ministry of Home Affairs no. 7, which regulates the objectives, form, functions and management of RT/RW in Indonesia, in the case of a desa (village) the number of households in an RT should be less than 30, and in the case of a kelurahan (urban sub-district) the number should be less than 50. The data in table 2 shows that the average number of households in Menteng Atas and Menteng is still within the limits set by the 1966 Decree and the 1983 Provision. However, in some cases, the number of households does exceed the limit.

While taking into consideration the scale of RTs in both areas, it is also necessary to understand the background of the area in which each RT is located (see table 3). Even though both Menteng Atas and Menteng do not show any significant population change, 15.6% of RT chiefs in Menteng Atas mentioned that there is 'some increase' in population in their RT areas. On the other hand, 23.6% of Menteng chiefs mention 'some decrease lately' in the population, and 52.6% of the residents are 'retired' people. It is clear that the community in Menteng is aging, and at the same time it is losing residents, leading to a further hollowing out of the community; whereas in the case of Menteng Atas, there is some increase in the population, and 7.8% of the residents are seasonal workers (as compared to nil in Menteng). This indicates a higher degree of population circulation in Menteng Atas.

IV. Organizational Structure

A. The History of the RT

One of the most important matters for any comprehensive understanding of the RT/RW is the history of their formation. In the case of Menteng Atas and Menteng, the reason behind the formation of the RT can be deduced from table 4 and table 5.

A total of 25.1% of RTs in Menteng Atas and Menteng were formed for the first time in the 1960s. This is the second highest percentage of answers in the questionnaires, after 'unknown'. As shown in table 5, among RTs formed during the 1960s, most were formed as the result of encouragement from the government (7 RTs) and as a means to foster amity among residents (8 RTs). If the prototype of the RT is to be found during the Japanese occupation [Kurasawa 1992; Sato 1994], based on the data in table 4 and 5 it can be said that from the 1960s the RT was incorporated into the government as the smallest unit of neighborhood organization, and with the 1983 Provision of the Ministry of Home Affairs no.7 it was then fully absorbed as a government organization. This fits with Suwarno, who emphasized the attempts of the government from the 1960s onwards to integrate the neighborhood associations into the administrative system [1995].

B. The Organization of the RT

Having examined the history of the RT in Menteng Atas and Menteng, we turn to the organizational structure of the RT/RW and the distribution of households or enterprises in the membership among RTs. As seen in table 6, in Menteng Atas the largest proportion of RTs has 'more than 30 but less than 40 households as members' (42%); whereas in Menteng the scale is one

rank lower: 36.8% of RTs have 'more than 20 but less than 30 households as members'. This reflects the aforementioned characteristic of Menteng Atas as a kampung with high population density. However, looking at the rate of membership in each area, the percentage of RTs where 'every household became a member', when combined with RTs where 'more than 90%' of households became a member, reaches almost 80% in Menteng. On the other hand, in Menteng Atas it does not even reach 50%. This is another indication that in densely populated areas such as Menteng Atas there is a high degree of population mobility, and as a consequence the RT as a neighborhood organization is unable to cover all of the people in the area.

In the case of Menteng, it turns out that 21.1% of RTs do not collect any membership fees from members (table 7), and almost all RTs do not have a meeting place (table 8). Also when it comes to the publication of bulletins or reports, there seems to be some inertia in Menteng (table 9). From this, it can be concluded that, compared to RTs in Menteng Atas, RTs in Menteng are losing their function as neighborhood organizations. It does not need to be argued that to operate an organization such as a neighborhood organization, a certain amount of financial support in the form of a membership fee collected from members is a must. All of the RTs in Menteng Atas clearly get such financial support from the residents. However, 66% of the RTs in this area have to apply a scale of membership fees, according to the financial ability of each household. This indicates that there is a considerable variation in the wealth of the households in the area.

Looking at the method of election of RT chiefs in table 10 and table 11, which show how RTs in both areas cope with requests from government offices, it is once again clear that RTs in Menteng do not fully function as neighborhood organizations, since in this residential area only 39.5% choose their RT chief at a general meeting, compared to a high percentage, 77.3%, for Menteng Atas. In addition to this, whenever requested by the government to carry out certain programs or administrative work, the percentage of RTs that will actively give their cooperation in Menteng is lower than in Mentang Atas.

C. Relations with Other Organizations

One important factor not to be overlooked whenever conducting a study into the organizational structure of the RT is its relation to other groups or organizations in the area. Table 12 points out these relations in Menteng Atas and Menteng between RTs and other organizations. Table 12 shows that the other groups that are commonly found in both Menteng Atas and Menteng are siskamling (civil defense/night-watch group) and women's arisan (rotating credit association). In the case of Menteng Atas, there are also groups such as posyandu (community-based health care group), PKK (family-welfare group), karang taruna (youth association), Koran study group, men's arisan, RT arisan, and cleaning volunteers.   In Menteng, on the other hand, such groups are rarely found. This is also an indication of the loose community in Menteng.

Both Menteng Atas and Menteng RTs consider 'securing the safety of the area' is the most important role for their RTs (see table 13). Needless to say, this role is carried out through the civil defense/night-watch group. In May 1998, the same year in which this research was conducted, Jakarta had to face a chaotic situation caused by widespread riots, and since then maintaining peace and public order has become more difficult. It is only natural that 'securing the safety of the area' has become the primary task for RTs. The second most important role for the RT in both areas is 'reconciling people in the area', which means trying to get people together to create peace in the area. This role is being fulfilled by the rotating credit association, which is usually more of a social gathering than a credit association.

Returning to table 12, when it comes to the relations of the RT with other groups, as seen in

terms of the flows of 'people', 'money' and 'organization', it is clear that there is a one-way flow of people from RTs to groups, especially in the case of posyandu, siskamling, and karang taruna—although in Menteng this is not as clear as in Menteng Atas. As for organizations, it can be said that the only group which serves as a sub-organization of the RT is the siskamling; while regarding the flow of money, there is no sign of money flowing, either from RTs to other groups, nor from other groups to RTs.

V. Activities

A. The Present State of Activities

Having examined the organizational structure of the RT, the following section will look at the current activities of RTs. In Menteng Atas and Menteng, the activities of an RT can be broadly classified into three types (see table 14). The first type is activities initiated by the people in the community, or 'community initiative' type of activities; the second is activities resulting from 'collaboration between the community and the government'; and the third is purely 'government initiatives' in which the people in the area only carry out a program handed down from the government. The first type of activity includes: collecting membership fees, solving the problems of residents, and holding festivals during national holidays or religious celebrations. The second type is, for example: preserving the health of infants, maintaining a hygienic environment, cleaning the area, cooperating in garbage disposal, conducting maintenance of public roads, and preventing crime and youth delinquency. Among the activities that are promoted by the government, except for assisting in tax collection, all activities mentioned in table 14 show a high percentage of participation. Based on this, it can be concluded that the RT serves as a medium for the everyday life of the people, since this neighborhood organization comprehensively carries out various functions. However, the similarity of activities in both areas ends here. Taking a closer look at the activities, it is apparent that the percentage of activities which are the result of 'collaboration of the community and the government' is higher for Menteng Atas, while those purely 'from the government' activities form a higher percentage in Menteng. This difference distinguishes an area where daily affairs can be managed personally (Menteng), and an area where they have to be managed by common action among the people (Menteng Atas). The difference will also be seen to distinguish the positioning of the RT in each area.

To add to the above conclusion, both Menteng Atas and Menteng show a high percentage for the activity of 'cooperating in general elections' (53.2% in Menteng Atas and 76.3% in Menteng). However when it comes to giving 'support to a certain political party during a general election' (table 15), the majority of RTs never give any support to any political party.

One important factor relating to the activities of the RT is having a place to carry out those activities. Table 16 shows groups, organizations and activities that have some connection with RTs and the places where activities are conducted. From the data in the table, it can be said that in many cases the RTs' facilities are being used mainly for activities that are the common affairs of the community, such as civil defense/night-watch (siskamling) gatherings, RT meetings, family-welfare group activities (PKK), and community-based health care group activities (posyandu). However, in Menteng generally the use of RT facilities for activities is considerably lower. This is mainly due to the fact that most RTs in the area do not even have any facilities, and various activities or affairs are managed personally. This lack of facilities, and other problems concerning the operations of RTs and problems in the community, is the subject of the following section.

B. Problems and Methods for Solutions

Both Menteng Atas and Menteng have to face problems in the operation of their RTs (see table 17). As mentioned in the above paragraph, the lack of a meeting facility in Menteng keeps RTs from operating fully (28.9%); while in Menteng Atas, with a considerable population of poor families, the problem of a 'small budget' is considered serious (41.1%). However, both areas point to the shortage of people who want to be RT staff as their biggest problem in operating their RTs. The fact that this problem is more serious in Menteng (68.4%) than in Menteng Atas (47.5%) indicates the lack of community in Menteng, and at the same time reveals that, for residents of Menteng, being RT staff is not likely to be chosen as a means for self-actualization. These people seek a place for self-actualization not in the community where they live but, rather, outside this community. This can be seen further with regard to problems such as the 'low of participation from residents in events' and 'residents' lack of interest towards RT'. Nevertheless, in order to manage community daily affairs, both Menteng and Menteng Atas emphasize the need for an RT/RW meeting place (see table 18).

Problems faced by RTs are not solely operational ones. Both areas are facing the problem of a 'decline in government service', apart from other problems such as a 'decline in living environment' and a 'rise in crime, juvenile delinquency and decline in public morality' (see table 19). What is worth mentioning here is the method chosen by each area to solve these problems. In Menteng Atas, most of the time people choose to go and 'ask the RW chief' or 'ask the head of the kelurahan' to help them solve these problems. In contrast, the RT chiefs in Menteng think that to 'go straight to the government division in charge' is a more effective way to solve problems. This clearly shows that, compared to Menteng, Menteng Atas tends to rely on its community leaders, or in other words, has a type of vertical relation, in which the RT chiefs stand at the last end of this vertical relation. This may also explain why in some RTs in Menteng Atas, there is a problem whereby too many people want to become RT staff (see table 17), since being an RT staff member is still considered a means of self-actualization.

In considering the significance of the community leaders, the following part of this paper will try to take a closer look at RT chiefs in Menteng Atas and Menteng, since the characteristics of RT leadership may be an important factor in studying the structure and function of the RT itself.

VI. Social Characteristics of the RT Chief

A. Social Characteristics of the RT Chief

In examining characteristics of the RT chief in the community, it is important to consider the concurrent positions of the chief in other organizations, as shown in table 20. Some of the people who served as RT chiefs when this research was conducted turned out to have had some experience as organizing staff in other organizations, whether in the past or in their current positions. These RT chiefs held positions, or used to be staff in, organizations such as the youth association (karang taruna), social welfare groups, and religious groups.

The social attributes of RT chiefs, shown in table 21, can also explain the characteristics of community leadership in Menteng Atas and Menteng. The table shows that RT chiefs in both areas are usually people who have relatively high educational qualifications and have lived more than 30 years in their area, which makes them 'almost native' to the area. However, the similarities end there. In the case of Menteng, the average age of RT chiefs is high, as can be seen from the fact that RT chiefs who are in their 60s and 70s make up more than half of the number of RT chiefs in the area. Moreover, 23.6% of them have retired from government office, the private sector or the

military. Needless to say, as the community in Menteng is aging, so too are the RT chiefs. In addition, it is only natural that the area has a 'shortage of people who want to be RT staff' (see again table 17), and this explains why one important reason for being an RT chief is because 'no other person wants to be RT chief' (28.9%). Looking back at table 10, which showed the method of election of RT chiefs, in Menteng only 39.5% of RT chiefs were elected at a general meeting, compared to 77.3% in Menteng Atas. All of the above data point to the declining and hollowing out of the community in Menteng, and this reduces the effectiveness of RTs in Menteng as neighborhood organizations. On the other hand, RTs in Menteng Atas still function. This can be seen from the character of the RT chiefs, who are usually in their productive years, their 40s or 50s (table 21), and from the fact that they were chosen at a general meeting of the residents (table 10).

B. The RT Chief's Knowledge of a Community

The RT chiefs' knowledge and understanding of their communities also defines the structure and function of the RT. Another indication that the RT in Menteng is losing some of its functions can be seen in table 22. Compared to RT chiefs in Menteng Atas, RT chiefs in Menteng show a low degree of knowledge about their own community. The fact that Menteng Atas is also a residence for seasonal workers and that the area's high population-mobility makes it difficult for RTs to cover all of the people in the area does not adversely effect the degree of knowledge RT chiefs have about their communities, and they even manage to maintain a high degree of knowledge and understanding of the communities. This clearly suggests that in Menteng Atas, as a neighborhood association, the RT serves as the center of the Lebens Welt (life world) of the people, in which people daily interact with each other.

In addition to the above, RT chiefs in Menteng Atas are more interested in the affairs of local government, compared to those in Menteng, and, at the same time, RT chiefs in Menteng Atas also position their organization as a cooperating body with the government (46.8%). This high percentage suggests that RT chiefs in Menteng Atas regard their RTs as representatives of the community, and as playing an important role as mediators between the people and the government.

VII. Concluding Remarks

From the results of field research conducted mainly in the form of questionnaire research, this paper has tried to take a close look at the organizational structure and present state of activities of RTs in two residential areas in Jakarta, namely the kampung Menteng Atas and the elite Menteng. Based on the above analysis, there are at least two aspects that need to be emphasized.

The first is that, apart from superficial similarities in the neighborhood organizations, the characteristics of RTs are highly influenced by the characteristics of the area. In the case of Menteng Atas, the monetary and financial crisis that swept Indonesia from the second half of 1997 has brought about a serious impact on the area, and this has resulted in further impoverishment. Along with this, the need for common action to solve various problems caused directly or indirectly by the monetary crisis has been growing. The result is that the importance of RTs in Menteng Atas as neighborhood associations remains unchanged. On the other hand, in the case of RTs in Menteng, apart from facing a serious problem of aging that leads to a hollowing out of the community, there has also been a rapid privatization in the life world level of the people in the area.

The second aspect to be emphasized is that, even though the system of the RT/RW was completed during the era of the New Order and is still being preserved in the management of the RT/RW at the present time, the shift from the Suharto administration, which represented the New

Order era, to the short-lived Habibie administration and now to the present Wahid administration may also lead to a reexamination of the local government system. Needless to say, any such reorganization will affect the framework of the RT/RW. Accordingly, it is important to conduct further observations into the changes of function of the RT/RW as an organization of the people, in relation to the structure of mobilization of people from 'the top' using the RT/RW as mediator, and the reaction of the people at 'the bottom' towards such mobilization, as they grasp it and reply to it through their everyday needs.

References

Bianpoen. 1983. Research and Development for Urban Management - Case Jakarta. Rotterdam: Erasmus Universiteit . 61 p. (Doctoral Dissertation)

Devas, Nick. 1989.'Local Government Finance in Indonesia: An Overview' in Nick Devas ed. Financing Local Government in Indonesia, pp. 1-51. Ohio: Ohio Univ. Center for International Studies.

DKI Jakarta, Information and Report Bureau. 1992. Sistem Pemerintahan di DKI Jakarta (Jakarta Local Administrative System). Jakarta : Information and Report Bureau. 29 p.

Dwianto, Raphaella D. 1999a.'Toshi Bodo to Jikeidan -1998 nen 5 gatsu Jakarta Bodo wo Megutte- '(Urban Riots and Civilian Defense Group -The Case of May 1998 Jakarta Riots-) in Tohoku Toshi Gakkai Kenkyu Nenpo (Tohoku Association on Urbanology Annual Report) 1: 34-51.

Dwianto, Raphaella D. 1999b.'Patron-Client Relation Reconsidered: Comparing Civil Defense Group in Kanto Earthquake and Jakarta Riots of May 1998' in International Journal of Japanese Sociology. 8: 161-181.

Kikuchi, Miyoshi. 1973.'Kyoju Kukan to Chiiki Shudan' (Living Space and Locality Group) in Susumu Kurasawa ed. Toshi Shakaigaku (Urban Sociology). Tokyo: Tokyo Univ. Press.

Kurasawa, Aiko. 1992. Nihon Senryoka no Jawa Noson no Henyo (Change in Javanese Rural Area during Japanese Occupation). Tokyo: Soshisha.

Nakamura, Hachiro. 1968.'Urban Ward Associations in Japan'in R.E. Pahl ed. Readings in Urban Sociology. Oxford: Pergamon.

Sato, S. 1994. War, Nationalism and Peasants. London: Allen & Unwin.

Sullivan, John. 1980. Back Alley Neighborhood: Kampung as Urban Community in Yogyakarta. Melbourne: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies Monash University . 63 p. (Working Paper no. 18).

Sullivan, John. 1992. Local Government and Community in Java - An Urban Case Study -. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.

Suwarno, PJ. 1995. Dari Azazyookai dan Tonarigumi ke Rukun Kampung and Rukun Tetangga di Yogyakarta (1942-1989) (From Azazyookai and Tonarigumi to Rukun Kampung and Rukun Tetangga in Yogyakarta (1942-1989). Yogyakarta: Penerbitan Universitas Sanata Dharma.

Suyono. 1976.'Development Patterns of Urban Residential Areas' in Prisma 4: 59-64.

Torigoe, Hiroyuki. 1994. Chiiki Jichikai no Kenkyu (Study on Local Self-governing Association). Kyoto: Minerva Shobo.

Yoshihara, Naoki and Dwianto, R D. 1996.'Jakarta Tokubetsu-ku ni okeru Grass roots no Ichi Sonzai Keitai -RT/RW ni tsuite no Sobyo-' (An Existing Form of Grass roots in Jakarta -Sketch on RT/RW-) in Tohoku Daigaku Bungakubu Kenkyu Nenpo (The Annual Reports of The Faculty of Arts and Letters, Tohoku University) 46: 99-130.

Yoshihara, Naoki and Dwianto, R D. 1997.'Jakarta Tokubetsu-ku ni okeru Grass roots no Ichi Sonzai Keitai -Arisan ni tsuite no Sobyo-' (An Existing Form of Grass roots in Jakarta -Sketch on Arisan-) in Tohoku Daigaku Bungakubu Kenkyu Nenpo (The Annual Reports of The Faculty of Arts and Letters, Tohoku University) 47: 169-194.

Figure 1 Location map, Jakarta

Figure 2 Local Administrative System

Source: [Devas 1989:15; Sullivan 1992:135 ; Biro Informasi dan Pelaporan DKI Jakarta
     1992:29]

Table 1 Overall Condition of Menteng Atas and Menteng

		Menteng Atas		Menteng	
		1991	1996	1991	1996
indonesian nationality	male	24,017	20,799	19,683	20,489
	female	23,166	20,159	19,744	20,645
	total	47,183	40,958	39,427	41,134
foreigner	male	22	9	63	61
	female	26	6	52	49
	total	48	15	115	110
total		47,231	40,973	39,542	41,244
population movement	birth	*	304	453	28
	inflow	893	335	846	47
	outflow	3507	748	748	31
	death	*	73	168	15
marriage & divorce	marriage	*	213	476	34
	divorce	*	1	-	-
	reunite	*	-	-	-
	household	9,875	7,296	8,175	*
	RT	198	145	123	138
	RW	15	11	10	10
	area	90.40 a (0.90 km^2)	147.00 a (1.47 km2)	243.90 a (2.44 km2)	243.90 a (2.44 km2)

Source: [Kecamatan Menteng dalam Angka (1991), Kecamatan
Setia Budi dalam angka (1991), Kecamatan Menteng dalam
angka (1996), Kecamatan Setia Budi dalam angka (1996)
Note: * data unknown

Table 2 Outline of RTs in Menteng Atas and Menteng Area

	Name of RW	Actual number of RT (number of collected questionaires/numer of NA for this question)	largest RT (number of household as member)	smallest RT (number of household as member)	number of household as RT member	average number of houshold	number of enterprise as member
Menteng Atas (①)							
1	RW 02	11 (11 / none)	RT 009 (39)	RT 008 (12)	297	27	9
2	RW 04	11 (11 / none)	RT 008 (63)	RT 009 (6)	382	34.7	8
3	RW 05	16 (16 / none)	RT 006 (66)	RT 004 (30)	659	41.2	1
4	RW 06	15 (15 / none)	RT 015 (50)	RT 010 (13)	488	32.5	12
5	RW 07	17 (17 / 1)	RT 010 (58)	RT 002 (17)	573	35.8	29
6	RW 08	13 (12 / none)	RT 006 (75)	RT 013 (12)	477	39.8	10
7	RW 09	16 (15 / 1)	RT 013 (133)	RT 003 (22)	608	43.4	4
8	RW 12	12 (12 / none)	RT 009 (106)	RT 005 (29)	608	50.7	3
9	RW 13	9 (9 / none)	RT 002 (76)	RT 006 (28)	382	42.4	-
10	RW 14	9 (9 / none)	RT 007 (59)	RT 008 (25)	341	37.9	11
11	RW 15	14 (14 / none)	RT 004 (82)	RT 003 (14)	482	34.4	5
Total (①)		143 (141)			5,297	38.1	92
Menteng (②)							
12	RW 04	12 (10 / none)	RT 001 (80)	RT 012 (22)	346	34.6	21
13	RW O5	16 (10 / 2)	RT 015 (82)	RT 010 (15)	334	41.8	29
14	RW 06	10 (9 / none)	RT 006 (61)	RT 010 (12)	347	38.6	35
15	RW 07	11 (9 / none)	RT 011 (37)	RT 009 (19)	236	26.2	10
Total (②)		49 (38)			1,263	35.1	95
Total of both area (①+②)		192 (179)			6,560	37.5	187

Table 3 Present Situation of RT Surroundings

	Menteng Atas (①)	Menteng (②)	Total (①+②)		Menteng Atas (①)	Menteng (②)	Total (①+②)
(1) Overall situation				**(5) Rebuilding of houses or buildings**			
business/industrial area	0.7	-	0.6	occurred within the last 5 years	8.5	13.2	9.5
manufacturing area	-	-	-	between 5-10 years	5	-	3.9
residential area	87.9	92.2	88.8	more than 10 years ago	0.7	-	0.6
company housing area	4.3	2.6	3.9	date unknown	10.6	2.6	8.9
rsedential & offices area	4.3	2.6	3.9	never	66.7	65.8	66.5
residential & shopping area	-	-	-	other	5	7.9	5.6
other	2.8	2.6	2.8	NA	3.5	10.5	5
(2) Population change				**(6) Renumbering of houses**			
considerable increase lately	3.5	-	2.8	occurred within the last 5 years	2.8	-	2.2
some increase	15.6	7.9	14	between 5-10 years	9.2	2.6	7.8
no change	71	52.6	67	more than 10 years ago	12.1	-	9.5
some decrease lately	3.5	23.6	7.8	date unknown	16.3	2.6	13.4
considerable decrease	3.5	5.3	3.4	never	56.7	84.2	62.6
other	2.9	5.3	3.9	other	1.4	5.3	2.2
NA	3.5	5.3	1.1	NA	1.4	5.3	2.2
(3) Characteristics of residents				**(7) Living environment**			
self employed/home industr	14.9	-	11.7	improved	25.5	18.4	24
employee outside the area	3.5	5.3	3.9	more or less improved	36.2	28.9	34.6
employee in Jakarta	44	29	40.8	no change	28.4	42.1	31.3
employee in neighborhing				more or less deteriorated	7.8	5.3	7.3
area of Jakarta	11.3	7.9	10.6	deteriorated	1.4	-	1.1
working in another province	-	-	-	NA	0.7	5.3	1.7
seasonal worker	7.8	-	6.1	**(7)-1 the reason for this:**			
retired	2.8	52.6	13.4	efforts from the people	28.7	11.1	25.7
other	14.9	2.6	12.3	efforts from RT/RW	35.6	16.7	32.4
NA	0.8	2.6	1.1	efforts from enterprises etc.	-	-	-
(4) Apartments in the area				efforts from the government	21.9	61	28.6
many apartments	1.4	-	1.1	economic and social condition	1.2	5.6	1.9
some apartments	3.6	2.6	3.4	natural condition	5.7	-	4.8
no apartement	95	89.5	93.9	other	5.7	5.6	5.7
other	-	-	-	NA	1.2	-	0.9
NA	-	2.6	1.7				

Table 4 History of RT

	Menteng Atas (①)	Menteng (②)	Total (①+②)
(1) Period of first formation			
Dutch colonization era	2.1	-	1.7
Japanese occupation era	2.1	-	1.7
the year 1945	2.8	-	2.2
1950s	12.1	13.1	12.3
1960s	24.1	28.9	25.1
1970s	15.6	2.6	12.8
1980s	12.1	5.3	10.6
After the year 1990	1.4	-	1.1
unknown	25.5	47.4	30.2
NA	2.2	2.6	2.2
(2) Momentum behind formation			
separation from original RW	17.7	2.6	14.5
formation by newcomers	0.7	5.3	1.7
formation with the establishment of			
new residential area	3.4	-	2.8
to solveproblems faced by the are	10.6	7.9	10.1
to foster amity among residents	12.8	10.5	12.3
encouraged by the government	9.9	5.3	8.9
encouraged by RW	2.8	5.3	3.4
merger with neighboring RT	2.1	2.6	2.2
always existed	32.6	47.4	35.8
other	3.6	7.9	4.5
NA	3.6	5.3	3.9

Table 5 Period of Formation of RT and Momentum behind Formation

	Dutch colonization era	Japanese occupation era	year 1945	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	After year 1990	unknown	NA
separation from original RW				2 [1]	5	4	6		8	1
formation by newcomers				2 [2]			1			
formation with establishment of residential new area					2	2			1	
to solve problems in the area		1		1	3	5	3		5 [3]	
to foster amity among resients	1		1	4 [1]	8 [1]	2	3 [1]		2	[1]
encouraged by the government			2	2	7 [2]	1	1	1	2	
encouraged by RW				1	1 [1]	2	1		1 [1]	
merger with neighboring RT					2 [1]	1	1			
always existed	2	2	1	7 [1]	12 [2]	5 [1]	3 [1]	1	31 [13]	
other					4 [3]	1			3	
NA				3	1 [1]				1 [1]	2
TOTAL	3	3	4	22 [5]	45 [11]	23 [1]	19 [2]	2	54 [18]	4 [1]

note: The figures in the table show the total of Menteng Atas and Menteng, while the figures in [ ] represent those in Menteng area

Table 6 Number of Households as RT Member, Percent... Number of Enterprise as RT Member

(%)

	Menteng Atas (①)	Menteng (②)	Total (①+②)
(1) Number of households as member			
less than 20 households	5.8	7.9	6.8
more than 20, less than 30	16.3	36.8	20.7
more than 30, less than 40	42.5	21	38
more than 40, less than 50	15.6	10.5	14.5
more than 50, less than 75	14.9	13.2	14
more than 75 households	3.5	5.3	3.9
NA	1.4	5.3	2.2
(2) Percentage of membership			
every household becomes member	20.7	55.3	27.9
more than 90%	24.8	23.7	24.6
more than 70%, less than 90%	22.7	-	17.9
more than 50%, less than 70%	8.5	2.6	7.3
less than 50%	9.9	7.9	9.5
Unknown	3.5	2.6	3.4
NA	9.9	7.9	9.5
(3) Number of enterprise as member			
none	71.6	21.1	60.8
1 enterprise	12.8	2.6	10.6
2 enterprise	6.4	21.1	9.5
3 enterprise	0.7	5.3	1.7
4 enterprise	2.8	7.9	3.9
5 enterprise	2.1	2.6	2.2
6 enterprise	0.7	2.6	1.1
7 enterprise	-	-	-
more than 8 enterprise	0.7	7.9	2.2

Table 7 Method of Collection of Membership Fee

(%)

	Menteng Atas (①)	Menteng (②)	Total (①+②)
Equal sum for every household	26.2	42	29.6
Different sum according to household financial ability	66	21.1	56.4
Different sum for household and enterprise	1.4	2.6	1.7
Other method of collection	2.1	5.3	2.8
No collection of membership fee	-	21.1	4.5
NA	4.3	7.9	5

Table 8 Meeting Place

(%)

	Menteng Atas (①)	Menteng (②)	Total (①+②)
RT's own meeting place	3.5	-	2.8
Community meeting place (joint ownership with other RT)	3.5	-	2.8
Community meeting place (joint ownership with other group)	2.9	-	2.2
Community center	9.2	-	7.3
No meeting place	68.9	97.4	74.8
Other	8.5	-	6.7
NA	3.5	2.6	3.4

Table 9 Publication of Bulletin or Report

(%)

	Menteng Atas (①)	Menteng (②)	Total (①+②)
More than once a month	9.2	2.6	7.8
Basically once every month	21.3	13.2	19.6
Several times in a year	31.9	21	29.6
Once or two times a year	12.8	7.9	11.7
Rarely	15.6	31.6	16
No publication	6.4	15.8	8.4
NA	2.8	7.9	3.9

Table 10 Method of Election for RT chief

(%)

	Menteng Atas (①)	Menteng (②)	Total (①+②)
Elected in a general meeting of residents	77.3	39.5	69.3
Elected among staffs themselves	-	-	-
Recommended by the staff meeting	-	2.6	0.6
In rotation	-	2.6	0.6
Voted by the residents without general meeting	11.4	23.7	13.9
Nominated by the former RT head	1.4	18.4	5
Other	1.4	5.3	2.2
NA	8.5	7.9	8.4

Table 11 Coping with Requests from the Government Offices

(%)

	Menteng Atas (①)	Menteng (②)	Total (①+②)
Actively cooperate	46.8	39.4	45.3
Cooperate for formality's sake	5.7	5.3	5.6
Cooperate only with regular distribution of government information	4.9	7.9	5.6
cooperate only when considered necessary or important	36.9	42.1	37.9
Other	4.3	5.3	4.5
NA	1.4	-	1.1

Table 12 RT and Its Relation with Other Groups or Organization

(%)

		exist in RT	RT sends its repre-sentative (1)	the group send its represen tative to RT (2)	the group is sub-or ganization of RT (3)	the group gives its subsidy to RT (4)
Posyandu (5)	①	31.2	48.9	6.4	9.9	1.4
	②	-	-	-	-	-
	①&②	24.6	38.5	5	7.8	1.1
PKK (6)	①	28.3	42.6	4.3	11.3	2.1
	②	18.4	15.9	-	2.6	2.6
	①&②	26.2	36.9	3.4	9.5	2.2
Karang Taruna (7)	①	21.3	23.4	1.4	11.3	0.7
	②	10.5	2.6	-	2.6	-
	①&②	18.9	18.9	1.1	9.5	0.5
Boy/Girl Scout	①	-	-	-	1.4	-
	②	-	-	-	-	-
	①&②	-	-	-	1.1	-
Siskamling (8)	①	66.7	34.8	2.1	25.5	-
	②	34.2	13.2	2.6	5.3	-
	①&②	59.8	30.1	2.2	21.2	-
Koperasi (9)	①	7.1	7.1	-	0.7	1.4
	②	5.3	2.6	-	-	-
	①&②	6.7	6.1	-	0.5	0.5
Sports Group	①	12.1	9.9	0.7	3.5	-
	②	5.3	2.6	2.6	2.6	-
	①&②	10.6	8.4	1.1	3.4	-
Culture and Art Group	①	2.1	5	-	2.1	-
	②	-	-	-	-	-
	①&②	1.7	3.9	-	1.7	-
Koran Study Group	①	44.7	18.4	0.7	9.2	-
	②	13.2	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6
	①&②	37.9	15	1.1	7.8	0.5
Prayer Group	①	3.5	4.3	-	2.1	-
	②	2.6	-	-	-	-
	①&②	3.4	3.4	-	1.7	-
Women's Arisan (10)	①	55.3	17.7	1.4	14.9	0.7
	②	57.9	13.2	7.9	15.9	2.6
	①&②	55.9	16.8	2.8	15.1	1.1
Men's Arisan	①	30.5	17.7	0.7	7.8	1.4
	②	-	-	-	-	-
	①&②	24	13.9	0.5	6.1	1.1
RT Arisan	①	35.5	7.8	-	12.1	1.4
	②	-	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6
	①&②	27.9	6.7	0.5	10	1.7
Cleaning Volunteers	①	39.7	12.8	2.1	14.9	-
	②	5.3	-	-	5.3	-
	①&②	37.4	10	1.7	12.8	-
Family Planning Group	①	14.2	14.9	3.5	6.4	0.7
	②	5.3	5.3	-	-	-
	①&②	12.3	12.8	2.8	5	0.5
Other	①	1.4	2.1	-	0.7	-
	②	-	-	-	-	-
	①&②	1.1	1.7	-	0.5	-

note: 1) the figures in (1), (2), (3), (4) are percentages of the total shown in column 'exist in RT'
2) (5) community based health care group, (6) family welfare group, (7) youth association
(8) civil defense (night watch) group, (9) cooperative association, (10) rotating credit association
3) ① percentage of Menteng Atas, ② percentage of Menteng

