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Politicizing territory: the transformation of land struggle in Okinawa, 1956

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
1. Introduction


This paper examines the process of the first *shimagurumi-toso* (island-wide struggle) against the U.S. military rule that took place in Okinawa, Japan in 1956. The purpose of this paper is to explore how territorial identity is formed and to evaluate the role of territorial identity in collective action under an oppressive regime. The reasons why this paper focuses on this issue are as follows. First, since the early 1980s, the research interest of Anglophone political geography in nationalism and ethnic movements has been directed towards territory and identity. While there has been positive recognition of these themes, few studies have been conducted in Japan as to how territorial identity is constructed and what kind of political implication it has in a concrete time-space context of collective action. Second, while recent sociological studies are paying attention to collective consciousness in social movements, geographical studies dealing with border change and political consciousness are increasing in number. Few studies, however, have been conducted to combine these two fields of research. Finally, the examination of the role of territorial identity in collective action can lead to the reassessment of ideational and geographical factors to mobilize masses.

Okinawa (Okinawa Prefecture) is located between mainland Japan and Taiwan and consists of Okinawa Island and more than one hundred other islands (Figures 1 and 2). It was the place where a ground war was fought between Japan and the U.S. near the end of the Asia-Pacific War (1945). After this ground war, the U.S. military force occupied Okinawa and neighboring islands. After the seven-year military occupation, the Peace Treaty with Japan enforced in 1952 provided that the administrative rights over Okinawa were transferred to the U.S. government, and the re-independence of Japan was internationally

recognized. This international treatment of Okinawa was motivated by the strong strategic interest of the U.S. in the West Pacific, that is, the beginning of the Cold War. As the U.S. government recognized Okinawa's geopolitical importance, the U.S. military forces in Okinawa started to forcibly seize land and build military bases¹. For Okinawa, this was the beginning of a long repressive regime by a foreign ruler, which is called *amerika-yu* (the era of America) in Okinawan dialect. In exchange for Japan's democratization, independence, and economic growth, Okinawans² had to start struggling for the realization of their own freedom, autonomy, and democracy.

Figure 1. North East Asia





Source: Okinawa Times sha (1997a) p. 12

Figure 2. Okinawa Island

In the following chapters, the author will discuss theoretical perspectives according to the above-mentioned motivations, overview the historical relationship between the U.S. military rule and the development of Okinawan autonomy, and examine the development of the island-wide mass protest as a process of territorial identity formation. Using 174 newspaper articles and other documents, the author will address the importance of linking the concept of territory to collective identity as a strategy to organize mass protest in Okinawa in the 1950s.

2. Theoretical perspectives

With regards to theoretical perspectives, this paper draws on three different disciplines dealing with collective action: sociology, political geography, and political science. First, the research paradigm of collective action in sociology once shifted from the emphasis on grievance or social disorder to rational choice or resource mobilization (e.g. McCarthy and Zald 1977). A newly emerging paradigm again pays substantial attention to sociopsychological aspects of mobilization (Melucci 1989; Buechler 1993; Tarrow 1994; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 1996). The difference between resource mobilization and sociopsychological paradigms is that the latter regards the basis of collective action as the social or cultural that transcends a mere sum of (rational) individuals. If we look at social movements in authoritarian regimes, shared grievances, ideologies or beliefs for changing society play an important role in collective action (e.g. Zhou 1993; Noonan 1995). This is mainly because the range of choice on the side of the challengers is quite limited and because it is sometimes effective for opposition leaders to appeal to or even create shared collective consciousness in order to mobilize masses against the authoritarian rule.

In terms of collective consciousness, European scholars emphasize the role of collective identities and the sociopsychological aspects of micromobilization. Melucci (1989) argues that "new social movements" cannot be explained from material interests that have been elaborated in the studies on labor movements but rather from identity politics constructed collectively. In other words, the grievances and mobilizing factors tend to focus on cultural and symbolic issues that are linked with issues of identity rather than on economic grievances. Johnston, Larana, and Joseph (1994:7) argue that these factors are associated with a set of beliefs, symbols, values, and meanings related to sentiments of belonging to a differentiated social group; with the members' image of themselves; and with new, socially constructed attributions about the meaning of everyday life. They believe that this is espe-

cially relevant to the ethnic, separatist, and nationalistic movements within existing states. Social constructivists such as Melucci maintain that a collective identity is essential to social movements and that the success of movements depends on the creation of powerful identities strengthening solidarity. However, Johnston et al. (1994:15-16) point out that this social constructivist definition of collective identity has three dimensions that make it an especially difficult concept to pin down empirically. First, it is predicated on a continual interpenetration of the individual identity of the participant and the collective identity of the group. Second, by the very nature of the phenomena we study, the collective identity of social movements is a "moving target," with different definitions predominating at different points in a movement career. Third, distinct processes in identity creation and maintenance are operative in different phases of the movement. According to this critique of study on collective identity, collective identity is not a solid entity frozen in time and space but a shifting process of interpreting and defining the movement.

In the U.S., the frame approach, which was first formulated by Snow, Rochford, and Benford (1986), focuses on this ideational aspect of collective action. By exploring how political discourses to "frame" collective action are constructed, transformed, and extended in the course of movements, frame analysis attempts to assess the role of ideology, beliefs, and values and examine the interaction among different frames in political mobilization (e.g. Noonan 1995; Ellingson 1995). As Hunt, Benford, and Snow (1994: 203-204) argue, framing and identity construction processes are interconnected in a dynamic, almost recursive fashion. The linkages between framing and identity construction processes direct attention to social movement organization actors' efforts to interpret and operate within collective action arenas. History, social structures, and cultural arrangements constrain social movement organization actors' interpretive work. Based on these arguments, this paper will examine how social actors frame collective action in relation to their value, belief, or identity.

However, there have been critiques of this approach (e.g. Benford 1997; Steinberg 1999). According to Benford (1997), frame analysis has several shortcomings: neglect of systematic empirical studies, descriptive bias, static tendencies, the reification of frames, reductionism, elite bias, and monolithic tendencies. Although not seeking to avoid all the critiques, this paper explores the dynamic process of frame formation and transformation in a particular case of Okinawa. By looking at the shift of ideational emphasis in the Okinawan land struggle, this paper focuses on the transformation of "injustice frames" into "collective action frames" (Noonan 1995; Benford 1997: 416). That is, the development of

the land struggle was the process of the reinterpretation of the injustice in the U.S. acquisition of land as a threat to Okinawan common goods (i.e. national territory or state sovereignty). Such transformation is also treated as the process of producing "cultural resonance" (Snow and Benford 1988) which was based on Okinawan collective identity. In so doing, this paper attempts to show the usefulness of frame analysis in understanding how territorial identity is constructed in collective action.

Second, in the field of political geography, the relationship between territory and identity has long been discussed. Nationalist or ethnic movements are common themes in this field of research (Knight 1982; 1984; Agnew 1984; 1987; Johnston et al. 1988; Murphy 1990; Kaplan 1994; Passi 1996; Herb and Kaplan 1999). Recent studies on territorial identity formation evolve around the role of language (Murphy 1990), spatial perception (Kaplan 1994), boundary change (Passi 1996; Newman and Paasi 1998), or the concept of scale (Herb and Kaplan 1999). Unlike these studies in which the concept of territory is treated as an existent basis for political action, this paper focuses on how the concept of territory emerged and was politicized in the struggles for land. Thus, an attempt will be made to illustrate how the concept of territory is incorporated into collective identity and how the relationship between these two is strengthened in the development of collective action.

