Do populists support populism? An examination through an online survey following the 2017 Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election

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Abstract

Based on an ideational approach, a burgeoning body of literature directly measured the populist attitudes among supporters of populist parties. However, few empirical works have examined whether these attitudes among voters also explain their preferences for politicians whom a political-strategic approach regards as populists. In addition, no research verified the applicability of individual populist scales to non-Western countries. To overcome these shortcomings, this study assesses populist attitudes among Japanese citizens and explores whether a respondent with these attitudes tends to vote for populist politicians in Japan. We conducted an online survey after the 2017 Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election. Survey results revealed that the supporters of the Tomin First Party—a typical populist party in a political-strategic sense—lack the quintessential elements of populism. Further, several sub-components of populist attitudes led to support for the Japanese Communist Party—a radical leftist party.

Introduction

Reflecting growing concerns about populism as a threat to established representative democracy, the body of literature on populism has accumulated a vast amount of research in recent decades. In the literature, while previous works used to explore the indirect conditions—such as political opportunity structures and social class characteristics—in which populist parties thrive, an increasing number of studies have come to directly measure populist attitudes among voters in recent years (Akkerman et al., 2014; Akkerman et al., 2017; Elchardus and Spruyt, 2016; Hawkins et al., 2012; Hawkins et al., forthcoming; Oliver and Rahn, 2016; Rooduijn, 2014; Schulz et al., 2017; Spruyt et al., 2016; Stanley, 2011; Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel, 2018). This paper engages with this burgeoning body of literature.

The literature on populist attitudes reveals two shortcomings. First, existing studies geographically restrict themselves mainly to Europe, and therefore few studies exist outside of this region. While the framework of populist attitudes is universal in theory, it has rarely been applied to other regions, such as East Asia, in practice. Second, little research has been conducted on whether populist parties and politicians who successfully seek and seize power by garnering support from unorganized followers are backed by constituents with populist attitudes. The extant studies mainly focus on populist attitudes among the electorate under a parliamentary system with proportional representation. It is plausible that a radical populist party could consolidate segmented supporters from constituents with populist attitudes by propagating radical messages under the electoral rules of proportional representation. However, it is important to empirically validate whether populist politicians who have succeeded in

mobilizing the unorganized mass and seizing power under a presidential system are, in fact, backed by constituents with populist attitudes.

To overcome these limitations in the literature, this study investigates populist attitudes among the electorate in Tokyo. Japan's local politics present an interesting case for research on populist attitudes. First, it allows us to measure populist attitudes outside of the regions wherein the existing studies were carried out. Second, it also permits us to examine the relationship between populist attitudes and political preferences in a political-institutional context that differs from the one in which the extant research was administered. Japan's local governments adhere to a presidential system, and they have produced several populist leaders in recent years. Among them, a prominent populist politician, Yuriko Koike, was elected as a governor of Tokyo in 2016, subsequently launching a new political party, 'Tomin First no Kai', or 'Tokyoites First Party' (hereafter referred to as the 'TFP'), which won the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election by a landslide in 2017. As we will discuss later, Koike is a typical populist politician. Koike's victory in the gubernatorial election and the TFP's landslide owing to the momentum of her win give us the opportunity to assess the extent to which a populist leader who is successful in mobilizing un-institutionalized and unorganized followers and gaining power is actually supported by voters with populist attitudes.

To achieve these purposes, we conducted an online survey of 1,500 Tokyo residents right after the assembly election to assess the characteristics of the supporters of a populist party there. We adjusted Akkerman et al.'s (2014) and Schulz et al.'s (2017) question items to measure populist attitudes in the Japanese political context. By analysing the original survey data, we first assess whether the question items commonly

used in the research on populist attitudes generate scales that are reliable and akin to those found in Europe and America. Second, we appraise the political party preferences of respondents with populist attitudes.

This paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses two approaches—political-strategic and ideational—in defining populism. Then, we review the literature on populist attitudes and clarify this study's contribution to it. We succinctly analyse the political strategies and ideologies of Yuriko Koike as a populist, develop a measure of populism as a multi-dimensional construct (cf. Schulz et al., 2017), and explain our methodological approach toward the online survey we conducted in June 2017 in Tokyo. We then perform factor and regression analyses to explore whether a scale for populism could be formed for Japanese voters and, if so, whether these populist scales are connected to their voting behaviours.

Defining populism: Political-strategic and ideational approaches

Two approaches have competed for conceptual dominance in the analysis of populist phenomena: political-strategic and ideational approaches. The political-strategic approach views populism as a strategy for political mobilization. 'Political strategy' denotes 'the methods and instruments of winning and exercising power' (Weyland, 2001: 12). Weyland (2001: 14) defines populism as 'a political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers'. As this definition suggests, existing research related to the political-strategic approach is centred on how a political entrepreneur mobilizes the

electorate. When an individual leader marshals mass support through an unmediated connection between the leader and his or her followers, the type of mobilization he or she inspires is called 'populism' (Weyland, 2001: 12-14).

The ideational approach perceives populism as a type of political ideology. Cas Mudde's seminal works created a focal point for ensuing empirical studies in this tradition, with his definition of populism as 'a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people' (Mudde, 2007: 23; italics in original). As this definition indicates, populists attach specific meanings to the people: the people are not only regarded as sovereign but also as homogeneous, pure, and virtuous (Akkerman et al., 2014: 1327). This specific understanding of the people leads to the next feature of populism in this tradition, which is the Manichean distinction between the elites and the people. The elites are conceived as the opposite of the people; while the elites are corrupt and evil, the people are pure and good. These dualistic characterizations of the people then give moralistic connotations to populism (Mudde, 2017).