Table 13 Ten Most Important Roles of RT

(%; multiple answer)

Menteng Atas (①)	Menteng (②)	Total (①&②)
[1] Securing the safety of the area (71.6)	[1] Securing the safety of the area (65.8)	[1] Securing the safety of the area (70.4)
[2] Reconciling the people in the area (29.8)	[2] Communicating official information and doing administrative work (26.3)	[2] Reconciling people in the area (27.9)
[3] Electing RT staffs (27.7)	[3] Taking care of residents in cases of emergency (23.7)	[3] Electing RT staffs (24.6)
[4] Giving help on a resident's death (25.5)	[4] Reconciling people in the area (21.2)	[4] Giving help on a resident's death (21.8)
[5] Holding sports events and festivals (15.6)	[5] Cooperating with government in program implementation (15.8)	[5] Communicating official information and doing administrative work (16.8)
[5] Taking care of the elderly and the handicaped (15.6)	[6] Solving problem and representing reside in dealing with government (13.2)	[6] Taking care of residents in case of emergency (15.6)
[7] Cooperating with the government in program implementation (14.9)	[6] Electing RT staffs (13.2)	[7] Cooperating with the government in programs implementation (15.1)
[8] Communicating official information and doing administrative work (14.2)	[6] Taking care of the elderly and the handicaped (13.2)	[7] Taking care of the elderly and the handicaped (15.1)
[8] Electing RW staff (14.2)	[9] Giving help on a resident's death (7.9)	[9] Holding sports events and festivals (14.
[10] Taking care of residents in case of emergency (13.5)	[9] Holding sports events and festivals (7.9)	[10] Solveing problems and representing residents in dealing with the government (13.4)
[10] Solving problems and representing residents in dealing with government (13.5)	[9] Giving help at a resident's wedding (7.9)	
	[9] Other (7.9)	

Table 14 RT's Activities

(%; mulitple answer)

	Menteng Atas (①)	Menteng (②)	Total (①&②)
[I] 'Community initiatives' Type			
Cultural activites by the residents	0.7	2.6	1.1
Sports activities by the residents	19.9	21	20.1
Festivals	35.5	34.2	35.2
Preservation of traditional art and culture	3.5	2.6	3.6
Mangement of public parks and squares	14.2	18.4	15.1
Mangement of meeting places	12.1	7.9	11.1
Helping the elderly in their everyday life	7.8	5.3	7.3
Helping the handicaped in their everyday life	-	5.3	1.1
Helping the poor in their everyday life	7.8	10.5	8.4
Helping working mothers with house work	1.4	5.3	2.2
Solving the problems of the residents	44.7	50	45.8
Building their own area and community	4.3	2.6	3.9
Coping with traffic safety	0.7	5.3	1.7
Collecting membership fee	72.3	68.4	71.5
[II] 'Collaboration between the community and the government' type			
Preserving the health of infants	72.3	15.8	60.3
Bringing up and educating children	27.7	7.9	23.5
Educating young people	19.9	5.3	16.8
Cooperating in medical check up	12.1	5.3	10.6
Maintaining public hygene	82.2	44.7	74.3
Anti-pollution measures	7.1	7.9	7.3
Cleaning the area	51.8	28.9	46.9
Cooperating in garbage disposal	48.2	31.6	44.7
Conducting maintenance of public road	36.9	15.8	32.4
Preventing disaster and calamity	10.6	7.9	10
Preventing fire and fire-fighting	0.7	-	0.5
Preventing crime and youth delinquency	57.4	42.1	54.1
[III] 'Government initiatives' Type			
Issuing various notes of authentication	73	86.8	76
Organizing family registration cards for the resie	63.8	71.1	65.4
Giving cooperation for the census	31.9	50	36.9
Assissting in tax collection	21.3	10.5	18.9
Implementing instructions from the government	40.4	50	42.5
Cooperating in general elections	53.2	76.3	58.1
[IV] Other			
Other	22.7	7.9	19.5

Table 15 Support for a Certain Political Party during General Elections

(%)

	Menteng Atas (①)	Menteng (②)	Total (①&②)
In every general election	4.3	-	3.4
Tends to do it in recent year	2.8	2.6	2.8
Sometimes	1.4	-	1.1
Used to do it	10.7	5.3	9.5
Never	79.4	89.5	81.5
NA	1.4	2.6	1.7

Table 16 Activities and Place for Activities

(%; multiple answer)

		RT/RW's facilities	community group's facilities	kelurahan's facilities	enterprise's facilities	other facilities	no facilities
PKK	①	47.5	2.1	6.4	-	7.8	4.3
	②	7.9	-	-	-	5.3	-
	①&②	39.1	1.7	5	-	7.3	3.4
Posyandu	①	46.1	1.4	6.4	-	10.6	3.5
	②	-	-	2.6	-	-	2.6
	①&②	36.3	1.1	5.6	-	8.4	3.4
Sports	①	16.3	1.4	5	-	5.7	7.1
	②	2.6	-	-	-	2.6	2.6
	①&②	13.4	1.1	3.9	-	5	6.1
RT's meeting	①	51.1	0.7	1.4	-	15.6	2.1
	②	-	-	-	-	13.2	-
	①&②	40.2	0.5	1.1	-	15.1	1.7
charity activities	①	27	1.4	4.3	-	2.8	7.1
	②	2.6	-	-	-	2.6	-
	①&②	21.8	1.1	3.4	-	2.8	5.6
Arisan	①	39	0.7	0.7	-	22	2.8
	②	2.6	-	-	-	18.4	-
	①&②	31.3	0.5	0.5	-	21.2	2.2
Night-watch	①	56	-	0.7	0.7	9.2	0.7
	②	21	-	-	-	-	-
	①&②	48.6	-	0.5	0.5	7.3	0.5
Wedding	①	8.5	-	2.8	-	12.8	5.7
	②	-	-	-	-	2.6	2.6
	①&②	6.7	-	2.2	-	10.6	5
Funeral	①	12.8	-	1.4	-	14.9	4.3
	②	-	-	-	-	5.3	2.6
	①&②	10	-	1.1	-	12.8	3.9
Party or festival	①	9.2	-	1.4	0.7	5.7	5.7
	②	-	-	-	-	5.3	-
	①&②	7.3	-	1.1	0.5	5.6	4.5
Other	①	2.1	-	0.7	-	2.1	0.7
	②	-	-	-	-	-	-
	①&②	1.7	-	0.5	-	1.7	0.5

Note: ① percentage for Menteng Atas, and ② percentage for Menteng

Table 17 Problem in Operating RT

(%; multiple answer)

	Menteng Atas (①)	Menteng (②)	Total (①&②)
Residents' lack of interest in the RT	7.1	21.1	10
Low of participation from residents in events	24.8	26.3	25.1
Shortage of people who want to be RT staff	47.5	68.4	52
Too many people who want to be RT staff	0.7	-	0.6
Small budget	41.1	13.2	35.2
Lack of meeting place	20.6	28.9	22.3
Too many requests of cooperation from government or other organizations	5.7	-	4.5
Requests to cooperate in politics of election	6.4	10.5	7.3
Frictions among residents	2.1	-	1.7
Generation gap among residents	0.7	-	0.6
Inability of new-comers to adapt to the community	6.4	7.9	6.7
Lack of harmony among the staffs	2.8	-	2.2
No important problem at all	15.6	13.2	15
Other	4.3	5.3	4.5
NA	1.4	7.9	2.8

Table 18 Fifteen Most Needed Facilities

(%; multiple answer)

Menteng Atas (①)	Menteng (②)	Total (①＋②)
[1] Children's playground (38.7／7.1／10.6	[1] RT/RW's meeting place (34.2／5.3／2.6	[1] RT/RW's meeting place (33.5／2.2／3.4
[2] RT/RW's meeting place (33.3／1.4／3.5	[2] Street lamps (13.2／5.3／10.5)	[2] Children's playground (31.8／6.1／10.6
[3] Clinic (21.3／9.2／5.0)	[3] Parking space (10.5／13.2／7.9)	[3] Clinic (18.4／8.4／4.5)
[4] A standard gym (19.1／27.7／14.2)	[3] Community center (10.5／-／2.6)	[4] A standard gym (15.1／23.5／13.4)
[5] Place for Posyandu (15.6／9.2／5.0)	[5] Clinic (7.9／5.3／2.6)	[5] Street lamps (14.0／7.3／12.3)
[6] Street lamps (14.2／9.2／11.3)	[5] Public park (7.9／5.3／13.2)	[6] Library (12.8／15.1／10.1)
[6] Library (14.2／17.7／9.9)	[5] Avenue's trees (7.9／-／10.5)	[7] Place for Posyandu (12.3／8.4／4.5)
[8] Place for PKK (12.1／7.8／5.0)	[5] Library (7.9／5.3／10.5)	[8] Place for PKK (11.2／7.8／4.5)
[9] Mail boxes (10.6／6.4／4.3)	[5] Children's playground (7.9／2.6／10.5)	[9] Community center (10.6／14.0／5.0)
[9] Community center (10.6／17.7／5.7)	[5] Place for PKK (7.9／7.9／2.6)	[10] Mail boxes (8.9／5.0／3.9)
[11] Welfare facilities (9.9／12.8／9.9)	[11] Police box (5.3／5.3／10.5)	[10] Public park (8.9／10.1／14.0)
[12] Public park (9.2／11.3／14.2)	[11] Sidewalk (5.3／5.3／5.3)	[12] Parking space (7.8／7.8／11.2)
[12] Post office (9.2／29.8／7.1)	[13] Shops (2.6／-／2.6)	[12] Welfare facilities (7.8／11.7／8.9)
[14] Sports center (8.5／17.0／9.9)	[13] Mail boxes (2.6／-／2.6)	[14] Post office (7.3／24.0／6.1)
[15] Parking space (7.1／6.4／11.3)	[13] Hotel (2.6／-／2.6)	[15] Sports center (6.7／14.0／9.5)
[15] Police box (7.1／26.2／7.8)	[13] Medical staffs (2.6／13.2／5.3)	
[15] Other (7.1／5.7／9.2)		

Note: the figures in （ ） show the percentage in RT, Kelurahan, and Jakarta city

Table 19 Problems and Method of Solution

(%; multiple answer)

Five most often occur problems	Three most effective method of solution
Menteng Atas (①)	
1. Rise in crime, juvenile delinquency and decline in public morality (33.3)	[1] fo straight to the government division in charge (32.0) [2] ask RW Chief (28.0) [3] do nothing (7.2)
2. Decline in government service (30.5)	[1] ask RW chief (53.5) [2] ask head of kelurahan (32.6) [3] go straight to the government division in charge (25.6)
3. Shortage of public park, sports gym, recreation facilities (30.5)	[1] ask head of kelurahan (30.2) [2] ask RW chief (25.6) [3] do nothing (14.0)
4. Decline in living environment due to development program (29.8)	[1] ask RW chief (59.5) [2] go straight to government division in charge (35.7) [3] ask head of kelurahan (31.0)
5. Shortage of facilities for cultural activities (28.4)	[1] ask RW chief (42.5) [2] ask head of kelurahan (32.5) [3] do nothing (17.5)
Menteng (②)	
1. Decline in government services (36.8)	[1] go straight to the government division in charge (42.9) [2] ask RW chief (35.7) [2] ask head of kelurahan (35.7)
2. Shortage of facilities for cultural activities (28.9)	[1] ask RW chief (54.5) [2] ask an influential person in the community (18.2) [2] ask head of kelurahan (18.2)
2. Lack of socialization among residents (28.9)	[1] ask RW chief (36.4) [2] do nothing (27.3) [3] ask head of kelurahan (18.2) [3] establish special group (18.2)
4. Decline of the natural environment (23.7)	[1] go straight to the government division in charge (44.4) [2] ask RW chief (22.2) [2] ask head of kelurahan (22.2) [2] Other (22.2)
5. Lack of cultural activities (18.4)	[1] go straight to the government division in charge (28.6) [1] ask RW chief (28.6) [1] ask head of kelurahan (28.6)
Total (①＆②)	
1. Decline in government services (31.8)	[1] ask RW chief (49.1) [2] ask head of kelurahan (33.3) [3] go straight to the government division in charge (29.8)
2. Shortage of facilities for cultural activities (30.2)	[1] ask RW chief (42.6) [2] ask head of kelurahan (27.8) [3] do nothing (14.9)
3. Decline in living environment due to development program (26.3)	[1] ask RW chief (59.6) [2] go straight to the government division in charge (40.4) [3] ask head of kelurahan (34.0)
3. Rise in crime, juvenile delinquency and decline in public morality (26.3)	[1] ask RW chief (55.3) [2] ask head of kelurahan (29.8) [3] go straight to the government division in charge (23.4)
3. Shortage of public park, sports gym, recreation facilities (26.3)	[1] ask head of kelurahan (29.8) [2] ask RW chief (25.5) [3] do nothing (14.9)

note: figures in （ ） in column of 'method of solution' are the percentage of the total of each answer in column of 'most often occur problems'

Table 20 Concurrent Position in Other Organizations

(%; multiple answer)

	Menteng Atas (①)		Menteng (②)		Total (①&②)	
	at present	in the past	at present	in the past	at present	in the past
Posyandu	8.9	-	-	-	6.3	-
PKK	5.4	4.2	15.4	14.3	5.1	6.5
Karang Taruna	10.7	33.3	15.4	7.1	10.1	27.4
Fire fighting group	1.8	-	-	-	1.3	-
PTA	8.9	4.6	7.7	14.3	7.6	14.5
Koperasi	12.5	6.3	7.7	14.3	10.1	8.1
Social welfare group	16.1	8.3	30.8	7.1	16.5	8.1
Citizen group	3.6	2.1	7.7	21.4	3.8	6.5
Sports group	7.1	6.3	-	7.1	5.1	6.5
Religious group	19.6	18.8	23.1	-	17.7	14.5
Political group	3.6	6.3	7.7	7.1	3.8	6.5
Company's labor union	3.6	2.1	-	28.6	2.5	8.1
Alumni association	1.8	2.1	-	7.1	1.3	3.2
Home town gathering	16.1	4.2	15.4	21.4	13.9	8.1
Government association	3.6	4.2	-	21.4	2.5	8.1
Other	19.6	8.3	15.4	7.1	16.5	8.1

Note: Figures in the table are percentage of the total 'yes' answer of the question
whether the RT chief has any concurrent position

Table 21 Data on RT Chiefs

(%)

	Menteng Atas(①)	Menteng (②)	Total (①&②)		Menteng Atas(①)	Menteng (②)	Total (①&②)
(1) Age				**(5) Educational background**			
20s	0.7	-	0.6	Elementary school	9.9	2.6	8.3
30s	17.7	7.9	15.6	Junior high school	19.1	7.9	15.6
40s	35.5	21	32.4	Senior high school	50.4	28.9	46.4
50s	30.5	13.2	26.8	Technical college	12.8	21.1	14.5
60s	13.5	36.9	18.4	University / post graduate studies	7.8	39.5	15.1
70s	2.1	18.4	5.6				
80s	-	2.6	0.6	**(6) Type of housing**			
				Own the house	89.4	76.3	86.6
(2) Sex				Own the appartment	-	-	-
Male	93.6	55.3	85.5	Company house	1.4	2.6	1.7
Female	6.4	44.7	14.5	Rent the house from private sector	1.4	-	1.1
				Other type	7.8	21.1	10.6
(3) Family composition							
Single	-	5.3	1.1	**(7) Years of living in the area**			
Husband and wife	0.7	2.6	1.1	Less than one year	-	-	-
Husband, wife, unmarried children	56	21.1	48.6	More than one, less than 5 years	6.4	2.6	5.6
Husband, wife, married children	7.1	-	5.6	More than 5, less than 10 years	9.9	2.6	8.4
Husband, wife, children, grand				More than 10, less than 20 years	24.1	13.2	21.8
children	5	15.8	7.3	More than 20, less than 30 years	22	18.4	21.2
Other	26.9	52.6	32.4	More than 30 years	34.1	52.7	38
NA	4.3	2.6	3.9	NA	3.5	10.5	5
(4) Occupation				**(8) Reason of being RT chief**			
Self employed in commerce	7.1	5.3	6.7	Asked by the residents	79.4	39.4	70.9
Self employed in industry	2.8	7.9	3.9	recommended by the former RW			
Employee (full time)	43.3	21.1	38.5	chief	5.7	13.2	7.3
Employee (part time)	5	-	3.9	Appointed by the former RW chief	1.4	7.9	2.8
Jobless	8.5	7.9	8.4	No other person wants to be RT			
Retired of government official	9.9	13.1	10.6	chief	7.8	28.9	12.3
Retired of private enterprise	5.7	5.3	5.6	Other reasons	5	5.3	5
Retired of military	1.4	7.9	2.8	NA	0.7	5.3	1.7
Other occupations	16.3	31.5	19.6				

Table 22 RT Chief's Knowledge on the Community

(%)

	Menteng Atas (①)	Menteng (②)	Total (①&②)		Menteng Atas (①)	Menteng (②)	Total (①&②)
(1) Knowledge of households in the area				**(4) Important matters for building the community**			
Knows all the households	58.9	26.3	51.9	Landscape of the city	16.3	34.2	20.1
Knows most of the households	22.7	39.5	26.3	Development of suburbs	4.3	7.9	5
Knows only those registered as				Roads and traffic system	2.6	10.5	18.4
RT members	17	26.3	19	Redevelopment of city center	0.7	5.3	1.7
Does not know any household	0.7	7.9	2.2	Street children	53.2	44.7	51.4
NA	0.7	-	0.6	Moral education	55.3	50	54.2
				Management of shopping districts	10.6	7.9	10.1
(2) Interest towards local government in Jakarta				Infrastructures for tourism industry	3.5	7.9	4.5
Very interested	12.8	10.5	12.3	Preservation of environment	32.6	42.1	34.6
Interested in some parts	72.3	55.3	68.7	Community building	7.1	13.2	8.4
A little interest	9.9	7.8	9.5	Infrastructures in surrounding areas	52.5	23.7	46.4
Not interested at all	2.1	13.2	4.5	Other	7.1	2.6	6.1
NA	2.9	13.2	5	NA	1.4	10.5	3.4
(3) Positioning of RT							
Independent from the government	18.4	36.8	22.3	Note: (4) shows multiple answer (up to three)			
Cooperative body for the government	46.8	31.7	43.7				
Only RW leader is a government offic	16.3	15.8	16.2				
Does not know	7.8	2.6	6.7				
Other	7.1	2.6	6.1				
NA	3.6	10.5	5				

Locating Trans-border Subjects:
Hong Kong Working People in Mainland China

PUN Ngai[*]

I. Introduction

On a direct train to Dongguan, one early morning in June 2002, Hong Kong working people were busy using their mobile phones talking in Mandarin (with strong accents) with their China counterparts. Already it was daily practice for thousands of Hong Kong residents to work across the border in Mainland China. Crossing the border became an eye-catching issue, granted coverage by Time Magazine in May 2001, where it states, "Nowhere is the demarcation more striking than at its border with Shenzhen - a line that Hong Kong people can cross freely but most mainlanders can only gaze at. The one-way traffic has become a nonstop flood: up to 200,000 people a day, 100 million crossings a year, a number likely to triple by 2010." According to the Hong Kong Annual Report 2000, Mainland China is the most important trading partner with Hong Kong.   40 per cent of its trade was with the Mainland and three quarters of the 18 million containers handled by the port of Hong Kong were connected to trade with the Mainland, mostly to and from the Pearl River Delta region. On average, 31,000 vehicles and 280,000 people traveled across the boundary every day during the year of 2000.[1]

This chapter aims to locate globalization in multiple specific temporal and spatial scales with special reference to the labour flow of Hong Kong across border in Mainland China in general. It involves a study of the making of trans-border labour relations between Hong Kong and China as this being rapidly configured in the period since the 1997 hand over. Going beyond a dichotomy between the "space of flows" and the "politics of place", this study will explore how building trans-border social relations has a key role in realizing globalization as a multi-scalar, multi-temporal, and multi-causal process (Smith 2001). The study of trans-border labour relations as central to understanding globalization processes in Hong Kong and/or China is much needed as many previous studies have had a penchant for looking at transnational capital or social networks (Ong and Nonini eds, 1997; Ong 1999). More specifically, this chapter has three objectives. First, it hopes to understand the trans-border labour flow in terms of its multi-scalar politics as new labour relations are forged in the restructuring of Hong Kong's political economy. Second, by situating the multi-spatial and multi-temporal moments of globalization in a particular labour flow between Hong Kong and China, we can explore not only novel forms of cross-border labour relations but also the process of how these forms are

[*] Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong, CHINA   sonpun@ust.hk
[1] Hong Kong 2000, available at "http://www.info.gov.hk/hk2000

constructed in all its conflict and tension-ridden nature. Third, we will highlight the cultural production of this trans-border subject and its implications for identity issues. Thus we will carefully study the agency and lived experiences of trans-border subjects in the age of globalization.

II. Situating Trans-border Space

The rapid restructuring of Hong Kong society, especially in terms of "economic integration" with South China, created a new concern with the trans-border economy and urban space in the new millennium. China's entry to the WTO reinforces the demand for accelerating a multi-scalar mix in the direction of trans-border fusion between Hong Kong and the Pearl River Delta Region, in which new forms of urban governance, market networks and societal links are being forged. In light of China's incorporation into the global market, the current spatial restructuring between Hong Kong and southern China, which has developed over the last two decades, will be accelerated. New spatial enclaves cutting across borders will be governed through emerging forms of trans-border relations, involving both state and non-state networks and actors. Amongst of all these networks and actors, the cross-border labour flow of Hong Kong working people to and from Mainland China constitutes one of the complex configurations of this trans-border fusion.

Looking from a multi-scalar point of view, this trans-border configuration is made possible by the changing geopolitics of both sides: South China and Hong Kong. Upon the establishment of the People Republic of China in 1949, Guangdong Province was the major gateway connecting the whole country to the outside world. Canton City had been one of the important cities in connecting the national economy with global capitalism. Its geographical location at the southern end of China made the region more competitive and conducive to international capitalist players. China's Open-door policy and the Economic Reform of the late 70s brought forth a great change in the geopolitics of South China, especially when Special Economic Zones (SEZs) were set up, followed by many newly developed industrial towns. The "open-door" policies were the first attempt to incorporate the socialist system of China - the national-local spaces into the global market - the global-regional scalar mix (Breslin 2000; Sum 1999). SEZs in China were widely known as experimental practices combining a socialist planned economy with a global capitalist market in new and productive ways. In 1979 the Party Central Committee announced a special strategy of allowing Guangdong and Fujian to set up SEZs as the base for launching export-led industrialization and inviting foreign investment. In May 1980 a small town, Shenzhen was chosen for setting up the first SEZ in China. Shenzhen then became the first immigrant city in Reform China, established as a test case, as an economic development zone open to international capital. Situated in the far south of Mainland China, Shenzhen is close to Hong Kong, and every day thousands of people, mainly Hong Kong citizens go hurriedly back and forth across the Lo Wu bridge separating and yet linking the two places. It takes about forty-five minutes by train from the Kowloon Railway Station to the Lo Wu bridge, and then join the queues to go through the Customer Gate. During the weekends or at Chinese New Year and other big traditional festivals like Ching Ming and Mid-Autumn, queuing for an hour or more is normal.

This bold experiment of establishing special economic zones won support from key party elites and coastal-provincial actors in East China, especially when the four special economic zones and fourteen coastal cities witnessed a rapid influx of foreign capital and fast development in the 80s and 90s. Breslin (2000) rightly states that the development of the SEZs brings us to the importance of China's gradual process of re-engagement with the global economy. The rapid increase of foreign direct investment and joint-ventured cooperation, especially with Hong Kong capital in the 90s, thus allowed the national-local scales of Chinese industrialism to link up with the global and regional scalar mixes. The pace of new spatial configuration was greatly accelerated with the rise of Shanghai as a global city in the late 90s. China's entry to the WTO in 2001 and Beijing's successful bid for the 2008 Olympics finally signify a rise in China's status as a globalizing society. All these encourage rapid, extensive and magnificent spatial re-organization for capitalist development in multi- scalar processes. Local states thus take very active roles in initiating new projects in cooperation with non-state actors outside China, particular with Hong Kong in the field of transportation, industrial investment, property, informational sectors as well as the financial market. This led to a process of reformulating trans-border alliances between external non-state actors and domestic state and state-related actors (Breslin 2000).

In this context, strategic images of "Greater China" were enhanced - "South China Economic Circle", "Chinese Economic Community", "Border Free Trade Zone", and "Triangular Growth" - to present an image of vibrant economic interactions (Sum 1996; 1998). These trans-border discourses help to constitute a re-mapping of Hong Kong, southern China, and Taiwan as part of an imagined community of "Greater China". They work to re-map HK as a "gateway" to China, "Greater China" and the rest of the world when increasing Hong Kong capital and labour was flowing into the region. Hong Kong is by now the biggest investor in China, exceeding the USA, Japan and other European countries since 1979. A new form of "trans-border integration" was articulated when both governments worked together to regulate "triangular growth" across the border.

On the side of Hong Kong, its rapid integration into China's economy highlights its role as a gateway city serving as a stepping stone for Taiwanese, Japanese and other foreign investment seeking to move into Mainland China. The economic strategy advocated by the first Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) government after 1997 was that of an entrepreneurial *middleman*, acting as a bridge between China's economy and the global economy. After the transfer of sovereignty to Mainland China, political obstacles to further trans-border economic fusion were removed. Good relationships between the Hong Kong government and the Central government have speeded up "trans-border integration" and the role of South China as a gateway increased gradually. Not only does Hong Kong provide support to the manufacturing base, which has now moved to South China, but also serves the regional economy by linking up global sourcing, trading and producer servicers with the trans-border economic activities.

Starting in the mid-80s, the Hong Kong economy underwent a process of de-industrialization and a massive relocation of manufacturing industries to South China. The late colonial government, busy negotiating sovereignty issues, adopted a let-go approach. By mid-1988, about 2,400-2,700 enterprises of Hong Kong industrial capital had relocated to the

Pearl River Delta in Mainland China, most of them involved in manufacturing. It has been estimated that over 30% of Hong Kong's manufacturing has moved to the Mainland, among which some industries like the electronics and plastics industries even amounted to 70-80% in the early 90s[2]. Correspondingly, the proportion of Hong Kong's workforce employed in manufacturing also dropped drastically- from a peak of 869,753 persons in 1986 to 257,042 in 1998.[3]

The development of the Hong Kong economy demonstrates a deepening of labour-intensive industry by incorporating Southern China as the production base, while Hong Kong retains the service part of the production process. The manufacturing sector has become management oriented in coordinating cross-border processing in Guangdong with the remaining operations performed in Hong Kong. This emerging multi-scaled territorial governance is aptly described by Sit and Yang (1997) as a "front shop, back factory" model. And while the share of GDP contributed by manufacturing has declined drastically, in the 90s service industries (including trading, finance and business services) have taken over as the engine of Hong Kong's economic growth. In the 1990s, the Hong Kong economy has been transformed into a post-industrial one. It was not until the handover that the newly established SAR government, to gain legitimacy from the general public, attempted to restructure the city by actively imagineering a grand vision of a regional gateway city in Hong Kong (Pun and Lee 2002).

The Asian Financial Crisis and its aftermath hit the Hong Kong economy badly at the time of its restructuring into a regional financial city. The unemployment rate rose to 7.8% in mid 2002 and still there is no trace of improvement. Furthermore, one of the most active post-industrial economic activities in Hong Kong - the bubble in the property economy - has burst and asset prices have dropped by over 50% in 2002 in comparison to the highest prices in 1997. The poor performance of the economy has contributed to the worst unemployment problem in Hong Kong's history since the rapid industrial development over the last three decades. The serious unemployment problem pushed the SAR government to further depend on the trans-border imaginary to solve its internal economic crisis. In his 2001 Policy Address, the Chief Executive of the SAR government, Tung Chee Wah stressed that HK as a gateway city has a unique position, with the Mainland as its hinterland and extensive links to all corners of the globe. Tung said, "At a time when foreign investors are vying to enter the China market, we are already well positioned to seize the opportunities they seek."[4] Tung also boasted that Hong Kong's infrastructure, such as the Hong Kong International Airport and the international container port, were world-class, as were the talents of Hong Kong's professionals and their management experience. Thus, he said,

> "We are in the right place at the right time to benefit most from the economic development of our Motherland…

---

[2] See Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong SAR Government, 1986-1998.

[3] Ibid., 1986-1998.

[4] Hong Kong Government Policy Address 2001, p6. Available at http://www.info.gov.hk.

Following China's accession to the World Trade Organisation, co-operation between Hong Kong and Guangdong will rise to new heights."[5]

The Hong Kong government thus openly encourages trans-border flow and persuades its citizens to look for jobs in Mainland China. The trans-border flow is aided by extensive newspaper coverage and media propaganda. "Looking northward", literally meaning to search for opportunities in China to the north, suddenly becomes a new hegemonic discourse. An editorial in a major Chinese newspaper in Hong Kong, Ming Pao Daily News titled "Citizens could consider working on mainland" strongly encourages Hong Kong people to work in China. On October 17, 2001, it states,

> "When the mainland's economy soars, people well versed in international trade will be in great demand there. Mainland businesses will then need financial professionals, accountants, lawyers and people experienced in import and export business. Many Hong Kongers have much such experience. If they are prepared to work on the mainland, they are likely to accomplish much.
>
> In the 1950s and 1960s, many Hong Kongers left the territory to seek their fortune. Some set up garment factories in Africa; others opened restaurants in South America. Now Hong Kong's economy is in difficulty and unemployment is rising, capable people, especially capable young people, should be ready to achieve their goal anywhere in the world. Hong Kong is close to the mainland culturally, linguistically and geographically, and the pay gap between them has narrowed. If we capitalize on these advantages, which people in other regions are not blessed with, we can surely start a new chapter for ourselves and for Hong Kong."[6]

These official and hegemonic discourses encouraging Hong Kong people to find a way-out in Mainland China seem a bit redundant if not ridiculous. Besides the state factors, trans-border interactions between Hong Kong and the Pearl River Delta, from the bottom up, have been underway for more than two decades.[7] In addition to capital relocation, both in manufacturing and services sectors, cross-border employment, marriage and housing have already become conspicuous social phenomena in the last decade. Breslin's effort (2000) to differentiate the concept of regionalisation from the concept of regionalism is helpful for us in examining the trans-border labour flow to and from Hong Kong. On the one hand, regionalism, says Breslin, consists of top-down processes relating to conscious and deliberate attempts by national states to create formal mechanisms for dealing with trans-border issues. On the other hand, regionalisation refers to "bottom-up processes where the most important forces for economic integration come from markets, private trade and investment flows, and from the policies and decisions of companies, rather than resulting from predetermined plans of national or local governments"(2000:207). The creation of a trans-border spatial structure thus was more inclined to informal and soft integration and reliant on the actions and decisions of non-state actors. The

---

[5] Ibid, 2001, p.8.