Finally, the collective action literature tends to neglect external, structural elements that constrain or enable collective action. Political opportunity approach treats collective action in relation to the openings and closings of political opportunity (Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Kriesi et al. 1992; Kurzman 1996; Zhao 1997). However, this approach has a tendency to regard human agents as being passive in the face of structural constraints. The author would argue that the relationship between structure and human agency should be considered relational, dynamic, and recursive (Giddens 1979). In addition, in the literature of democratic transition, the perspective regarding elite strategic choice as the most important factor for democratization has become dominant (Rustow 1970; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Huntington: 1991). This elite-centric perspective, however, tends to underestimate the role of collective action. Several studies have pointed out the weakness of this view by indicating the significance of labor movements (Valenzuela 1989; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992: 99; Bermeo 1997; Collier and Mahoney 1997), popular economic grievances (Haggard and Kaufman 1995: 60), and popular urban movements (Sandoval 1998). Collective action, therefore, should not be neglected in explaining the change of political structure.

According to the above-mentioned theoretical perspectives, this paper attempts to illustrate the development of mass protest in Okinawa in 1956. Research focuses, there-

fore, are placed on the role of territorial identity in collective action under an oppressive regime by a foreign ruler. According to Sandoval (1998), contentious actions for democratization appear in various forms in the case of Brazil. In Okinawa, where labor movements were strongly regulated in the 1950s, various kinds of mass protest such as sit-ins, public meetings, demonstrations, hunger strikes, and marches were organized by people in various segments of society. In addition, collective action in Okinawa before 1972 was often protest against the U.S. military rule and struggles for various issues such as the 'defense' of land, the reversion to Japan, and free election for the chief executive of the Okinawan government.

3. The historical relationship between the U.S. military rule and the development of Okinawan autonomy

(1) From the occupation to the reversion

As was mentioned in the introduction, the long-term occupation of Okinawa, or "Ryukyu,"³ by the U.S. military administration was a result of the development of the Cold War. After the end of the Asia-Pacific War, the Chinese Revolution (1949) and the Korean War (1950) made the U.S. government very cautious about the spread of communism in Asia as well as in other parts of the world. This was a major cause of Kennan's "containment policy." Kennan also proposed recommendations for the continuous occupation of Okinawa, which finally became an official U.S. policy in 1948 (Miyazato 1986; Eldridge 1999). This policy included three items concerning Okinawa (Miyazato 1986: 77). First, the U.S. government decided to retain Okinawa for a long period of time and military bases were to be developed according to this decision. Second, the governmental institutions responsible for the governance of Okinawa were immediately to make and carry out a long-term plan to increase the economic and social welfare of the native people and to establish their self-sufficient economy as long as it was practical. Third, when it was appropriate, the U.S. government was to obtain in the most realizable way an international approval of the U.S. insuring the strategic control of Ryukyu to the south of 29 degrees north latitude.

Although this policy was later modified, the basic policy of the U.S. government was to insure a long-term and internationally recognized military utilization of Okinawa. This finally led to the conclusion of the Peace Treaty with Japan and the Japan-U.S. Security

Treaty in 1951 as well as the restoration of the independence of Japan as a member of the Western bloc. In Article 3 of the Peace Treaty with Japan, Japan's administrative rights over Okinawa were transferred to the U.S. government. As a result, Okinawa was separated from Japan so that the U.S. military force could freely utilize Okinawa for its military purposes. In this sense, post-war Okinawa was a product of the antagonism between the West and the East in the Cold War. In accordance with the above-mentioned diplomatic processes, the U.S. government had to reconstruct Okinawa as an "anti-communist fortress" and developed it as a "show window of democracy" although the former objective was prioritized as a logical consequence.

Although there was little hope that democracy for the Okinawans could be fully implemented, the U.S. military administration initiated projects for the recovery of Okinawan economy and society and allowed the Okinawans autonomy to the extent that it did not pose a threat to the U.S. military rule. From 1946-47, Okinawan civil governments were established in the four archipelagoes and political parties, including a leftist party, were created (Toriyama 1998: 65-66). Expecting that democratic governments formed through free election would necessarily become pro-U.S. and cooperate with the U.S. military administration, the U.S. military administration held the first gubernatorial and assembly elections for each archipelago in 1950 (Arashiro 1997: 229).

However, elected Okinawan governors and assemblymen were not necessarily pro-U.S., which was an inevitable outcome of the oppressive military rule. The U.S. government reformed its governing body in Okinawa into the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) and established a provisional central government for Okinawans. The chief executive of the central government was appointed by USCAR, and the provisional government was to turn into a federal government consisting of the four archipelago governments. However, in the first election for the central legislature in 1952, the majority of the elected assemblymen were those who pledged to promote Okinawa's reversion to Japan. Feeling threatened by this result, USCAR canceled the planned public election for the chief executive and the introduction of a federal system so that the new central government for Okinawans was created in its semi-democratic form in 1952. The appointed chief executive of the provisional central government, Shuhei Higa, was reappointed by USCAR as the first chief executive of the new central government. The new government was called *Ryukyu-seifu* (the Government of the Ryukyu Island, GRI). Although the GRI had its own Legislature, Administration, and Judiciary according to the U.S. model of the separation of the three powers, USCAR (the high commissioner, in particular) held the

final determinant power through the appointment of the chief executive, by overruling decisions of the Legislature and Judiciary, and by issuing its own ordinances.

These incidents clearly illustrate that there was potential political tension between USCAR and the Okinawans and that policies of USCAR could become inherently oppressive to the Okinawans as long as its primary objective was to maintain Okinawa as an anti-communist fortress. However, in order to maintain Okinawa as such, USCAR needed to mitigate Okinawan protest against itself. This relationship brought about a gradual progress towards democracy for the Okinawans. The popular election of the chief executive had been one of the major democratic demands of the Okinawans and became a cause of Okinawan social movements seeking autonomy as well as reversion to Japan in the early 1960s. Finally, as a result of persistent pressure from the Okinawans, the popular election of the chief executive was implemented in 1968. This indicates that in the Okinawan case, the legitimacy of the U.S. military rule was not necessarily stable. Even though the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty legitimized the U.S. military presence in Okinawa, the two countries declaring that they were democratic could not legitimize the violation of Okinawan property and human rights. This contradiction, or hypocrisy, increased Okinawan grievances and finally resulted in Okinawa's reversion to Japan in 1972.

Therefore, the postwar political history of Okinawa can be described as a series of collective actions over the legitimacy of political institutions imposed by the U.S. and the Japanese governments. According to Bratton and van de Walle (1997), the process of democratization in Africa is categorized into three phases: protest, liberalization, and democratization. Okinawa under the U.S. military rule followed a similar process from 1945 to 1972. The process leading to the reversion in 1972, however, is not the topic of this paper. Instead, this paper explains the cause and effect of the mass protest in 1956. The protest can be seen as part of the longer-term process leading to the final reversion.

(2) The causes of mass protest over land in Okinawa

Because of the U.S. military rule, Okinawan life was significantly restricted in terms of property rights as well as political liberties. As mentioned above, the primary objective of the U.S. military rule in Okinawa was to build and maintain military bases to defend the Western capitalist bloc from the Eastern communist one. Therefore, it became necessary to secure land and labor force for that purpose. From the beginning of the occupation, the U.S. military forces continued to forcibly seize Okinawan private land and increase the area of military bases (Figure 2). This created a large number of landless Okinawans some of

whom were absorbed as labor force into the construction and maintenance of U.S. military bases (Nagumo 1996). However, the forcible seizure of private land created complex legal issues between Okinawans and USCAR. These legal issues over seized land concerned low rent payment and long-term leasehold and later became a focal point of intense political conflicts between the two in the 1950s. For this reason, some of the major social movements in Okinawa are categorized as *tochi-toso* (land struggles). Even though the source of such conflicts may have been legal or economic, they tended to be politicized as struggles over national territory before the 1972 reversion.