As we will discuss later, this study applies both of the approaches to politicians and only the ideational one to the voters. That is, it assesses the political strategies and ideologies of a seemingly populistic politician through the lenses of the political-strategic and ideational approaches to populism, and then, based on the ideational definition of populism, measures populist attitudes at the individual level. Political strategies and ideologies have a black-and-white nature. In terms of political strategies,

we judge whether a politician attains the power based on direct, unmediated, un-institutionalized support from mostly unorganized followers or not. In terms of ideologies, we determine whether a politician's discourses exhibit all the populistic features: the Manichean distinction between the people and the elites, the worship of popular sovereignty, and belief in the homogeneity and virtuousness of the people. By contrast, this study assesses populist attitudes as a continuous variable at the mass level. We assume that individuals can have varying degrees of attitudes in each of these three sub-dimensions of populism as an ideology. This study's approach allows it to gauge the complex structure of political attitudes at the individual level. However, it still requires that voters score highly on all three components of populism to be regarded as populists.

Literature review: Populist attitudes

On the basis of the ideational definition of populism, research on populist attitudes among the electorate has thrived in recent years (Akkerman et al., 2014; Akkerman et al., 2017; Andreadis et al., 2019; Elchardus and Spruyt, 2016; Hawkins et al., 2012; Hawkins et al., forthcoming; Oliver and Rahn, 2016; Rooduijn, 2014; Schulz et al., 2017; Spruyt et al., 2016; Stanley, 2011; Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel, 2018). Research on this topic has pursued two purposes. The first has been to develop a valid and reliable scale measuring populist attitudes among the public. Hawkins et al. (2012) pioneered a scale that measured these attitudes, which Akkerman et al. (2014) extended. In so doing, they found that populist attitudes are distinguished from those of elitism and pluralism. Schulz et al. (2017) recently indicated that populist attitudes are

composed of three sub-dimensions: anti-elitism, a preference for popular sovereignty, and a belief in the homogeneity and virtuousness of the people.

This study also aims to improve the populism scale and assess its applicability in an exceedingly different context—such as Japan—than the one in which the original scale was devised. Previous works on populist attitudes geographically restrict themselves to specific regions—Europe and America. Hence, to what extent the measures of populist attitudes used in the existing literature can travel across regional contexts is unclear. In addition, we must find out whether populist attitudes exist in East Asian democracies in particular. Although Hellmann (2017: 161) points out that 'populist politicians and parties are…an extremely rare species' there, it does not necessarily mean that populism as an ideology is less likely to resonate with the electorate in these countries. They have consolidated their democratic regimes over an extended period, and their citizens have developed a sense of aversion to the resulting dysfunctional parliamentary democracy as well (cf. Wong et al., 2011). Without empirical research on populist attitudes among voters in East Asian countries, we will never know the reason that few populist politicians and parties exist there. Is it because populist attitudes have not been indigenous to the region from the beginning? Is it because populist politicians have failed to mobilize populist sentiments among constituents? This study is the first attempt to apply the populism scale to the masses of an East Asian polity to address these questions.

The second purpose of the studies on populist attitudes has been to scrutinize the relationship between these attitudes and preferences for populist parties or politicians. Several studies substantiate the positive relationship between populist attitudes and

support for left-wing and right-wing populist parties in West Europe (Akkerman et al., 2014; Akkerman et al., 2017; Rooduijn, 2014; Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel, 2018). Oliver and Rahn (2016) also show that Trump supporters have higher scores than average citizens on all three components of populism—anti-elitism, mistrust of experts, and national affiliation.

In the extant literature, however, there are few works on whether a populist party or politician who successfully seeks and seizes power by garnering support from unorganized followers is backed by constituents with populist attitudes. Previous studies only verify the existence of populist attitudes among segmented voters supporting radical parties in several European countries. Oliver and Rahn's (2016) results merely indicate that even Trump enjoyed the support of no more than a fraction of Republican voters with populist attitudes in the primary election. As previously discussed, political-strategic and ideational approaches are vying with each other for hegemony in research on populism, and the ideational approach has become dominant in recent years (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018). These empirical cases, in fact, confirm the assumption of the ideational approach—that the ideational elements of politicians' discourses constitute populism as an ideology and then spur the electorate to support a populist party or politician. However, this assumption has never been empirically validated in those cases—except in that of '*Trumpenvolk*'—which the political-strategic approach typically considers populism, such as those of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and Evo Morales in Bolivia. If the assumption that the ideational approach supersedes and encompasses the political-strategic approach is correct (cf. Mudde, 2017), the ideational content of a populist leader's discourses should resonate with populist sentiments

among the electorate even in countries that have populist leaders who are equipped with successful political mobilization strategies and actually grab the power. This hypothesis still needs to be verified with evidence.

Stating the above argument differently, both the political-strategic and the ideational approaches need to be cross-validated beyond their respective applied institutional contexts. While the political-strategic approach is abstracted from populist mass mobilization by a personalistic leader in Latin American countries, the ideational approach is based on the experiences of populist parties in West European countries. Whereas the former assumes that a charismatic leader mobilizes the unorganized mass under a presidential system,[1] the latter presupposes that a populist party consolidates its support base through its ideological campaign under a parliamentary system with proportional representation.[2] If the ideational approach is better suited to analyse populism than other approaches, it should be applied to, and verified in, the political-institutional context from which the political-strategic approach originated. However, except for the work of Hawkins and his colleagues (Andreadis et al., 2019; Hawkins et al., forthcoming), no study on populist attitudes has ever been carried out in that context.

The logic of populist mobilization under a proportional representation system might differ from that which exists under a presidential system. Under a proportional representation system, a populist party can secure its political influence through the mobilization of segmented voters. For instance, all a populist radical right party has to do to obtain a certain force in the parliament is to rally 'an electoral coalition that is highly homogenous with respect to its position on the new cultural dimension'

(Bornschier, 2019: 219).[3] Their votes will be translated into a portion of seats and will not be wasted under that system. Since the content of populism as an ideology—such as the Manichean distinction between the corrupt elites and the virtuous people, the assumption of the people's homogeneity, and the emphasis on popular sovereignty—is quite radical, it is plausible that populist attitudes may drive a small portion of voters to support a populist radical right or left party under a proportional representation system (Akkerman et al., 2014; Akkerman et al., 2017; Rooduijn, 2014).[4] However, it is a great leap to assume that a large segment of voters is attracted to the radical content of populism before electing a populist as president under a presidential system, where the political-strategic approach presupposes that a typical populist mobilization occurs. Under a presidential system, a populist politician is required to not only consolidate his or her support base but also extend it enough to secure a majority of voters. Hence, a populist politician successful in winning an election and gaining power must garner support from the broader electorate beyond a few voters motivated by the populist ideology under that system. This institutional hypothesis, in fact, accounts for Hawkins and his colleagues' findings that populist attitudes are not associated with the voting behaviours of those supporting populist politicians in Chile and Bolivia.