[6] Ming Pao's own translation. See Ming Pao, 18 October 2001.

[7] For the concept of transnationalism from below, see Michael Smith, ed. 1998. Transnationalism from below. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers.

trans-border labour flow between Hong Kong and Mainland China no doubt was a kind of regionalisation process before it was co-opted into a regionalism process when the Hong Kong government put it under its imagineering project for planning a "South China Economic Circle".

A "trans-border regionalisation" has been emerging long before the governments on both sides finally came to the scene, attempting to promote or regulate it. According to a survey conducted between April and June 2001 by the Census and Statistics Department, there should be more than 190,800 Hong Kong residents working on the Mainland, equivalent to 5.9% of the total employed population of Hong Kong at the year of 2000-2001.[8] A special topics study done via General Household Survey in 1999 gives a full panoramic view of Hong Kong people working in China, recording that the number has been increasing rapidly over the past ten years.[9] In 1988 it records only 52,300 persons who had worked in Mainland China, while the number rose sharply to 157,300 in 1998. Of the 157,300 persons who had worked in Mainland China, the median age was 39. The majority was aged between 30-39 (35.5%) and 40-49 (32.9%). The report speaks against the hegemonic discourse that the new Hong Kong generation, especially university graduates, could have opportunities to find jobs in Mainland China. One of the important findings of the trans-border labour market is that the employment opportunities are mostly available to the experienced managerial class, professionals or skilled workers. 79.6% of the newly created jobs were solely open to the managerial class and professionals, as shown in Figure 1. Moreover, over 86.2% of them were males. This means that most of the female working population of Hong Kong was excluded to a great extent in this "trans-border economic integration". The trans-border labour market, in fact, is highly skewed in terms of age, gender and skill factors.

Looking carefully, only 72.7% of Hong Kong people working in Mainland China were employees; and the rest were employers or self-employed persons. There is an increasing trend for more and more small businessmen to set up their shops across the border, clustering in the Commercial Building City of Lo Wu. For the employees, 95.3% were actually employed by companies in Hong Kong to work in Mainland China. Few of them could really go Mainland China and find a job across the border. Among all employed, 43% of them were in the wholesale, retail and import/export trades, restaurants and hotels sector and 37.8% in the manufacturing sector. According to the figures, the percentage of Hong Kong labourers engaged in the manufacturing sector in Mainland China decreased from 58% in 1995 to 37.8% in 1998. In contrast, the percentage of those engaged in the wholesale, retail and import/export trades, and the restaurants and hotels sector was rising across the border.

---

[8] It should be noted that persons who had been to Mainland China only to conduct business negotiations and the inspection of businesses, and/or to attend trade fairs, meetings and business-related entertainment were not regarded as having worked in the Mainland. Moreover, transport workers commuting between Hong Kong and the Mainland as well as fishermen and seamen working within the waters of the mainland of China were also excluded from the figures quoted above. See the report on http://www.info.gov.hk/censtatd/chinese/hkstat/index2.html.

[9] Special Topics Report No. 21, Social data collected via the General Household Survey, Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong, 1999.

Figure 1   Hong Kong residents working in Mainland China by occupation in 1998

Source: Special Topics Report No. 21, Social data collected via the General Household Survey, Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong, 1999.

Table 1   Hong Kong residents working in Mainland China by industry in June 1998

Industry	No. of Person ('000)	Percentage (%)	Compared to all employed persons in HK (%)
Manufacturing	50.5	37.8	12.0
Construction	5.6	4.2	10.3
Services (wholesale, retail and import /export trades, restaurants & hotels, and other services)	57.4	43.0	30.4
Others	0.9	0.6	46.6
Overall	133.5	100.0	0.7

Source: Special Topics Report No. 21, Social data collected via the General Household Survey, Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong, 1999.

The figures also show that about one-third of the Hong Kong working people first started working in Mainland China before 1990. It reveals that trans-border labour flow starts as early as capital flow and long before the Hong Kong government would adopted that economic vision or strategy. The figure of most concern is the duration of stay in Mainland China - most of the Hong Kong working people will still consider it drudgery rather a challenge to work on the Mainland. The median duration of stay in China was 3 days each time the Hong Kong labourers traveled across the border in 1998. 47.3% had an average duration of stay of 1 to 2 days; and 17.8% of 3 to 4 days.

The above statistical data provides us a broad view of trans-border labour flow in terms of Hong Kong people working in Mainland China. The picture foretells a process of "trans-border economic integration" from below which first sprouted in the early 1990s, long before the proliferation of state discourses ten years later. According to these macro statistical views, trans-border labour flow has been the central part of the globalization process, specifically in the multi-scalar configuration and trans-border making between China and Hong Kong in the 90s and this will continue in the coming years.

III. Trans-border Move

The first phase of the "trans-border move" made by Hong Kong manufacturing was in the 80s and 90s. Looking at the number of manufacturing establishments, it had dropped sharply to 23,631 in 1998, which was equivalent to less than 50% of the total number of factories in 1988. More than 600,000 Hong Kong labourers were laid off and had to find new jobs in the services sector, construction or retailing industries during the ten years between 1988 and 1998. In the trend of relocating production bases to Mainland China, only a small section of employees were maintained for helping to transfer the industry and management of the new set-ups to Shenzhen or the Pearl River Delta. This small section of employees were the pioneers of the trans-border labour flow, mostly becoming managers or supervisors in their Mainland production lines, and thus making up the first wave of the trans-border managerial class in the 90s.

Following the relocation of manufacturing industries to Mainland China, the Hong Kong producer-related services sector also re-scaled their organizational set-up by reducing their business operations in Hong Kong. In recent years, many transnational companies like the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank Corporation (HSBC) and Pacific Century (PCCW) decided to move their back-office work to Shenzhen or Guangzhou. For instance, PCCW moved its customer service center to its Guangzhou office and from August 2001 some of its Hong Kong employees had to go work in Mainland China. In addition to the large firms like HSBC and PCCW moving their back-offices to the Mainland, some small local firms also made the "trans-border move" in re-organizing their business and management structure. The reason was simply to make use of the multi-scalar competitive advantages of cheaper land and labour costs in the Pearl River Delta. For example, employing one university graduate from Mainland China in audit work would only cost HK$2000 each month, a figure six times lower than employing a fresh graduate in Hong Kong. Therefore in order to be cost effective, many companies gave up their bases in Hong Kong and moved to the Mainland. The working class in Hong Kong thus faced increasing unemployment problems and severe competition with Mainland workers.

To alleviate their employment problems Hong Kong labourers have two choices (or no choice). Either they can follow in the footsteps of transnational capital and cross the border, and therein become part of the "trans-border move", or struggle to reshape themselves in the new services sector which actually had been contracting in recent years. Now nearly all openings for both industrial and commercial firms, as shown in the recruitment pages of newspapers, require job duties on the Mainland. A willingness to stay in China is a prerequisite, accompanied by fluent Mandarin. Thus working in China has become a trend, if not a necessity, for Hong Kong

people. This trans-border labour flow is further boosted by repeated reports in the mass media that many big Mainland enterprises or companies will employ Hong Kong professionals or workers in their businesses. At the end of 2001, Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Daily added to these reports, releasing the news that over 100 enterprises in Mainland China had decided to employ Hong Kong professionals in trading, financial and administrative fields in 2002.[10]

IV. The Emergence of Transborder Working Class

The second part of this chapter will draw on ethnographic studies of Hong Kong cross-border truck drivers. The trans-border working class, often a neglected subject, although in its nascent stage is growing more and more mature in its form. One conspicuous feature of this trans-border working class is the rapidly increasing number of cross-border truck drivers. It has been estimated that more than 30,000 truck drivers are involved in cross-border transportation between Hong Kong and China. The living experiences of these drivers are vastly different to the Hong Kong managers or professionals in coping with the trans-border life. Relatively younger than the managerial class people, these truck drivers, often in their early 30s, are still single or have their families established in Mainland China. Since they were more required than the trans-border managerial class to adapt their lives to the Mainland, these truck drivers would often mix the domains of their work and their family by marrying or staying with a Mainland woman.   Some of them even had a second-wife illegally in Mainland China.

Mr So, aged 32, has been a cross-border truck driver for eight years. Five years ago, a Hong Kong printing company, whose production base is in Dongguan, employed him. With more than 1,000 workers in its Dongguan factory, the company produces books and magazines for Japanese market. This involves frequent land transportation between Dongguan and Hong Kong so that its products can be exported via Hong Kong entrepot to Japan. Thus Mr So was hired as a full-time 24-ton truck driver for the company to take up this busy transportation. His duties are mainly to carry raw materials to the Dongguan factory from a supplier in the New Territories and to bring finished products back to the Hong Kong warehouse. His driving route and also the work pattern are repetitive. Every time he goes to Dongguan, after unloading the raw materials at the company, he has to stay overnight in Dongguan because it will be too late to return to Hong Kong on the same day. He will start the return journey to Hong Kong the next morning with finished products loaded on his truck. Typically he has to stay about twenty nights a month in Dongguan.

A Cross-border Truck Driver's Work Schedule in November 2001

8:30am leave Dongguan
12:00pm   reach New Territories and wait for production materials to be uploaded
1:50pm   leave New Territories after uploading materials and having his lunch
2:25pm   arrive at Lok Ma Chau and queue up to cross the border at the Hong Kong side

---

[10] Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Daily , 20 December 2001.

3:30pm	complete the border crossing procedure via the border through Huanggang, Shenzhen
5:05pm	arrive at the Dongguan Customs and wait for the immigration documents
7:00pm	still wait for the documents and have dinner on the truck
8:30pm	finally get the sealed documents and drive to the Dongguan factory
9:00pm	arrive at the factory and unload production materials

Because of his long working hours and frequent stays in Dongguan, Mr So can earn a monthly salary of $15,000 to $18,000, which is relatively higher than a local truck driver. This salary allowed him to set up a trans-border family – enough to both to buy a flat and to support household expenditure. A friend in Dongguan introduced him to his wife three years ago and he decided to get married and set up his family there. For him, there is little choice because of his cross-border work pattern and the financial burden of forming a family in Hong Kong. As he spends the nighttime in Dongguan after taking this job, it seems more natural for him to settle down in Dongguan than in Hong Kong.

Nevertheless this trans-border settlement never leads to his "assimilation" into Mainland society. He is still reluctant to blend into this society. In his eyes, Mainland society is full of social disorders such as corruption, crime, traffic chaos, bad and slow work pace, cheating and so on. Whenever talking about the identity issue, he insists on claiming himself as a "complete" Hong Konger and resists the idea of sharing any cultural traits with the Mainlanders. "Although I have a Mainland wife now, I still don't like the Mainlanders. If I have son or daughter in the future, I will have them educated in Hong Kong and apply for them to leave Mainland China. Dongguan is not a nice place, nice people won't come here."

Resistance to "trans-border fusion" from a socio-cultural aspect is crystal clear here. The border is still a very important dividing line for inscribing identity between Mainlanders and Hong Kongers. The actual "physical" fusion - work and family - goes hand and hand with a "cultural" segregation, which is rooted in the daily work experiences of the truck drivers. These truck drivers are often discriminated or bullied by local Customs officials. Every time they crossed the border, the Customs authorities would only inspect Hong Kong trucks, resulting in them waiting for longer hours. The drivers often had to make under-table deals with the Customs inspectors for quicker cross-border procedures. Other Customs staff would also target Hong Kong drivers and squeeze money out of them at any opportunity. Bad feelings are often generated, which do not contribute to harmonious relations between the two sides. For these truck drivers, they have to work with somewhat different social values, which allow them to single themselves out as Hong Kong people. Value conflicts with the Mainland Chinese are thus inevitable, leading to a "trans-border distance" instead of "trans-border fusion". Mr So emphasized that if it were not because of the difficulty of finding a job in Hong Kong, he would never have turned to becoming a cross-border driver, and thus having to face the so many disliked persons on the Mainland.

However, there are interesting and sharp gender differences in stereotyping Mainland people. The truck drivers were more inclined to see these negative traits in men than in women. In the eyes of the cross-border truck drivers, Mainland women are more simple, understanding and tender, especially those from inner-China. The drivers are often likely to develop some sort

of relationship with them either as legal or illegal wives or simply as girlfriends. More of the drivers actually develop quite long-lasting relationship with Mainland women because, in their own words, cross-border driving gives them a sense of floating here and there, and they rather would have their body, if not their soul, settled somewhere, preferably with a woman. This feeling of "floating" is not only restricted to single men, as most of the married drivers will also use the same "excuse" to set up their second family in Mainland China, leading to increasingly serious family crises in Hong Kong.

V. Conclusion

This chapter on Hong Kong's cross border labour attempts to understand new trans-border configurations in light of Socialist China's incorporation into global capitalism and Hong Kong's transforming into a global city concomitant to its rapid economic restructuring. The making of "trans-border space" involves the politics of scale - the complexity of the multi-scalar mix that may cause fusions as well as conflicts over national sovereignty, local autonomy, cultural identity and everyday practices at different levels. There will be a contest of different discourses and identities because both spatial areas may be embedded in different political systems, cultures and values. The study of the trans-border working class of Hong Kong - contributes to understanding this complex and conflictual process of trans-border fusion or diffusion in its very specific temporal and spatial scales. The making of trans-border labour relations between Hong Kong and China is rapidly constituted and constituting, especially in the period since hand over in 1997. This study reveals how trans-border social relations have a key role in realizing globalization as a multi-scalar, multi-temporal, and multi-causal process.

The trans-border working people are the liminal subjects living out the tensions of this multi-scalar trans-border space in their everyday practices. The term "trans-border persons" vividly depicts them as subjects of flow, who contribute to bridging the different spatial scales between Hong Kong and Mainland China. Successful or not, their "cross-border work experience" is the new work pattern produced for meeting the scalar mixes of global production. Nevertheless, if we look from a micro-cultural perspective, resistance to "trans-border fusion" is very strong. The border, as a "physical and visible wall", is still a crucial dividing line for cultural identification between Hong Kong people and the Mainland Chinese. The border is only open unconditionally to Hong Kong citizens, not vice versa. Excepting a few talented professionals, the majority of the Mainland Chinese are still excluded by the border from working and living in Hong Kong. On the other hand, while increasing numbers of Hong Kong labourers have to work and form their families in Mainland China, mainly in the Pearl River Delta Region, the actual fusion of the realm of work and family in South China does not result in "cultural assimilation". Instead, cultural segregation is further created and embedded in the daily experiences of the trans-border working class. General distrust, rigid stereotyping, value conflicts and different social systems at large generate the conflictual and tension-ridden nature of this "trans-border space" in the making.

Reference

Breslin, Shaun 2000. "Decentralisation, Globalisation and China's Partial Re-engagement with the Global Economy", *New Political Economy* 5(2):205-226.

Cox, Kevin R. 1997. *Spaces of Globalization: Reasserting the Power of the Local*. New York: The Guilford Press.

Henderson, Jeffrey. 1991. "Urbanization in the Hong Kong-South China Region: "In Introduction to Dynamics and Dilemmas." *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 15:169-181.

Ho, K. C. and Alvin So. 1997. "Borderland Integration of Singapore and Hong Kong: Origins, Characteristics, Conflicts and Dynamics." *Political Geography* 16 (3):241-259.

Hong Kong 2000, Hong Kong Government Printer.

Kwok, Yin-Wang Reginald and Alvin Y. So, eds. 1995. *Hong Kong-Guangdong Link: Partnership in Flux*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.

Lin, George C. S. 2001. "Metropolitan Development in a Transitional Socialist Economy: Spatial Restructuring in the Pearl River Delta, China", *Urban Studies*, 38(3):383-406.

Lo, Fu-Chen & Yue-Man Yeung eds.1996. *Emerging World Cities in Pacific Asia*. New York: United Nations University Press.

Ong, Aihwa and Donald Nonini ed. 1997. *The Cultural Politics of Modern Chinese Transnationalism*. New York and London: Routledge.

Ong, Aihwa 1999. *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality*. Durham and London: Duke University Press.

Pun, Ngai and Lee Kim-ming 2002. "Locating Globalization: The Changing Role of the City-state in Post-handover Hong Kong", *The China Review*, 2(1):1-28.

Sit, F. S. Victor and Chun Yang 1997. "Foreign-investment-induced Exo-urbanization in the Pearl River Delta, China", *Urban Studies*, 34(4):647-677.

Sklair, Leslie 1998, "The Transnational Capitalist Class and Global Capitalism: The Case of the Tobacco Industry", *Political Power and Social Theory*, 12:3-43.

Smith, Michael Peter 2001. *Transnational Urbanism: Locating Globalization*. Oxford: Blackwell Publisher.

Special Topics Report No. 21, General Household Survey, Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong, 1999.

Sum, Ngai-ling 1996 "'Greater China' and the Global-Regional-Local Dynamics" in I. Cook and R. Li (eds*) Fragmented Asia*, Aldershot: Avebury.

_____1998. "The Making of the 'Greater China' Subregion in G. Hook and I. Kearns (eds) *Subregionalism and World Order*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

_____1999. "Rethinking Globalization: Re-Articulating the Spatial Scales and Temporal Horizons of Trans-border Spaces", in Peter Dicken (ed.) *Globalization in East Asia*. London: Routledge.

Yeung, Godfrey (2001) "Foreign Direct Investment and Investment Environment in Dongguan Municpality of Southern China", *Journal of Contemporary China*, 10(26), 125-154.

To Make Both Ends Meet:
A Comparison of Two Paradigms of Public Participation

Fun Jen TANG*

Abstract:

In the discussion of public participation, two paradigms pay particular attention to the elaboration of rationality. The first is Mancur Olson's rational choice theory and the second is what Judith Innes calls 'the emerging paradigm of planning', the communicative planning theory. Olson argues that people tend not to participate in the decision-making of public goods without external inducements and they choose not to do so probably for practical reasons, rather than because of normative considerations. Rational choice theory sees participation as a preference aggregation process, in which participant is regarded as utility maximiser who makes decision in accordance with a cost/benefit calculation. Olson's logic of collective action and the phenomenon of the 'free-rider' demonstrate that the summation of individual preferences may prove to be harmful for the individuals as a whole. As a result, rational choice theory is best described as the pathology of public participation and provides answers to the common phenomenon, indifference. On the other hand, communicative planning theorists regard participation as a process of communication, where participants deliberate via a social learning process. Compared with the aggregation of individual preferences, communicative planning stresses the importance of group dynamic and it argues that participation should be interactive and socially constructed. The result of communicative participation should therefore be a legitimate and optimal consensus.

The two theories make an interesting antithesis: the explanation of rational choice theory ends with when participation begins and provides no description of how participants interact with each other, while the rationale of communicative planning theory only begins with where rational choice theory ends and it cannot explain why people decide to participate. As a result, the former may only present a pathology of participation and the latter may present a bounded rationality and circular argument. The two theories happen to be inter-supplementary to each other. An infusion of the two will be very thought-provoking and is worth further elaboration. However, the paper will focus on the dialectical relationship of the two theories. Major attention will be paid to the discussion of the new paradigm of planning. The author points out that the reflection of publicness will play a significant part to improve the new paradigm for public participation in urban planning.

Key words: rational choice theory, communicative planning, public participation

---

* National Taiwan Normal University, TAIWAN   brucetan@cc.ntnu.edu.tw

In recent years, a new policy-making paradigm, derived primarily from Habermas's theory of communication ethics, has emerged and it has won huge attention from the academic fields. In political science, the paradigm is called deliberative democracy while in planning, the policymaking paradigm was proposed as communicative planning (e.g. Sager, 1994) or collaborative planning (Healey, 1997). The Habermassian, communication-based policymaking paradigm provides a new perspective for public participation in democratic decision-making process, which has long been cornered by the dilemma between the elitist or egalitarian viewpoint (Webler and Renn, 1995). Webler and Renn think the communicative rationality of stakeholders is a possible way to overcome the dilemma between competence and fairness(ibid.). However, the paradigm only normatively demonstrates a partial process, participated by those who are willing to communicate or bargain with the likeminded to reach and accept a consensus, of the whole social interaction. For those who do not participate in the communicative forum, no matter they are unable, unwilling or unknowing, the communicative process cannot be regarded as fulfilling the mission of balancing competence and fairness. In this regard, rational choice theory provides an analytical framework explaining why rational individuals tend to decide (not) to participate in public goods decision. As a result, they are, to some extent, inter-supplementary although there are still deficiencies in their own parts.

I. Communicative planning

In recent years, many people have emphasised the importance of communication, debate and discourse in planning (Forester, 1988; 1993, Healey, 1992; 1997, Sager, 1998). Innes (1995:184) describes, 'planning is more than anything an interactive, communicative activity'. The major difference between communicative planning and others is how it sees the planning world. In other words, it is epistemologically distinctive from other planning theories. In this regard, knowledge, broadly speaking, is seen as being socially constructed and interactive and the way of knowing must be obtained by means of an interactive observation and participation. Habermas's idea of communicative rationality and ideal speech situation stand for a universal pragmatic, which " lies within the mode of speech itself as it unfolds through intersubjective communication, if the dialogue relies on the sincerity, comprehensibility, legitimacy and truthfulness of arguments"(Hoch, 1996: 89, cited in Ploger, 2001). Habermas argues that there are four types of speech act in our everyday discourse. They are,

1. communicative speech acts. They make validity claims to their comprehensibility.
2. representative speech acts. They claim sincerity with reference to speaker's subjectivity.
3. regulative speech acts. They claim normative rightness through appeals to legitimate interpersonal relationship, and
4. constative speech acts. They claim validity in accordance with truth (Webler, 1995).

In accordance with this typology, communicative speech could be deconstructed and categorised to these four distinctive parts and they claim validity from different domains. Misuse in appealing to validity would confuse and trouble communication. Communicative rationality means a successful message exchange with a correct validity claim, and of course the competence of speakers to manage to differentiate these speech acts. The ideal speech situation is therefore one

in which speakers have the same chance to employ these acts and to interpret, assert, justify or refute these speech acts and most importantly, all the participants in a discourse must have the opportunity to use these speech acts (Kemp, 1985). With the help of the clearly-defined speech acts, participants are able to select and check appropriate validity claims and enhance the likelihood of mutual-understanding in an ideal speech situation. More importantly, Habermas's communicative rationality could therefore be transcendental.

II. The new roles and institution for communicative planning

In Habermassian procedural criteria of the ideal speech situation, the planner's role should be changed and could be discussed from both the professional and ethical aspects (Rydin, 1999, Healey, 1997; 1998, Innes, 1995; Taylor, 1998). Planners should empower the participants by providing advice and expertise in the participation process, drawing participant's attention to alternatives and helping the disadvantaged to have their ideas expressed. The lay/expert distinction and instrumental rationality would be minimised and dispersed because participation in this framework has been transformed into a social learning process and it would reach a 'collective wisdom' in the Aristotelian phrase. The new roles for both planners and participants in communicative planning echo some democracy theorists' (Pateman, 1970; Lively, 1975) 'the developmental or educational effects of participation'. Pateman argues that participation is a social training:

> "democracy must take place in other spheres in order that the necessary individual attitudes and psychological qualities can be developed. This development takes place through the process of participation itself. The major function of participation in the theory of participatory democracy is therefore an educative one, educative in the every widest sense, including both the psychological aspect and the gaining of practice in democratic skills and procedure" (Pateman, 1970: 42).

The emphasis of communicative rationality in our everyday speech is perhaps the most attractive part of the new paradigm of participation. However, how can it be guaranteed? Habermas also emphasised the importance of "'institutionalisation of the corresponding procedures and conditions of communication... rather than reliance on a shared ethos" (Baynes, 1995:215, cited in Sanderson, 1999:331). In this regard, many scholars endeavour to work out some institutional arrangements to promote communicative rationality in planning, which could minimise power manipulation. For instance, Dryzek suggests that a neutral third party should oversee discussion (Hillier, 1993). Innes and Booher (1999) propose seven process criteria as the institutional arrangements. The most systematic arrangements were proposed by Healey (please see, Healey,1996:231). These could possibly take communicative planning and the ideal speech situation from a normative model to more feasible and pragmatic methods.

III. The advantage and disadvantage of communicative planning

Communicative planning theorists argue that participation must face and solve the dilemma between elitism and egalitarianism, i.e. either competence or fairness, and they maintain that communicative planning is able to solve the problem. The major reason is communicative planning emphasises that political decisions should be made in a collective and deliberative fashion, in which the better argument prevails. Benhabib (1996:73) argues "when presenting their points of view and positions to others, individuals must support them by articulating good reasons in public context to their co-deliberators. The process of articulating good reasons in public forces the individuals to think of what would count as a good reason for all other involved". Clearly the source of legitimacy in this process is more about the process than about the result. It is the deliberation that generates the legitimacy of policies (Benhabib,1996; Manin,1987). Unlike representative democracy, which adopts a procedural or instrumentalist rationality seeking for the majority vote as legitimacy, communicative rationality seeks for a consensus based on deliberation. More importantly, only the legitimacy based upon communicative rationality can possibly solve the problem about boundaries as delineated by Schmitter (1994:65-66), "if there is one overriding political requisite for democracy, it is the prior existence of a legitimate political unit. Before actors can expect to settle into a routine of competition and co-operation, they must have some reliable ideas of who the other players are and what will be the physical limits of their playing field. The predominant principle in establishing these boundaries and identities is that of 'nationality'".For instance, when we consider the issue of sustainable development, we must take future generations and neighbouring countries into consideration. However, they cannot be legally represented and their welfare might therefore be discriminated. The proposal of communicative rationality and deliberation as the source of legitimacy would to some extent, offset, if not resolve, this deficiency of democratic decision-making. "The essence of democratic legitimacy is to be focused not in voting or representation of persons of interests, but rather in deliberation...It can downplay the problem of boundaries" (Dryzek,1999:44).

Communicative planning has a strong normative tendency and has inevitably faced criticisms, one of which is that Habermassian thought tends to demonstrate a significant blindness to the role of power..."(Hillier, 1993:89). She argues that "Habermassian analysis is thus an attempt to demonstrate the means by which communications may be systematically distorted by organisations and/or individuals to obscure issues, manipulate trust and consent, twist fact and possibility. Such analysis alone, however, does not allow sufficient consideration of the why and how issues of power relations" (ibid.: 95). In this regard, Foucault points out that rhetoric, knowledge and power are related and power relations are rooted in social networks (ibid.). Nevertheless, communicative planning theorists have more or less noticed that and they have tried to improve this problem in their institutional arrangements (e.g. Innes and Booher, 1999; Healey, 1996).

Secondly, within the political context where power is more obvious, the way to deal with power is by institutional arrangements to exert the functions of checks and balances, which prevent power from over-concentration. As Sir Acton argues, power tends to corrupt, absolute power corrupts absolutely. Then how about planning? One of the purposes of participation is to provide checks but it could not necessarily balance the existing power relationships between the

state and the participants and between the participants. Compared with pluralism, where decisions should be made from bargaining, exchange and compromise between interest groups, communicative planning seems to be too optimistic because it hopes the powerful abandon their vested interests in the process of communicative participation. Habermas argues for the enlightening power of human rationality but it may not outweigh people's selfishness, particularly in a winner-takes-all capitalist market.

Thirdly, communicative planning may present a perfect intrinsic logic of communicative rationality within a participation forum but it may be a bounded rationality if only limited people participate in the forum. Communicative planning theorists pay most of their attention to how the communicative rationality is and how it can run smoothly. On the other hand, they do not answer what if stakeholders do not, wittingly or unwittingly, participate in the forum.

Rational choice theory

The analysis of participation based on a rational choice theory is that participation is a collective action but it is composed of participation by individuals under their free and rational considerations. This viewpoint takes account, therefore, of decisions to participate in relation to an individual's rational calculation. Instead of saying people ought to participate, it tends to provide a rational calculation framework explaining what might affect an individual's participation decision and therefore draws a tendency that rational individuals tend not to participate. It tries to answer why there is a gap between the normative claims of participation and some of the facts, e.g. the low turnout at elections.

While many political theorists argue that people should participate and the advantages of participation are so important, only a limited number of people do participate in fact. Olson argues that those who do not participate choose not to do so probably for practical reasons, rather than because of normative considerations (Olson, 1965). Olson's major argument is that rational individuals in a large group tend not to participate without external inducements (Nagel, 1987). There are three assumptions for this argument: firstly, rational individuals maximise utilities; secondly, individuals are free and no enforcement should be placed upon them to influence their decisions; thirdly, every individual is equally entitled to enjoy the public goods resulting from collective action, no matter whether he/she participates or not. In any collective action where the three assumptions hold, and because participation has a cost in terms of time and money, a rational individual tends not to participate in order to maximise his/her utilities and non-participants become free-riders as a result. This tendency needs to base itself on another premise that the group is large enough to make every decision-maker recognise 'the imperceptibility of individual effects', in Nagel's phrase (ibid.). In a small group, if people find their individual absence in participation would affect the consequence, they are likely to change their mind and to take part in order to maximise the utilities. When individuals feel that their participation will make little difference to the consequence, rational individuals tend not to take part. Therefore although we think participation should be considered under a cost/benefit analysis for rational individuals, their decisions are to a large extent considered under a cost-oriented fashion because the individual's participation has little influence on the outcome in a large group. In addition to the cost/benefit account, in fact, people may participate to fulfil

their civic duties, to enjoy being included as well as social affinity, to learn skills and knowledge and because they are subject to group pressure, all of which are independent of the possible outcome. Olson also noticed these possibilities and discusses the influence of external inducements, saying that people are sometimes also motivated by a desire to win prestige, respect, friendship, and other social and psychological objectives (Olson, 1965). However, his rational choice explanation is regarded as economically-driven (Jordan and Maloney, 1996). Olson does not emphasise too much the relationship between these side-effects, and participation and therefore he comes to a pessimistic conclusion that rational individuals tend not to participate. In some cases, the side-effects might outweigh the rational calculation of participation. For instance, rational individuals might not vote but those who do vote are still rational because they might vote for strategic reasons or to fulfil their civic duty. According to a research regarding public interest participation, Jordan and Maloney think that Olson's theory should be improved in two respects: firstly, it should subsume non-material incentives; secondly, it is significant to consider group activity in shaping the preferences of potential members and in stimulating membership (ibid.). They found that "the public interest group expansion (in membership) and proliferation in the past decades suggest that sufficiently large numbers of sympathisers do not engage in such reasoning"(ibid.:669).