Table 1 shows major land struggles before 1972. Although the nature of Okinawan land struggles cannot be generalized over time, Table 1 shows that the imperative of the U.S. military forces to seize land for new bases conflicted with Okinawan interests in the 1950s. In fact, USCAR's land policies did not respect Okinawan property rights and often became a cause of their resentment (Nakano and Arasaki 1976: 74-80). USCAR sometimes attempted to repress Okinawan protests using MPs and armed soldiers, but their protests were persistent and repeated. Because USCAR could not completely regulate the freedom of the press, these land issues necessarily attracted international attention so that USCAR

Table 1. Major Land Struggles Before 1972

Date	Place	Issue	Type of protest	Number of people involved
4.1953 to 3.1955	Isahama, Ginowan City	Forcible land seizure	Sit-ins and people's support of them	A few thousands
1953 to 3.1955	Ie Island (Ie Village)	Forcible land seizure	Sit-ins and demonstrations in Naha	
6.1956 to 8.1956	Okinawa Island	Opposition to a lump-sum rent payment for the land leased by US bases	Public meetings and demonstrations	About 450,000
1966 to 1971	Konbu, Gushikawa Village	Forcible land seizure	Building and staying in <i>toso-goya</i> (huts for struggle)	

Source: Okinawa Times sha (1997b) pp. 224-227.

had to give up the forcible seizure of land from Okinawans in the late 1950s. Therefore, how to respect Okinawan property rights also became a focal point in the U.S. military rule. These long-term persistent protests by Okinawans influenced the oppressive policies of USCAR and resulted in the improvement of rent payment and other lease conditions to

some degree. This shows one of the inherent limits in the control of Okinawa by a foreign ruler.

4. The mass protest, or *Shimagurumi-toso*, in 1956

(1) The historical background of the mass protest

Mass protest in Okinawa is sometimes described as *shimagurumi* (island-wide). *Shimagurumi-toso* in Japanese literally means "struggle wrapping an island." This word expresses how mass protest against the U.S. military rule spread all over Okinawa. The mass protest in 1956 was the first one expressed as such. After the Peace Treaty with Japan came into effect in 1952, USCAR started to seize land to build new bases. This seizure was carried out according to the ordinances issued without the consent of the Okinawans after 1950. The ordinances provided that the seizure of land by the U.S. military forces automatically created a right to lease the land regardless of making a contract with Okinawan landowners. After USCAR issued Ordinance No. 106 for new land seizure in 1953, forcible seizures of land were carried out in several villages despite the protests of Okinawan farmers. In 1954, USCAR announced the policy of the U.S. army that provided a lump-sum rent payment for the land leased by the U.S. army. The intention of USCAR was to establish a permanent leasehold of land by paying the rent corresponding to a sixteen and half year lease all together (Nakano and Arasaki 1976: 74-77).⁴

For Okinawan farmers, this meant virtually selling their land to the U.S. military forces and leaving their land for good. In addition to repeated human rights violations by the U.S. military forces⁵ and anti-communist oppression towards parties and workers by USCAR in the 1950s, this forcible land seizure became one of the major targets of mass protest in the 1950s. Being aware of accumulated Okinawan grievances, the GRI strongly objected to the policy of further land seizure by USCAR. In 1954, the GRI Legislature adopted a petition about the treatment of military land. The following four principles were addressed in the petition: 1) abolition of lump-sum payments, 2) appropriate compensation for land seizure, 3) appropriate reparation for damage caused by the U.S. military forces, and 4) opposition to any new land seizure. These principles were later called *tochi wo mamoru yongensoku* (the Four Principles to Defend Land) and became the major slogan in the 1956 mass protest. In the sense that this slogan specified injustices in the forcible land seizure in the mid-1950s and was widely shared among Okinawan protesters, the Four

Principles can be interpreted as a "domain-specific interpretive frame" (Snow et al. 1986) or an "injustice frame" (Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina 1982). It should also be noted that the Four Principles referred not to any ideational elements of Okinawan identity but to the economic issues over the land lease contract. They represent Okinawan practical strategies concerning land lease contracts. The land issue was first interpreted using this frame by Okinawan governmental elites.

As soon as the petition was adopted, the GRI Administration and the Legislature, the Association of Mayors, and the Association of Military Land Owners organized the Quadripartite Council (*Yonshakyo*). The Council sent its representatives to the U.S. in 1955 to request the U.S. government to reconsider the land policy of USCAR. According to this request, the Armed Services Committee in the House of Representatives decided to dispatch an inquiry commission led by Representative Melvin Price to Okinawa. Although Price presented the recommendations of his commission (the Price Report) in 1956, the Quadripartite Council found it unacceptable according to the Four Principles. The Price Report became a direct trigger of the subsequent mass protest.

(2) The process of the mass protest

In order to understand the reciprocal interactions between USCAR and Okinawan protesters through collective action, it becomes necessary to disaggregate the process of the 1956 mass protest according to the behavioral changes of political actors (see Table 2). In this section, the author regards the actions of USCAR (or its officials) as representing structural constraints on the Okinawans and Okinawan protesters as representing human agents reacting to the constraints. Even though this division oversimplifies reality, the reciprocal interactions between USCAR and Okinawan protesters have been the most essential part of the political dynamism in pro-reversion Okinawa. The following sections of this paper divide the rise and fall of the mass protest into different phases. The division helps to explain how USCAR and Okinawans interacted with each other, what kind of frame was used, and what kind of effects the 1956 mass had on the political structure of Okinawa.

Table 2. Phases of Protest

Phase	A Initiative	B Outbreak	C Ideological splits	D Repression	E End
Date	6.8 to 6.19.1956	6.20 to 7.28.1956	After 7.19.1956	8.7 to 8.18.1956	8.19.1956 to 7.31.1958
Okinawan actors	Governmental elites	Governmental elites Parties Organizational leaders Masses	Governmental elites Parties Organizational leaders Masses Students	Governmental elites	Governmental elites
Okinawan strategy	Planning protest	Organizing protest	Negotiation Organizing protest	Accepting/ Criticizing repression	Negotiation
Attitude of USCAR	Announcing policy	Warning	Warning	Repression	Concession

Phase A: The initiative of the Quadripartite Council

In this section, *Sengoshiryō Okinawa* (Postwar Historical Resources of Okinawa, Nakano 1969) is used as a major source of information because it compiles newspaper articles and other documents (174 pieces altogether) describing the process of the 1956 mass protest. This paper attempts to trace the rise and fall of the mass protest in order to identify major actors and ideological driving forces in the mass protest. Mass protest in Okinawa was, and still is, often patronized by political parties or non-governmental organizations such as labor and non-labor unions, interest groups, and voluntary associations. Okinawan mass protest was usually well organized or non-violent except for a few cases. In this sense, Okinawan political elites tended to play an important role in organizing and mobilizing masses. The author pays close attention to who or what group organized mass protest in Okinawa. In the 1956 case, we first need to look at the action of the Quadripartite Council. However, as Benford (1997: 421-22) criticizes, using newspaper articles tends to limit the scope of frame analysis to the action of elites. This paper, therefore, attempts to explore the extension of mass protest to non-elite social groups.