Japan's local politics offer an important case for appraising the extent to which the ideational approach's assumption can be applied to contexts in which a personalistic leader is likely to succeed in relating directly to the unorganized mass followers and then rising to power. First, the local governments—both prefectural and municipal—adopt a presidential system in Japan. This allows us to simulate a political institutional circumstance like that which the political-strategic approach presupposes. Second, local

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politics provides a more fertile ground than national politics for anti-establishment sentiments in Japan. While the electorate are more careful at the polls in national elections—especially general elections of the lower house—they more casually cast a protest vote against the then-nationally dominant parties in local elections. Japan's local politics have produced a few populist politicians in recent years. One of those prominent populists, Yuriko Koike, was elected governor of Tokyo in 2016 and subsequently launched a new political party, TFP, which won the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election by a landslide in 2017. Koike's victory in the gubernatorial election and the TFP's landslide on her coattails give us the opportunity to assess to what extent a populist leader, who is successful in mobilizing un-institutionalized and unorganized followers and is gaining power, is supported by voters with populist sentiments.

Overall, this study tries to overcome two limitations in the current research on populist attitudes. First, it overcomes the geographic constraint in the existing literature. This study is the first to measure populist attitudes among the public in East Asia. Second, it goes beyond the political-institutional context that is typical of research on populist attitudes. It assesses the relationships between populist attitudes and party preferences under a presidential system rather than a parliamentary system with proportional representation. This study explores the limitations of the research framework of populist attitudes and, ultimately, the ideational approach.

Yuriko Koike and the TFP as populists

The emergence of Yuriko Koike and the TFP is one of the crucial examples of a populist surge in Japan.[5] There have been a few cases demonstrating the rise of populists in Japanese local elections in recent years, such as those of Takashi Kawamura of *Genzei Nihon* and Toru Hashimoto of *Osaka Ishin* (Jou, 2015; Zenkyo, 2018). Among them, Koike and the TFP shared some typical characteristics of populist politicians and parties. Yuriko Koike, who had been a prominent politician of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), ran in the Tokyo gubernatorial election as an independent on a populist platform and won it by a landslide in 2016. Soon after the election, she founded the TFP, which was a personalized election vehicle for contesting in the upcoming assembly election. The newly-formed TFP handily defeated the LDP—the incumbent majority party—in the 2017 Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election.

Although Tokyo assembly members were elected under a combination of single-member districts (SMDs) and multi-member districts with a single non-transferable vote (MMDs with SNTV), voters casted their votes primarily owing to the TFP's party reputation in the 2017 Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election. The prevailing theory suggests that such electoral rules motivate candidates and electorates to cultivate personal votes because, under MMDs with SNTV, multiple candidates from the same party vie for a seat in the same district (cf. Carey and Shugart, 1995). However, there are several reasons that this theory does not apply to the 2017 election. All the TFP candidates rode on Koike's coattails to win seats. They all highlighted Koike's autograph and message in their campaign bulletins and tried to take advantage of her popularity. In addition, 40 out of 50 TFP candidates were first-timers, and most of them did not have personal networks of supporting groups. Furthermore, aiming to

take advantage of the reputation of the TFP, 10 incumbents or former members of the Tokyo assembly significantly increased their votes after switching from other political parties to the TFP. For example, three co-founders of it raised their vote shares by 60 to 320 percent over previous elections (Secretariat to Election Administration Commission, n.d.). This dramatic increase in votes for the incumbents was merely a result of being associated with the TFP.

If the competence and reputation of TFP's individual candidates did not deliver its landslide victory, what then motivated the Tokyoite voters to support Koike and the TFP? They tried to gain support from un-institutionalized and unorganized followers who were dismayed by the successive scandals of LDP politicians by adopting a typical populist strategy: bringing together disparate popular claims and demands and focusing them against self-serving and corrupted elites as a common enemy (Betz, 2019: 192). By the 2016 election, Koike had already started denouncing the LDP as 'authoritative bossism' and 'centralism' and condemning it for manipulating the assembly against the people's will (Sankei Shinbun, 2016). Koike adopted slogans such as 'Tokyoites First', 'bring back government to Tokyoites', and 'work for cause of the people', which were aimed to shatter the dominance of the LDP and gain support of unorganized voters. Subsequently, Koike featured similar slogans, such as 'Tokyoites First', 'information disclosure', and 'wise spending' in the 2017 election. The discourses and communication styles of Koike and the TFP strategically targeted un-institutionalized and unorganized voters who held anti-elite sentiments against the LDP.

Koike manifested several aspects of populism as an ideology as well. First, Koike and the TFP featured anti-elitism and a Manichean outlook on politics. Since

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2016, Koike had been consistently decrying ruling elites—especially those of the LDP in the assembly—for making all decisions behind closed doors and damaging the fairness and transparency of Tokyo's governance. Against the backdrop of deep distrust toward the LDP among the electorate, Koike and the TFP demonized it as a protector of vested interests in the election. We conducted a quantitative text analysis on the campaign bulletins of all candidates in the 2017 Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election (see Supplementary Appendix A), and its results show that the TFP candidates mentioned words such as 'reformation', 'Tokyo assembly', and 'politicians' more frequently than other party candidates. The results match the claim made by Koike and the TFP that the assembly should be freed from the bossism of LDP politicians. Second, Koike and the TFP embraced popular sovereignty. We qualitatively compared the manifestos of all the parties in that election (cf. Research Institute of Manifesto, 2017). The TFP was the only party that put 'complete disclosure of information' at the top of its manifesto. Koike said that it is important to provide information and to make policy process more transparent because that would make government officials more accountable to the citizens of Tokyo, who are sovereign in governance (Koike, 2017: 24-25). Third, Koike and the TFP presented the people as homogenous. They often addressed the 'interest of Tokyoites', as their party name—Tokyoite First—indicates. Koike seemed to assume that people (i.e. Tokyoites) are united and identifiable, as they share a common interest (Koike, 2017: 123).