Key factors in Olson's theory are assumptions that individuals act rationally, the existence of large groups where individuals cannot feel their influence on the outcome, collective action and lack of external inducements, to which Olson does not pay sufficient attention. Jordan and Maloney (ibid.) also argue that participation is a preference-shaping process, which would have an influence on potential participant's attitudes. This point is significant in saying that participation could manage to effect an optimal decision or even establish a new agenda but it is irrelevant to Olson's logic. If the new agenda or the mediated preference is attractive to the stakeholders who have not yet participated, potential participants would still stand a reasonably high chance of taking a free ride and choose not to participate, unless they think they could make a unique contribution to the agenda-setting, optimal decisions and the common good. But, this possibility is against the principle of imperceptibility of individual effect. In voting, if one learns that the other voters would make a fifty-fifty balance and her single vote is decisive, she is likely to vote; in a forum, if one gets an idea which seem to be much better than all others, she is likely to advance that solution, but both the situations do not apply to Olson's assumptions, and nor to Jordan and Maloney's.

IV. Participation and game theory

Olson's theory could be exemplified in a prisoners' dilemma-type situation as shown in figure 1. In the example of the prisoners' dilemma, prisoner A and B are isolated and there is no communication between them. Under these circumstances, the individual optimal decisions will result in an outcome which ends up to be the worst for both. Co-operation barely stands a chance here, not only because they are isolated from communicating with each other, but because there is an assumption that an individual's decision-making is largely driven by self-interest and the possibility of altruism and self-sacrifice are thus unlikely. If communication

is allowed or the game is iterated, which means that they could cultivate a sense of trust, then the worst situation could be avoided by co-operation (Hardin, 1982). In the application of the prisoners' dilemma, the situation of making a decision in a collective action would be more complex for the potential participants. Firstly, an individual will predict the possible outcome but her own endeavour will not stand a chance to affect the outcome, as she rationally understands it. Secondly, the individual then decides to take part or not. Olson's logic is that the individual will

	Prisoner B pleads			Actions of others	
	Guilty	Innocent		Successful participation	Unsuccessful participation
Guilty	10 yrs, 10yrs **I**	1 yr, 15 yrs **II**	participate Mr. A decides	outcome **-cost**	cost
Innocent	15 yrs, 1yr **III**	2 yrs, 2yrs **IV**	not participate	outcome	No outcome No cost

Prisoner A pleads

Prisoners' Dilemma   **Collective action as a Prisoners' Dilemma**

decide not to take part because this will avoid the cost of participating but maximises the net utility.

Figure 1: Application of participation in Prisons' Dilemma (based on Nagel, 1987:25)

Participation in voting

Before discussing what factors could make people participate, it is helpful to look at how some economists see voting participation. Riker and Ordeshook, following Downs and Tullock, argue that rational voters act under the following hypothesis,

R = PB + D - C   (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968).

In this hypothesis, P is a subjective expectation of the percent a voter perceives her preferred candidate will get; B, the net benefit from her preferred candidate; D, some psychological effects like civic duty and C represents the cost of voting. Thus, a person votes when PB + D- C > 0 (Mueller, 1987: 78-83).

Nagel expanded this formula by adding some considerations from Olson and the expanded version is,

P (Bi + Bg) + S + D - C > 0

In this formula P is the individual's power to suggest the collective outcome; Bi, the value to the individual of the collective good; Bg, the value the individual places on the benefit other people receive from the collective goal; S, the value of any personal and collective incentives that depends on the individual's participation; D, the strength of the individual's sense of duty or responsibility to participation and C is the cost (Nagel, 1987: 26).

Actually, variable B in the former and variables (Bi + Bg) in the latter almost refer to the same thing and the major difference between them is the latter contains one more variable S: selective incentives. By selective incentives, Olson means rewards and punishments that can be given or withheld contingent on the members contribution (ibid.). The first factor that would affect participation is the size of the group. In a small group, one gets a bigger stake in terms of sense of duty and influence on the group. In addition, social interaction would be better in small groups than in big groups and people would have more face-to-face interaction, which would help to form a well-connected social network among people. As the social capital theory argues that some factors would promote organisational efficacy, it is likely that these factors will be present in small groups rather than in big ones. In a small group, Olson's assumption of the imperceptibility of individual effect would be less likely to hold. Olson mentioned the idea of federations of small groups and he thought that small groups could promote participation (Olson, 1965). Small groups provide people with a belief that every individual's participation is to some degree influential but as the members in a group increases, this belief fades out. As a result, the objective perception of one's influence is replaced by a subjective one. Therefore sometimes an announcement is made before elections that 'your vote counts' and the purpose is to create an image that their participation could still be influential and to encourage people to participate. However, this propaganda is directed at some groups only. Under the assumption of rational behaviour, these announcements are effective only when people believe that a collective good is on the threshold and thus their participation becomes psychologically more important and the target groups are tempted to participate to tip the scales because they believe that their participation will make a quantitative difference. This normally happens in elections and is not common in other forms where participation is a deliberation. In other words, this motivational explanation is quite limited. The second factor that could affect participation is the selective incentives in Nagel's formula. Unlike collective goods, one has to participate to get the selective incentives. In other words, the groups use selective incentives to regulate the behaviour of their members. Like Olson's theory, social capital theory also emphasises the importance of rewards and sanctions in groups. Selective incentives, on the other hand, imply there should be some institutional arrangements in groups to promote participation.

The third factor concerns psychological and moral motives. In Olson's argument and in the prisoners' dilemma, individuals are regarded as self-interested and the prototype of rational individuals are utilitarian maximizers. In Nagel's formula, the individuals would not only consider their own benefits but also other's as well. Altruistic individuals are more likely to participate because they would value the welfare of others as well as of themselves and would therefore get a stronger motive to take part. In addition to altruism, people might in other cases consider other's welfare. From the geographical aspect, people will have a sense of community and care for those who share common interests with them. For political reasons, people of the same interest form a political party and co-operate to promote the common interest. And for some social reasons, people from the same associations might consider other fellow member's welfare when they are making decisions to take part in collective actions. The description of isolated and atomised individuals made by rational choice theorists is quite limited. Those social bonds would influence a rational individual's decisions and make them consider other rationalities, for instance,

group pressure and group norms. In political mobilisation, group pressure and norms are perhaps more effective to make people participate than informing them participation is in their interest.

Duty is another moral motive that makes people participate. Compared with altruism, a sense of duty is not interest-driven and is unconditional. Judgement out of an altruistic motive means that one has to be able to make a value evaluation on the matter involved and make a decision in accordance with other's interests. However, if one has a sense of duty, the question why it is one's duty has been socially internalised into one's mind and answered. Under the circumstances, the person stands a higher chance to take part.

Therefore the conclusion is that participation from an individual perspective should be revised by adding some social factors into consideration. One's participation could be an individual's decision or the result of group mobilisation. An individual might not only think of her own benefit but also her group's benefit when making participation decisions. If that is the case, the influence P in the equation R should also be expanded from one's own to that of the whole group. For instance, Putnam argues that people in dense networks of interaction probably broaden the participants' sense of self, developing the 'I' into the 'we' or enhancing the participants' taste for collective benefits (Putnam, 1995: 67).

Planning theorists can learn a lot from political scientists regarding their delicate anatomy of voting behavior. Factors such as selective incentives, federations of small group etc. could be regarded as guidelines for the institutionalisation of public participation in planning. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the framework of analysis was developed by theorists to explain voting behaviour, which is different from other forms of participation. Participation in a long term process such as a campaign or social movement could be a continuous or spiral process, which helps the participants to decide whether to continue their involvement. Both of the formulas lack the ability to explain how interaction between people works, which might in turn affect the nature of the issues, options and the participants and non-participants' sense of duty or other norms. It is better to see these formulas from a qualitative perspective rather than a quantitative one although they are in a mathematical form.

V. Conclusion: is it possible to make both ends meet?

Rational choice theory, as introduced above, pays great attention to solve the problem of ' to be or not to be' and pessimistically claims that rational individuals tend not to participate in public goods decision, although it pragmatically provides some solutions. On the other hand, communicative planning stresses the importance of communicative rationality and hopes a consensus can be reached through an inclusionary and non-coercive deliberation. They present an interesting antithesis because each provides what the other lacks: rational choice is about what might influence stakeholder's decision to participate or not but does not say anything about the interaction in participation; while communicative planning sets normative regulations for participants' communication but does not say anything about how to restructuring communication with more stakeholders.

There are some different features between them, which makes them difficult to merge.

Firstly, rational choice theory is based on individualism. Social action is composed of individual's free and rational calculation, based primarily on her own cost/benefit analysis. However, communicative planning has a communitarian assumption of human nature and social action. They can be both true so long as they do not make universal claims. It might be possible to introduce an individualist to communicative participation but it is perhaps very unlikely to merge these two theories. In other word, it is feasible to devise a participation institution with the ideas of ' federations of groups', which makes rational individuals non-anonymous and their participation perceptible, but it is difficult to make they abandon their vested interest when it is in conflict with the public interest. That is to say, communitarianism and individualism are different systems of knowledge and values. To merge them is not only about decision-making or conflict resolution. It will definitely involves different ideas of the public interest, protection of private property and limits of freedom, which have been not so far harmonised.

Secondly, they are different in terms of their source of policy legitimacy. Rational choice theory, particularly as far as voting analysis is concerned, is base on liberal democracy. And thus policy legitimacy is based on majority vote. In communicative planning, legitimacy is about the establishment of deliberation and communicative rationality. As a result, at least in theory, this proposes a promising solution to the problem of boundaries in democracy and to the problem of sustainable development.

Finally, rational choice theory depicts a picture, where rational individuals are faced with non-excludable public goods and other possible stakeholder's participation. They tend to adopt a cost-oriented calculation and decide not to participate and to be free-riders as a result. They are faced with a fixed issue and agenda and they may feel either unaware or unable to reset the agenda and change the essence of the issue.

However, on the other hand, stakeholders may participate to challenge the norms, reset the agenda and redefine the scope of the plan and who the stakeholders are. According to Tan (2000), a planning case could exert different discourse powers to redefine its essence and boundaries, depending on whether it was defined as a compulsory purchase of private property or heritage conservation.

In rational choice theory, the essence and boundaries of an issue are predetermined. Nevertheless, communicative planning theorists argue that people can participate to redefine and thus to restructure the plan. People may, in the first place, think it is not a public good issue and decide not to participate, rather than think it is and do likewise. If we agree that the essence and boundaries of an issue should not be predetermined, then we probably need to accept that rational individuals cannot do rational calculation. Communicative rationality should therefore be brought into rational individual's mind. The phenomenon of free-rider will still be valid, but its territory would be thus diminished.

Reference

Benhabib, Seyla, 'Toward a deliberative model of democratic legitimacy' in Seyla Benhabib, eds. *Democracy and Difference.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton Academic Press, (1996).

Dryzek, John S., Transnational democracy. *The Journal of Philosophy,* (1999) 7: 30-51.

Forester, John, 'Critical theory and planning practice' in Forester John ed. *Critical Theory and Public Life.*

Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press (1988).

Forester, John, *Critical Theory, Public Policy and Planning Practice: toward a critical pragmatism*. Albany: State University of New York Press (1993).

Hardin, Russel, *Collective Action*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press (1982).

Healey, Patsy, Collaborative planning in a stakeholder society. *Town Planning Review:* (1998) 69 (1): 1-21.

Healey, Patsy, C*ollaborative Planning: shaping places in fragmented societies*. Basingstoke: Macmillan (1997).

Healey, Patsy, Planning Through Debate. *Town Planning Review,* (1992) 63 (2):143-62.

Healey, Patsy, The communicative turn in planning theory and its implications for spatial strategy formation. *Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design*, (1996) 23: 217-34.

Hillier, Jean, To boldly go where no planners have ever... *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, (1993) 11: 89-113.

Innes, Judith E. and Booher, David E., Consensus building and complex adaptive systems: a framework for evaluating collaborative planning. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, (1999) 65, (4): 412-23.

Innes, Judith E., Planning theory's emerging paradigm: communicative action and interactive practice. *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, (1995)14, (3): 183-89.

Jordan, G. and Maloney, W. A., 'How bumble-bees fly: accounting for public interest participation.' *Political Studies,* (1996) 44, (4): 668-85.

Lively, Jack, *Democracy*. Oxford: Blackwell (1975).

Manin, Bernard, On legitimacy and political deliberation. *Political Theory*, 15: 338-68 (1987).

Mueller, Dennis C., 'The voting paradox' in Charles K. Rowley ed. *Democracy and Public choice*. New York: Basil Blackwell (1987).

Nagel, Jack H., *Participation*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc.Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press (1987).

Olson, Mancur, *The Logic of Collective Action: public goods and the theory of groups* Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press (1965).

Pateman, Carol, *Participation and Democratic Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1970).

Ploger, John, Public participation and the art of governance. *Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design*, (2001) 28: 219-241.

Putnam, Robert D., 'Tuning in, tuning out- the strange disappearance of social capital in America' *Political Science & Politics*, (1995) 28, (4): 664-83.

Riker, William H. and Ordeshook, Peter C., 'A theory of the calculus of voting'. *American Political Science Review*, (1968) 62: 25-42.

Rydin, Yvonne, 'Can we talk ourselves into sustainability? The role of discourse in the environmental policy process' Environmretal Values (1999) 8: 467-84.

Sager, Tore, *Communicatice Planning Theory*. Aldershot, England: Avebury (1994).

Sager, Tore, Meaningful collective choice? Public planning and Arrow's Impossibility theorem. *Progress in Planning*, (1998) 50 (2): 75-138.

Sanderson, Ian, 'Participation and democratic renewal: from 'Instrumental' to 'communicative' rationality?' Policy and Politics, (1999) 27 (3): 325-41.

Schmittter, Philippe C. Dangers and dilemmas of democracy. Journal of Democracy, 5 (1994, April) : 57-74.

Tan, Hung-Jen, The Meanings of Public Participation: three case studies in Taiwan. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis The University of Sheffield (2000).

Taylor, Nigel, Mistaken interests and the discourse model of planning. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, (1998) 64, (1): 64-75.

Webler, Thomas ''Right'' discourse in citizen participation: an evaluative yardstick' in Ortwin Renn,

Thomas Webler and Peter Wiedemann ed. *Fairness and Competence in Citizen Participation.* Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers(1995).

Webler, Thomas and Renn Ortwin, 'A brief primer on participation: philosophy and practice' in Ortwin Renn, Thomas Webler and Peter Wiedemann ed. *Fairness and Competence in Citizen Participation.* Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers (1995).

The Dispute on Urban Autonomy Evoked by the Discourse of Garden City:
The Case of Japan in the Early 20th Century

Hitoshi NISHIBE*

I. The person integrating "here and now" and the discourse

What *can* we human creatures do faced with geographical and historical opportunities and restrictions? In the last two decades critical geographers have devised ways to break down epistemological and institutional barriers so that anybody can do what s/he likes doing. On the other hand, we have rarely seen the creativity, fantasy and instinct of each person being discussed among them. Instead, we see the Euro-American ideal in their competitive society that holds that every person should be given equal chances and receive different outcomes as a result of his/her *own* efforts. Nonetheless, the field and span of our lives is so limited because of the nature of our physical body that we can never receive quite equal chances.

Critical geographies revealed that the geographical categories hitherto taken for granted were social constructs, enhanced the sensibility to difference and hybridity, and criticized power severely. In those processes which were influenced by post-structuralism, the anti-humanistic human model as the intersection of such discourses as race, class and gender was substituted for the humanistic human model in the Enlightenment as the human spirit transcending the body and the world. As a result, the whole personality was broken into many pieces that were allocated to each collective representation. In order to think about the creativity of the person, we have to recover the humanistic human model "here and now" and propose a two-edged human model in which every person both internalize and get rid of the cultural systems.

I constitute such a model through Gestalt psychology (Köhler 1969; Lewin 1951). Each person centers his/her psychological field where attractive forces and repulsive forces are generated and conveyed between the person and his/her environment. The field includes only the facts that are co-existent with and significant to him/her. When s/he discovers a new relation between the facts and the dynamics in the psychological field, intuition occurs. These intuitions make up the creativity of a person.

When the psychological field is restructured and extended through intuitions, it turns into a multi-layered field including the realms of fantasy, dreams and memory as well as the realm of reality. A discourse links the several facts in this extended psychological field through intuition. The modality of the connection is called the story. It is also the cultural equipment to switch over the intentions or purposes of the person to assumable variations through the multi-layered unreal realms (Bruner 1986). Thus, while the discourse regulates each person's

* Osaka city University, JAPAN   nishibe@lit.osaka-cu.ac.jp

behaviour and statements, s/he can make active use of the discourse for the sake of him/herself. This is pivotal in reflection of my first question.

II. The mayor of Osaka City and the state bureaucrats as the persons integrating within Japanese society in the early 20th century

After the Meiji Restoration in 1867, Japan strove to enter more actively into the global capitalist economy with promotion of new industries. As a result, by the beginning of the 20th century, Japan had built the foundation of an industrial country through the aid of the compensation deprived of China in the Sino-Japanese War. Many goods were still self-sufficient in rural areas. The local economy where the demand and the supply were balanced in a narrow domain remained superior in Japan. But the Japanese economy was just being restructured through capitalistic development. A considerable amount of the rural population flowed into urban areas where they experienced terrible conditions and were severely exploited[1]. Some socialist thought prevailed among those citizens who began the struggles of the people of Japan against the state. These conditions had become obstacles to capitalistic development. To make matters worse, the state finance was almost bankrupt due to the vast expenditure for the Russo-Japanese War[2].

Here I present two subjects who were responsible for this social condition. One is the (deputy) mayor of Osaka City, Hajime Seki, and the other is the state bureaucrat in the Interior Ministry represented by Yuichi Inoue. Seki is known as a pioneer in the thought concerning the city in Japan. While he had deepened his ideas concerning the city, he had restructured Osaka City into a modern city through many engineering and social works[3]. On the other hand, in the pre-war Japanese state government, the Interior Ministry had the jobs of rigidly producing, managing, and disciplining the people and the land of Japan, including police, local administration, civil engineering, hygiene, social work and town planning. Both subjects were forced to cope with urban-rural problems and social problems.

III. The interpretation of the discourse of Garden City from the viewpoint of the state bureaucrats

The original discourse of Garden City, which was advocated by Ebenezer Howard in 1898, circulated around advanced capitalistic countries. It developed into Garden Suburb, the regional planning and new town planning within the United Kingdom. It required the urban-rural amalgam where the vigour and pleasure of the urban area married the comfort and beauty of the rural area to resolve the large slum problem in big cities. There are three characteristics of the discourse: the presentation of the economic system to build a Garden City, the idealization of the cooperative society which consists of persons in various classes, and the project to constitute the self-supplied urban-rural amalgam with the help of high technology.

Although the original discourse of Garden City was urban fundamentalism, the state bureaucrats turned its principle into both urban and agricultural fundamentalism when they introduced it most influentially to Japan in 1907. They thought they could solve both the urban

and rural problems through the spirit of Garden City, urbanizing the rural area and ruralizing the urban area.

There were several reasons why they adopted such a standpoint. First, even if the cities began to attract many people, the population in the rural area was much larger than the urban area[4]. They had to cope with the decline of the rural area due to population drain and financial crisis. Second, they had put the foundation of the nation state on the landlord system in the rural area. They were very afraid that the nation state might be destroyed if the rural area continued to decline and to be negatively impacted by the urban area. Last, they did not have enough funds to sufficiently protect the rural area.

They wanted the rural area to be financially independent to such a degree that it would not be a burden to the state, but to be politically dependent to such a degree that it might spontaneously receive the state objectives. Next, they attempted to persuade the local leaders to be loyal, to work hard, and to co-operate each other with a Confucian ethic mixed with the discourse of Garden City. When they visited Letchworth, they found the ideal model of those morals and ethics in its facilities and its residents that were located inside rich nature.

The discourse of Garden City reformed by the state bureaucrats turned into an ideology to defend the state regime and finances. They admired the rich nature of Japanese cities and villages and promoted the popular romanticist desires for nature. However, they secretly tried to recover the order in the rural areas. They did so not because they wished to relieve the people of miserable conditions, but because they hoped to repress the claims of such people without expending much money.

IV. The interpretation of the discourse of Garden City from the viewpoint of the mayor of Osaka City

In 1922, Hajime Seki, the deputy mayor of Osaka City, criticized the state bureaucrats for a misunderstanding of the original discourse of Garden City. He suspected that they had not been able to understand the spirit of Garden City despite their detailed accounts of European Garden Cities, referring to their statement that Kyoto, Tokyo, and other Japanese cities were no doubt Garden Cities. He insisted that anyone who wanted to argue about the Garden City should examine enough the origin of the discourse as a socialist thought.

He categorized the European Garden Cities into three types. The first type was the Garden City in the narrow sense, more specifically, that advocated by Howard. The second type was the Garden Suburb where comfortable houses were provided in the planning. The third type was the cultural village built by utopian socialists, which is a set of the plant and the worker's houses. He evaluated each type of Garden City. He said that the Garden City in the narrow sense should not be adopted because it attempted to revive medieval cities on the basis of the back-to-the-land movement even in the days when foreign trade and large industries were largely being developed. As a result, he liked the Garden Suburb best.

Consequently, he described an ideal image of the future city as a solar system. To put it concretely, there is a central city in the middle of the system just as the sun, around which there are some residential districts surrounded by open space with ample nature. These residential

districts are connected through a full transit system. This image was derived from 'Social City' in Howard's original discourse, that is to say, the cluster of a central city and several Garden Cities as a unit. However, he did not follow Howard exactly. His image was not that of the cluster of the autonomous cities but rather that of the cluster of the residential districts dependent on the central city. As you can see on this image, Seki himself developed the discourse of Garden City in terms of a more urban fundamentalism than Howard did. This discourse of the mayor is a vivid contrast to that of the state bureaucrats.

His career and the history of his own ideas account for the reason why he took such a position when applying the discourse and why he focused on 'Social City' that seems to be an additional part of Howard's discourse. Seki was a political economy professor at Tokyo Commercial College from 1897 to 1914, the deputy mayor from 1914 to 1923, and the mayor of Osaka City from 1923 to 1935. When the Japanese economy developed rapidly after the Sino-Japanese War, he went to Belgium to study policy studies. Taking this opportunity, he realized his own key concept of 'national economy'. The national economy is the organic economic relations where the people who have a common culture, custom, and education engage themselves in co-operative production activities made possible by the division of labour within the frame of the nation state.

He recognized the relation between the national economy and the state policy from the social reformist viewpoint. He said that we had to construct a strong community among all Japanese people through the division of labour. Thus, it was extremely favorable for him that some of the population left the rural area of the self-supplied economy and went to the urban area to develop the industry. But various problems take place when greedy persons seek their self-interest without recognizing their responsibility as members of society. In this regard, the state needs to intervene in the relation and eliminate the problems.

As the national economy was built up, the regional division of labour was increasingly developed through the railway network, and the local centralization of specific industries was seen more often. Nevertheless, in 1910 Seki discovered the case of local decentralization of industries in England since 1900. He thought it came from the movement of the Garden City and he noted the Garden Cities as a disturbing factor in this process. After a while, he identified them as one of the social reformist techniques that could resolve the slum problem. The image of the solar system occurred to him as the ideal of social policy. In his thought, the railway network played a significant role in this model as well as in the national economy.

In this way, the solar system model of the ideal city as the connection between the utility districts had a parallel relationship with the concept of the national economy as the connection between various local industries. The discourse of the Garden City was the trigger Seki used to link the national economy to the ideal city model. In this place, nature was given social reformist value because it could offer a way to restructure the overcrowded and unsanitary cities into livable ones.

V. The conflicts over the town planning of Osaka City in operation

Although the citizens of Osaka City had struggled against the state government for urban

autonomy since 1888, the strategy to win autonomy led by Seki became active after the promulgation of the Town Planning Law in 1919. It became unavoidable that Osaka City would extend its administrative domain in late 1910's because the domains of the surrounding towns and villages became urban areas, some of which contained the slums. Therefore, the town planning area of Osaka City had to be set up across administrative boundaries in order to put the solar system model into practice. However, no one had yet determined how the town planning area should be handled in the Town Planning Law.

Osaka City and Osaka Prefecture, a branch office of the Interior Ministry, presented their own proposals of the town planning area for Osaka City in 1921. Osaka Prefecture proposed a larger area than Osaka City did by the inclusion of some rather distant central places like Sakai City in which approximately 80,000 persons lived. Osaka municipal bureaucrats thought that they should leave the area for population growth in the future and that they did not need densely populated places. On the contrary, state bureaucrats thought that the area should exist as a setting for the adjustment of urban life among cities, towns, and villages around Osaka City and that it should not necessarily be dependent on Osaka City. Consequently, the proposal of Osaka City was decided upon as the area with the help of the Osaka City Council and the surrounding towns and villages.

This conflict contained such significant problems as to undermine the foundation of the local administration in prewar Japan. The Osaka municipal bureaucrats attempted to restructure Osaka City in itself, while the state bureaucrats planned to reorganize the region around Osaka City. The former wanted to make Osaka City transcend the surrounding towns and villages, while the latter tried to decrease the power of Osaka City with antagonism from the surroundings. As we remember, the former had interpreted the discourse of Garden City in terms of urban fundamentalism, while the latter had interpreted it in terms of both urban and agricultural one. As a result, the concept of nature was linked to the dispute on urban autonomy or local administration.

We can see this conflict in the design of the transit system in 1925, too, which was vital to the solar system model of the ideal Osaka City. The Osaka municipal bureaucrats designed the subway system extending as far as the boundary of the town planning area, while the state bureaucrats cut down the part of the planned subway line running parallel to the private railway line. The former accepted the modification by the latter in order to rapidly put the plan into practice. However, the former attempted to make firm the connection among specific districts in the area and to enrich the finances of Osaka City with the municipal transit system, while the latter wanted to protect the private railway companies in conspiracy with the state government and to harness the dynamism of Osaka City. In this way, their conflict over the interpretation of the discourse of Garden City influenced the spatial arrangement of a material facility.

VI. Conclusion

I focused mainly on the mayor of Osaka City and the state bureaucrats in the Interior Ministry as the persons integrating "here and now". They were both elite persons in Japanese society in the early 20th century. They had profoundly internalized the loyalty to the nation state

Japan and blessed the Japanese capitalist development. However, they recognized the Japanese urban-rural relationship respectively, exerting their own creativity.

Their psychological fields contained the expanding urban area and the still broad rural area in the real realm. Furthermore, these fields contained in the unreal realm their fear of the menace of the imperialist world order and the internal collapse of the state regime by urban problems and social struggles, their social responsibility as the elite for the future of the nation, and their accumulated knowledge, perspectives, and experiences.

Within these psychological fields, these facts were articulated by the discourse of Garden City. We can find their intuitions in the way they recognized the utility of the discourse for combining these facts favorably from their own standpoints. The mayor of Osaka City used the discourse to develop nature in terms of the social reformist urban policy. He focused on the 'Social City' model, especially in the original discourse of Garden City. He would then restructure Osaka City into a coalition of the utility districts, namely the urban division of labour through the analogy of the national economy. It decided the guideline of the town planning in Osaka City. Today that inheritance continues in Osaka City. On the contrary, the state bureaucrats used the discourse to excite the romanticist longing for nature. They thereby aimed to stabilize the local administration, suppressing the population flow. They focused on the construction of the moral co-operative society in rural areas, especially in the original discourse of Garden City.

Their dispute over the discourse expresses how they tried to take advantage of nature in the rural area from their own standpoints.

Notes

1) The population of Osaka City was 332,425 in 1882, and shifted to 1,331,994 in1912. It increased to one million people in 30 years.
2) The Japanese government spent 1,7 billion yens for the Russo-Japanese War when the state budget was 300 million yen a year.
3) An English biography of Seki has been published recently. See Hanes (2002).
4) The population ratio in major cities was still 10.07% in 1908. It extended to over 30% in the 1930's and surpassed the rural one in the 1960's.

References

Bruner, J. (1986): *Actual Minds, Possible Worlds*. Harvard University Press, London, UK.

Hanes, J. E. (2002): *The City as Subject: Seki Hajime and the Reinvention of Modern Osaka*. University of California Press, Berkeley, USA.

Köhler, W. (1969): *The Task of Gestalt Psychology*. Princeton University Press, New Jersey, USA.

Lewin, K. (1951): *Field Theory in Social Science*. Harper, New York, USA.

Nature as a Locus of Resistance:
Representation and Appropriation of Nature in the Grass-roots Movement Against the U.S. Military Exercises in Hijudai, Japan

Koji Nakashima[*]

I. Introduction

> "Oh Palestine! Oh Jerusalem!" Palestinian people call their home land with deep attachment to them as if they called lovers. Olive trees grow, orange trees bear fruit, wheat fields spread like golden ocean and stone houses stand there. That landscape is inseparably connected to the memories of lives there for over hundreds of years, suffering, sorrow and pleasure lived by Palestinian people (Oka 2001:106).

A Japanese critic of Arabic literature, Oka (2001) sympathizes with the viewpoint of Palestinian people who refer to the land in the second person. "Oh Palestine!" "Oh Jerusalem!" These callings are directed neither to the state nor to humans, but to the land where people live. In contrast with this viewpoint in the second person, she criticizes the viewpoint of reconnaissance satellite through which U.S. governmental leaders and most of the mass media see Afghanistan. This "satellite view" does not see the land of Afghanistan as the place where people live their lives, but sees it as a topographical map on which the points to drop bombs and food are marked. Oka (2001) raises for us the question, "from whose viewpoint do we see the world?"

This is an important question that makes us reconsider the position from which we speak of the problem of "nature." Of course, she does not naively insist on conserving the nature and landscape of Afghanistan. She insists on the necessity to grasp the suffering of people exposed to bombing in relation to the suffering of burnt trees, smashed rocks and land destructed from the bombing. This is a problem of our imagination: whether we imagine Afghanistan people as an abstract object of a bombing attack and humanitarian aid, or imagine them as a concrete subject of human lives constructed on the material environment of "nature." Taking the latter image, we could proceed into more democratized politics of security founded on people's lives and nature, that is to say, "people's security."

Though the concept of "people's security" has not been fully elaborated upon even in the fields of political sciences, it has gradually become a key concept in the alternative peace movement developed especially in Okinawa[1]. "People's security" aims to produce an alternative to national security that is constructed at the sacrifice of local people. For example, approximately 75% of the U.S. Military Base related areas in Japan are located in Okinawa, which

---

[*] Kanazawa University, JAPAN   koji331@kenroku.ipc.kanazawa-u.ac.jp

comprises only 0.6% of the entire land area of Japan. People in Okinawa have continuously suffered from various problems caused by the presence of U.S. Forces even after the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese control in 1972. Though the concept of "people's security" has mainly been developed in the anti-base, antiwar movements of Okinawa, it has recently spread to other U.S. Military Base related areas on the Japanese mainland and Korea.

This paper looks at a grass-roots movement against the U.S. military exercises in Hijudai, a local area of Oita Prefecture on the Japanese mainland, as a case study. The features of the grass-roots movement in Hijudai are 1) an extensive network between the maneuver areas including Okinawa and Korea, 2) a variety of activities from political agenda to musical concert and film production, and 3) an emphasis on the affinity between the lives and the nature in Hijudai. By mainly focusing on the third feature, this paper attempts to explore the potentials of socially produced nature for "people's security." In the grass-roots movement of Hijudai, nature represents a source of peaceful lives, and the conservation of nature is regarded as the security of local lives. On the basis of this perspective of nature, local people attempt to construct various natural formations through parks, photographs and festivals. They are natures alternatively imagined and re-appropriated by local people rather than dominated and managed by the state.