The major portion of the Price Report was published in Okinawa on June 8, 1956. The Report was upsetting to the Quadripartite Council since the Council believed that it virtually denied the Four Principles the Council had framed. The Report was basically created in order to overcome the land issues and ease protests that USCAR faced in the early 1950s (see Table 1). It consisted of two parts. The first part emphasized the geopolitical importance of Okinawa as an "anti-communist fortress" and a "show window of democracy" in the

West Pacific. The second part recommended the establishment of the permanent leasehold of military land according to the prospect of the long-term (semi-permanent) stationing of the U.S. military forces in Okinawa. Although the Report requested that the U.S. government should sincerely support Okinawa's socioeconomic development, it was clear that the Report aimed at primarily securing the U.S. military presence in Okinawa at the expense of Okinawan property rights.

The Price Report was so disappointing to Okinawans in general and the Quadripartite Council in particular that the GRI Legislature immediately appealed to the U.S. government to reconsider the Report and the Japanese government to protest it on June 12. The appeal states:

We believe that the decision of the U.S. Congress will influence *the territorial sovereignty of Japan (nihon no ryodo-shuken)*. We will persistently struggle against the decision. The resolution of the Legislature requests the Japanese government as a *territorial sovereign state (ryodo-shuken-koku)* to take measures to oppose the decision (Nakano 1969:179, emphasis added).

The Council regarded the Report as a violation of Japan's territorial sovereignty and the property rights and life of the Okinawans. Compared to the Four Principles adopted by the Legislature in 1954, this statement has a different nuance. The phrase referring to the violation of national territorial sovereignty was newly added and had been used before by the Okinawa People's Party which defined the U.S. military rule as colonialism (Nakano and Arasaki 1976: 77). However, from the very beginning of the 1956 mass protest, this frame of "defense of national territory" came to be more widely used (see Table 3).

Noticing the increase of Okinawan objection to the Report, Vonna F. Burger, Civil Administrator of USCAR, sent the Quadripartite Council a letter telling them not to take extreme action (the *Ryukyu Shimpo* June 14, 56). However, the Council repeatedly discussed the issue and decided to thoroughly protest the Report. The Council adopted the strategy that the members would resign their public positions and would organize a mass protest (the *Ryukyu Shimpo* June 15, 56; the *Okinawa Times* June 16, 56). The decision was immediately reported to Deputy Governor James E. Moore and Civil Administrator Burger.⁶

Table 3. Frames Used for Protest (June 12- August 8, 1956)

Article	Date	Phase	Government	Non-govtl. organization	Public meeting	Demonstration	Univ. / High-school meeting	
I-2	6.12	A	DT	DT				
I-10	6.14							
I-5	6.15*		SH					
I-8	6.15		NH					
I-9	6.15		DT					
I-11	6.15*		DT	SH				
I-12	6.15							
I-14	6.17*		NH					
I-15	6.19*			DT, TS				
I-17	6.19*		DT, NH					
RO-1	6.2	B			DT, NH	na		
(RO-2)	6.2				DA, DT			
RO-4	6.25				DA, DT, NH, SH			
(RO-5)	6.25				AC, DT, NH			
RO-6	6.25				DT, SH			
RO-7	6.26				DT			
RO-12	6.28*				DT			DA, DT DA, NH, RV RV NH, RV
RO-19	6.29							
RO-20	7.02							
RO-21	7.03							
RO-22	7.03							
I-3	7.16		DA, TS	DT, NH, SH				
RO-29	7.18							
RO-17	7.22	C	DT		AU	AU	NH, RV	
RO-35	7.22							
RO-25	7.27							
RO-35	7.27							
RO-36	7.28							
(RO-37)	7.28		NH AU AC, DT, NH, SH					
HA-5	8.08	D				canceled	NH, RV	

AC = anti-colonialism NH = reference to nationhood
 AU = anti-US RV = desire to revert to Japan
 DA = defense of ancestral land SH = refusal to sell homeland
 DT = defense of (national) territory TS = reference to territorial sovereignty

Notes: Parentheses means that the article refers to the same event shown above.
 "*" indicates the date when the article was published, not when the event occurred.
 "na" means that the article provides no information about a frame.

This protest action quickly spread to other non-governmental organizations in Okinawa. The Association of Military Land Owners decided to protest the lump-sum payment of rent on June 14 (Nakano 1969: 188). The Okinawa Young Men's Association, the Okinawa Teachers Association, and the Association of the Chairmen of Municipal Assemblies pub-

lished statements that they would oppose the Report and support the Council (the *Okinawa Times* June 16, 56; the *Ryukyu Shimpo* June 21, 56). As Table 3 shows, the frames seen in Phase A imply “defense of territory”, “refusal to sell homeland”, “territorial sovereignty” or “nationhood.” These frames appeared as follows:

In order to oppose this [the Price Report], there is no other way than each one of the people opposing the lump-sum payment and frantically *protecting territorial rights* (*ryodo-ken wo shishu suru*). (From the resolution of the general meeting of the Association of Military Land Owners on June 14, Article I-10 in Table 3, emphasis added.)

If their [the U.S.] organizations are left, the lump-sum payment and other policies will be carried out as they wish. This means helping *sell our homeland piece by piece* (*jibun no sokoku wo kiriuri suru*). (From the minutes of the Quadripartite Council published on June 15, Article I-5 in Table 3, emphasis added).

Land issues in Okinawa violate Japan's *territorial sovereignty* (*ryodo-shuken*) and concerns the life and death of all the people [in Okinawa]. We assert that the Japanese government is responsible for the protection of the Japanese who unite frantically to defend land and national land. We request that the Japanese government take a strong stance toward the U.S. (A telegram from the Quadripartite Council the Japanese government published on June 19, Article I-15 in Table 3, emphasis added).

We transcend our individual interests, and defend land and territorial rights according to *national consciousness* (*minzokuteki ishiki*). We fearlessly and bravely proceed with this just confidence (One of the policies for struggle of the Quadripartite Council published on June 19, Article I-17 in Table 3, emphasis added).

The above-mentioned frames clearly indicate the possible direction of the following mass protest, which was different from the first frame shown in the Four Principles. These new frames interpreted land struggles as national struggles to defend the national territory of Japan, not Okinawa. This implies that Okinawan elites justified their land struggles by defining the Okinawans as the Japanese who were bravely fighting against the violation

of their territory by a foreign ruler. The land issue was re-framed more for a collective struggle.

While the realization of the Four Principles continued to be the central goal in the 1956 mass protest, the above-mentioned new frames add to the protest new meanings beyond economic land struggles. The author would argue that there are three possible reasons for this transformation of “injustice frames” into “collective action frames” (Noonan 1995; Benford 1997: 416). First, these new frames had already been implied in the policies of the Okinawa People’s Party and the Okinawa Social Mass Party since these reformist parties officially supported the reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1951 (Nakano 1969: 756). Okinawan governmental elites affiliated with these parties could take advantage of land struggles as opportunities to transform them into reversion movements. Second, in order to change the oppressive foreign rule, collective action frames needed to be reconstructed so that they could have “cultural resonance” (Snow and Benford 1988) among the Okinawans. Finally, accumulated grievances against the U.S. military force provided the basis of mass protest beyond mere legal or contractual land issues. Okinawan elites could effectively mobilize the grievances by redefining the issues as threats to the Okinawans as a whole.