Data and Measurements

To measure populist attitudes among Tokyoites and examine the relationship between these attitudes and people's voting behaviours, we conducted a web-based survey that consisted of a diverse set of questions on political attitudes and behaviours of Tokyoites aged 18–79 after the 2017 Tokyo Assembly Election, during July 10–13, 2017. We recruited survey respondents from an online panel registered with a Japanese research firm (Rakuten Insight, Inc.), which had over two million Japanese monitors as of May 2016. We collected our data through Qualtrics by using a quota sampling method to balance the marginal distributions of gender (male and female), age (18–29, 30–39, 40–49, 50–59, and 60+), and voting behaviours (having voted for Tomin First, the Liberal Democratic Party, Komei Party, Communist Party, and the other parties, as well as abstentions) in the 2017 Tokyo assembly election between the sample and the target population.[6] The total number of respondents who completed our survey was 1,500. Moreover, we reweighted our estimated results by using entropy balancing scores (Hainmueller, 2012) to enhance the external validity.[7]

We asked the respondents general questions concerning Japanese politics and solicited their opinions on the following 15 items to measure political attitudes among Tokyoites. Akkerman et al. (2014) distinguished between three political attitudes: (1) populist, (2) pluralist, and (3) elitist. In addition, Schulz et al. (2017) suggest that populist attitudes contain three distinct sub-dimensions: (1) anti-elitism,[8] (2) belief in unrestricted popular sovereignty, and (3) understanding of the people as homogenous and virtuous. Except for HOM 1 and PLU 1, these 13 items are taken from previous studies to measure these distinct political attitudes.[9] The respondents rated all items on

5-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (Disagree) to 5 (Agree). The order of these items was completely randomized in our survey:

- Politicians very quickly lose touch with ordinary people. (ANT1)

- The differences between ordinary people and the ruling elite are much greater than the differences among ordinary people. (ANT 2)

- Politicians are not really interested in what people like me think. (ANT 3)

- The people should have the final say on the most important political issues by voting on them directly in referendums. (SOV1)

- The people should be asked whenever important decisions are taken. (SOV 2)

- The people, not the politicians, should make our most important policy decisions. (SOV 3)

- In general, ordinary people have similar ways of thinking. (HOM 1)

- Ordinary people share the same values and interests. (HOM 2)

- Although the Japanese are very different from each other, when it comes down to it they all think the same. (HOM 3)

- Freedom cannot exist without respect for diversity. (PLU 1)

- It is important to listen to the opinion of other groups. (PLU 2)

- In a democracy, it is important to make compromises among differing viewpoints. (PLU 3)

- Politicians should lead rather than follow the people. (ELT1)

- Our country would be governed better if important decisions were left up to successful business people. (ELT2)

- Our country would be governed better if important decisions were left up to independent experts. (ELT3)

Results

To determine whether distinct dimensions were present in our data, we conducted an explanatory factor analysis (EFA) first. The 15 political attitude items were submitted to EFA using the oblimin rotation method and the maximum likelihood method for factor extraction, setting the number of factors as five based on the results of the parallel analysis.[10] We summarized those results in Figure 1.[11] The EFA results, which relied on our sample, reveal a five-dimensional structure: anti-elitism, sovereignty, homogeneity, pluralism, and elitism, and they are similar to the findings of Schulz et al.'s (2017) study, which used a regional sample in Switzerland. In other words, we were able to replicate the results of the previous study on the structure of populist attitudes through the analysis using a non-European sample.

[Figure 1 around here]

However, the EFA results in our data also show some differences from the previous research. Although Schulz et al. (2017) maintained that the populist dimension was modelled as a second-order factor comprised of three proposed distinct sub-

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dimensions (anti-elitism, sovereignty, and homogeneity), we did not replicate this result in our data analysis. The anti-elitism factor was highly correlated with the sovereignty factor (Pearson's r = 0.56). However, the homogeneity factor did not highly correlate with either anti-elitism (Pearson's r = 0.15) or sovereignty factors (Pearson's r = 0.26). From the results of our EFA, unlike those of Schulz et al. (2017), we are unable to conclude that populist attitudes are a latent higher-order construct composed of three lower-order sub-dimensions.

We further examined the dimensionality of political attitudes using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to test the robustness of our EFA results. In this analysis, we permitted items to load only on the factors that were expected from the results of EFA. The results confirmed the five-dimensional factor model and indicated an acceptable model fit (see Supplementary Appendix E for details). For example, the value of the comparative fit index was 0.989. Beyond that, other indices to judge the goodness of fit, such as the NNFI, RFI, and NFI, also exceed 0.95 points. The value of the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) was lower than 0.05. Although the results of CFA that excluded ELT1, whose standardized coefficient is a bit small (0.208), may be a better fit, we can accept the result of CFA using full items.

Based on the results of both EFA and CFA, we created five different scales for each dimension of political attitudes (means of the sum scores) for examining the relationship between populist attitudes and voting behaviours in the 2017 Tokyo assembly election.[12] The homogeneity scale was constructed from the items HOM 1 to HOM 3 (mean = 2.82, S.D. = 0.81); the sovereignty scale, SOV 1 to SOV 3 (mean = 3.34, S.D. = 0.83); the anti-elitism scale, ANT 1 to ANT 3 (mean = 3.75, S.D. = 0.79);

the pluralism scale, PLU 1 to PLU 3 (mean = 3.94, S.D. = 0.64); and the elitism scale, ELT 1 to ELT 3 (mean = 3.13, S.D. = 0.66). We use these five composite scales for the subsequent analyses.