II. Place of "Hijudai"

In 1996, the Final Report of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa specified that the impact of the U.S. military presence on Okinawa should be reduced and the artillery live-fire exercise should be relocated from Okinawa to the five maneuver areas of the Self Defense Force on the Japanese mainland (Figure 1). The extensive grassland in Hijudai (area is approximately 4,900 hectares, distance is 16 km from east to west, and 5km from north to south) in Oita Prefecture is one of those five maneuver areas, and the local people of Hijudai have practiced radical and flexible resistances

Figure 1 Relocation of the U.S. Forces' artillery live-fire exercise from Okinawa to the five maneuver fields of the Self Defense Force in the Japanese mainland

against the U.S. military exercises since that time.

Before 1900, when the maneuver field of the Japanese Army was first established in Hijudai, there had been some settlements, paddy fields, crop fields and pasturelands in it. As described in Table 1, since 1900 Hijudai has been continuously utilized as a maneuver area of the Japanese Army (1900-1945), the U.S. Forces and Allied Forces (1946-1957) and the Self-Defense Forces (1958-). Although settlements and agricultural lands were moved out of the maneuver area, utilization of communal pastureland within the maneuver area by local farmers has remained as customary land use. Even now, local farmers burn off the pastureland in the spring, leave the cattle to graze in it during the summer season, and mow the grass in the autumn.

However, violent artillery live-fire exercises by the Self-Defense Forces for more than two hundred days a year have caused various kinds of environmental destruction in Hijudai: they have damaged the land, caused bare grassland to appear, and accelerated the soil erosion of the fields. Furthermore, local people living adjacent to the maneuver fields have suffered from the terrible noise and vibration of the explosions, accidents of false bombings and so on in their daily lives. Under such circumstances, relocation of the U.S. Forces' artillery live-fire exercise from Okinawa to Hijudai has stirred up fierce urge and rebellion by the local people.

Table 1. History of Hijudai

Year	Date	Events
1900		Commencement of the Japanese Army's military excise
1901~1909		The Japanese Army purchased the land of Hijudai
1908		Superintendent of the Hijudai maneuver field was established
1946	June	The U.S. Forces and the Allied Forces occupied Hijudai maneuver field
1953	Nov	The Self-Defense Forces commenced military exercise in Hijudai
1957	6.Oct	The U.S. Forces and the Allied Forces released Hijudai maneuver field
1962	28.Sep	The U.S.-Japan Joint Committee has agreed on the U.S. Forces' reuse of Hijudai maneuver field (Military exercise was not practiced)
1987	Nov	The 1st U.S.-Japan Joint Military Exercise in Hijudai
1991	Nov	The 2nd U.S.-Japan Joint Military Exercise in Hijudai
1995		(The rape of a Japanese schoolgirl by U.S. military soldiers in Okinawa fueled public opinion against the U.S. military bases in Okinawa)
1996	29.Aug	The U.S.-Japan Joint Committee has agreed to the relocation of the U.S. Forces' artillery live-fire exercise from Okinawa to five maneuver fields on the Japanese mainland including Hijudai
	4~17. Nov	The 3rd U.S.-Japan Joint Military Exercise in Hijudai
	2.Dec	Final report of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa
1997		(The U.S. Forces' artillery live-fire exercises in three maneuver fields on the mainland: Kita Fuji, Yausubetsu, and Ojojihara)
1998		(The U.S. Forces' artillery live-fire exercises in four maneuver fields on the mainland: Higashi Fuji, Kita Fuji, Yausubetsu, and Ojojihara)
1999	4~12. Feb	The 1st U.S. Forces' artillery live-fire exercise in Hijudai
2000	3~10. Feb	The 2nd U.S. Forces' artillery live-fire exercise in Hijudai
2001	8~16. Feb	The 3rd U.S. Forces' artillery live-fire exercise in Hijudai
2002	1~8. Feb	The 4th U.S. Forces' artillery live-fire exercise in Hijudai

The first grass-roots movement against the U.S. military exercises was conducted by the people of Yufuin, a famous hot spring resort adjacent to Hijudai. Yufuin is famous for its unique town development centered around the hot spa. For the tourist resort Yufuin, relocation of the U.S. Forces' artillery live-fire exercise was considered damaging the sophisticated images of a tourist resort. Yufuin Tourist Association, Hotel and Inn Union of Yufuin town, and other NPO groups conducted a campaign to collect signatures and petitioned against the U.S. Forces' artillery live-fire exercise in Hijudai. Next, they organized the "People's Liaison Conference against the U.S. Forces' Exercise" (P.L.C.) which aims to make contact between three Towns (Kusu, Kokonoe and Yufuin Town) adjacent to the maneuver areas. The P.L.C. developed the grass-roots movement in each town, and each village, for example, had a local meeting and a "Green Postcard Campaign" against the U.S. Forces' Exercise.

On the other hand, the people of Onobaru district (Kusu Town) next to the maneuver areas conducted a simple but steady protest movement against the U.S. Forces' Exercise. Onobaru district is an agricultural area, and most of the residents are farmers whose ancestors had lived within the maneuver areas before 1900, and had utilized the communal pastureland of Hijudai. They organized the "Hitomi-kai" group, which is a youth group in the local community. Although "Hitomi-kai" has petitioned the Kusu Town Office to stop the U.S. Forces' Exercise and has put up signboards and a flag protesting the U.S. Forces' Exercise, their voices are not very loud and they do not have any political power to mobilize influential politicians. However, after participating in the P.L.C., they have gradually become associated with the people of Yufuin.

Since the inauguration of "Local NET Oita, Hijudai: What should we do with the U.S. Military Bases and Japan?" (Local NET), the nature of the grass-roots movement has changed. Though Local NET was formed by the parent organization of the P.L.C., it consists of various kinds of groups and individuals from a women's group, youth group, pacifist organization, religious organization, theatrical group, and chorus group to a photographer, artist and musician. It is the network itself which connects different people in different places with each other. Originally, Local NET was designed as a sub-network of "National NET: What should we do with the U.S. Military Bases and Japan?" which consists of five sub-networks based on the five maneuver areas on the Japanese mainland: Yausubetsu (Hokkaido), Ohjojihara (Miyagi), Higashi Fuji (Shizuoka), Kita Fuji (Yamanashi) and Hijudai (Oita). However, this National NET does not have any substantially unified power and each Local NET works well independently. Among them, Local NET Oita, Hijudai is the most active one, and it is recently developing closer contacts with the people of Okinawa and Korea who have lived adjacent to the U.S. Military Base and suffered from serious damages.

III. Producing Natures: Imaginative and Maternal Construction of Nature

Local NET organizes various events in Hijudai and Yufuin: protest rallies, lectures, photograph exhibitions, music concerts, festivals, movie showings and so on (Table 2). The contents of its movement vary from those with a political agenda to cultural events. These diverse events, however, have a general feature in common. Locality of the movement is emphasized by

focusing on the affinity for nature of Hijudai.

At first, the problem of nature in Hijudai was mainly concerned with the environmental destruction caused by the artillery live-fire exercises and the compensation for it. Since 1957, the Japanese government has acknowledged the serious damage to the physical environment of Hijudai caused by the U.S. Forces' military exercises, and has compensated the local people and the related municipal government for the damage through subsidies. According to the report on compensation (Association for the compensation construction of the Hijudai maneuver field 1962), the destruction of the land and the soil erosion in Hijudai caused by the artillery live-fire

Table 2. History and events of the opposition movement against the U.S. Forces' military exercises in Hijudai (1995-1998)

Year	Date	Ervents
1995	11.Nov	Yufuin Tourist Association and Hotel & Inn Union of Yufuin gave a presentation to Yufuin Town Office against the relocation of the U.S. Forces' military exercise
1996	17.Mar	Yufuin Protest Rally against the relocation of the U.S. Forces' Military Exercise
	10.Apr	Inauguration of the Yufuin People's Liaison Conference against the relocation of the U.S. Forces' Military Exercise
	27.Jun	Inauguration of the Kusu, Kokonoe, Yufuin Liaison Conference against the relocation of the U.S. Forces' Military Exercise
	7.Jul	Protest Rally against the relocation of the U.S. Forces' Military Exercise (Kusu Town)
	1.Aug	"Hitomi-kai" group gave a presentation to the Oita Prefectural Government against the relocation of the U.S. Foces' Military Exercise to Hijudai
	27.Sep	"Message from women of Okinawa" (at Yufuin Town Public Hall)
	Nov.	"Springhead Festival of Hijudai: Mountain is fine" at Yufuin and Hijudai
	4.Nov	The Oita Protest Rally against the U.S.-Japan Joint Military Exercise (the 1st)
	10.Nov	The Oita Protest Rally against the U.S.-Japan Joint Military Exercise (the 2nd)
	28.Nov	Inauguration of "the Local NET Oita, Hijudai: what should we do with the U.S. Military Bases and Japan"
	23.Dec	Session on the actualities of Okinawa (at Yufuin Town Community Center)
1997	22.Mar	Okinawa-Ohjojihara-Hijudai Joint Rally (at Yufuin Town Community Center)
	23.Mar	Oita Protest Rally against the relocation of the U.S. Forces' Military Exercise from Okinawa to mainland (at Kokonoe Town, Usa Town and Saiki City)
	Apr.	Municipal governments of Ohjojihara, Kita Fuji and Hijudai maneuver fields officially accepted the U.S. Forces' Military Exercise
	27.Apr	"Women's rally for secure lives" (at Kusu Town Public Hall)
	30.May	Opinion advertising "Please remove your Marines from our soil!" (*New York Times*)
	4.Jun	"Mayonaka shin'ya, Okinawa antiwar singer's concert" (at Yufuin Town)
	1.Jul~3.Sep	"Memories of Wind, Photograph Exhibition: Photo Document of Hijudai and Okinawa"
	27.Jul	"Lecture of Allen Nelson, ex-soldier of the U.S. Marines" (at Yufuin Town Community Center)
	8.Aug	"Evening concert of *Sanshin* and the history of Okinawa" (at Kusu Town)
	6~7.Sep	"Champur Forum in Yufuin: rethinking the security of lives" (at Yufuin Town)
	Oct.~Nov.	"Peace Art Exhibition" (at Oita City, Kusu Town, Kokonoe Town)
	24.Nov	"Peace Message from Oita" rally against the U.S. Bases in Japan (at Beppu City) (Lecture by a famous journalist, a chorus concert, and an Okinawa folk song concert)
	25.Nov	"Rethinking agriculture, livelihood and life" rally (at Yufuin Community Center)
1998	17.May	"Springhead Festival of Hijudai: Mountain is green" at Ryumon Fall
	2.Jul	*"Mensore Okinawa"* Okinawa comedy show (at Hita City)
	5.Aug	*"Yuntanza Okinawa"* movie show (at Yufuin Public Hall)
		Panel discussion on *"Yuntanza Okinawa"* : talking with the director Nishiyama
	9.Aug	*"Nanumu no ie"* (Habitual sadness) Korean movie show (at Oita City)
		Lecture "Japan and Korea, past, present and future: thinking through *Nanumu no ie* "
	23.Nov	Opinion advertising "It's time to bring the U.S. Marines home!" *(New York Times)*

exercises brought about an inflow of sand and mud into the river, and often caused floods along the river. For the same reason, the drinking water supply and the irrigation canal were seriously damaged. The Japanese government carried out various types of construction as compensation, such as dam construction, improvement of the river and irrigation canal, construction of water supply facilities, and road construction. Furthermore, as compensation for damages to agriculture and daily lives, a tomato sorting center, a cold storehouse for vegetables, a garbage disposal facility, a swimming pool, a day nursery and other related facilities were constructed. Thus, the compensation system of constructing infrastructure has involved local people in interdependent relationships with the national and municipal government. In that system, ironically, environmental destruction is a source of compensation, and nature is material for such compensation. Although some of the local people who live the closest to the maneuver field and suffer everyday from many damages managed to oppose the presence of the maneuver field itself, their voices were lost in the political and financial system of compensation.

The movement of Local NET is completely separate from this type of compensation system. It does not receive any support from the national and municipal government. It does not appeal to any politicians. Instead, it receives various types of support from non-governmental organizations and individuals. It appeals to people's power. Therefore, it needs to attract as many people as they can. One of the strategies to do so is the use of events and the media. It holds many events, and one of the important motifs of those events is the nature of Hijudai. By looking at several cases, we examine how they represent and re-appropriate nature of Hijudai.

1. Festival

On the 17th of May 1998, Local Net held the "Springhead Festival of Hijudai: Mountain is Green" at Ryumon Fall adjacent to the Hijudai maneuver field. This festival was held in response to the "Human Chain" protest rally at Futenma U.S. Air Station in Okinawa on the same day. The program of the Springhead Festival included a chorus, a theatre, a musical performance of Japanese drums, a traditional dance of Okinawa, and a massage from Okinawa. Nearly four hundred people participated in it. The Declaration of the Springhead Festival reads as follows:

> "Source of the peace is this beautiful air, water, and the mountain and grassland which produce them. Source of the peace is those who are able to entrust themselves gently to such an atmosphere… It is the very precious treasure for our home land that mountains remain green forever." (Local NET Oita, Hijudai 1998: 1)

Hijudai is located at the springhead of three large rivers in Oita Prefecture and, as mentioned above, the river environment of Hijudai was formerly damaged by the artillery live-fire exercises. Though at that time nature was resources for compensation, nature in this festival is represented as "treasure" to be conserved. That is to say, conserving the treasure of nature is translated into saving the home land. Nature conservation and security of homeland are described in an equivalent context. This type of narrative of nature often appears in other discourses in leaflets, posters and brochures published by Local NET. For example, Yoji Eto, the chairperson of Hitomi-kai, describes his feeling about it in his essay (Eto 2001: 65) as follows:

Three months after the third U.S. Force's military exercises
Hijudai in May is the most comfortable of the year with breeze from
the earth
Faces of people living here seem the most bright in the year, too
In this season
These wonderful lives and nature
I come to think that by all means I want to hand them down to the
next generation

Eto is a livestock farmer. For him, the nature of Hijudai is the fields of labor and life. During my interview with him, he said that he would not engage in livestock farming again if he moved out of Hijudai. The nature of Hijudai and livestock farming cannot be separated from each other. Therefore, nature conservation and security of homeland are the same problem for him.

2. Exhibition

In 1997, "Memories of Wind, Photograph Exhibition: Photo-Document of Hijudai and Okinawa" was held at Yufuin Town, Fukuoka City and Kitakyushu City. Photographs of nature and people in Hijudai and Okinawa were exhibited. Tsuyoshi Takami, a photographer and the director of Yufuin Fancy Forest Museum of Art, organized this project and held the exhibition in three cities (one of them was at his own museum). After the exhibition, he published a book of those photographs titled *"Memories of Wind: Photo-Document of Hijudai and Okinawa 1996-1997"* (Association for the Publication of *"Memories of Wind"* 1998). It includes photographs of the artillery live-fire exercises, U.S. soldiers, local people, cattle, settlement and nature in Hijudai and Okinawa. Restrained monochrome photographs illustrate the contrast between soldiers and residents, tanks and cattle, choppers and farm tractors (Figure 2). Tank trails spreading over the field like capillaries remind us of the pitiful scratches on the earth (Figure 3). These photographs illuminate the incompatibility of war and peace in the scenery of nature in Hijudai and Okinawa.

Figure 2. Tanks and cattle in Hijudai. Photograph by Akimitsu Enomoto. Source: Memories of Wind: Photo- Document of Hijudai and Okinawa 1996-1997. Reprinted with permission of the photographer

Figure 3. Pitiful scratches on the earth.
Aerial photograph of Hijudai by Fumio Hashimoto.
Source: *Memories of Wind: Photo-Document of Hijudai and Okinawa 1996-1997*.
Reprinted with permission of the photographer

  The natural scenery of Hijudai is represented in several ways. For example, primrose is used as a symbol of Hijudai where primrose blooms in spring. It is printed on postcards, stickers, brochures and towels that Local NET has produced for its fund-raising campaign. Cattle are also used as a kind of trademark of Local NET on those products, leaflets and brochures. The movement of Local NET actively exhibits the nature of Hijudai through photographs and illustrations. Through such concrete forms, they attempt to embody the objects they are trying to save in their movement. As suggested in Eto's essay, the objects they are trying to save are the lives and the nature in Hijudai.

3. Parks

  As described above, Onobaru district is an agricultural area where most of the residents are engaged in the production of vegetables, rice and the raising of livestock. Due to the damages caused by the artillery live-fire exercises, the depression of the livestock industry and the decrease in the youth population, Onobaru has been situated as one of the marginalized regions in Oita Prefecture. In addition, in October 1999, the Defense Facilities Administration Agency (D.F.A.A.) proposed a compensation plan for people to move out of Hijudai. The D.F.A.A. specified 145 houses in Hijudai as objects of compensation for moving out. Until now, six houses have already moved out of Hijudai, and several other houses have applied. The price of

Figure 4. "Green Dream Park" constructed by Hitomi-kai.
Photograph by author

the compensation payment for moving out is relatively high compared with the ordinary land price of Hijudai. Therefore, many residents of object houses have become interested in this plan. Although moving out is not compulsory, some of the Hitomi-kai members criticize this plan, "it will accelerate depopulation in Hijudai and dissolve the local community."

In order to do away with those negative images of Hijudai, members of Hitomi-kai set about constructing two small parks in Onobaru district. First, in April 2000, they constructed "Green Dream Park" beside Onobaru dam (Figure 4). The aim of this small but sunny park is to attract many people both from within and without Hijudai. This project was further developed in September 2001, when Hitomi-kai constructed a second park called "Spring of the Earth." Members of the Hitomi-kai wanted to let people experience the clear water and wonderful nature of Hijudai and to visit and enjoy Hijudai. On the 8th of September 2001, "Hijudai, Home of the Earth and Water Festival" was held as an opening ceremony under the auspices of Hitomik-kai and Local NET.

IV. Conclusion: Toward "Revolutionary Environmentalism"

Thus, the grass-roots movement in Hijudai has evolved from the performances of festivals and the representational practices of photograph exhibitions into the material construction of parks as well as protest activities against the U.S. Force's military exercises. It has focused on the security of nature and lives in Hijudai rather than on political ideology or "militant" opposition. It clearly denies "national security" that presumes military security by the state. Instead, it advocates "people's security" that presumes non-military security by the people. Local NET has

learned much about "people's security" from Okinawa. Through active exchanges with the social movement in Okinawa, members of Local NET have become conscious of the importance of their own lives and nature at home. They define lives and nature as objects to be saved and conserved. This is exactly the issue of "security."

In realizing that "people's security," Local NET focuses on "nature" as both concept and material for its movement. It represents nature as a "treasure" to be conserved, and sees it as inseparable from people's lives at home. In other words, saving their lives and nature is considered the same issue. It embodies the object to be saved by exhibiting nature in the forms of photographs and illustration. Furthermore, it constructs a "second nature" of parks where people from both within and without Hijudai can enjoy the wonderful nature of Hijudai. Of course, these are not authentic natural parks. They are socially constructed "second natures." However, by constructing these "second natures," it could re-appropriate the meaning of nature by itself which was formerly reduced to the material of compensation by the government.

Smith (1998: 280) notes, "The raw materials for a revolutionary re-enchantment of nature are simultaneously scarce, yet all around." We cannot know at the present time whether the grass-roots movement in Hijudai can succeed in the difficult task of the revolutionary re-enchantment of nature or not. However, Local NET's attempts to represent and re-appropriate nature are surely based on the steady criticism against First World consumerism and capitalist globalization. Local NET is recently attempting to circulate local currency named "Yufu." Though its circulation area is still limited, its attempt aims to challenge the intrusion of global capitalism into the regional economy of Yufuin. Furthermore, it is constructing a broader network with other nature and other people. These grass-roots movements have made it possible not only to empower the local people of Hijudai, but also to bring together the marginalized people of maneuver areas on the Japanese mainland, Okinawa and Korea. In addition it may produce an alternative geopolitics of "the people's security" that would replace the conventional geopolitics of national security.

We are able to see a potential for such alternative geopolitics in the lyrics of Okinawan folk singer Tetsuhiro Daiku's song *"Okinawa kagayake" (Okinawa, Shine)* and *"Hijudai kagayake" (Hijudai, Shine)* performed during his live concert at Yufuin.

Kagayake Okinawa (Okinawa, Shine)	*Kagayake Hijudai (Hijudai, Shine)*
With bearing the deepest sorrow	Blown by blue wind
Sun-shinning, flower-blooming island,	Field green with fresh grass
Oh Okinawa	Oh Hijudai
Songs tell us people's sincerity	Fertile land irrigating all the lives
In Okinawa without war	Vastly spreading over the home of Hiju
Heal your soul in Okinawa	Birds sing, flowers bloom
Enjoy your dream in Okinawa	Quiet waterside, last forever
Okinawa, shine, Oh Okinawa, shine	Save Hijudai, Oh Hijudai, shine

Copyright: Tetsuhiro DAIKU

Note

1) The concept of "people's security" is differentiated from that of "human security" originally advocated by the United Nations Development Program. Although both of them argue for the necessity of social, economic and environmental security centered on human lives and dignity, they have some remarkable differences in the agent of security and the attitudes towards global capitalism. While "human security" admits roles of the state and the military organization as agents of security, "people's security" situates them as one of the principal sources of people's insecurity, and defines people themselves as agents of their security. Further, while the former does not confront the complicit relationships between global capitalism and international security organization, the latter criticizes the process of globalization itself as one of the principal sources of people's insecurity (see Mushakoji 2000; People's Plan Study Group 2000).

References

Association for the compensation construction of the Hijudai maneuver field (1962): *Hijudai enshujo kankei hosho-shi I (History of the compensation for the Hijudai maneuver field I)*, Association for the compensation construction of the Hijudai maneuver field, Oita. (written in Japanese)

Association for the Publication of "Memories of Wind" (1998): Memories of Wind: Photo-Document of Hijudai and Okinawa 1996-1997, Kaichosha, Fukuoka.

Eto, Y. (2001): Ima, watashi ga omou koto (What I think now), *Hijudai Peace Action 2001*: 65. (written in Japanese)

Local NET Oita, Hijudai (1998): Hijudai Genryu Matsuri: Oyama wa midori (Springhead Festival of Hijudai: Mountain is Green), *Hijudai no Kaze (Wind from Hijudai)*, 4: 1-2. (written in Japanese)

Mushakoji, K. (2000): From hegemonic insecurity to people's security: an overview, (published on the website of People's Plan Study Group,
URL http://www.jca.apc.org/peoplessecurity/okinawa/mushakoji-en.html).

Oka, M. (2001): 'Watashi tachi wa nanimono no shiten de sekai wo mirunoka?' (From whose viewpoint do we see the world?), *Gendaishiso (Revue de la Pensee d'aujord'hui)* 29(13): 105-110. (written in Japanese)

People's Plan Study Group (2000): The declaration of Okinawa International Forum on People's Security: towards People's Security in the East Asia Pacific Region, *People's Plan Forum* 3(4) (published on the website of People's Plan Study Group, URL http://www.jca.apc.org/ppsg/Doc/
urasoede.htm).

Smith, N. (1998): 'Nature at the millenium: production and re-enchantment,' In Braun, B. and Castree, N. (eds):   *Remaking reality: nature at the millenium*. Routledge, London and New York. pp.271-285.

Re-Mapping the Configuration of Regional Identity in Ryukyu Islands[*]

Naoki OSHIRO[**]

I. After the G8 Okinawa Summit

The G8 (G7) Summit was held in Okinawa from July 21-23, but perhaps no one knows exactly what was at stake at this meeting and what contributions it made. It is really historical irony that such a conference criticized by the British media as the squandered Summit was held in Okinawa. Japan, as chair, could not play a leading role in the conference, and was only concerned with showing Japanese hospitality and following the schedule, not addressing the accumulated problems. In addition the Japanese government spent an enormous amount of money, 81 billions JPY (810 million USD), on this summer party during which the inadequacy of Prime Minister Mori was revealed. That is 100 times as large as the Birmingham or Koeln (Cologne) summit. The Japanese government summoned approximately 22,000 policemen, 100 guard boats, 40 special boats, and military airplanes (P3C) in the sky and instituted surveillance nets for this Summit. This could have been reaction to the outbreak of protest at the World Trade Organization conference in Seattle. This summit bore no fruit despite the absence of storong protest (except the human chain demonstration by 27,000 people which circled Kadena air base).

Apart from the inadequacy of the Japanese Prime Minister, what was most regrettable was that Mr. Clinton, the first U.S. President to come to Okinawa since its hand over in 1972, re-corroborated the military importance of Okinawa to the U.S. armed forces. He went to the Cornerstone of Peace Park and made such a statement at the cliff, the very place where the inhabitants of Okinawa who were cornered by both the U.S. military and the Japanese military in the last World War committed suicide. I was dismayed and felt that the significance of regionalism in Okinawa against the presence of the U.S. military was seen as an outrage by all watching this scene on TV. Still, 75% of the U.S. bases in Japan are concentrated in Okinawa which occupies only 1% of the Japanese land mass. Now, it is well known that the Japanese government intended to host this summit to uphold the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.

The Japanese government certainly aimed to quiet the movement of regionalism in Okinawa which had soared during the protest against a rape incident by Marines that occurred in 1995 and which developed into the revision of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement. To do this, they decided to host the summit in Okinawa and to invest 100 billion JPY (1 billion USD) for

---

the promotion of the northern part of Okinawa main land. Of course, I think neither the government attained its intention nor the sympathy of the Okinawan people. But we must remember how the Okinawa prefecture and its Governor acted as hosts to the G8 summit and negotiated with the government. I will explain the reasons why Okinawans had such attitudes during the summit although they were placed in peripheral and marginalized positions in Japan, by presenting the recent counter-hegemonic discourse of conservatives.

II. Historical Revisionism in Okinawa

Before assessing the conservative discourse, we must understand its target, liberal discourses. Almost all Japanese recognize that for about the last 5 years Okinawa was led by Masahide Ota, the former Governor of Okinawa Prefecture. He served two terms, 1990-1998. He is known as a famous investigator of the Battle of Okinawa in the Pacific War and was a professor of mass communication study at the University of Ryukyus(e.g. Ota 1967). Everyone recognizes him as an advocate of peace. He negotiated with the Prime Minister at that time, Ryutaro Hashimoto, on the leasehold problem of U.S. facilities in Okinawa under his slogan Okinawa without military facilities. A typical remark from the liberal side is as follows:

> Okinawan people have suffered miserable experiences, as one third of noncombatant inhabitants died in the last Okinawan battle, but today, 75% of the U.S. facilities in Japan still exist in Okinawa. We never hear the end of incidents caused by U.S. soldiers and can still not arrest criminals under the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement. In the first place, Okinawa Islands are peaceful, people go unarmed and they hate war. Actually, in the pre-modern era, we went to many Asian countries to exchange not only commodities but also culture. Today, we must seek the way of diplomacy. We think there is no necessity for military facilities in Okinawa. They must be removed…

The hegemony of the liberal side, represented by Ota, rose to a peak in September 1995 when the rape incident occurred and descended in February of 1997 when Ota refused to accept an alternative site for Futenma Airbase.

This refusal hardened the Japanese government. Consequently, the Japanese central government became reluctant to promote Okinawa prefecture. Ota failed to maintain the support of the people and lost his seat in November 1998. Keiichi Inamine who was the President of the Okinawan Association of Economic Corporations became the next Governor of Okinawa Prefecture. He and his planners are regarded as conservative. A typical conservative remark is as follows:

> Mr. Ota and his adherents always say 'peace, peace', but they did not think about ways of improving much employment despite the fact that the prefecture has the worst unemployment rate in Japan. Of course, peace is precious, but reaction to the government creates no products for us. If the government continues to reduce financial support to us any longer, what shall we do? Our number one priority is to make a living!

This is too practical an opinion. However, along with these opinions, a cultural aspect was

added to the discussion in 1997 by Inamine's planners to challenge liberal discourses flavored with greater historical backgrounds and taste and problematizing its very way of recognizing Okinawan history. It states we must be aware of the logic rather than the pathos in exploring our future: from collective enthusiasm to cool analysis. And they, the three professors of the University of Ryukyus: Kurayoshi Takara, Tsuneo Oshiro, and Morisada Maeshiro, manifested this orientation as the Okinawa Initiative in the Okinawa forum of the Asia Pacific Agenda Project held in March, 2000. I will first summarize this manifesto, and then criticize it.

III. Okinawa Initiative: What is it?

Preamble: They said:

In the powerful Unitarian frame centered on Tokyo in modern Japan, Okinawa was seen as an outfield or islands which have at first glance a different culture from Japan, or are regarded as the military hub, or a tropical island resort. Okinawa could not brighten its own light autonomously. We three (Takara, Oshiro, Maeshiro) hope Okinawa will become a new intellectual power in the 21st century and thereby offer a view point which is needed to reappraise the potential of Okinawa. We think Okinawa must muster its own initiative to improve its conditions and surroundings.

The Historical sense of the Okinawan people

We think it is for the specific historical sense Okinawan people have that Okinawa can present its overpoweringly unique stance in Japan. We divide this into seven points for simple explanation as follows:

1. Building a pre-modern particular state of the Kingdom of Ryukyu

In 1429, the political power which was based on Shuri unified the Okinawan islands and established the Kingdom of Ryukyu. While maintaining its close relationship with China, it developed diplomacy and trade with Japan, Korea and south-east Asian countries and prospered as a staple trade state of east Asia. However it was invaded by Japan in 1609, and became subordinate to Japan while ostensibly keeping its relationship with China. In 1879, Japan, as a modem nation-state, purged the king of Ryukyu from Okinawa, applied the prefecture system, and established Okinawa as a formal part of its territory. A series of these processes gives Okinawan people two reasons for being historically recognized. First is that they have a unique background which established an independent and different pre-modern state from mainland Japan and they had a tradition of acting as an independent member in the Asian world. Second is that originally they were not a member of Japan, and became the latest member through the gradual process of inclusion.

2. Having unique culture

Though the building of a unique kingdom and the cross-fertilization with Asian countries, Okinawa developed particular cultures which were different from mainland Japan. In addition, folk cultures matured in each island added to the condition of traditional Okinawan cultures and developed its uniqueness compared to other Japanese prefectures. This cultural situation caused Okinawan people to develop two consciousnesses: one is of a differentiation of themselves in that they differentiate themselves as We (Okinawan natives) from They (people in other prefectures of Japan): namely, Uchinaanchu and Yametonchu. Another is that we must be proud of our own traditional cultures and should hand them down passionately. In another sense, that Okinawan culture

is not a completely foreign culture to the Japanese and originally had the same root. They departed from ancient Japanese culture, and then varied to Okinawan and mainland Japanese culture. That is to say, if we look at our cultural origin, these two cultures begin to look similar, however if we emphasize historical results, we could conclude that the two cultures should be distinguished from each other.

3. Discrimination by mainland Japanese

These peculiar cultures of Okinawa have been used by the people of mainland Japan(Yamatonchu) to underestimate and discriminate against the local people considering them as backward. Modern Japan negated its Asian character and centered its state development on the models of Western advanced countries. Okinawan culture was seen as Asiatic and low-grade. The experience of losing their pride and confidence in their own cultures and having been discriminated against as Okinawan people who had their peculiar culture has stigmatized the people.