Since the whole Report had not been published until June 20, Deputy Governor Moore emphasized the benefits the Okinawans would have from the Report and requested the Quadripartite Council to treat the issue in a prudent manner (the *Ryukyu Shimpō* June 19, 56, June 21, 56). However, as explained in the following section, the spread of protest did not stop. The Council decided upon the following seven basic policies for the land struggle (the *Mainichi Shimbun* June 19, 56): 1) We maintain organizational solidarity; 2) We defend national land and territorial sovereignty; 3) We protest with nonviolence; 4) We respect Americans’ human rights; 5) We maintain social security; 6) We maintain our own autonomy; and 7) We overcome immediate difficulties to realize the Four Principles to Defend Land. As the second policy clearly expresses, the Council completely reinterpreted the land struggle based on the Four Principles as a territory-based national struggle.

Phase B: The outbreak of mass protest

According to the leadership of the Quadripartite Council, public meetings to protest the Price Report were planned all over Okinawa on June 20. It turned out that these meetings mobilized a remarkable amount of people (Table 4). According to the newspaper article (the *Ryukyu Shimpō* June 21, 56), the total number of participants was estimated as

Table 4. Mass Protest on June 20-August 8

Date	Region	Place	Measure	Estimated Participants
June 20	South	10 municipalities	Public meeting	75,000
	Central	9 municipalities	Public meeting	60,000
	North	15 municipalities	Public meeting & demonstration	6,000+
June 25	South	Naha	Public meeting	100,000
	Central	Koza	Public meeting	50,000
June 29	South	Naha High School	Student meeting	1,600
July 2	Central	Nodake High School	Student meeting	700
July 3	Central	Ishikawa High School	Student meeting	750
July 22	South	Shuri	Public meeting	3,000
July 27	South	Mawashi	Public meeting	300
		Naha	Student meeting	200
July 28	South	Naha	Public meeting	150,000
			Demonstration	400
August 8	Central	Koza	Student meeting	250

Source: Nakano (1969)

200,000. Although the number may have been exaggerated because of the organizer's estimation, it was about 25% of the total population of Okinawa at that time. Major speakers in these meetings included the representatives of the administrative and legislative bodies of municipalities and local non-governmental organizations such as school staff associations and women's and young men's associations. It can be assumed that these local organizations contributed to mobilizing people in their municipalities through their social networks. In this sense, these meetings mobilized various segments of Okinawans in local communities. The Council, therefore, played an important role in organizing and mobilizing the whole society and region of Okinawa. Other public meetings were also planned a few days later as the Council became the Quintupartite Council by adding the Association of the Chairmen of Municipal Assemblies as a member, in the hopes of strengthening its organizational power as an umbrella body for mass protest (the *Ryukyu Shimpo* June 23, 56).

The next wave of mass protest was two large-scale public meetings on June 25 in Naha and Koza. Five days earlier these cities attracted approximately 40,000 and 18,000 participants respectively. The *Ryukyu Shimpo* (June 26, 56) reported that Naha attracted about 100,000 participants while Koza attracted 50,000. If this information is reliable, the amount of people gathering at these meetings doubled, suggesting that the degree of pro-

test was not necessarily in decline. According to the articles about these meetings, the representative of the organizer for the meeting in Naha was a secretariat of the Okinawa Teachers Association while that in Koza was a deputy secretariat of the same association. Major speakers in Naha were the vice executive of the GRI Administration, the president of the Okinawa Teachers Association (Chobyō Yara), the executive member of the Okinawa Social Mass Party (Saichi Kaneshi), the chairman of the Okinawa People's Party (Kamejiro Senaga), and the representatives of the student body of the University of Ryukyu, the Okinawa Young Men's Association, the Okinawa Women's Association, and other non-governmental organizations. The affiliation of major speakers in Koza was similar to that in Naha. Compared to the locally based mobilization led by municipalities on June 20, these meetings, especially the one in Naha, were slightly different. These meetings were organized by the Okinawa Teachers Association and were more reformist-oriented. The reasons for this are that speakers such as Kaneshi and Senaga were considered communists and targeted by USCAR and that Yara was an active reformist who later became the first publicly elected chief executive of the GRI. The fact that these meetings later took on a more reformist nuance led to the 'repression' by USCAR.

In addition to these facts, it seems that Okinawan resentment was more concentrated in the two meetings in Naha and Koza on June 25. The declaration adopted by the Naha meeting states:

The Price Report has humiliated and trampled on our 800,000 Okinawans' requests to realize the Four Principles to defend *our nation and land (minzoku to kokudo)*. That is, America forcibly continues the plan to newly seize and make a package purchase of *our national land*. [...] However, we will no longer and never surrender to any kind of coercion [by the U.S.]. This is because the neglect of the Four Principles is driving *our nation (waga minzoku)* into destructive crises. [...] It is now that we form solid unity and iron solidarity and that we proceed refreshing our resolution and courage not to sell a single piece of land to America. We firmly believe that this brilliant historical struggle for *national self-determination (minzoku-jiketsu)* is the way leading to the reversion to *our homeland (sokoku)* and independence and peace and that this way is *the highest national morality (minzoku saiko no dogi)* to repay the strong support and encouragement that increase daily and hourly and come from all over the world and *our homeland*. We swear that we will never surrender under whatever conditions (the *Ryukyu Shimpō* June 26, 56, emphasis added).

This statement emphasizes that the struggle for land is a historical one for national self-determination to return to Japan, that the Four Principles to Defend Land must be realized to defend the Japanese nation and the national territory of Japan, and that the Okinawans will not sell a single piece of their land to the U.S.

In the Koza meeting, the *Ryukyu Shimpo* (June 26, 56) reported that participants used placards saying "Do not sell any single piece of our national land to America" or "All the people will fight for the realization of the Four Principles and the defense of our national land." The opening speech states:

According to the Price Report, America now attempts to forcibly seize the island that our ancestors have defended with their blood and sweat. We 800,000 Okinawans have never known such a unilateral and non-democratic route. Everybody! Now we should stand up like a fireball to defend *our national land (kokudo)* (the *Ryukyu Shimpo* June 26, 56, emphasis added).

At these meetings, the legal or economic issues over land were reinterpreted as national problems. It can be said from this that the 1956 mass protest was gradually becoming a nationalist movement based on reformist ideology. As Sandoval (1998: 172) argues, this nationalistic change of the goal of the mass protest should be regarded as an important outcome of the dynamic political process occurring in Okinawa at that time.

Moore and Burger in USCAR regarded this tendency as being agitated by communists and warned that the extreme behavior of Okinawan leaders would not benefit ordinary Okinawans (the *Yomiuri Shimbun* June 28, 56; the *Tokyo Shimbun* June 30, 56). USCAR rightly saw the mass protest in June as being led by Okinawan elites. The Quintupartite Council (formerly the Quadripartite Council) began diplomatic negotiations with the Japanese and the U.S. governments. The Okinawan representatives selected at the first public meeting in Naha also went to Tokyo to negotiate with cabinet members of the Japanese government and to discuss the land issue with Commander Lyman L. Lemnitzer who was the governor of USCAR. However, the attitude of the U.S. government and USCAR did not seem to change (the *Mainichi Shimbun* July 7, 56; the *Asahi Shimbun* July 7, 56). According to these articles, the mass protest in June did not directly affect USCAR's attitude although it contributed to an increase in the public awareness about the Okinawan land struggle in mainland Japan.

In addition to the reformist transformation of the mass protest, another important shift in Phase B is that the mass protest extended to broader segments of Okinawa Island. In addition to the geographical expansion of the protest, its social expansion to younger generations such as university and high school students implies that the protest would have significant impacts on the future of Okinawa. The frames used for university and high school meetings indicate that younger generations tended to interpret land struggles as movements for reversion (Table 3). The resolutions of the Nodake High School meeting state:

We fight until the end to oppose the Price Report and realize the Four Principles from our own position.