Figure 2 lists the weighted mean scores of each dimension and their 95% confidence intervals estimated using the bootstrap method (1,000 resampling) by vote choice. The circles in this figure are the weighted means in each voting category, and horizontal error bars indicate their confidence intervals. The dotted lines are the total weighted means of each dimension. As shown in Figure 2, all populist attitudes are significantly correlated to a respondent's voting behaviours. The results of a one-way ANOVA indicate that all weighted mean differences by voting behaviour are statistically significant, at 5% levels (see Supplementary Appendix F for more details). However, the mean scores of the respondents who voted for TFP candidates are not necessarily higher than the scores of those who voted for other parties, nor are they significantly different from the total mean scores. These results suggest that the respondents who voted for TFP candidates did not hold strong populist attitudes.

[Figure 2 around here]

With respect to the differences in the dimension of homogeneity, the score for TFP voters is statistically higher than the scores of the Communist Party (dif. = -0.372, $p < 0.01$) and other parties (dif. = -0.266, $p < 0.05$). However, the mean score for the LDP, which is not a populist party, is also significantly higher than the scores for both the Communist Party (dif. = -0.453, $p < 0.01$) and other parties (dif. = -0.345, $p < 0.01$).

The sovereignty score for TFP voters is closer to the overall mean, and the differences between the TFP, Komei party, Communist Party, other parties, and abstaining voters are not statistically significant, while the score for the TFP is significantly higher than that for the LDP (dif. = -0.404, $p < 0.01$). The pluralism score for TFP voters is closer to the overall mean as well. The anti-elitism score for TFP voters is significantly higher than that of the LDP (dif. = -0.407, $p < 0.01$) and Komei party voters (dif. = -0.368, $p < 0.01$). However, it is almost equal to the total mean, and the score for Communist Party voters is higher than that of TFP voters (statistically insignificant). Finally, the elitism score for TFP voters is also closer to the overall mean. To sum up, these results show that TFP voters do not necessarily have distinctive populist attitudes.[13]

Contrary to our expectations, Figure 2 shows that the Communist Party is supported more by people who hold several components of populist attitudes than the TFP or LDP. The weighted mean scores of anti-elitism and sovereignty for Communist party backers are higher than the overall mean. In addition, the mean scores of these two dimensions for the Communist Party are the highest in this figure. Nonetheless, the mean scores of homogeneity and pluralism are also the lowest and the highest among its electorate, respectively, which means that the supporters of the Communist Party do not believe in the homogeneity of the people and do respect the diversity of opinions.

In order to check the robustness of the findings described above, we examined the correlation between populist attitudes and voters' preferences, such as support for the TFP. We measured the feeling thermometers for the LDP, the Communist Party, and the TFP in our survey (see Supplementary Appendix H). We analysed the correlations

between populist attitudes and feelings toward the TFP and compared them with the results in the cases of the LDP and the Communist Party.

Figure 3 shows the results of the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. The dependent variables are the feeling thermometers for the TFP, the LDP, and the Communist Party. The independent variables are the scales of anti-elitism, sovereignty, homogeneity, pluralism, and elitism. In addition, xenophobia, ideology (liberal[0] – neutral[5] – conservative[10]), gender (male[1] or female[0]), age (18 – 79), education (1 – 4), and region (inside the 23 wards[1] or not[0]) were included in the models to control the effects of these variables.[14] The circles in Figure 3 are the estimated values of coefficients of each variable, and horizontal bars are their 95% confidence intervals. If a horizontal line does not overlap with the 0-point vertical line, its coefficient would be statistically significant at the 5% level.

[Figure 3 around here]

Figure 3 illuminates that populist attitudes have no significant relationship with not only voting behaviours for the TFP but also with preference for that party. The coefficient values of anti-elitism, sovereignty, homogeneity, and pluralism scales are relatively small and do not significantly affect feelings toward the TFP. Although the elitism scale has a significantly positive relationship with the preference for the TFP, its effect size is almost the same as that of feelings toward the LDP, which is not a populist party. By contrast, the sovereignty and pluralism scales have significantly positive effects on feelings toward the Communist Party at the 5% level. These results suggest

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that while Communist Party supporters share one important aspect of populism—popular sovereignty—they also believe in recognizing diversity and respecting divergent opinions among sovereign people. In sum, we found no apparent relationship between populist attitudes and preferences for a populist party, which is in contrast to the results of the analyses in previous studies.

Conclusion

Building on previous research, this paper undertook two tasks. First, we examined whether the scales employed for measuring individual populist attitudes in previous works (cf. Akkerman et al., 2014; Schulz et al., 2017) generated consistent dimensions among the Japanese electorate and, if so, what shape the structure of these dimensions would take among them. Second, we investigated whether voters with populist attitudes tended to support populist politicians in a polity where a personalistic leader had succeeded in mobilizing the unorganized mass and seizing power.

Concerning the first task, we demonstrated that the question items on populist attitudes constructed scales among Japanese voters as well, and those scales were consistent with the findings in the previous research. The EFA and CFA revealed that populist attitudes form a three-dimensional structure composed of anti-elitism, popular sovereignty, and homogeneity, all of which are distinctive from elitist and pluralist attitudes. These results suggest that populist attitudes exist in Japan, as well as in Europe and America, and it is possible to measure them with the question items regularly used in the literature. However, the results also indicate that, unlike in Schulz et al.'s (2017) work, one sub-dimension of populist dimension—homogeneity—is not

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strongly correlated with the other two sub-dimensions—anti-elitism and popular sovereignty; this means that fewer voters combine these three components of populism in their attitudes in Japan, at least among Tokyo residents.