4. Unforgettable damage suffered in the last Pacific War

The Okinawan battle at the tail end of the Pacific War left the Okinawan people with unforgettable historical scars. Because *the homes of the people became a battleground, many inhabitants were entangled in fierce battles and about 25% of them died. The landscape or cultural heritage which represented Okinawan unique history and culture was ruined. The most cruel thing was that the Japanese soldiers discriminated against Okinawan inhabitants even though they were also Japanese. They came down on them, and behaved brutishly, pushing inhabitants toward their death. Through these severe experiences, inhabitants became to hate war and fervently seek peace.

5. Experience of domination by other nations

Since the end of the war in 1945, Okinawa prefecture was separated from Japan and put under the governance of the U.S. until 1972. This is a very important factor in people's sense of history. The U.S. government's definition that Okinawa holds an important position for military strategy is a one-sided definition without asking the peoples' opinion. Under the overwhelming power of the U.S. military, Okinawa turned into an island of bases and the corner stone of the Pacific.

6. Wishing to return to Japan

The Okinawan people never despaired of Japan, even though it sold Okinawa to the U.S.. Through the process of criticizing the issues deriving from the U.S. control of Okinawa, the Okinawan people discussed which nation Okimawa belonged to, and most wished to return to Japan. The reason for this is that they had been part of Japan for 70 years and their cultural identity supported the feelings of belonging to Japan. Though this region had built the Kingdom of Ryukyu and had a tradition of developing its own peculiar culture, Japan was still culturally familiar to Okinawa. Okinawans felt a unity with Japan. Therefore, they thought that Japan was their homeland and that they could solve their ambiguous position by regaining it. The political expression of this took the form of a movement to regain unity with Japan. Eventually, on May 15, 1972, the Okinawan people chose Japan as the country to which they belonged.

7. Experiencing the inequality in facility sharing

After unification, however, Okinawa did not cease being an island of bases. Okinawa was re-defined in the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and it was estimated that it would be a crucial function for this alliance. In the national interest of both countries, Okinawa was authorized as the island of bases. Before considering the significance of the Japan-U.S. relationship, many inhabitants denied the

actuality that about 75% of the facilities of the American military in Japan were located on this small island and that they incurred many sufferings because of the bases. Indisputably, the sense of inequality compared to other prefectures occurred here. The matter of the base problems, which arose from a rape incident committed by a U.S. marine in September 1995, shows again the marked gap between the inhabitants and the national interests and casts a large shadow on the operation of the Japan-U.S. alliance.

IV. Criticisms of historical senses

This summary of Okinawan history is, of course, biased. I shall return to this point later, but now continue to follow the professors. They point out the problems of their historical sense as follows:

In many cases, these historical senses have overlapped and mixed like a cocktail and form the regional identity of Okinawa. Although we three respect this regional identity which is based on historical senses, we demarcate a logic which resulted from excessive accountability to history. Certainly, history should be respected, but we think this matter must be distinguished at once from the problem of responsibility which we undertake it to be today. What is important is not to remain under the control of history but to set in history and the future by grounding our own responsibility and subjectivity as people today. The only people who have the ability to undertake the whole history are ourselves at the present time. In addition the regional property which is offered to the future by history will only be actualized, if the people of the present inherit it. Therefore we make some remarks as follows:

1. Generalization of Self-evaluation

The regional identity based on the historical question should not be confined to the problems related only to Okinawa. Rather we should be aware that we are called on by our efforts to generalize it to the whole of Japan or Asia Pacific countries. For example, when we insist that we are not dealt with fairly inside Japan, we need to ask what kind of relationship the problem has to the actual circumstances and the degree to which it occurs in the whole of Japan from the viewpoint of the region. When we support the idea of anti-war or the idea of peace which was generated from our experiences of suffering by war, we should strive to tell them using a broader (nation-wide or worldwide) context and in universal language. Universal language here means to give rationality and logic to the language with which we can speak up for ourselves and persuade others, and to appreciate the power of language, that is, to communicate, to negotiate and solve, thus illustrating that language is a powerful weapon. Particularly on the question of the bases, we take the needs of this universal language and power of language to heart.

2. Evaluation of Okinawa as a base

There is a deep-seated political anti-base feeling/emotion in Okinawan inhabitants due to the heavy burden associated with the bases. The issues examined in the question of the bases, however, are not presented by either the historical problem or the issue of the damage caused by the military bases, and are not developed by insisting on the search for peace and negation of war. We must consider the degree of security for Japan as a member of international society and how to realize peace in the world.

3. Okinawa as an intellectual power

When we strive to displace the historical question with universal language or power of language, its central activity would be an excellent intellectual infrastructure which characterizes this region of Okinawa. We Okinawans have pride in our own history and culture, we share the pains of being treated as an ethnic minority, we hate wars, we love peace, and we have the will to let everybody know what we are. Speaking out about all these is our most precious treasure and intellectual power. We do not want to confine this intellectual power within a national area. Today, when the concentration of administrative, political, economic, and cultural power in Tokyo is reduced and a new form of regional division of governing power is sought, we Okinawans should also regain control and re-establish our own way of governance. In doing so, it is important that we overcome the historical problem and participate in the creation of a new national image of Japan for the 21st century. We have to evaluate ourselves in this way, and take our own responsibility as part of a new Japan.

V. Political Context of the Manifesto

I have outlined the ideas of the three professors who presented their new perspective of the Okinawans' identity in the Okinawa Initiative. As it clearly stated, they emphasize that Okinawa is part of Japan, and they are trying to establish its role in Japan and to revise Okinawans' historical consciousness which they regard as an obstacle to this goal. Among the three professors, Takara plays a particularly important role. He is a widely known historian who represents Okinawans. He is engaged in enthusiastic writing activities and has published numerous works on the pre-modern history of Okinawa which is his specialty. He has not only presented new findings by revealing previously unknown historical data but also has criticized and challenged an earlier mainstream historical view on Okinawa through re-examining historical data. Professor Takara was actively involved in the rebuilding of the Shuri Castle as the main project of the 20th Anniversary of Okinawa's Reunification with Japan, and he was the expert consultant for Wind of Ryukyu, the historical drama produced by Nippon Hoso Kyokai (the Japanese Broadcast Association). In short, he has been the central figure in the studies of Okinawan history for the last 10 years. During this period, he has established his status as an academic representing Okinawa by publishing books on Okinawan history through major Japanese publishers (Takara, 1980, 1987, 1993). Since the mid-1990s, his discussion has adopted the tone of conservatives ideology (Takara, 1997). Although I am not sure of the reason why he moved in this direction, it may be partly because he made more contacts with administrators of the Japanese central and the Okinawan local governments through involvement in projects related to the 25th Anniversary of Okinawa's Reunification with Japan. Professor Takara himself commented, "Many Okinawan historians tend to describe Okinawa and Okinawans as victims but I am trying to focus on something which cannot be seen in such a definition."

Some of Takaras main criticisms of the historical consciousness in the Okinawa Initiative had already been revealed in a book entitled *Okinawas Self Examination; Discussions on Transformation from the Pathos to the Logic.* Hirotaka Makino, one of the authors of this book, became a vice-Governor of Okinawa Prefecture after its publication. The book criticizes in detail the policy of Ota, a former Okinawan Governor, in particular his three requests to the Japanese

central government; the Action Program to Remove the U.S. Military Bases from Okinawa; the Plan to Build an International City; and the Request to Develop Industry and Deregulation of the U.S. Military Bases. What we have to pay attention to is the timing of the publication of this book. It was published in February, nine months before his election as the vice-Governor of Okinawa Prefecture. In this light, we can surmise that this book is more or less aimed at publicizing the political ideology of Inamine's group which was trying to gain control of the government of Okinawa. In his election campaign, Inamine adopted the catch phrase, Kensei Fukyo, i.e. economic depression was caused by the previous government. Inamine's group employed a famous advertising agent who created this catch phrase, and then blamed Ota's group for the problem in the way that candidates of the U.S. presidency behave, and Inamine eventually won the seat of the Governor of Okinawa. Inamine's group used an impressive strategy. Although poor preparation and miscalculation by Ota's group would have been important factors in bringing about this result, Inamine's affluent resources gained through support from the Association of Management Executives of Okinawa Prefecture made a great difference in his election campaign.

VI. Examining the Historical Revisionism

When we take this political context in which the Okinawa Initiative was presented into consideration, we can understand that the Okinawa Initiative was intended to ruin the plan that the previous Governor of Okinawa and his team developed and to support Inamine's policy. We can also understand that the Okinawa Initiative is the geopolitical discourse which represents this intention. For example, in their article *Geopolitics and Discourse*, O Tuathail and Agnew (1992) state that a historical characteristic which is seen in geopolitical description from that time to today is the assertion that geopolitics is confronted with idealism, ideology, and the human will. This tendency of geopolitical description is exactly what we can see in the Okinawa Initiative. This is nothing else but a geopolitical Practice, in the sense that while focusing on one particular region it ignores the ideal and the will of the people, takes the viewpoint that it was the natural environment and the geographical setting of a state which exercised the greatest influence on its destiny (O Tuathail and Agnew, 1992: 191), and tries to replace the ideal and the will of the people with geopolitical logic. Those who take a conservative position about Okinawan identity and politics always emphasize reality rather than an ideal. They are caught in the image of international relationships which is based on the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and overlook the potential that this image might be merely an historical construction.

Liberals had a hegemonic power at the time of the referendum in Okinawa Prefecture on the Revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and Reduction of the U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa held on September 8, 1996. The proportion who voted for this referendum was 59.53 %, and the ratio of people who voted was 10:1 for the position of the liberals. This was the peak of liberals political power ruling Okinawa.   However, because the Japanese central government regarded this result as a protest against the national policy, it strengthened is oppressive attitudes towards Okinawa and suspended aid for industrial development which was once promised to Okinawa. Due to this action of the Japanese government, the feeling of helplessness in economic and

political arenas spread in Okinawa because it had no strong industrial infrastructure to independently develop its own economy. Conservatives have taken advantage of this situation, articulated their opinions, and developed their political power.

As well as this political and economic context, we should also pay attention to rhetoric adopted in the discourse of the Okinawa Initiative. This is an actual manifesto to call for national unification and this is a familiar type of discourse to us. For example, in 1930 Okinawans organized the Movement for homeland Education (Kyodo kyoiku undo). Although Okinawans became more aware of their own individuality, specialty, or peculiarity through this movement, their folklore was simply regarded as the secondary part of the national character of Japan. By taking this into consideration, we can say that the premise of the manifesto in the Okinawa Initiative was that Okinawa's initiative was merely practiced within Japan and that Japan was the only stage on which Okinawans could demonstrate their unique character.

This reminds us of Althusser's theory of ideology (Althusser, 1970). Aocording to him, the subject cannot exist without the Master. Only by responding to His call can his/her subjectivity be established. It seems that the authors of the Okinawa Initiative speak to Okinawans to re-identify themselves in the relationship of the subject/subjects and to appreciate what guarantees the Master/the subject. Taking this understanding of the formation of the subject, Okinawa as the subject can be established only by responding to the call of the nation state, that is, Japan. Akira Arakawa, an Okinawan journalist, warns us of the danger of the Okinawa Initiative. He states that it is the policy of Japan to integrate Okinawa, and it will he accomplished in a more perfect form by gaining Okinawa's acceptance not from its economic perspective which emphasizes material satisfaction but from its false academic and intellectual point of view.

The Okinawa Initiative is the manifesto which has both positively and negatively influenced and stimulated Okinawans in reconsidering their historical consciousness. At the same time, it has provided others, non-Okinawans, with great opportunities for understanding the Okinawans' plurality in their identity and political and historical understanding. The historical perspective which views Okinawa as a victim, represented in the discourse of Ota, previous Governor of Okinawa, still has its hegemonic power in Okinawa. This view is problematic because by emphasizing Okinawa as a victim it hides the fact that Okinawans actively participated in the war (see for example, Yoshida 1993). Osawa (2000), a rising sociologist, recognizes the importance of this fact in his discussion with Shun Medoruma, a young novelist who won the Akutagawa Award which is one of the most highly regarded literature awards in Japan. Medoruma, who was born in the 1900s, listened to the experiences of his grandparents and parents about the war. What is important here is his position as a listener of two different stories; one about firsthand historical experiences and the other from a dominant ideological historical view on these experiences. The recognition of the gap between these two stories is the underlying theme of Medorumas novels. I, too, belong to his generation and had similar experiences.   However, we do not have direct experiences of the war. We are responsible for examining this historical perception and viewing ourselves, and Okinawa, as victims from a relative perspective, and uncovering and exploring the forgotten fact that we also had a part in invading others. The three professors, Takara, Oshiro, and Maeshiro, the authors of the Okinawa Initiative, fail to recognize

this point. They focus only on the form of a nation-state and ignore the academic historical examination of its substantial meaning and content. Thus it is reasonable that Takara, a historian representing Okinawa Prefecture, is now subject to severe recurring criticisms.

Before concluding, I would like to outline the likelihood of discourse on the Okinawan conservatives and its meaning in the future study of Okinawan regional identity and historical perspective. Responding to the dynamic situations in the Korean Peninsula, the U.S. military arrangement in East Asia may drastically change. This will probably have a considerable influence on the future of the U.S. bases in Okinawa. In this light, it seems that the political understanding of Okinawa's future from a conservative perspective, which simply accepts the regime based on the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, is not prepared for such a potentially radical change in military balance. Furthermore, looking at domestic issues, since the recent election of members of the House of Representatives, the national community has started calling for a radical reform of distribution of public investment. This is the critical reaction of people to the Liberal Democratic Party which generously provided financial support all over Japan in order to collect votes without thinking of the results. If the LDP loses power to other parties at the national level due to this criticism, what are the Okinawan conservatives going to do? Such changes in regional political climates in East Asia and in the balance of political power within Japan may lead to reform in the enormous amount of financial allocation which Okinawa has gained and enjoyed from the central government through political negotiations. When we predict these political changes, which of course may not happen, we can more clearly see the short-sighted character of the professors in the Okinawa Initiative. In other words, the main aim of the authors is blaming the Ota government, and their claim for revising Okinawa's position in a wider context has now become the weakness of their own vision of Okinawa.

VII. Conclusion

In this presentation, I have focused on a critique of the conservatives in Okinawa. In further research I would like to explore the rhetoric used in the conflicts over hegemonic power around the politics of difference and the effectiveness of essentialism from historical and political angles. This is, however, not limited to Okinawan issues. There are many other regions in which regional identities are reinforced under the development of globalization. Everybody seeks to improve their regions position. Consequently we should not discard the Okinawa Initiative as a mere agitation, but we need to compare different views and claims within it. We should probe the issues around the identities of people within regional boundaries and their position through a careful exploration of conflicts and hybrid construction of geopolitical de-/re-boundarization or integration or differentiation.

References (J: Japanese)

Althusser, L., 1970, Ideologie et appareils ideologique d'etat: notes pour une recherche, *La Pensee*, 151, 3-38.

Arakawa, A., 2000, Reading the Okinawa Initiative, *Okinawa Times,* 16 May.(J)

Kan, S-J. & Yoshimi, S., 2000, Challenge to hybrid society: seeking public spaces in globalization (6): Rippling new public space: question of Okinawa, *Sekai*, May, pp. 160-175.(J)

Kaneko, M., 2000, Tom Okinawa: What should be thought between memory and festival, *Sekai* 678, pp.139-149.(J)

Maeshiro, M., Makino, H., & Takara K., 1998, *Okinawas Self Examinotion: Discussions on Transformation from the Pathos to the Logic*, Hirugi-sha. (J)

O Tuathail, G. & Agnew, J., 1992, Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical geopolitical reasoning in American foreign policy, *Political Geography*, 11(2), pp.190-204.

Ota, M., 1967, *Popular Consciousness in Okinawa*, Shinsensha. (J)

Takara, K., 1980, *The Age of Ryukyu*, Chikuma Shobo. (J)

Takara, K., 1987, *The Structure of kingdom of Ryutyu*, Yoshikawa Kobunkan. (J)

Takara, K., 1993, *The kingdom of Ryukyu*, Iwanami Shoten. (J)

Yoshida, T., 1993, H*imeyuri Chushingura (Story of lily loyalist)*. Ohta Shuppan. (J)

Table: Chronology of the Issues around the U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa

Date/Month	Year	Incidents
Mar. - Jun.	1945	The Okinawa War
15 Aug.		Japans surrender to the Allies
1 Apr.	1952	The establishment of the Ryukyu government
28 Apr.		The U.S.-Japan Peace Treaty, The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty
15 May		The enactment of the Law of Special Requisition of Private Land for the U.S. Military Bases
Apr.	1953	The start of compulsory requisition of private land
Jun.	1956	The rise of resistance against compulsory requisition of land all over the Okinawa islands
ll Nov.	1968	The first election of a Governor of the Ryukyu government. Chobyo Yara was elected for the first Governor.
21 Nov	1969	The Sato-Nixon Announcement
20 Dec.	1970	The outbreak of riots in Koza
17 Jun.	1971	Agreement on the reunification of Okinawa with Japan
15 May	1972	The reunification of Okinawa with Japan
17 Nov.	1990	Masahide Ota was elected as Governor of Okinawa
20 Nov.	1994	Ota was re-elected as Governor of Okinawa
4 Sep.	1995	A U.S. soldier in Okinawa raped a 12-year old local girl
21 Oct.		The Okinawans held a meeting to support the decrease and removal of U.S. military bases in Okinawa (85,000 people attended this meeting)
Jan.	1996	The Okinawa government presented the Action Program of Removal of the U.S. military Bases
Nov.	1998	Inamine was elected as Governor of Okinawa

Landscapes of National Parks in Taiwan During the Japanese Colonial Period

Koji KANDA*

I. Introduction

This paper will discuss the politics of national park landscapes in the case of Taiwan during the Japanese colonial period. Generally speaking, it has been pointed out that mountains, valleys, and forests were selected as national park landscapes in prewar Japan. Therefore these landscapes were thought of as being equivalent to Japanese nationalism in the modern period, which was seen, for example, in the discussions of Shigetaka Shiga, who was a famous Japanese nationalist geographer. His most important book "*The theory of Japanese Landscape*" (1894), was very influential in creating the notion of the Japanese landscape in the modern Japanese mind, and he insisted that Japanese landscapes were symbolized by mountains. In fact, three national parks in Taiwan that were selected under the Japanese colonization were also symbolized by the mountain landscapes.

However, in the case of Taiwan, two conditions were different from those of other Japanese national parks. Firstly, Taiwanese national parks were developed in the colonial areas of Imperial Japan[1], and they were selected through other decision making agencies and processes. That is, the Taiwan National Parks were selected by the Taiwan Colonial Government that was supervised by the Ministry of Colonial Department of Imperial Japan. Another national parks that were on the mainland of Japan, which was called "*Nai-chi*"[2], were selected by the Ministry of Interior. Secondly, Taiwan had many tropical landscapes, so the natural landscape feature of Taiwan was not necessarily mountain landscapes. In other words, the features of Taiwanese natural landscape risked distorting the imagined nationalistic Japanese landscape.

Because of these marginal conditions, there were a lot of discussions in the decision-making process concerning Taiwanese national parks. Documentations of these discussions allow us to understand why these landscapes were selected, what aspects were considered in these selections, what kinds of images were projected onto these national park landscapes, and how the definition of Taiwanese imaginative geography was discussed.

II. The Selection Process

* Osaka City University, JAPAN   kanda@lit.osaka-cu.ac.jp

In *Nai-chi*, the discussion of national parks began in 1911, the National Parks Association was established in 1927, the Law of National Parks was proclaimed in 1931, and twelve national parks having the characteristics of mountain landscapes were selected between 1934 to 1936.

In Taiwan, the Taiwan Colonial Government first assigned Tsuyoshi Tamura, who had played important roles in selecting national parks in *Nai-chi,* to the investigation of mountain areas around the Ari and the Nitaka mountains in 1928(see Fig. 1). After that, some local administrative organizations and influential persons organized national park societies which aimed that mountains where located inside or near their administrative district would be included in the Taiwan National Parks; the Arisan National Park Society established by the Chiayi (*Kagi*) city office in April 1931, the East Taiwan National Park Advertising Society established in the Hualien (*Karen*) port state in November 1931, the Tatun (*Taiton*) National Park Society established mainly by the Taipei (*Taihoku*) state office in 1934. As for the system of selecting and designating the Taiwan National Parks, the Taiwan Colonial Government established the National Parks Investigative Board composed of governmental bureaucrats in 1933. After that, it proclaimed the Law of Taiwan National Parks and set up the Taiwan National Parks Committee in 1935, that was attended by the bureaucrats, the local intellectuals, and Tamura. Finally, the Taiwan Colonial Government designated three Taiwanese national parks in 1937: The Tatun National Park*,* which was located in the northern area of Taipei city and which became the smallest national park in Japan; The Tsugitaka-Taroko National Park*,* which was located in the east area of Taiwan island and which became the largest national park in Japan; and The Nitaka-Arisan National Park, which was located almost in the center of Taiwan island and which contained the highest mountain in Japan[3] (see Figure 1).

Thus, the selection process of Taiwanese national parks was basically executed by resources from the *Nai-chi*; *Nai-chi* ideas, *Nai-chi* ways, and *Nai-chi* personnel. However, because the selection was made under unique circumstances, an opportunity occurred which was discussion about Taiwanese national parks among the local intellectuals living in Taiwan, the bureaucrats of the Taiwan Colonial Government, and Tsuyoshi Tamura. This was the first meeting of the Taiwan National Park Committee and took place in 1936.

III. The Arguments at the first meeting of the Taiwan National Parks Committee in 1936[4]

On February 3, 1936, the first meeting of the Taiwan National Parks Committee was held with the chief of the Taiwan colonial government, 14 bureaucrats of the government, 15 local intellectuals, and Tamura.

First, the chief of the government explained that by protecting and developing natural landscapes, the national parks could serve two purposes, namely, training the minds and bodies of Japanese subjects and attracting foreign visitors so as to repay the international debt.

The bureaucrats nominated three candidate national park areas, called Tatun, Tsugitaka-Taroko, and Nitaka[5], which had been previously selected at the second meeting of the National Parks Investigative Board in 1934. One bureaucrat said that the selection standard in

Fig. 1   Location map of main cities, the Taiwan National Parks, and the Eight Landscapes in Taiwan

Nai-chi was applied to Taiwan, meaning that natural and grand landscapes which symbolized the great Japanese Empire were selected to flaunt Japanese superiority and to have the charm which could attract tourists from all over the world. However, I notice these areas had something in common, that is, only mountain landscapes were selected.

Nine years before, the Taiwan Daily Newspaper Publishing Company (*Taiwan Nichi Nichi shin-po*) conducted a popularity contest of 'The Eight Landscapes of Taiwan'. These were the Hsu Hill (*Asahigaoka*), the Tamsui (*Tansui*), the Pahsien Mountain (*Hassenzan*), the Sun Moon Lake (*Nichigetsutan*), the Ali Mountain (*Arisan*), the Shou Mountain(*Kotobuki-yama*), the Oluanpi (*Garanpi*), and two more special holy landscapes which were the Taiwan Temple (*Taiwan gin-jya*) and the Nitaka Mountain (*Nitakayama*). Classifying these landscape types by referring to comments written by intellectuals at the time, four areas can be thought as seashore landscapes, while only three areas can be thought of as mountain landscapes (see Fig. 1). Thus, popular natural landscapes for the people living in Taiwan did not be limited mountain landscapes.

However, landscape areas above seashore were not included in Taiwanese candidate national park areas. In particular, the Oluanpi was the most popular site in the contest but was not included among the national parks during the Japanese colonial period and instead was included in the first national park called Kenting selected by the Republic of China in 1982. On the other hand, the Tatun Mountain was nominated among the candidate national park areas by the board merely for being a mountain, in spite of the fact that it was not selected in 'The Eight Landscapes of Taiwan' and was too small to call a grand landscape.

Responding to the committee's suggestions, some local intellectuals living in Taiwan stated their objections. Several intellectuals expressed their belief concerning the reduction of the number of national parks: for example, one wanted to create only one national park to express the pride of Taiwan; another believed in combining the Nitaka and the Tsughitaka-Taroko because these two were too close to each other and had similar mountain landscapes; and another believed in removing Tatun which was too small and had no qualifications as a national park. However, Tamura refuted the idea that national parks had to be selected by one regular policy in Japan, so the number of national parks in Taiwan was suitable because there were three national parks in the Kyushu Island which was about the same size as the Taiwan Island.

The other main discussion was about which landscapes had to be included in Taiwanese national parks. Ichiro Hayasaka, a professor at Taipei Imperial University and a famous paleontologist, said that the distinctive characteristic of Taiwan was found in the tropical landscapes which were seldom seen in other Japanese areas and which were important tourist sites. As a result, Taiwanese national parks had to include the southern area of Taiwan which was rich with coral reefs and tropical rain forests. However, Shohkou Kohama, a director of the Bureau of Interior of the Taiwan Colonial Department who played an important role in selecting national parks in Taiwan, said that national parks in *Nai-chi* were mostly mountain landscape areas because their use was to train the mind and body of Japanese subjects. Tamura also refuted the idea that national parks were not tourist spots. On the other hand, Hayasaka maintained that tropical landscape areas in southern Taiwan were not only tourist spots but also places to train the body. He also argued that if *Daisetsuzan* in Hokkaido was selected because of its glaciers, then Taiwanese national parks should include tropical landscapes. However, the chief of the department did not acknowledge these objections, and the initial three candidate areas were selected as national parks.

Ⅳ. Imaginative Geographies, Positionalities, and Scale Politics about the Taiwan National Parks

After the first meeting of the Taiwan National Parks Committee, many the participants and interested others contributed articles to 'The Special Number of the Taiwan National Parks' in the magazine 'The Forest in Taiwan' published in July 1936. In these articles, we can see different imaginative geographies depending on their positionalities, which were often related to scale politics.

The first article in this volume was 'The Mission of the National Parks' written by Kohama (1936). He pointed out that the Taiwanese characteristic landscapes were beautiful mountain

landscapes, which had the power to discipline the Japanese subject's aesthetic sentiment. The second article was 'The Mission of the Taiwan National Parks' written by Tamura (1936). He argued that the most important purpose of the National Parks was not to attract tourists but to train the minds and bodies of Japanese subjects by introducing them to the grand nature and involving them in it. Moreover, he emphasized that the people living on level ground in Taiwan had to go to the highlands of the Taiwan National Parks so that their minds and bodies could recuperate and so that they could develop their spirits since their minds and bodies had become weak due to the tropical climate. These two articles illustrated the main landscape, image, ideology, and logic of the Taiwan National Parks. Much of these were the same as other Japanese national parks, but tropical climate and imaginative geography made the mountains more important for the national parks in the case of Taiwan under the idea of environmental determinism.

1. Hayasaka's critique

On the other hand, Hayasaka (1936b) criticized three candidate national park areas in an article called 'The Request for the Project of the Taiwan National Parks' that appeared in the same magazine as the one referred to above. He pointed out that the selection processes of the Taiwan National Parks had to be criticized especially in terms of the tropical landscape was ignored by the bureaucrats in the Taiwan Colonial Government and by Tamura despite the earnest opinions of scientists who had majored in various specialized field in Taiwan and who had emphasized the importance of tropical landscapes which were thought as the best characteristic of Taiwan in Imperial Japan. Hayasaka also argued that the national parks had to be selected by thinking not only in terms of domestic but by thinking globally, because national parks had to attract not only Japanese people but also foreign tourists.

Three months prior to this, Hayasaka had written a more-detailed and longer paper than the article, namely 'The Request for the Project of the Taiwan National Parks' (1936a). In this paper, he expressed his belief that the most important duty of national parks was to preserve the grand nature, and he referred to the idea of national parks in the United States of America which advocated the no-destruction and the preservation of nature for people's enjoyment in the future. He then made the following points:

1)   There was almost no difference between the Tsugitaka-Taroko National Park and the Nitaka-Arisan National Park from the point of view of physical geography, geology, and botany.

2)   It was not necessary to select Tatun as a national park because there were similar and larger volcano mountain landscapes in Japan.

3)   In some of the reports by the National Parks Investigative Board and Tamura, it was frequently pointed out that botanical conditions changed from the tropical plant zone at the bottom part to the frigid plant zone at the top part in both the national parks of Tsugitaka-Taroko and Nitaka-Arisan. Hearing their opinions, I believed that they paid attention to the tropical characteristics in Taiwan and wanted to introduce these characteristics into the Taiwan National Parks. But I did not think there were real tropical landscapes in these areas. Referring to the climate classification devised by Koppen, real tropical landscapes were seen only in areas where the average monthly temperature was over 18℃. In Taiwan, these areas were only around the Hengchun (*Koushn*) Peninsula which

was south of Taitung (*Taitou*) city. Thus, it was careless of the National Parks Investigative Board to exclude real tropical landscape areas from the Taiwan National Parks. If these areas were included, the Taiwan National Parks would get a characteristic symbolic landscape under the special scales of both Imperial Japan and globally.

4) I thought that two areas must be selected in the Taiwan National Parks. The first was the main part of the areas of the Tsugitaka-Taroko and the Nitaka-Arisan. The second was the southward areas of Taiwan Island, namely real tropical landscape areas in the Hengchun Peninsula.

5) It was said that the Hengchun Peninsula area had no landscape beauty, but I thought we needed to be aware that this opinion was not so much objective as subjective. Thus, there were deviations in Tamura's or other national park specialist's view of landscape aesthetics, because they were scientists of forestry. Consequently, they did not notice real tropical landscapes in the Hengchun Peninsula and paid attention instead to tropical-like landscapes in the Tsugitaka-Taroko National Park and the Nitaka-Arisan National Park.

6) Although it was said that mountains were useful for the nourishment of the national soul, the selection process was in fact influenced by concession hunters who wanted to develop the local areas. Thus, I feel that the mountain landscapes were chosen because of secular motivations rather than holy inspirations. Why was it thought that these national parks were useful for the nourishment of the national soul?

7) It was regrettable that the areas of the Taiwan National Parks were selected by ignoring many of the physical and human scientists who lived on Taiwan Island.

Hayasaka believed that Taiwanese national parks should include tropical landscapes. As a paleontologist he believed in the conservation of nature. He also believed that in order to attract tourists, Taiwan's geographical characteristics had to be emphasized. Because these assertions relied on global and Taiwan island spatial scales, his opinion was in sync with other Taiwanese intellectuals who hoped to claim Taiwanese identity and to attract tourists. However, they were refuted and ignored by Tamura and Kohama who wanted to exalt nationalism and to produce homogenized national space. In other words, these confrontations clearly embodied scale politics.

2. Tamura and Tourism

Although Tamura denied the role of tourist attraction at the first meeting of the Taiwan National Parks Committee in 1936, in ' The Report of the Ari Mountain Landscapes' (Tamura, 1930), he discussed the importance of tourism and said the Ari Mountain which was one of the core areas of national parks in Taiwan, must become a worldwide tourist spot to attract not only Japanese but also foreigners. Moreover, in ' The Landscape of Taiwan' (Tamura, 1928), which was an essay of his first trip to Taiwan in 1928, he imagined, as a tourist, that Taiwan resembled Hawaii which he thought was a southern paradise, and said Taiwanese plants were similarly tropical. As Hayasaka pointed out, Tamura paid attention to tropical plants in the Ari Mountain without going to the Hengchun Peninsula.