We send our representatives to all kinds of national meetings to solve land issues.

We always work in cooperation with other schools and take united action.

We make a prompt effort to realize *reversion to our homeland (sokoku fukki)* as all the representatives' strongest wish (The *Ryukyu Shimpo* July 3, 56, Article RO-20 in Table 3, emphasis added).

The resolution of the meeting organized by Okinawan university students studying in mainland Japan also declares:

[...] We resolve that we continue to fight with 800,000 Okinawans until *reversion to Japan (nihon-fukki)* is realized (the *Ryukyu Shimpo* July 28, 56, Article RO-25 in Table 3, emphasis added).

The use of these frames is the result of primary and secondary education in Okinawa at that time which attempted to educate Okinawan students as Japanese nationals (Oguma 1998: 556-596). In order to secure the foreign military rule, USCAR always needed to tackle this growing nationalist sentiment among the Okinawans.

Phase C: Splits among Okinawan elites and further mobilization

As Sandoval (1998: 173) argues, outcomes of social movements can have an impact on the internal dynamics of the social movements. The fact that the mass protest did not seem to be very effective to USCAR caused unrest within the Quintupartite Council. While the

Council sought to have a tripartite meeting of the Ryukyu, Japan, and the U.S. governments, Chobyō Yara (the president of the Okinawa Teachers Association) established a new council called "the Okinawa Council to Defend Land" (OCDL) to deal with the land issue at the non-governmental level. Unlike the Quintupartite Council which was an elite group, the OCDL depended on the masses (Nakano and Arasaki 1976: 88), criticized U.S. military policies, and emphasized that the struggle for land was to defend the national territory of Okinawa and Japan for their independence, peace, and democracy (the *Ryukyu Shimpō* July 18, 56). Therefore, the OCDL clearly followed the mass-based reformist policies addressed in the public meetings on June 25. On the other hand, conservative members in the Quintupartite Council began to find a meeting ground with USCAR. Jyugo Toma (the mayor of Naha) stated that he did not necessarily oppose the lump sum payment of rent considering the regional difference between Okinawan interests and the potential danger of anti-U.S. movements. Because this statement betrayed the basis of the Four Principles to Defend Land, he was severely criticized and was requested to resign by reformist party members at the City assembly (the *Ryukyu Shimpō* July 21, 56; July 24, 56). In addition to this incident, the cleavage between conservatives and reformists was becoming larger at the level of the GRI. Reformists requested Chief Executive Shuhei Higa as well as Toma to resign since Higa was appointed by USCAR. Reformists believed that an appointed chief executive would weaken the unity of the Okinawans. The Ryukyu Democratic Party, which was the conservative party in office and whose president was Higa, was offended by this reformist attack. This type of political antagonism was becoming clearer at the elite level. As Valenzuela (1989: 462) suggests for labor movements, in Okinawa where the activity of labor unions was strictly regulated while competition between political parties was permissible to some degree, a conflict between the different levels of political leadership tended to develop easily. This often brought about splits among Okinawan political leaders and made it difficult for them to maintain the unity of mass protest. USCAR was able to take advantage of these splits among Okinawan elites.

Meanwhile, public meetings to protest the Price Report were held sporadically in July and tended to have anti-U.S., anti-war, anti-nuclear, and nationalistic slogans (the *Ryukyu Shimpō* 7.23.56; Nakano 1969: 201; see also Table 3). The public meeting held in Naha on July 28 attracted 150,000 participants and was a climax of the mass protest in 1956 (Table 4). Having been influenced by the incident in which the U.S. military force burned farms and crops in Iejima on July 21, the meeting became a radical, anti-U.S., and anti-colonialist protest. The following expressions were used in statements about the meeting (the *Ryukyu*

Shimpo July 29, 56):

The Price Report has exposed America's real intentions. America, which had tortured Okinawans for ten years, started to say that it would seize new land. They sprinkled gasoline from the sky and burned the crops in Ie Island during Okinawans' struggle against the Price Report. Atrocious! Human beings could not do this. Although they say that land is necessary for world peace, the world is peaceful now. It is they Americans that attempt to construct bases by seizing Okinawans' land, to initiate war, and to destroy world peace. Their intention is to construct peace at the expense of a different national group (A representative of the Okinawan university students studying in mainland Japan).

How would the spirits of the three great Americans such as Lincoln and Jefferson [sic] view the American governance of Okinawa for the past ten years? How would they feel if they saw America treat 800,000 Okinawans cruelly in order to prevent communism? To realize the Four Principles is the minimum hope for Okinawans to live with (Koichi Taira, Chairman of the Okinawa Social Mass Party).

America sprinkled gasoline from the sky and burned the crops in the Maja district of Ie Island which has been struggling for two years. Neither a liter of water, a grain of sand, nor a piece of land is for America. [...] We should initiate disobedience movements against America (Kamejiro Senaga, Chairman of the Okinawa People's Party).

The resolutions adopted by the Naha meeting also declare:

We have accumulated bloody and tearful tragedies under a great amount of severe sacrifice and coercion for eleven years after the war and *have stood up decisively with our 80,000,000 national compatriots for the defense of our territory and the protection of the right to live*. [...] We frantically defend the Four Principles to *defend our national homeland and nation (sokoku to minzoku wo mamori)* and protect the land and life of all the Okinawans. [...] We resist like iron with our determination not to sell any single piece of *national land* to America and with our undefeatable unity and solidarity (from the declaration of the meeting, the *Ryukyu Shimpo* July 28, 56,

emphasis added).

By sending [to Japan] the representatives of the Okinawans who have experienced suffering under the military occupation for the past eleven years and by appealing to workers and farmers who are suffering in the same way all over Japan, we should further strengthen organizational solidarity from now on. We then oppose colonialism and firmly believe that the struggle for the realization of the Four Principles will achieve victory with the support from the people fighting for peace in the world (the resolution for sending the prefectural representatives to the homeland, the *Ryukyu Shimpo* July 28, 56, emphasis added).

The meeting decided to request Higa and Toma to resign, and selected Koichi Taira and Kamejiro Senaga who were reformists to be the representatives of the Okinawans to protest the Report. The conservative Ryukyu Democratic Party did not send its representative to this meeting. In addition, students of the University of Ryukyu organized anti-U.S. demonstrations in downtown Naha (the *Ryukyu Shimpo* July 28, 56; July 29, 56). Splits among political elites and radicalization of the masses proceeded in Phase C. The mass protest started to be re-framed as "reformist nationalism" by Okinawan reformist elites (Oguma 1998: 522-555). 'Repression' by USCAR finally came after this phase.

Phase D: Repression by USCAR

USCAR did not take any visible action until August, 1956. However, radicalization of the public meetings in July was becoming "a double edged sword" which might induce authoritarian intervention (Valenzuela 1989: 450). Since Deputy Governor Moor regarded a series of mass protests as being agitated by communists and because he was concerned about the spread of communism in Okinawa (Ota 1996: 128, 154), repression by USCAR was highly predictable.

On August 7, 1956, USCAR announced that it designated the central part of Okinawa Island as an "off limits" area to military personnel in case conflicts between them and the Okinawans took place (the *Okinawa Times* August 7, 56). However, the fear of conflicts was not the real reason for the "off limits" policy. U.S. bases were concentrated in the central part of the mainland. Entertainment and amusement businesses in that area depended on U.S. military personnel. To designate the central part as an "off limits" area meant to prohibit them from entering the area and would cause significant damage to these businesses.