Second, engaging with previous research (Akkerman et al., 2014; Akkerman et al., 2017; Andreadis et al., 2019; Hawkins et al., forthcoming; Oliver and Rahn, 2016; Rooduijn, 2014; Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel, 2018), we also scrutinized the relationship between populist attitudes and political preferences among the Tokyoite constituents. Unlike in these existing works, we found that there was no substantive correlation between populist attitudes and either voting behaviour for, or feelings towards, a populist party. Rather, supporters of the Japanese Communist Party exhibit populist tendencies distinctive from those of other constituents in the dimensions of anti-elitism and demand for popular sovereignty, though they do not believe in the homogeneity of the people. Nonetheless, since Communist Party backers do not necessarily exhibit the three essential components of populism, they are hardly considered to be populists.

The empirical results of this study point to the limitations of populist attitudes as an explanatory variable for the rise of populism. Several components of populist attitudes—such as the demand for popular sovereignty and belief in the homogeneity and virtuousness of the people—are quite radical political views. As the supporters of the Communist Party express some affinity for anti-elitism and popular sovereignty in our survey sample, it is plausible that a radical party might attract a greater or lesser portion of constituents with populist attitudes by embracing populism as a political ideology. In fact, populist radical right parties have consolidated their political influence

by regularly securing segmented voters under a proportional representation system in most West European countries. However, they have remained entrenched as fringe parties in most of these countries. It is hard to imagine that a majority of voters might retain populist attitudes and that these attitudes might drive them to support a populist politician and propel him or her to power. The case of Yuriko Koike indicates that, even though her discourses and political style sounded populistic during the gubernatorial and assembly elections, her populism did not necessarily resonate with her supporters. This study implies that the theoretical approach employing populism as a political ideology and focusing on populist attitudes at the individual level is unable to account for the rise of a populist politician who has been successful in mobilizing a majority of voters and then seizing power.

Without going beyond speculation without solid empirical evidence, this study's results also cast doubts about the effectiveness of populist attitudes in accounting for populist phenomena in East Asia at the mass level. Populist politicians in a political-strategic sense—such as Yuriko Koike—appeal to frustration with ongoing politics and anti-establishment sentiments among ordinary citizens there, which is a common theme in other regions as well. However, as the empirical results indicate, the constituents who hold anti-elitist views and demand popular sovereignty do not necessarily believe in the homogeneity and virtuousness of the people in Japan. If we follow Mudde's (2007: 23) definition, these voters playing into populists' hands cannot be called populists in an ideational sense. In East Asia, political antagonism has historically been structured around foreign policy, and not associated with socio-economic (i.e. class politics) or socio-cultural (i.e. immigration policy) cleavages. As Hellmann (2017) points out, since

this political context blurs the boundary of social identities among the electorate, right- and left-wing politicians face difficulties in identifying the contours of the 'pure people' in East Asia. It is not until the 'foe' is identified that 'friends' are perceived as homogenous. Nonetheless, because the literature lacks empirical works that apply populist attitudes to regions other than Europe and America, more research is required to assess the transversality of populism scales.

Notes

1 The term 'unorganized mass' aligns with a majority electoral coalition open for radical political change in Bornschier's (2019: 219) 'majoritarian populism'.

2 It is true that France and the UK have rigorous populist radical right parties—the National Front and the UKIP—and they adopt a single-member district system with or without two-round runoff voting, respectively, for their national elections. However, the National Front and the UKIP have bolstered their party strength through the European Parliament elections, which use a proportional representation system.

3 The term 'segmented voters' corresponds to the voters that 'segmented populism' tries to mobilise (Bornschier, 2019: 206).

4 While some might argue that populist radical right parties have recently expanded their support beyond 'segmented voters', their support bases are not comparable to the share of votes a successful populist politician garners in a presidential election. For example, the French National Front received only 13.2% of votes in the first round of the national assembly election in 2017, the Sweden Democrats gained 17.5% in 2018, and the Jobbik of Hungary acquired 19.1% in 2018 (Döring and Manow, 2018). It is true that the Five Star Movement secured 33.3% of votes in the Italian general election and created a coalition government with the League (former Lega Nord) in 2018. Nevertheless, it has not been empirically demonstrated that the Five Star Movement was supported by constituents with populist attitudes in that election.

5 It is worth noting that chief executives of Japanese local governments are elected under the presidential system and the extent of power granted to them was enlarged by decentralization reforms in the 2000s. Due to these institutional elements, there has

been more room for populistic politicians to prevail in Japanese local politics than on the national scale.

[6] We obtained information about the Tokyoite population from the website of the Statistics Bureau of Japan. It is available at: http://www.stat.go.jp/ (accessed 22 May 2018).

[7] The details of the reweighting procedure and results are provided in Supplementary Appendix C.

[8] As Akkerman et al. (2014) suggest, populist movements are often led by a charismatic leader in practice. Therefore, while ordinary people regard the elites as 'evil', they accept the leadership of other elite politicians at the same time. Ideas of anti-elitism and elitism need not be mutually exclusive.

[9] HOM1 and PLU 1 are our own original items. Although 'freedom depends on diversity' and 'ordinary people are of good and honest character' have usually been used in previous works to measure political attitudes on dimensions of homogeneity and pluralism, the wording of these items was awkward when translated into Japanese. Therefore, we coined these original phrases. The remainder of the eight items related to anti-elitism, demand for popular sovereignty, and belief in homogeneity were taken from Schulz et al. (2017), and the five items related to pluralism and elitism were taken from Akkerman et al. (2014).

[10] Parallel analysis is one of the methods used to determine the number of latent factors through the comparison of eigenvalues between actual data and randomly generated data using Monte Carlo Simulation. On the basis of their simulated studies, Çokluk and Koçak (2016) emphasized that parallel analysis is an acceptable and consistent method in deciding the number of factors. We summarize the results of the parallel analysis in

Supplementary Appendix D. These results suggest that the five-dimensional structure

model of populist attitudes is a good fit for our data.

[11] The five factors together account for 46% of the variance (Homogeneity = 10%,

Sovereignty = 10%, Pluralism = 10%, Anti-Elitism = 10%, and Elitism = 6%).

[12] The question wordings and the answer categories of voting behaviours are provided

in Supplementary Appendix H. In the analysis of this section, we recoded the scale of

voting behaviours into six categories to easily interpret the results.