Tourism was important not only for Japanese intellectuals living in Taiwan and local people living near the parks, but also for Tamura and the bureaucrats, because it allowed national parks to become involved in the context of capitalism. However, the cultural aspect of Tourism created their different attitudes toward it. For many tourists, tropical landscapes are a symbol of

other attractive places. Consequently, this created some problems for national park planners especially in their attempts to exalt nationalism. For Tamura and other modern Japanese landscape theorists, mountains were suitable for Japanese landscapes, because they thought of them as a holistic zone, the point of overlooking others, and the centrality of nationalism. Tropical landscapes were the 'other' compared to Japanese landscapes because they evoked the imaginative geographies of the 'South' which had a tendency towards place-myth making, not only of paradise but also of barbarous and primitive humankind's world, as seen in the discussions of Orientalism.

At first, Tamura pointed out the dual aspects of the landscapes of the Taiwan National Parks, that is, mountain landscapes as a symbol of Japanese landscapes and tropical landscapes as a characteristics of Taiwan landscapes. In other words, for Tamura, the Taiwan National Parks were hybrid spaces, which included both home and other place. However, Tamura gradually had to emphasize the importance of the mountain, because local intellectuals were paid attention to tropical landscape areas did not have mountain landscapes. Thus, he had to deny the importance of tourism, to exclude real tropical landscapes as other space of Imperial Japan.

For Tamura, tourism became the key in disrupting the consistency in his argument, as it brought otherness to national parks in Taiwan. Moreover, it broke the national spatial scale, because it did not rely on a specific spatial scale. Tourism was concerned not only with nationalistic authenticity and capitalism but also with otherness and political conflicts, because it was the space 'in-between'.

V. Conclusion

In my conclusion, I would like to make two points. First of all, by studying the case of Taiwanese national parks, it becomes clear that modern Japanese national parks were selected in mountains to exalt nationalism. Moreover, it becomes evident that national parks were very useful for colonial policy Japanalizing people's minds and bodies in Taiwan. Secondly, I find that tourism, local identities, and the conservation of nature were often made light of in selecting national parks in modern Japan, because these aspects went against the logic of Japanese national parks which were aimed at the production of exclusive homogeneity of national scale and national authenticity, by inviting otherness such as tropical landscapes to the home and complicating spatial scales.

Note
1) Taiwanese national parks were also unique in the sense that they were the only national parks made in the Japanese colonies.
2) '*Nai-chi*' literally means 'inner-land'.
3) Tatun was the name of a volcano. Tsugitaka was the name of the second highest mountain in Japan, and Taroko was a famous valley. Nitaka was the name of the highest mountain in Japan, and Arisan was famous as a mountain tourist spot and a view point to look up to Nitaka mountain.
4) The following arguments were presented in the Taiwan National Parks Committee (1936).
5) In the beginning, Nitaka-Arisan was only called Nitaka.

References

Hayasaka, I. (1936a): 'Taiwan no Kokuritsh Koen [The National Parks in Taiwan].' *Taiwan Hakubutshu Gakkai Kaiho [The Transactions of the Academic Meeting of Natural History in Taiwan]* 26(151): 182-189.

Hayasaka, I. (1936b): 'Taiwan no Kokuritsh Koen Ghigyou ni Thai shuru Kibou [The Request for the Project of the Taiwan National Parks].' *Taiwan no Sanrin [The Forest in Taiwan]* 123:224-231.

Kohama, S. (1936): 'Kokuritsh Koen no Shimei [The Mission of the National Parks].' *Taiwan no Sanrin [The Forest in Taiwan]* 123:2-5.

Shiga, S. (1894): *Nihon Fuukei Ron [The theory of Japanese Landscape]*. Sei-Kyo Publisher, Tokyo, Japan.

Taiwan Kokuritsh Koen Iinkai [The Taiwan National Parks Committee] (1936): *Dai Ikkai Taiwan Kokuritsh Koen Iinkai Gijirokh [The Record of the Proceedings of the First meeting of the Taiwan National Parks Committee]*. Taiwan Kokuritsh Koen Iinkai, Taiwan, Japan.

Tamura, T. (1928): *Taiwan no Fuukei [Landscapes of Taiwan]*. Yuuzan Kaku Publisher, Tokyo, Japan.

Tamura, T. (1930): *Arisan Fuukei Cyosa sho [The Report of the Ari mountain Landscapes]*. Taiwan Sotokufu Eirin Kyoku, Taiwan, Japan.

Tamura, T. (1936): 'Taiwan Kokuritsh Koen no Shimei [The Mission of the Taiwan National Parks].' *Taiwan no Sanrin [The Forest in Taiwan]* 123:6-8.

Representation of Local History:
The Case of the Onondaga Historical Association in Syracuse, New York

Tamami Fukuda[*]

I. Introduction

Present-day American society is strongly attached to the past. There are a number of constant visitors at Arlington National Cemetery and the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D.C., and such open-air history museums as Colonial Williamsburg and Greenfield Village are now some of the major tourist attractions. We also see a lot of enthusiasts of the Civil War who are eager to enact past battles as well as to research the war itself. In cities, gentrification is made through the preservation and application of abandoned historic buildings, while in the suburbs the number of shopping malls with historical theme is increasing[1]. In addition to the built environment, other popular media-magazines, television and the internet- are filled with historical themes. We, without being conscious of academic history, meet and consume the past in contemporary societies (Glassberg 2001).

On the other hand, the memory of the past is sometimes controversial in the political arena. While the memory of the past has been strongly connected to the formation and reinforcement of the imagined communities (Anderson 1991) of nations, the past that was never told under the History, namely the official history, began to become visible. Minorities including black and aboriginal people, women, gays and other ethnic groups claimed their rights to represent the past and culture by themselves and as their own[2]. Historians were also affected by the civil rights movement, the anti-war movement and feminism, and advocated a new history and began to involve themselves in people's memory and its practical use in society. Consequently the exhibitions and practices in museums changed. The point to be discussed is not only what to display and how to express it, but also who can value it.

Over a few decades, a considerable number of studies have been done that interpret the museum as a social construction[3]. Though their research subjects and authors' positions are different from each other, all discuss the specific practices of the museum in socio-political contexts. They have reconsidered the practices of collecting materials, ordering them in the knowledge system and making visual expressions through displaying them. In *the Birth of the Museum* (Bennett 1995), Tony Bennett made it clear in his illustration of museum history that the modern museums linked to scientific rationality played a critical role as a means for public enlightenment. That does not mean the universal knowledge prevailed evenly throughout the whole of society through this device. On the contrary, it caused a definite distinction between

[*] Osaka Prefecture University, JAPAN   tamami@hs.cias.osakafu-u.ac.jp

the elite as a creator and manager of knowledge and the public as disciplined. Moreover, Donna Haraway's interpretation of the American Museum of Natural History revealed that messages in the museum were never neutral (Haraway 1984). She interpreted the Museum's Roosevelt Memorial and the African Hall, and insisted that the specific museum practices embodied in the idea called " Teddy Bear Patriarchy", saying " all (public activities in the museum were) dedicated to preserving a threatened manhood. They were exhibition, eugenics, and conservation. Exhibition has been described here at great length: it was a practice to produce permanence, to arrest decay. Eugenics was a movement to preserve hereditary stock, to assure racial purity, and to prevent racial suicide. Conservation was a policy to preserve resources, not only for industry, but also for moral formation, for the achievement of manhood" (Haraway 1984). Her analysis disclosed the masculine thought that "Truth, Knowledge, Vision", the words as a confession of the faith to the universal knowledge in the Hall, were based on, and the dichotomy of the West/non-West represented the pseudo-paternal relationship between Teddy (and white men) and "primitive" Africans. Haraway is not the only author to consider the museum from the viewpoint of the West/non-West. Anthropologists like Michael Ames (1992) and James Clifford (1988) critically questioned the relations between Western anthropologists and non-Western societies as investigated from the point of view of representation of others.

A series of these works, though they have been criticized because they failed to interpret the museums as dynamic media including the different experiences of visitors[4], have brilliantly demonstrated that the museum is a site where various theories socially and culturally embodied are developed. The museum is reflected by the dominant ideology. The fruit of their works should be applied to the daily practices in the museum. Above all in contemporary societies where people are struggling to manage and represent "our" past for "ourselves" and by "ourselves", it is essential to consider how the collective self-image is expressed in the museum. Who are "we"? In what was context the frame of "us" formed? Who is "not-we", the other side of "we"? Much attention should be given to the interdependence of the creation and reinforcement of a group's identity and the image of the past.

In this essay, I will discuss a display of American historical societies, a kind of museum that flourished at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, American museums experienced a great development. First, the alternation from amateurism to professionalism occurred in this country. As the modern sciences developed, natural history museums in particular were professionalized. Second, as academic disciplines were established, museums were divided into various specialties. Natural history museum, art museum, and history museum were established with different knowledge systems. This professionalization of the museum influenced historical societies that had been founded on the continent in the late eighteenth century. Originally, historical societies were not established as exhibition space. Early people were anxious for these societies, because historic documents and materials were on the verge of being to be scattered and lost, and there were few research libraries to preserve and open them to the public in the early nineteenth century (Dunlap 1944). At the same time, historical societies had an important purpose to spread historic knowledge to the people through lectures and exhibitions. According to the history of the museum described by Bennett (1995), historical societies have played a role as an institution

where the public was imbued with a standard and moral in the elite society. Compared with European museums, American museums have focused their attention upon social education, and scholars such as George Brown Goode, John Cotton Dana, and Theodore Low have developed theories emphasizing educational practices taking the side of the museum. We find such a characteristic not only in great museums at a national level, which Haraway discussed in her essay, but also in local institutions such as historical museums and historical societies. Japanese scholars, Gentaro Tanahashi (1930; 1932) and Kinjiro Mori (1932), who visited advanced museums in the West in the early twentieth century, admired and reported that American museums worked for the general public while European ones did not.

Now we have to consider carefully what these museums thought would serve the general public in those days. For the museum is connected with the predominant scientific and socio-political ideas at that time. In this essay, I will focus my attention upon these thoughts produced through important specific practices in the museum, the practices to collect, classify and exhibit materials. Careful interpretation of these practices may make it clear how people order space and human society under the banner of "for the people". This essay deals with a case of the Onondaga Historical Association (OHA) founded in 1862 in Syracuse, New York State. After looking at the documents about the association, I became fascinated by the early OHA members' ambivalent attitude toward local history. Their attitude was both patriotic and scientific. On one hand, it was filled with an unsophisticated and innocent sense of attachment to things of the past, but on the other hand it showed strong intention toward rigidly scientific classification. I noticed they showed such an ambivalent attitude toward different objects and different kinds of people. The questions are who showed such an ambivalent attitude and toward did they show it, in other words, who told local history and to whom did they tell it: who were "we", telling and creating local history? Who were the outsiders? To record and represent regional and local history means to create "ourselves" who share these senses and knowledge. This specific practice in the museum was also intertwined with the building of the modern city.

II. The Onondaga Historical Association and its development

The Onondaga Historical Association (OHA) is a private organization founded in 1862 in Syracuse in order to study and preserve the historic materials in Onondaga County and to promote the people's historical knowledge. The city of Syracuse, a center in the County, was making remarkable development as an industrial city at that time. In 1860, the population in Syracuse was 28,119 and 90,686 in the whole county[5].

Originally, the land around Onondaga belonged to the Iroquois, the confederacy of American Indian groups[6]. Natural resources of salt and furs attracted the white settlers during the early stage of history. After the Revolutionary War when many Indian groups sided with the British, they were deprived of their land and driven into the reservations, and white settlement in this area expanded rapidly. The white settlers developed salt making as one of the principal industries, the ancient Indian trails turned into new roads, and consequently the settlement expanded westward. However, it was not until the Erie Canal was opened to traffic that Syracuse started real development as a town. The construction of the Erie Canal, connecting the Hudson

River and Lake Erie, started in 1817 and was completed in 1825. Two years later the Oswego Canal, a branch canal from Syracuse to Lake Ontario, was opened. The construction of the canals drew a lot of engineers and laborers into Syracuse. The railroad came after the canal. The railroad reached Syracuse in 1839, and its network kept expanding. The golden age of railroad transportation was from the 1860s to the 1920s. With the development of the transportation network, new industries such as chemical, typewriter, bicycle, brewery and ceramic industries sprung up in this town, and the new immigrants from Europe became inevitable labor for these industries.

In this growing industrial city, some of those who were collecting and researching historic materials by themselves were actively catching up with the leading historical societies in the United States and organize their own society[7]. Before the OHA was founded, more than sixty historical societies existed including the Massachusetts Historical Society established in 1798. In January, 1862, six men assembled at the first meeting in order to establish a new society. First, they confirmed the fundamental ideas that the land of Onondaga was historically significant and that they needed an institution to record and preserve historical materials in the county. They had several meetings after the first one, and consequently eight directors were elected and the OHA went into operation. The following year, the charter was secured from the State legislature and secured rooms to manage the OHA, collect the materials, and exhibit them to the public. A publication in 1865 (OHA 1865) indicated that they possessed these things and that they were opened to the public. There were, for example, journals, a hundred volumes of bound newspapers that were both weeklies and popular city dailies, an entire file of *New York Spectator*[8], about two hundred statistical, scientific and historical books, old maps, leaflets, and both official and private letters. Among them, early members were proud that they acquired a rare book, *History of England*, which not all libraries even in the United Kingdom had. In addition to printings, they collected and exhibited more than two thousand kinds of geological specimens, the collections of shells and corals that they bought from collectors, paintings, curios and antiques, old coins, historic materials on the Civil War, and aboriginal materials. The rooms of the OHA looked like a small library and a primitive museum. The institution, which stored materials from ancient history before the white immigrants to the recent events of the Civil War, may look like an unusual mixture to us. These characteristics, namely that the spatial and temporal scale was obscure and that natural history including geology, anthropology and archaeology was stressed, were common to early historical societies (Dunlap 1944).

The OHA began to invite more citizens, especially "the leading professional and business men of the growing city" (OHA1895) to their activities as well as to study and preserve local history. However the OHA could not continue operating profitably and as a result stopped opening the exhibition rooms and the library to the public in 1871. Since that time, annual meetings have been held only for the election of directors. The association for historical research disappeared from the public eyes.

It was in the 1890s when the OHA revived. Indeed it became more active and flowered. First it organized the Historical Club, which strongly promoted the historical study and learning. In addition, it started planning a commemoration of the Onondaga Centennial in 1894. The OHA and its members were deeply involved in the centennial commemoration and

demonstrated their leadership as much as they did in the local economic and political lives. They organized a historical pageant, one of the main events, which was based on the history of Onondaga (the Onondaga Historical Society 1894). That pageant included the following scenes: beginning with "the legend of Hiawatha", namely the formation of the Iroquois League in 1414, through the "Jesuit mission" in the middle of the seventeenth century, the pioneer's camp and salt boiling in the 1780s, a country store in the early days, "the quilting party" filled with old music and dancing, the arrival of General LaFayette in 1825, a scene from school in the1840s, "Jerry Rescue[9]" in 1851, the fire at the Wieting Block in 1856, and ending with the Civil War. This pageant was seen as a form of entertainment, but it helped people have an image of local history. The pageant's story both reflected and shaped public historical imagery. In other words, the OHA did play a crucial role in forming the public imagery[10]. In addition to the historical pageant, the ceremony of the Onondaga Centennial was held under the auspices of the association at the Armory on June 6, 1894. The OHA President, William Kirkpatrick, presided at the ceremony. A loan exhibition was also held at the Centennial. More than nine hundred artifacts were sent to the exhibition mainly from local people. According to a pamphlet of the exhibition, the exhibition was arranged and collected under the supervision of the Loan Exhibition Committee, which was different from the OHA. In fact, the committee members were different from the OHA officers. However, a local newspaper reported, "many priceless relics exhibited by the Historical Society[11]". Though the relationship between the OHA and the Loan Exhibition Committee is a point to investigate in detail, it can be assumed that both overlapped or that people at those days thought of the committee as a part of the OHA.

The OHA was successful in directing the centennial commemoration of Onondaga County through focusing on dramatic episodes and attracting public attention to local history. We can find many examples in American societies in the turn of the century. As Glassberg (1990) examined in his study on American historical pageantry, history played a crucial role for town's commemorations, and these media such as museums, monuments, murals and pageantry contributed to creating the imagery of "common" history. After the centennial, the OHA became more active. In 1894, rooms for regular meetings and a museum were secured in the Saving Bank building. In 1896, it began to publish a serial publication, *Local History Leaflet*, which included historical research reports presented at its regular meetings. William Beauchamp, a director of the Association, an Episcopal clergyman and a scientist and archaeologist for the New York State Museum, was one of the most active authors. He and others discussed early Onondaga history, Indian and archaeological relics, geology, and earlier literature written by scientists and historians who had visited and studied about Onondaga. Additionally, in the same year, the OHA started the observance of Pioneer Day, annual events signalized by trips of the members to historic spots. In 1897, the OHA took the initiative and carried out the celebration of the semi-centennial of the incorporation of Syracuse.

Consequently, during its peak period, the OHA moved its office again, and obtained its permanent home building. It purchased a five-story building at Montgomery Street with the funds bequeathed by William Kirkpatrick, a salt industry pioneer and an ex-president of the Association. This is the first building in Onondaga County devoted exclusively to historical purposes, consisting of an office, library, museum, and assembly room. This has been the basis

of historical activities in the Association until the present.

III. Classifying materials and ordering spaces

Let's begin with what kind of materials the OHA possessed and how it displayed them in that building. Here I will examine an OHA publication *Catalogue of portraits, relics, historic objects, maps, etc., in historical building, Syracuse, New York* (OHA 1911). It consists of an entire list of the items stored and displayed in that building. The association also published another catalogue of museum items in 1930 (OHA 1930). It is a mere list of historical objects, portraits and relics from no.1 to no.1000. Examining the catalogue of 1930 allows us to get an idea of when and what items were collected. However the catalogue of 1911 was more than a list. It showed in detail where the items were exhibited. That is, it specified in which room the items were exhibited, in which case and with what items they were displayed together, and whether they were hung on the wall or not. In other words, it showed us how the OHA arranged these things.

The following is a layout of this building: the first floor for administration office and galleries, the second floor for assembly room and galleries, the third floor for library and a kind of memorial room called the "Kirkpatrick Room", and the fourth and fifth floors for the museum. This catalogue did not show how these spaces were used, but it may be natural to think that rooms on the lower floors, due to ease of accessibility, were used more frequently. Because the description in the catalogue starts from the first floor, such an order is related to the order when the association explained the purposes of its activities. The Association thought it had to promote general interest in historical work first "by holding occasional meetings devoted to suitable topics" and second "by keeping open a place for the exhibition of articles of historic value"(OHA 1895). The purposes of the association follows with that order: to increase general interest, to assist the study of local history, to mark historic spots within the county, to collect and preserve Indian heritage, to preserve the materials under the destruction, and to publish.

Now let us start from the first floor as if we were a visitor to the OHA building in the early twentieth century. When we enter a gallery on the first floor, we would see a number of paintings. Most of them are portraits donated by family members and relatives. Among fifty-two paintings, thirty-two are white, local and male portraits. Portraits of business leaders in the county are especially remarkable. These men are all leaders in the growing town of Syracuse. By contrast, only ten are women's portraits and all women are wives or daughters of the painted men. Women were never painted for their own achievement. On the second floor, we would see additional paintings. White, male, local celebrities, again. We would see twenty-two portraits of business leaders, fourteen of politicians, and seven of soldiers. No portrait of the Iroquois is displayed here. The second floor was used as an assembly room, so we can easily imagine that the attendance at historical meetings was welcomed by these portraits, the portraits of male leaders. While they listened to lectures on local history, they must have felt as if these men created the history of Syracuse and Onondaga. The third floor is a space to memorialize the Kirkpatricks. In the Kirkpatrick Room, we would see a dozen paintings of their family members and decorative furniture and utensils. A library is also tied to the Kirkpatricks. All items including twenty-nine paintings, though more than seventy percent are landscape paintings, written

documents and utensils, belonged to William Kirkpatrick and he donated them after his death.

The fourth floor is for the museum. We would see an old-fashioned but common image of a museum, where there are several cases and cabinets along the walls and at the center of the rooms. It is an image of a museum which is filled with countless artifacts and has an orderly arrangement of things. Here by the wall paintings and historical documents are hung. These paintings include the portraits of male leaders but the number is not necessarily large. We could also see paintings of historical figures from outside Onondaga County, portraits of the Iroquois and landscape paintings. The number of the Iroquois portraits is not so large, but larger than in the galleries and library on the lower floors. The things related to the Iroquois are not only paintings but also various tools they used. In addition to the utensils and implements used by white families, the Iroquois tools are displayed by the wall. The other characteristic is to have written documents of various historical themes, including wars, science, education, development of land, industry and events concerned with black people. Looking at the items by the wall, we would see a series of past events, ordered randomly, from the remote past to the immediate past, from the past before human beings or the past before the white settlement to yesterday.

Seven cases and two cabinets are also filled with objects, which exemplify the history, living and physical environment of Onondaga. Each case has a specific theme. There are three cases and two cabinets for tools and utensils used by white families, a case for the items from wars such as the Civil Wars, two cases for coral and shells, and a case storing tools used by the Iroquois- whether past or present-, archaeological materials- whether in the United States, in Rome, in Egypt or in other places-, and natural specimens. The combination that we can see in the last case is not unintentional, but reflects the scientific knowledge at that time, namely the knowledge common to the great museums of natural history.

Let us go up to the top floor. The list about this floor is extremely short. There are geological specimens and other natural history specimens. In addition to them, there are a few items which are too big to store in the museum cases in the lower floors. Lastly let us look at the exhibition or decoration in the stairway and hall. For example, there are the Declaration of Independence, Constitution of the United States, lists (or portraits) of American statesmen, and botanical and animal charts. When we go upstairs and downstairs, we meet a wider world of a nation and the evolution of lives.

The examination of the catalogue in 1911 enables us not only to imagine the early OHA museum was but also to consider how it classified museum materials and ordered spaces. The classification and exhibition of materials reflect the way in which the people understood the world. Classifying and ordering things is also significant in the history of museum. That practice separates modern museums from pre-modern ones known as "cabinets of curiosities", and has a close connection to the knowledge of modern science. As a matter of course, modern scientific knowledge is neither neutral nor universal. Thought it insists upon its universality, it is connected to the predominant ideology to control the whole of knowledge. In those days, which ideas made and supported the arrangement of materials and spaces in the OHA? There are two key points to discuss relating to that question.

First, one of the important features can be interpreted from the division between a gallery and a museum. In spite of the fact that both were serving as an exhibition space, why

were they named differently and how differently were they situated? We shall focus our attention upon what was displayed in these spaces in detail. What the association displayed in the galleries were mainly the portraits. These paintings were evaluated not as fine art drawn by well-known painters, but because of the figure painted on the canvas. Generally painted figures were, as mentioned above, local white men. Needless to say, they were celebrities in Onondaga, who played an important part in developing the growing town of Syracuse. Originally, they were painted to memorialize their splendid family members. Through the portraits, family members recognized and shared a sense of their brilliant family history, and reconfirmed their family roots. When these portraits were donated to the OHA by their family members and descendants, and opened to the public, another meaning was added to them in the galleries. Being displayed together, portraits from several families provoked a sense of history of Onondaga as well as their own family roots. In other words, through the media of the portraits, people shared a sense of themselves. The close tie within each family expanded to all of the society.

On the other hand, the items in the museum were evaluated and displayed in different ways from the portraits in the galleries. They were seen as objectively artifacts through the cases and cabinets. What they invoked in us was neither a human relation nor a sense of ourselves, but they conveyed a historical and scientific "fact". Though each artifact might convey some message to us, it is always combined with others and forms a group. Here grouping and classifying items are critical. According to Conn (1998), "the cases forced the visitor to stare at objects and to consider them first on their own terms and then in relation to neighboring objects". In the gallery, each portrait gave visitors the information about the painted figures and made them consider a history constructed by the painted celebrities. To the contrary, in the museum, things were divided into cases and cabinets, and they conveyed messages as a group. Here the most significant are events, facts and thoughts interpreted through the objects themselves and the contexts. These messages were strongly influenced by the scientific perspective at that time.

Comparison of display made a clear distinction between the space focusing on the figure and its social position and the space focusing on materials, that is, the contrast between the inter-subjective space where people can feel a sense of themselves and the objective space where people meet the fruit of scientific classification and research. That contraposition also works well in ordering the people. I will return to this in the next section. Before that, let us explore the glass cases in the museum in detail. That is the second point to consider in the arrangement of materials and spaces.

We can see four types in the exhibit cases on the fourth floor. Here I take the two remarkable types among them. The first is the one that consists of only natural specimens. Two cases in seven fall into this category. Including the collections of geological and natural specimens on the fifth floor, these natural specimens had been centered in American museum scenes since the dawn of the modern museum. A remarkable early example was Peale's Museum founded in Philadelphia in the late eighteenth century. It made admirable effort to present the world in an orderly fashion (Conn 1998). Charles Wilson Peale intended to show how important the knowledge of natural history was to every class of citizen, and to express the harmonious world of natural artifacts (Orosz 1990). It did embody the thought of what Michel Foucault

referred as "total history", that is, the thought that continuity and origin were principles. The "total history" is "one that seeks to reconstitute the overall form of a civilization, the principle- material or spiritual- of a society, the significance common to all the phenomena of a period, the law that accounts for their cohesion- what is called metaphorically the 'face' of a period" (Foucault 1972). The world expressed there is never limited to the harmonious nature. It represents an ideal society. For more than a hundred years afterwards, natural history supported by numerous expeditions and fieldwork has been leading American sciences. Natural history, the museum that collected and exhibited natural specimens, and the American national identity were closely linked throughout the nineteenth century. It was not an accident that the Theodore Memorial Hall is in the American Museum of Natural History. Considering the social context concerning the collection and exhibition of natural specimens, it is natural that geology and natural sciences played an important part in the OHA since its foundation. To understand the harmonious nature and the earth meant to lay the foundation to develop the town – to develop the natural resources and to improve social morality.

Another type is a case consisting of ethnological and archaeological materials. To be interesting, these materials were stored with natural specimens and arranged without a historical order. In this case, the flow of time never existed. Whether ancient remains or contemporary Iroquois tools, they were arranged together. Wasn't the Iroquois the contemporary existence? An early OHA document made a straightforward expression about the antiquarian attitude toward the aboriginal relics. "The Council-fires of the Six-Nations which burned so brightly at Onondaga, before the white man had commenced his inroads upon the settlements and home of the Indian, have gone out: but traces of the prowess and spirit of their noble Chieftains still linger around the places made memorable by the bravery of their warriors"(OHA 1865). The early OHA members collected and recorded the aboriginal relics and remains as if they were endangered species. In other words, the study about the Iroquois was not historical research, but rather scientific research to reconstruct the development of the human race, indicating progressive development and rich diversity. For white settlers, the Iroquois were part of the harmonious nature, where they were building the towns as their home. Thus it is natural that the Iroquois artifacts and the historical materials about the white settlers were classified and arranged quite differently. The latter represented "history", the former "geography". The latter represented developing human society: the former represented the earth where the white settlers made developments.

IV. Ordering the people

"We" and "not-we"

Classifying and arranging things orderly is linked to ordering the people in relation to these materials. How were the people ordered and who classified the people? That is the question about who represented a growing region and about who was responsible for telling a story of local history. At the same time, that is the practice of making a clear distinction between "we" and "not-we".

We shall return to the portraits displayed in galleries in the OHA (Table 1). More than

eighty percent of the painted figures are local white men. In terms of their occupation, businessmen, politicians and soldiers hold a majority. Though we should be careful since each person may fall into several categories at the same time or throughout the course of his life, it is clear that influential men, who were on the stage of developing town and industry were memorialized. The history represented through these portraits was of a brilliant past.

Table.1 Figures Painted in Portraits

Category	Number of Portraits (%)
Local/White/Male	**96 (82.8)**
Businessman	29 (25.0)
Politician	15 (12.9)
Serviceman	9 (7.8)
Educator & Scholar	6 (5.2)
Medical Doctor	5 (4.3)
Religionist	5 (4.3)
Early Settler	5 (4.3)
Journalist	4 (3.4)
Engineer	1 (0.9)
Artist	1 (0.9)
Others	16 (13.8)
Local/White/Female	**14 (12.1)**
The Iroquois	**1 (0.9)**
Historical Figure	**5 (4.3)**

Source: OHA (1991)

Who, then, reconstructed such a sense of region and history? Shift our focus to the directors of the OHA. Compare the members of the board in three different years: the year of the establishment of the OHA in 1862, the year just after the Onondaga Centennial, and the time when the list of items was made in 1911. There is a remarkable difference between the earliest members and the others, namely whether a woman was on the board or not. In 1862, there was no female director on the board, while there were some later. However there is a common point among the members of these three years. The members necessarily included leaders of the key industries in those days. While two of them were involved in the salt industry in the 1860s, some worked for the chemical industry at the end of the century. The OHA has been deeply connected to the core society and economy in the developing industrial town.

Those who were leaders in the growing town attempted to record and preserve the splendid past represented by the figures of the portraits as their own history. In spite of the OHA's aim to increase the people's historical knowledge through the pageantry in the Onondaga Centennial and the daily activities including exhibition and lectures, the representation of the past and of the region was exclusive to the bourgeoisie. Demographic records by occupation in 1900 proved that the OHA members were a handful of people in society. For many people who were factory laborers, and domestic service persons such as janitors, new immigrants and black people[12], their pasts were never like the ones represented in the OHA. Here, "our" past and

region were expressed by a handful of "our" people. By sharing "our" local history, a definite distinction between "we" and "not-we" was made and reinforced. Others were always infused with the history of influential men. They never told their own histories at that time.

Men and women

Several women were painted in the portraits and there were female directors in the association. Besides, household utensils, which belonged to the private sphere, were collected and displayed there. Though these facts may make us think women fully participated in the specific practices to reconstruct local history in the OHA, they do not prove that the self-image formed through the OHA always included women in those days. Firstly, we should pay attention to the fact, as I mentioned above, that women were painted not for their own achievement but for the great achievement or the social position of their husband and father. Secondly, we should carefully consider the fact that women participated in historic preservation and historical societies in those days. That is a characteristic of the period and we see several examples that patriotic women's associations were deeply involved in preservation of historic buildings[13]. That is not irrelevant to the fact that a number of women entered the field of education. In the United States where the museum began to develop as an institution for social education, it is natural that women were thought of as essential for the educational parts of museums and historical societies. However what I stress here is not whether women were included in the association's activities, but who was responsible for the reconstruction of local history and the making of "ourselves". To go right to the point, women were included to tell "official" local history which only men could reconstruct and which was represented through the portraits of celebrities.