Chief Executive Higa immediately reacted by announcing:

Because the recent movements over the issues of military land departed from "the basic movement policies to solve land issues" stated by the Quintupartite Council and because *they were becoming anti-base, reversion, and disobedient-to-the U.S. movements which deviated from their initial purposes*, I think that this [the "off limits" policy] is a result of the concerns of USCAR and the three U.S. military forces (the *Okinawa Times* August 8, 56, emphasis added).

He also emphasized that the economy of Okinawa highly depended on U.S. bases. The Ryukyu Democratic Party led by Higa also stated:

The purpose of the struggles for adhering to the Four Principles and opposing the Price Report was to correct the errors of the U.S. policy in a constructive way, *neither for national prejudice nor the denial of U.S. bases*. Therefore, our party will decisively eliminate impure behavior to take advantage of movements with other political intentions (From the statement of the Ryukyu Democratic Party, the *Ryukyu Shimpō* August 10, 56, emphasis added).

Okinawan conservative elites started denying the previous frames used for the land struggles and re-framing the situation of Okinawa as depending on the U.S. military force. For them, the territory of Okinawa became less national than before.

On the other hand, Yara (the president of the Okinawa Teachers Association) strongly blamed the "off limits" policy for not being humane and criticized Higa for sharing colonialist sentiments (the *Ryukyu Shimpō* August 9, 56). However, Yara advised the students of the University of Ryukyu to suspend demonstration after the public meeting held in Koza on August 8 so as to avoid conflicts with entertainment and amusement business owners in the area. The anti-U.S. tone became weaker in that meeting (the *Ryukyu Shimpō* August 9, 56). The symptom of moderation can be seen at Phase D, but the behavior of university students clearly aggravated USCAR.

Civil Administrator Burger criticized the students' attitude for being antagonistic to USCAR and he blamed the mayors for allowing the use of schools for political purposes. He added that the land issue should be treated as a legal issue (the *Okinawa Times* August 11, 56). He ascribed the responsibility for the "off limits" policy to the mayor of Koza City, the

University of Ryukyu, and three local newspaper companies since all of them allowed anti-U.S. movements to spread (the *Okinawa Times* August 12, 56). Moore also expressed his discomfort with the fact that Senaga and Kaneshi, who were executives of reformist parties, were selected as representatives of Okinawa and that university students used placards saying "Yankee, go home!" in their demonstrations (the *Ryukyu Shimpō* August 13, 56).

The "off limits" policy and these statements from USCAR immediately shook up Okinawan society. The Ryukyu Chamber of Commerce and Industry stated that it would not participate in the Okinawa Council to Defend Land led by Yara and requested USCAR to lift the "off limits" policy (the *Okinawa Times* August 11, 56). The Koza City Assembly made a prompt decision requesting that the City Board of Education should not allow schools to be used for political meetings which might induce the "off limits" policy (the *Okinawa Times* August 12, 56). According to the directions of Moore who suggested the removal of the "off limits" policy (the *Ryukyu Shimpō* August 13, 56), the mayor of Koza City apologized to the people of the city for allowing the anti-U.S. public meeting and announced that Senaga and Kaneshi were not the representatives of the city (the *Ryukyu Shimpō* August 13, 56). Three other municipalities in the central area followed the decision of Koza City (the *Ryukyu Shimpō* August 14, 56). Thus, the basis of mass protest was completely disorganized in the central part of Okinawa Island where people's lives were more dependent on U.S. bases than in other parts of Okinawa. This implies that the ideational frames of the 1956 mass protest were easily made powerless in the face of economic sanctions by USCAR.

Further repression by USCAR was placed directly on university students. The Foundation of the University of Ryukyu, which was organized by USCAR, stated that it would financially stop supporting the University because about 300 students participated in the anti-U.S. communist demonstrations (the *Ryukyu Shimpō* August 10, 56). The Board of Directors of the University immediately stated that the University opposed communism (the *Ryukyu Shimpō* August 11, 56). Burger was not satisfied with this statement and strongly requested that the University strictly punish the students (the *Ryukyu Shimpō* August 11, 56; August 12, 56). Even though the Board of the Directors attempted to defend the human rights of the students (the *Okinawa Times* August 12, 56), the University finally decided to expel six students and prohibit one student from coming to the university for a period of time (the *Okinawa Times* August 18, 56). Many non-governmental organizations such as the Okinawa Teachers Association, the Okinawa Council to Defend Land, the

Association of Military Land Owners, and the Okinawa Social Mass Party denounced this punishment as being unjust (the *Okinawa Times* August 18, 56; August 22, 56; the *Ryukyu Shimpo* August 18, 56; August 19, 56).

Since the U.S. military force occupied Okinawa, the spread of communism was one of the most frequent targets of repression (Monna 1996). In Phase D, USCAR impressed on the Okinawans the cost of mass protest that they had to pay. After this repression, mass protest over land rapidly weakened within Okinawa. The reasons for this were that the core organization mobilizing the masses had been disorganized, that there were ideological splits among Okinawan political leaders, and that the Okinawans realized how their life materially depended on U.S. bases. There was no unifying power left to Okinawan political leaders to reorganize the protest.

Phase E: The end of the mass protest

Although the Quadripartite Council decided to protest the Price Report on June 1, 1956 and became the Quintupartite Council, a core organization for the land struggle was shifted to the Okinawa Council to Defend Land (OCDL). The Quintupartite Council had lost the power to unify the Okinawans due to the ideological splits among leaders. Mass protest itself was gradually weakened by repeated repression by USCAR. The existence of the OCDL and USCAR's statement that it would start to negotiate directly with individual landowners (the *Okinawa Times* August 30, 56) made the Quintupartite Council meaningless. This meant the disappearance of a core organization for island-wide struggle. Taking advantage of this situation, USCAR began to develop a contract to seize new land in the northern part of Okinawa Island (the *Ryukyu Shimpo* December 20, 56). While the Ryukyu Democratic Party stated that new land seizure should be permitted if the life of the landowners was appropriately secured and if the U.S. government guaranteed the economic development of Okinawa, the Okinawa Social Mass Party and the Okinawa People's Party denounced the seizure and requested the Quintupartite Council to protest it (the *Ryukyu Times* December 24, 56). The new contract was finally made with six farmers on December 28, 1956 (the *Ryukyu Shimpo* December 29, 56). The six-month protest to refuse new land seizure came to an end.

On January 4, 1957, Governor Lemnitzer asked for Okinawans' understanding of the new seizure, stated that it was possible to receive rent annually, and stated that the rent would be tripled (Nakano 1969: 218-219). Toma, who was newly appointed to the chief executive by USCAR after Higa's sudden death in October of 1956, accepted this new pol-

icy. He stated that USCAR would not violate territorial sovereignty and that landowners should be allowed to lease their land to the U.S. military force at appropriate prices. Nobody overtly criticized him for this statement although it was similar to one he made when he was mayor of Naha the previous year. Toma also admitted that it was possible to receive the lump-sum payment of rent and that it was impossible to sustain the Four Principles to Defend Land (the *Mainichi Shimbun* January 10, 57). Toma's statement represented a changing social atmosphere in Okinawa Island although the objections of parties and non-governmental organizations to the new USCAR policy were still expressed (Nakano 1969: 238-40). The frames used for the 1956 mass protest had completely lost their framing power to maintain the protest.