[13] To test the robustness of Figure 2, we also examined the correlation between either

trust in politicians, trust in political institutions, or xenophobia, and a respondent's

voting behaviours in the 2017 Tokyo assembly election because it could be assumed that

these attitudes would correlate with populist attitudes, as suggested in previous works

(Akkerman et al., 2017; Inglehart and Norris, 2016; Rooduijn and Akkerman, 2017).

However, our results indicate that populist attitudes as well as political (dis)trust and

xenophobic attitudes are not correlated with the tendency to vote for TFP candidates

(see Supplementary Appendix G).

[14] These demographic variables are generally used as control variables. The xenophobia

and ideological self-identification scales are significant confounding variables.

Therefore, we include these variables in the regression model. Supplementary Appendix

H gives the wording of questions and the answer categories of these variables.

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**Figure 1. Result of explanatory factor analysis.**

Figure 2. Relationship between populist attitudes and voting behaviours.

**Figure 3. Results of ordinary least squares regressions.**

Supplementary Appendix

A. Quantitative Text Analysis

In order to understand what policies each candidate focused on during the 2017 Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election, we conducted a quantitative text analysis using their official election reports ("Senkyo Koho"). We gathered all of their report files from the Tokyo Election Management Committee's home page (http://www.senkyo.metro.tokyo.jp/election/senkyo-kouhou/togikai-kouhou/, accessed Jan. 20, 2019), and made a dataset for the analysis. This dataset includes all character information in the reports except candidate name, party information, biography, and recommenders' comments and their list. We used the RMeCab (ver. 1.00) R-programming package and the NEologd dictionary system (last updated Jan. 24, 2019) for the analysis. The total number of letters is 102,204 and the word length is 6,632.

We summarize the results of the text analysis in Sup. Fig. 1. This figure shows that the 20 nouns that the candidates used most frequently in their official election reports and the relative frequencies of use of these nouns by parties that won more than ten seats in the 2017 Tokyo election. The relative frequencies in this figure are calculated such that each word frequency is divided by text length for each party.

Sup. Fig. 1: The results of the relative frequency analysis

The figure demonstrates that Tomin First candidates tended to use the nouns associated with the 'big reformation of the Tokyo Assembly (東京大改革),' such as 'reformation (改革)', 'regulation (条例),' and 'politicians (議員),' in their reports. For example, Takaaki Higuchi, he is a candidate of Tomin First for Chiyoda District in the 2017 election, used 'regulation' and 'politician' as follows: 'regulation to prohibit intervention in personnel decisions in Tokyo metropolitan government and unfair intercession by politicians (議員の不当な口利きや都庁人事への介入禁止条例).'

On the other hand, as the figure shows, candidates of the other parties did not frequently use such words in their official election reports. For example, Liberal Democratic Party candidates tended to argue the necessity of 'progress of the Tokyo Olympics and Paralympics', and the Japanese Communist Parties' candidates tended to use words associated with moving the fish market from 'Tsukiji' to 'Toyosu' and 'Article 9 of the [Japanese] Constitution.'

These results mean that Tomin First candidates shared a basic policy and brought it across positively during the election campaign even under the combination of SMDs and MMDs with SNTV. Theoretically, candidates under this rule tend to appeal not to the policies of their parties, but to individual policies and characteristics. Therefore, electorates under this rule also tend to vote based not on the candidates' parties, but on their personalities under this rule. However, for the Tomin First candidates in the 2017 Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election, our results show that they emphasized on the party to which they belonged and strongly depended on the coattail effect of Yuriko Koike.

B. Details of Instruction Manipulation Check and Alert message

B. 1 Instruction manipulation check

After the preliminary questions for quarter sampling, we asked the respondents the question called Instruction Manipulation Check (IMC). The IMC is useful tool to identify satisficers who have limited cognitive resources and attempt to minimize cognitive effort. In order to make the respondents more attentive and careful, we also identified satisficers through the IMC as previous studies did.

We present our IMC in SupFig 2. The vignette begins with the heading "please read the following question," and we presented the respondents a very long text about decision making, like Oppenheimer et al. (2009). After that, we embedded the instructions "So, if you have read these instructions, please do not answer the following questions (that is, you should not choose any items) and proceed to the next page. A notification saying you did not choose any items will appear on your screen when you click on the next tab at the bottom without answering the question. Please ignore this notification." in the middle position of this vignette. Finally, at the end of the IMC, we asked the respondents "Of the following opinions, please check the ones that you agree to" to determine whether the respondents carefully read our instructions or not. The opinion items are as follows: (1) Economic gap has grown in Japan, (2) Government should abolish the welfare system for poor and needy people, (3) I would not like to join a radical political movement, (4) It is an obligation for us to participate in demonstrations, (5) Government should disclose the information about politicians and public administrators, (6) I cannot trust politicians and disapprove of their behavior, and (7) Does not apply.

以下の文章に目を通してください。

人間の意思決定に関する最近の研究において、人間の決定は「真空」状態で行われるものではないことが知られています。個人の好みや知識、そしてその人がそのときどんな状況にあるのかが、意思決定過程に重要な影響を及ぼすとされているのです。我々はこうした意思決定過程への研究を行うために、あなたの意思決定者としてのある要素を知りたいと考えています。つまり、あなたがこの文章を、時間をかけて読んでいるかどうかに興味があるのです。そこであなたがこの指示を読んでいるなら、最後のあなたのお考えに近いものを１つ選択してください、という教示を無視して、以下の項目のいずれにもチェックをせずに（つまりどの選択肢もクリックせずに）次のページに進んでください。何もクリックしない場合、警告文が出てきますが、その指示は無視してください。もし誰もこの指示をお読みになっていないとしたら、指示内容を変えることが意思決定に与える影響を見たいというような、我々の試みは成功しているとはいえないのです。

そこで以下の意見について、それぞれあなたのお考えに近い選択肢をあるだけ選んでください。

☐ 日本は経済格差が広がっている　　☐ 生活保護制度などなくすべきだ
☐ 過激な政治運動に関わりたくない　　☐ 政治家など信頼できない
☐ デモへの参加を義務化すべきだ　　☐ 同意できる意見はない
☐ 政治家や行政の情報は非公開にすべきだ

SupFig 2: Original Japanese IMC

Through the IMC, the 797 respondents (about 53.1 percent) were identified as satisficers in our survey. We showed an alert message, which we will explain in A.2 section, to the respondents identified as satisficers to make them more attentive and careful.