How can we understand a number of household utensils displayed in the museum, then? It could be said that these things were connected with the private sphere, while the portraits represented the political, social, and economic development in the public sphere. It would be difficult to contradict this assertion if we just focus upon the materials within the OHA. Putting this case in the wider context of how domestic things were evaluated, further interpretation can be made. In her book on house museums, Patricia West (1999) pointed out that "the cult of domesticity" spread throughout the country after the Civil War. She remarked that "civic virtue had been understood to have been based on the republican independent household" (West 1999) and white men admired a symbolic home, not a real home. She added that the domestic environment recreated in house museums sometimes memorialized a mythologized white male politician. From this point of view, the household utensils displayed in the OHA were linked to the idea of the "cult of domesticity", though they were not necessarily related to specific male figures. In other words, these materials were symbolized through men's desire toward the domestic. It reminded us that Gillian Rose made a definite distinction between women and Women, that is, women as living in a real world and Women imagined through men's gazes (Rose 1993). After all, in the reconstruction of Onondaga local history, women who looked involved in making "ourselves" told men's history and region. Women never told their own stories.

Masters of history and objects for science

In the previous section, I compared two kinds of space -gallery and museum. The former is an inter-subjective space where people shared their past, and the latter is a scientific space where people see things as research objects. It is possible to say they are a space for the history of white immigrants and a space for natural science about the earth and aboriginal people. It is also possible to contrast "we" as masters of history with "they" as research objects.

Such a contrast was often pictured at the turn of the previous century. Glassberg (1990) showed us several pageantry posters with this contrast in the early twentieth century. Here in Onondaga, such an image was made for the Centennial cerebration, which the OHA was deeply involved in. This is a picture in which an Iroquois man traditionally clothed is staring at the modern town of Syracuse from the outside. It is clear that he is outside of the town and the civilization. In other words, he is expressed as an outsider behind the times. His clothing emphasizes his position. At the end of the nineteenth century the way of living of the Iroquois was rather westernized and they wore their "traditional" cloths only for special occasions. It is not only this picture that depicts the Indian people as behind the times. The OHA exhibition also showed that the Indian materials were displayed much differently from the ones concerning white immigrants, ignoring the current of the times. While "we", the white settlers were the masters of history and development, "they", the Indian people were considered as being equivalent to nature and the earth. For the white people, "they" were closely linked to the land, which the white had invaded and exploited. Moreover, the white settlers required "their" existence related with the earth in order to reconstruct "our own history" in the frontiers, to make "home land" of the frontiers. "Their" existence also symbolized the harmonious world of nature as I have already discussed. "They" played a role as the ideal for the white American society, which on the one hand, was developing rapidly, and which on the other hand was becoming chaotic and disharmonious.

V. Conclusion

The ambivalent attitude toward local history, which I felt when I saw the museum catalogue (OHA 1911), stemmed not only from the mechanical classification of materials, but also from the formation of the selves. At the same time, it originated in the historical and scientific views predominant in American society in those days. This ambivalence was formed socio-politically, and to be more exact, it was supported by the scientific knowledge under the banner of neutrality and universality. The practice of classifying materials has been mechanically sophisticated and kept as one of the basic activities in the museum since then. Rather, continuity makes the practice of classifying and managing the materials possible.

However, where are the ideologies going, which were predominant when people began to scientifically order the things in museums? In recent years, the museum became a site for the argument over the representation of selves, and its display and activities have changed drastically. That happened because "scientific knowledge", the key principle in museums, was contested in the social and political context. That also happened because the historical and scientific views that I found in the catalogue of the OHA have been kept in the society. On the other hand, part of such an ideology remains undoubtedly in the contemporary society through the

commemoration of cities and nations and historical entertainment as well as museums and books.

The OHA moved its permanent exhibition to the neighboring building and opened a new exhibition focusing on the region and the people in 1983. In 2001, it added a small exhibition to it. The new exhibition addresses us. "History happens everyday, and our community's heritage is made by everyone who lives here. OHA is proud to present this changing exhibit area for organizations in our community to share their heritage and perspectives". The OHA and its exhibition are in the middle of negotiations over the presentation of the selves. The definition of "ourselves" is oscillating under multiculturalism at all times. When the tough and never-ending negotiation reaches the back stage of the museum in the future, do we have a chance to re-examine the specific "scientific" practice to classify things from its foundations?

Acknowledgments

Note

1) For example, see Sorkin (1992).

2) In a recent book edited by Sandercock (1998), they discussed the relationship between urban planning and diversity of cultures and histories.

3) See, for example, Karp and Lavin (1991) and Kaplan (1994). And also refer to my review article (Fukuda 1997).

4) Macdonald and Fyfe (1996) is one of the ambitious works that goes beyond the previous researches stressing cultural politics. Among Japanese scholars, Hashimoto (1998) presented a perspective toward new museum studies.

5) The numbers were cited from The Secretary of the Interior (1864). The following regional explanation is based on the works by Thompson (1966) and Schein (1989).

6) The Indians called themselves "Houdenosaunee". The French named them the Iroquois.

7) Ancient mounds, fortifications and burial places in Onondaga County had long attracted "men of letters, engaged in the study of antiquities". They tried to collect the curiosities and antiquities in their county with pleasure and pride, and to faithfully record the past events (OHA 1865).

8) A daily commercial paper published in New York City. The forerunner began to be issued in 1797.

9) At that time, in opposition to the Fugitive Slave Law adopted in 1850, leaders of the local Abolition movement organized a local committee to thwart its enforcement. In the midst of this movement, in 1851, federal marshals arrested a man who called himself Jerry, also known as William Henry and who was working as a barrel maker in Syracuse. He was arrested under the Law. However, he was rescued by the citizens and he escaped to Canada.

10) Regarding the issue of pageants and American sense of historical imagery, see Glassberg's work (Glassberg 1990). Hoelscher also discussed pageantries in his work on the invention of Swiss ethnic place in the United States (Hoelscher 1998).

11) *Syracuse Daily Standard* (June 7,1894).

12) "Jerry Rescue" is not an exception. The event, though it was concerned with black people, has been commemorated in the context of the Abolition movement in the North.

13) Mount Vernon Ladies' Association and the San Antonio Conservation Society are examples. See West (1999) and Hosmer (1981).

References

Ames, Michael. 1992. *Cannibal tours and glass boxes: the anthropology of museums*. Vancouver: UBC Press.

Anderson, Benedict.1991. *Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*. London: Verso.

Bennett, Tony.1995. *The birth of the museum: history, theory politics*. London: Routledge.

Clifford, James.1988. *The predicament of culture: twentieth century ethnography, literature, and art*. Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press.

Conn, Steven. 1998. *Museums and American intellectual life, 1876-1926*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Dunlap, Leslie W. 1944. *American Historical Societies 1790-1860*. Madison, Wisconsin: Privately Printed.

Foucault, Michel. (Trans.by A.M.Sheridan Smith).1972.*The Archaeology of knowledge*. New York: Pantheon Books.

Fukuda, Tamami. 1997. "Chiiki o tenji suru." *Jinbun-chiri* 49(5), pp.442-464. (in Japanese with English abstract)

Fukuda, Tamami. 2002. "Hakubutsukan-siryomokuroku no mouhitotsuno yomikata. "Tokushima Hakubutsukan Kenkyukai ed. *Chiiki ni ikiru hakubutsukan*. Tokushima: Kyoikusyuppan-senta, pp.204-224. (in Japanese)

Fukuda, Tamami. 2003. " Chiiki no tenji to 'watashitachi' no seisei." Kyodo Kenkyukai ed. Kyodo*: hyosho to jissen*. Kyoto: Sagano-shoin, pp.68-86. (in Japanese)

Glassberg, David. 1990. *American historical pageantry: the uses of tradition in the early twentieth century*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.

Glassberg, David. 2001. *Sense of history: the place of the past in American Life*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press

Haraway, Donna. 1984. "Teddy bear patriarchy: taxidermy in the Garden of Eden, New York City, 1908-1936." *Social Text* 4(2), pp.20-64

Hashimoto, Hiroyuki. 1998. "Busshitsu bunka no gekijo". *Minzokugaku-kenkyu* 62, pp.537-562. (in Japanese with English abstract)

Hoelscher, Steven D.1998. *Heritage on stage: the invention of ethnic place in America's Little Switzerland*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press.

Hosmer, Charles B. Jr. 1981. *Preservation comes of age: from Williamsburg to the National Trust, 1926-1949. vol.1*. Charlottesville: The University Press of Virginia.

Kaplan,Flora E.S. ed. 1994. *Museums and the making of "ourselves"*. London: Leicester University Press

Karp, Ivan and Lavine, Steven D. eds. 1991. *Exhibiting cultures: the poetics and politics of museum display*. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press.

Macdonald, Sharon & Fyfe, Gordon eds. 1996. *Theorizing museums: representing identity and diversity in a changing world*. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell.

Mori, Kinjiro. 1932. "Kyodo-hakubutsukan." *Kyodo-shi kenkyu koza* vol.9, pp.1-56. (in Japanese)

Orosz, Joel J. 1990. *Curators and culture: the museum movement in America, 1740-1870.* Tuscaloosa, Ala.: The University of Alabama Press.

Rose, Gillian. 1993. *Feminism and geography: beyond the limit of geographical knowledge.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Sandercock, Leonie.ed.1998. *Making the invisible visible: a multicultural planning history.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Schein, Richard. 1989. *A historical geography of Central New York: patterns and processes of colonization on the New Military Tract, 1782-1820.* Ph.D dissertation, Department of geography, Syracuse University.

Sorkin, Michael. ed. 1992. *Variations on a theme park: scenes from the new American city and the end of public space.* New York: Hill and Wang.

Tanahashi, Gentaro. 1930. *Meni uttaeru kyoiku kikan.* Tokyo: Houbun-kan. (in Japanese)

Tanahashi, Gentaro. 1932. *Kyodo-hakubutsukan.* Tokyo: Toko-shoin. (in Japanese)

The Onondaga Historical Association(OHA). 1865. *The Onondaga Historical Association.* Syracuse: H.P.Winsor (Printer).

The Onondaga Historical Association(OHA).1895. *Manual of the Onondaga Historical Association.* Syracuse: E.M.Grover (Printer).

The Onondaga Historical Association (OHA). 1911. *Catalogue of portraits, relics, historic objects, maps, etc., in historical building, Syracuse, New York (Publication of the Onondaga Historical Association New Series vol.1 no.1).* Syracuse: The Onondaga Historical Association.

The Onondaga Historical Association (OHA). 1930. *Fact out of the Past: Catalogue of Historical Objects, Portraits, Relics, etc. From Nos.1-1000 in the Onondaga Historical Association Building.* Syracuse: The Onondaga Historical Association.

The Onondaga Historical Society. 1894. *Historical society entertainment.* Syracuse: The Onondaga Historical Association.

The Secretary of the Interior. 1864. *Population of the United States in 1860; compiled from the original return of the eighth census.* Washington: Government Printing Office.

Thompson, John Henry. ed.1966. *Geography of New York State.* New York: Syracuse University Press.

West, Patricia.1999.*Domesticating history: the political origins of America's house museums.* Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press.

Panopticonization towards Space and Society in Modern Japan:
A case of a coal-mining region

Kenji TSUTSUMI*

I. Introduction

In Japan the *Meiji* 明治 government had rapidly proceeded modernization policies with incredible speed. The national government had promoted industrialization, militarization, creation of traffic and urban infrastructures, preparation of educational, institutional and assembly systems, and also bureaucracy, from the *Meiji* through the *Taisho* 大正 era. The former 300 feudal spaces were then integrated into one space of the nation state of Japan. Under several institutions through, as it were, "the *panopticonized*" space, people were been watched as members or agents of one modern nation, *the Empire of Great Japan.*

Among the modern industries, we can refer to coal mining as one typical example to which the nation state was strongly committed and took an active hand. In *Takashima* 高島, *Nagasaki* 長崎 prefecture, the formation of "*Gemeinschaftliches Gesellschaft*" can be seen. It is usually peculiar to modern coal mining society, and coupled with *Takashima*'s own geographical location as a peripheral island, is becoming drastically depopulated nowadays. There had been several controls through the ages of modern imperialism, modern capitalism, and global capitalism. In addition, through mutual checks among social strata, the modern institution of "*Naya* 納屋,″ and afterwards through that of "*Tsume-sho* 詰め所,″ the daily life of the people there had been watched in some ways. The watch-system like as *panopticon* partially had, a system of mutual aids at the same time there. It is ironic that in the modernization process such as the pre-modern-like "*Gemeinschaftlich*" character of a local society, mutual aids and watching system, has lingered in a coal-mining region.

In this paper, following after the two opportunities at the International Comparative Study of Coalminers (Toronto Univ., 1996) and at the Inaugural International Conference of Critical Geography (Vancouver, 1997), the author focuses on the spatial situation of modernization in Japan with the example of *Takashima* to consider the coal mining industry and the character of the regional society.

II. Policy of the *Meiji* government and industrialization in the modern era in Japan

* Osaka University, JAPAN   tsutsumi@let.osaka-u.ac.jp

The feudal age of Japan ended in 1868, with the *Meiji* Restoration. The reign of *Tokugawa Shogun* 徳川将軍 (the *Yedo* 江戸 era: 1603-1868) closed its history of approximately 270 years. During the *Yedo* era Japan was divided into about 300 small countries. Since the *Meiji* Restoration, the national government promoted political centralization and industrial modernization. The many 300 fragmented spaces were integrated into one nation space with political and economic meaning. As for industrial modernization, I once referred to that of the tea industry through local, regional, national and global levels, with the example of *Yame* 八女 region, *Kyushu* 九州, Japan (Tsutsumi, 1996a). The national government also thought much of education. Through these policies of modernization, the nation state of Japan, or its image, was formed.

From the middle of the *Meiji* era (1868-1912), Japan was considered to be a modern military state. Especially through the *Taisho* era (1912-1926) and the early part of the *Showa* 昭和 era (1926-1989), the militarization of Japan became stronger. This tendency was sustained with the armed invasion by Japan of foreign, especially, Asian countries.

The modernization of Japan before W.W.II.can be thought of as the history of industrialization and militarization. After very serious armed attack, Japan was defeated and occupied by the allied forces in 1945. Many heavy industrial regions were bombed by the U.S.Air Force, and it was necessary that industrial facilities were re-constructed upon the ruins. However, the Korean War occurred in 1950, then emergency demands were generated due to the outbreak of the war, and brought postwar economic rehabilitation and revitalization to Japan.

After that, particularly around the 1960's, Japan had experienced high economic growth. As symbols of its growth, we often refer to the Tokyo Olympic Games and the opening to business of the *Shinkansen* 新幹線(the super-express) in 1964. But just as it is in this age, depopulated regions and over-populated regions have emerged all around Japan. Migrants from rural regions have flowed into cities, changing the rural labor force into an industrial one in urban regions.

As for depopulated regions, especially rural regions, mountain villages, fishery villages and coal mining regions, where traditionally natural environment and resources were used for daily subsistence or industry, and where through such tradition social ties were created and reproduced, drastic out-migration and the decline of regional social and economic functions were experienced.

In other words, the high economic growth of postwar Japan was only possible through the formation of depopulated and overpopulated regions, and through the uneven development.

III. Panopticonization towards space and society

As is well known, the "*panopticon*" was treated by Foucault (1995.originally 1975), after Bentham had referred to it as one of the modern systems. In recent day, Hannah(1997) analyzed the "*panopticism*" to consider the relationship between power and individuals under that control.

Here I use the word "*panopticonization*" to analyze modern power and its control over industry in Japan, in particular using one example of a small coal mining society. That is, the *Meiji* government researched, integrated and controlled the national land of Japan with its strong power, and because these tasks had to be completed in a short time, so the government had to consider the national space under the watching and controlling system like *panopticon*. It is one of

the schemes that modern power structures and systems required. Such *panopticonization* has been seen in small coal mining societies, and that is critical point here.

The small coal mining society in Japan was one of the modern heritages that had survived partly until recent day. In that sense the character of such a society is a unique one, because as the famous Japanese sociologist, Yasuma Takata (1922) once suggested, the more *Gesellschaft* continues to emerge, the less *Gemeinschaft* proceeds on through the modernization process in Japan.

In addition, using an example of coal mining society is interesting when analyzing the modernity within the era called "*postmodern*." Such a small coal mining society, located especially in peripheral areas, was placed under the powerful control and aids by the national government, and sustained the nation's resource management and insurance. However, because imported coal costs only one-third of domestic coal, the coal mining industry declined to its silent death under severe international competition and the global economy. For these reasons, in this paper I observe and analyze such a *panopticonized situation* in a small coal mining society to illustrate and consider modernity in the present day.

IV. *Takashima* : society and space there

1. Coal mining industry in *Takashima*

Takashima is located in *Nagasaki* prefecture, about 15km southwest of the *Nagasaki* Harbor, *Nagasaki* city. *Takashima* as a town consists of four islands, but only one island "*Takashima*" is inhabited by about one thousand people. The island is very small to house such a big industry; it has a size of only 6.4km in circumference and the town area is only 1.27 square km, which is the smallest figure of a Japanese municipality. In March 1995, the population count was 1,100 with 606 households. The population per household was 1.83. At that time, this figures was also the smallest of all Japanese towns. However this town has a record of being the most densely inhabited town in Japan, from the 1960's through 1970's.

The first time that machines were introduced into the digging process of coal mining in this country was after the *Meiji* Restoration (1868), meaning the end of the feudal age in Japan, at *Takashima* coal mine, where a feudal landlord *Nabeshima* 鍋島 and a Scottish merchant Thomas Glover jointly operated the coal mine. In 1881, the *Takashima* coal mine fell into the hands of *Yataro Iwasaki* 岩崎弥太郎, who had established the *Mitsubishi* 三菱 Financial Group. We can trace the origin of the present biggest financial clique ("*Zaibatsu* 財閥") in Japan to *Takashima*. In other words, the *Mitsubishi* Group was born in *Takashima*. For more than one century, the coal mine at *Takashima* was under the control of the *Mitsubishi* Group till 1986 when the mine was closed.

It has been said that two coal mines, *Miike* 三池 and *Takashima*, were the best ones in the industrial area, and as a result they were recognized as the "Build Mines" which the National Government had planned to support politically and economically for a long time(Yada, 1975, 1981, 1994). However, the two mines were shut down during the last stage of the national coal mining policy (*Takashima*, in 1986; *Miike* in 1997). And there were only two coal mines at the moment in 1999 in Japan, *Ikeshima* 池島 in *Nagasaki* prefecture and *Taiheiyo* 太平洋 in

Hokkaido 北海道 but both of them have closed. At its peak, *Takashima* recorded more than 1.2 million tons/a year of coal production (1965), but during the period of severe conditions in coal mining in Japan (The Energy Revolution for petroleum and the importation of cheaper coal), its production was reduced to little more than 0.3 million tons/a year in the last year of its running in 1986.

2. Regional characteristics of *Takashima*

Takashima has been called "a region of one island, one town and one company," because its population consists of the residents of an isolated island (*Takashima* island) forming one town, and the town has been a company town (in Japan we express it as "*company castle town*").

Often people say that there were three headmen in *Takashima*, that is, the headman of *Takashima* town, the director of the *Takashima* Division of the *Mitsubishi* Coal-mining Company, and the executive leader of the Laborers' Union of the coal miners at the *Takashima* Division of the *Mitsubishi*. So, there were three power poles in *Takashima*. This situation developed because of the characteristics of *Takashima*, the extreme company town controlled by one company, the *Mitsubishi*.

As is often the case with coal mining regions, society was typical in *Takashima*. There were three hierarchically-structured classes; "*Shokuin* 職員"(white-collared workers), "*Koin* 鉱員"or "*Honko* 本鉱"(normally employed coal miners), and "*Kumifu* 組夫(subcontracted coal miners). They lived apart from the other classes (spatial segregation), and socio-economic differentiations were very clear among the classes; in housing, salary etc.

Most of the "*Koin*" lived in company apartment houses with two rooms (9 square meters each) and a small kitchen. There was no bath room in such a company apartment house, so they shared the public bath house offered by the company. Through such a bath system and intimate relationships formed in the neighborhood, networks of information and rumor were locally formed. "Gemeinschaftliches Gesellschaft" was generally formed in the coal mining region, and *Takashima* was not as exception.

During the pre-modern era through part of the modern era in Japan, there were many bond laborers pens called "*Naya*" in the watching system in the coal mining regions. The bosses of "*Naya*" collected coal miners and forced them to work under severer labor conditions. *Takashima* was not an exception. In the early *Meiji* era, there were special prisons for digging coal in *Hokkaido* and *Miike*, called "*Shu-chi-kan* 集治監," although they were soon abolished. During W.W.II, the national government of Japan forced Chinese and Korean people to engage in compulsory labor at domestic coal mines in Japan. As a result, the labor system in coal mines in the modern era was deeply related to exploitation, constraint, and severe control of the miners. That is, the Japanese coal mining society has had a history which related to *panopticonization* of the small society by power and industrial capitalism.

After W.W.II, the system of guardhouses called "*Tsume-sho*" was established in each small area in coal mining regions. In *Takashima* the members of "*Tsume-sho*" often checked the labor or health conditions of the miners, even their living conditions. The members of the "*Tsume-sho*" sometimes took the role of policemen, so it was said that there were almost no tasks for the real policemen in Takashima.

Yamamoto (1991) referred to the characteristics of the sub-culture of coal miners. He points out seven items related to on them as described below.

    1.pride in daredevil job

    2.strong friendship among colleagues

    3.self-identity to a dandy

    4.tendency to conspicuous consumption

    5.everyday dependency on drinking

    6.familial and marital complexity

    7.antagonism against the intellectuals

I cannot accept all of the items as typical characteristics of coal-miners, but I think that most of the items were typical for some people among "*Kumifu*" class. Yamamoto referred to such items as above because he intended to clarify the characteristics of coal-miners by comparing them with those of white-collared salary men. In another words, Yamamoto compared the sub-culture of coal-miners with that of salary men.

3. Out-migration and regional changes in *Takashima*

According to the National Population Census of Japan where research has been conducted almost every five years since 1920 to the present, the population of *Takashima* town has recorded its peak in 1960 at the census level (20,938). After the 1960's, its population was reduced mostly because of rationalization and restructuring of the *Takashima* coal mine. Just before the shutting down of the coal mine in 1986, there were about 6,000 people in *Takashima*. With the shutting down many people lost their jobs and were forced to seek new jobs and to live new lives outside the town. The population of *Takashima* decreased to about 1,100 or so. That is, in March 1995, there were 1,110 people and 606 households. Originally *Takashima* was the narrowest self-governing body in Japan (1.27 square km), but the population per one household was also the smallest of Japanese towns (1.8). *Takashima* then attained the most drastic depopulation in Japan (-95.1%/1960-1995). From these statistics, we can see the drastic depopulation and out-migration from *Takashima* after the shutting down of the coal mine.

When the *Takashima* coal mine was shut down (Nov.27, 1986), we organized a study group in *Nagasaki* prefecture. The majors of the members consisted of hygienics, geography, anthropology, financial policy and so on. Among them my task was to analyze the migration from *Takashima*. The data of migrants from *Takashima* developed into a huge volume, so I continue to analyze it even now. At the present, I can refer only to the outline of migration from *Takashima*. The characteristics of the migration are listed as below.

1. There were not so many migrants going to three big city areas (*Tokyo* 東京, *Osaka* 大阪, *Nagoya* 名古屋) , but about 91% of them (1,947/2,140) migrated to *Kyushu* Island.

2. Most of the migrants had originally come to *Takashima* from peripheral regions and many of them, after the shutting down of the coal mine, went out to peripheral regions. This pattern of migration is different from the usual migration in Japan.

3. Among the "*Shokuin*"(white-collared workers), "*Koin*"(normally employed coal miners), and "*Kumifu*"(subcontracted coal miners) could be seen a differentiation of migration;

"*Shokuin*" and their family tended to go to bigger cities, because the "*Shokuin*" did not lose their jobs with the shutting down of the mine but only transferred to the related companies of the *Mitsubishi* Group. All of the "*Koin*," however, lost their jobs, and had to leave *Takashima* to seek new jobs or to be trained for new jobs (to get a driver's license etc.). The "*Kumifu*" class experienced the shutting down under the severest conditions; some of them were not able to receive the special money for loss of jobs that was usually offered by the *Mitsubishi* to the "*Koin*" class.

As referred to above, characteristic migration flows occurred from *Takashima*. Especially through the sudden shutting down of the coal mine which affected a unique regional community of coal miners ("*Gemeinschaftliches Gesellschaft*"), unique migration as such had occurred, so we can see the unique characteristics of *Takashima* by analyzing the migration flow (Tsutsumi, 1991).

The drastic depopulation generated more and more depopulation. Not only coal miners and their families but also people who ran or who worked in shops had to close their shops and leave the island, because the population in *Takashima* was reduced to the level of the threshold population of sustaining the shops. In addition the financial conditions of the town worsened; the tax income from the company of the *Mitsubishi* was drastically reduced; huge volumes of migration more than had been imagined occurred. Regional functions decayed and a vicious circle of structural depopulation caused people to move ("Depopulation brings more depopulation"; Kamino, 1970). Including the case of *Takashima*, regional deprivation of functions of social and economic life occurred without exception. The hospital, elementary school and junior high school which were run by the town reduced their scale, and the *Takashima* High School run by *Nagasaki* prefecture was abolished.

It was one of the biggest tasks or wishes for *Takashima* to create new working places. During the time just after the shutting down, the town office established a company of flatfish breeding as a tertiary sector. However its facilities were hit by a typhoon and all the flatfish escaped from it, so the new enterprise had to be given up. Afterwards, a tomato breeding company was established, but its running is currently reduced. One company dealing with miscellaneous goods and bedclothes came to *Takashima*, but it had to pull back because of operating in the red.

After the time when the "boom town" disappeared, people in *Takashima* had to recognize that *Takashima* was an isolated island where there were no other economically useful resources than coal. Since then it has been difficult to generate new working places in *Takashima*.

4. Remaining problems of *Takashima*

Through the *Takashima* study, we recognized some points or critical tasks as below.

1. From the standpoint of security of energy holding, and from that of the remaining technology and techniques for mine digging, it is a pity to shut down coal mines in Japan (now in 2003, there is no coal mine in Japan).
2. We must think about regional revitalization or redevelopment not only by attracting new companies but also through the renewal and reactivation of regional functions which cover living functions of daily life.
3. The policy for the unemployed and elderly old people has become more and more

important for the town, in order to avoid more depopulation in the future. The treatment of financial conditions, which have been worsening must be based upon both as industrial policy to attract new companies and a policy for severe population problems.

V. Uneven changes in spatial integration

Several activities such as economic, political, social and cultural ones, develop differently in spaces. From a spatial perspective, economic activities tend to proceed widely or borderlessly. But cultural activities, especially local ones, are enclosed in narrower local spaces. We can see this more easily when we think about the narrower scales (not so global but regional or local scales) where economic, political, social and cultural activities develop. That is, there is a spatial order created by the four kinds of activities within heaped different spaces. In fact, the idea of these spaces has relationships to AGIL scheme by Talcott Parsons.

Most of the depopulated regions in Japan have their cultural roots in local environments like *Takashima*. In those cases the social ties in such communities are stronger (*Gemeinschaftlich*). But following the high economic growth of the 1960's, economic spatial integration has proceeded in this country. Spaces have been integrated economically into a wider space through the centralized function system of Japan. The trends of the global economy had effects upon the main industries in peripheral regions; mining, agriculture, forestry, and fishery etc. But in the case of local cultural space, such spatial integration has not occurred easily: within such space, spatial integration or spatial "averaging" faces resistance against changing. That is, although spatial integration through economic activities tends to proceed, the movement into local culture would experience resistance against change or integration into a wider space. Thus *Takashima* is a unique and typical case from this point of view.

References

Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, Department of Coal.(ed.)(1994) "*Coal note: 1994*," *Shigen Sangyo Shinbunsha* (Tokyo), 632P.

Foucault, Michel.(1995, trans. by Alan Sheridan) "*Discipline and punish: the birth of the prison*," Vintage Books(New York), 333P.

Hannah, Matthew.(1997) "Imperfect panopticism : envisioning the construction of normal lives," in Benko, George and Strohmayer, Ulf (eds.) "*Space & social theory: interpreting modernity and postmodernity*," Blackwell Publishers (Oxford), pp.344-359 (ch.15).

Kamino, Shinji.(1970) "*Kaso mondai to shiteno sanson mondai*(The problems on mountain villages as ones on depopulation)," *Ringyo Keizai* (The Forestry Economics in Japan) 264, pp.7-20.

Takata, Yasuma.(1922, revised ver.) "*Shakaigaku gairon* (The outline of sociology)," *Iwanami Shoten* (Tokyo), 540P.

Tsutsumi, Kenji.(1991) "*Tanko heizan ni tomonau Takashima-cho kara no jinko ido* (The out-migration from *Takashima* town caused by the shutting down of the coal mine)," in *Takashima-cho Chiiki Hoken Kenkyu-kai*(The Study Group for Regional Hygiene in *Takashima* Town)(ed.) "*Tanko heizan no shima kara mananda koto: Nagasaki-ken Takashima ni okeru gakusaiteki chiiki kenkyu no kokoromi* (Studied from an island

where a coal mine was shut down: a trial for interdisciplinary regional study in *Takashima*, *Nagasaki* prefecture)," *Showa-do Insatsu* (Nagasaki), pp.227-246.

Tsutsumi, Kenji.(1995) "Regional identity in Japanese centralism," in Fluechter, Winfried(ed.) "*Japan and Central Europe restructuring: geographical aspects of socio-economic, urban and regional development*," Verlag Harrassowitz(Wiesbaden), pp.240-250.

Tsutsumi, Kenji.(1996a) "Industrialization in a peripheral region at modern Japan: a case of tea industry in *Yame* region, *Fukuoka* prefecture," in Nozawa, Hideki(ed.) "*Social theory and geographical thought: Japanese contributions to the history of geographical thought(6)*," Institute of geography, faculty of letters, Kyushu University (Fukuoka), pp.7-10.

Tsutsumi, Kenji.(1996b) "Depopulated regions in Japan: a model on social change in peripheral regions," in Kobayashi, Kiyoshi and Kita, Yoshiyuki(eds.) "*Exploring sustainability: proceedings of the International Symposium on the Future of Small Society in a Dynamic Economy*," Regional Planning Research Group (Tottori), pp.251-259.

Yada, Toshifumi.(1975) "*Sengo Nippon no sekitan sangyo : sono hokai to shigen no hoki* (The coal mining industry of Japan after W.W.II. : its collapse and the abandon of coal resource)," *Shin Hyoron* (Tokyo), 285P.

Yada, Toshifumi.(1981) "The abandonment and renovation of coal reserves in Japan," in "*The roles of geosciences in development*" (Proceedings of the United Nations University-the Tokyo Geographical Society Joint Symposium, Tokyo,) , pp.98-106.

Yada, Toshifumi.(1994) "The industrial adjustment and regional policy in the case of Japan's coal industry," *Annals of the Society for Industrial studies, Japan* 10, pp.89-90(Summary).

Yamamoto, Yuji.(1991) "*Takashima tanko shakai ni miru "tanko bunka" to "inshu izon-sei*"(The sub-culture of coal mine and dependency on alcohol in the *Takashima* coal mine community)," in *Takashima-cho Chiiki Hoken Kenkyu-kai* (The Study Group for Regional Hygiene in *Takashima* Town)(ed.) "*Tanko heizan no shima kara mananda koto: Nagasaki-ken Takashima ni okeru gakusaiteki chiiki kenkyu no kokoromi* (Studied from an island where a coal mine was shut down: a trial for interdisciplinary regional study in *Takashima*, *Nagasaki* prefecture)," *Showa-do Insatsu* (Nagasaki), pp.17-72.