From 1956 to 1957, the land struggle in Okinawa began to gradually attract national and international attention. Okinawa was even called "Cyprus in Asia" by the national and foreign media. Many public meetings were held in Japan to support the land struggle in Okinawa. Domestic and international organizations also issued statements to support Okinawa (Nakano 1969: 222-238). These events created strong pressure on the Japanese and the U.S. governments. In this process, national parties rather than parties in Okinawa played an important role in mobilizing reformist Japanese. The land issue in Okinawa was thus nationalized.

In 1958, the land struggle finally became a diplomatic topic between the Japanese and U.S. governments (the *Tokyo Shimbun* April 6, 58). Moore, who was then high commissioner of the U.S. in Okinawa, suggested that USCAR would revise the plan of land seizure (the *Ryukyu Shimpō* April 12, 58). When the representatives of the GRI Legislature were sent to the U.S. for negotiations about the land issue, they were able to reach an agreement with the U.S. government (the *Asahi Shimbun* July 8, 58). According to this agreement, Donald P. Booth, the new high commissioner following Moore, announced that the lump-sum payment would be suspended in Okinawa (the *Asahi Shimbun* July 31, 58). As a result of this incremental diplomatic negotiation between the Ryukyu, the U.S., and Japanese governments, the controversial lump-sum payment was finally removed from the procedure of land seizure by USCAR.

Ironically, the land issue was settled due to the fact that the issue was nationalized and internationalized. Why the issue was not settled in the local context is an important question. The source of the problem in Okinawa was, and still is, the Japan-U.S. security relations. The political processes stemming from the relations could not be localized even though related problems emerged within Okinawa. The result of the mass protest in 1956

gave Okinawan reformist elites a strong message that they needed to revise their protest strategy.

5. Conclusion: the significance of the mass protest in 1956

As shown clearly in Table 2, a series of protests by the Okinawans was mostly led by political elites. Protest did not spontaneously come from the masses in the 1956 case. In terms of the strength of protest, the 1956 mass protest did not last for more than three months. Distinct mass protest was seen for a very short period of time on June 20, June 25, and July 28. Nevertheless, the estimated total number of participants in the mass protest was about 450,000 in Okinawa Island with a population of 735,000 (Tables 1 and 4). This mobilization cannot be explained by any individualized incentives such as the maximization of profit from land lease by landowners.

By focusing shared collective consciousness and framing processes through collective action in Okinawa, this paper has provided the evidence that land struggles shifted to national struggles and that the 1956 mass protest was the process of the formation of the territorial identity of Okinawans as defenders of Japan's national territory. As Oguma (1998: 502-555) argues, this process was intentionally promoted by Okinawan elites, particularly reformist political elites. This paper has shown that the instrumentalistic appropriation of nationalist cause was reflected in the frames used in the series of the mass protest. Since the importance of territorial components in nationalist movements has been pointed out (Knight 1982; Richmond 1984; Reynolds and Knight 1989; Smith 1991: viii; Kaplan 1994; Smith 1998), the findings of this paper can also contribute to a better understanding of how the concept of territory is linked to politicized collective identity against an oppressive regime. In addition, by examining the different phases of the 1956 mass protest and the socio-temporal transformation of collective action frames (see Table 3), this paper has attempted to avoid the reification, static and monolithic tendencies of the frame approach (Benford 1997).

After the 1956 mass protest, Okinawa's reversion to Japan became a predominant frame of Okinawan politics. The protest proved that the reversion frame based on national identity could be collectively shared among the Okinawans. In order to justify the reversion and mobilize the masses towards this goal, Okinawan political elites needed to identify the Okinawans with the Japanese and to define the territory of Okinawa as part of Japan. Without these personal and territorial principles, reversion movements would have been

logically impossible. As long as complete independence was not considered a realistic choice for Okinawa, it was quite natural that Okinawan elites depended on reversion movements for the emancipation of Okinawa from the U.S. military rule (Oguma 1998: 483-521). Therefore, they needed to construct frames based on national and territorial identity in movements against the U.S. military rule. The 1956 mass protest is a good example of this frame construction.

Notes

- 1 According to the counterargument against the Price Report published by the Quintupartite Council (Nakano 1969:183), the area of U.S. military installations was more than 40,000 acres (16,187.8 ha) in 1956, which was smaller than that in 1996. According to the articles compiled in Nakano (1969), the U.S. military force expropriated more land in the southern region in 1956 than in 1996. However, several articles in Nakano (1969) suggest that there was a concentration of U.S. bases in the central region (see Figure 2).
- 2 The definition of "Okinawans (*Okinawa-jin*)" can be problematic. From 1879-1945 and from 1972 to present, Okinawa Prefecture was/is part of Japan, and thus Okinawan residents were/are Japanese citizens. However, residents in Okinawa Prefecture have retained distinctive ethnic traits in terms of their racial appearance, language, family names, and shared history compared to those of mainland Japanese. Under the U.S. governance from 1945-1972, Okinawa was territorially separated from mainland Japan, which contributed to Okinawan ethnic distinctiveness. In this sense, it is not so problematic that this paper uses "Okinawans" in order to represent "subjects" or "agents" for political struggles in the 1950s.
- 3 "Ryukyu" is the Chinese name of the kingdom that governed the Ryukyu Islands between 1187 and 1879. The U.S. government used the name again from 1945 to 1972 when Okinawa reverted to Japan. During that period, the U.S. government avoided using the name since "Okinawa" implied a region (prefecture) within Japan, while Okinawans frequently used it.
- 4 The annual rent for leased land was determined to be 6% of its land value. USCAR thought that in order to lease the land permanently, it needed to pay the rent corresponding to 100% of the land value. 100 divided by 6 is 16.66. Therefore, USCAR decided to pay the rent corresponding to a sixteen and half year lease at a time. This was a virtual purchase of the land.
- 5 On September 3, 1955, an Okinawan girl was raped and murdered by a U.S. soldier. On April 8, 1956, an Okinawan woman was shot to death by a U.S. guard when she was collecting scrap metal in the area that Okinawans were prohibited from entering. These incidents also increased anti-U.S. sentiment among Okinawans at that time.

6 The governor of USCAR was served concurrently by the commander of the Far East Command in Tokyo. The Deputy Governor was the highest military officer of USCAR in Okinawa. The Civil Administrator treated general issues about the governance of Okinawa. In 1956, the Governor was Lyman L. Lemnitzer; the Deputy Governor was James E. Moore; and the Civil Administrator was Vonna F. Burger. The position of Deputy Governor was changed to High Commissioner in 1957. Moore became the first High Commissioner in Okinawa (Ota 1996: 12-13; Gabe 1996: 103).

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領域の政治化 - 1956年の沖縄における土地闘争の変容 -

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1980年初頭以来、ナショナリズムとエスニック運動への英語圏政治地理学の研究関心は領域 (territory) とアイデンティティとの関係に向けられてきた。しかしながら、そうした研究テーマへの積極的認知にもかかわらず、集合行為 (collective action) の具体的な時空間的文脈の中で、どのように領域的アイデンティティが構築され、いかなる政治的意味を持つかについて検討した研究は日本ではほとんどない。近年の社会学的研究が社会運動における集合意識へと関心を向ける一方、地理学においても境界変更と政治意識を扱う研究は増えつつある。これらの研究を参照しかつ日本の沖縄の事例として、本稿は国内エスニック集団が抑圧的体制の中で領域的アイデンティティを構築し政治化するプロセスを解明する。沖縄は1945年から1972年にかけてアメリカの軍事的支配下におかれていた。その期間の中でも、特に本稿は1956年に起きた大衆抵抗の盛衰に焦点を据える。この島内に拡大した最初の闘争の中で、土地の借用契約をめぐる法的問題が異民族支配から日本の領土を守るための復帰運動へと変容するのである。