B. 2 Alert message for satisficers

As we mentioned above, we showed the alert message like a SupFig. 3 to satisficers who did not follow our instruction "please do not answer the following questions." We explained the reason why we had shown this message and asked the satisficers to read the question wordings more carefully in our survey at the time of this alert. At last, we explained "if you do not read the question carefully and are identified as inattentive respondents again, we will ask you to stop answering the questions as we mentioned on the consent form," and required the satisficers to agree with this statement.

【注意】

あなたは先ほどの質問において **「以下の項目のいずれにもチェックをせずに次の**
ページに進んでください」 という教示文を読み飛ばし、次のページに進もうとし
ました。

そのような設問を読み飛ばそうとする行為は、調査結果の妥当性、そして学術的
研究を行うための調査としての価値を著しく棄損することが知られています。以
降の設問では、文章や項目にきちんと目を通されたうえで、ご回答いただきます
よう、よろしくお願い申し上げます。

同意画面にて記させて頂きました通り、**再度設問項目を読み飛ばすような事態が**
生じた場合、途中で調査を終了させていただく場合がございます。この点、ご了
承くださいますよう、お願い申し上げます。

☐ 設問に目を通すことに同意し、次に進む

SupFig 3: Original Japanese alert message for satisficers

C. Weighting

We reweighted our estimated results by using entropy balancing scores (Hainmueller, 2012) to enhance the external validity, because an imbalance has remained between the sample and the population. FigSup 4 presents the distributions of four variables in the target population, the weighted sample, and the unweighted sample. The distributions of gender and voting behavior are similar to the target population. Conversely, the distributions of residency and some age categories are significantly different from the target distribution. However, our sample is almost perfectly balanced with the target population regarding the distributions of the four demographical variables, after reweighting.

SupFig 4: Comparison of the survey sample and the target population

D. Parallel Analysis

SupFig 5 summarizes the result of the parallel analysis. Determining the number of dimensions of populist attitudes is one of the most challenging stages of our study because there is little evidence about the number of dimensions among Japanese voters. Therefore, we conducted a parallel analysis to determine whether distinct dimensions of populist attitudes were present in our data.

SupFig 5: Result of parallel analysis

As SupFig 5 shows, the eigenvalue of the first factor in the simulated data is around 0.3 points, while those of the other factors in the simulated data is 0.1 points or lower. On the other hand, the eigenvalue of the first factor in the actual data is over 2.5 points, and it is higher than that of the simulated data. The eigenvalue of the fifth factor is around 0.2, which is also higher than the value of the simulated data as well. However, the eigenvalue of the simulated data of the sixth factor is higher than that of the actual data. This result suggests that our data presents the five-dimensional structure model of populist attitudes.

E. Confirmatory Factor Analysis

SupTable 1: The result of confirmatory factor analysis

	Coef.	Std. Err.	Std. Coef.	R-Square
ANT1	1		0.814	0.662
ANT2	0.816	0.028	0.664	0.441
ANT3	0.909	0.031	0.740	0.547
SOV1	1		0.808	0.652
SOV2	0.951	0.029	0.768	0.59
SOV3	0.803	0.026	0.649	0.421
HOM1	1			0.648
HOM2	0.996	0.033	0.802	0.643
HOM3	0.758	0.026	0.610	0.372
PLU1	1		0.750	0.562
PLU2	0.954	0.035	0.715	0.511
PLU3	0.965	0.038	0.723	0.523
ELT1	1		0.208	0.043
ELT2	3.424	0.547	0.711	0.506
ELT3	2.905	0.477	0.603	0.364
Covariances:				
	SOV	HOM	PLU	ELT
ANT	0.611	0.155	0.306	0.207
SOV		0.271	0.247	0.318
HOM			-0.146	0.469
PLU				-0.015
Goodness of fit index:				
CFI	0.981			
NNFI	0.975			
RMSEA	0.053			
SRMR	0.045			

F. One Way ANOVA

SupTable 2: The result of one way ANOVA

	F Statistics	df	denom df	p value
Anti. Elitism	10.903	5	375.29	0.0000
Sovereignty	10.373	5	374.65	0.0000
Homogeneity	5.3947	5	370.97	0.0001
Pluralism	11.353	5	374.55	0.0000
Elitism	8.4805	5	370.88	0.0000

G. Relationships between Political Trust and Voting Behavior, and between Xenophobia and Voting Behavior

SupFig 6: Political trust scales and xenophobia by voting behavior (dashed lines are total means)

H. Question Wordings (English & Japanese)

1. Voting behavior in the 2017 Tokyo assembly election

Question: Did you vote in the Tokyo assembly election on July 2, 2017? If you vote, which party's candidate did you vote for? Please choose only one category (2017 年 7 月 2 日（日）に投開票が行われた東京都議会議員選挙についてお伺いさせて頂

きます。あなたはこの選挙で投票に行きましたか。また、行かれた場合、どの
政党所属の候補者に投票しましたか。以下の選択肢の中から 1 つ選んでくださ
い).

Answer categories: I voted for the Tomin First's candidate / I voted for the Liberal
Democratic Party's candidate / I voted for the Komei Party's candidate / I voted for the
Communist Party's candidate / I voted for the other party's candidate or an independent
candidate / I would like to go to vote, but I abstained. / I wouldn't like to go to vote and
abstained / No answer (都民ファースト所属の候補者に投票した/自民党所属の候
補者に投票した/公明党所属の候補者に投票した/共産党所属の候補者に投票し
た/その他政党・無所属の候補者に投票した/投票に行こうと思っていたが、行
かなかった/投票に行く気がなく棄権した/回答しない)

2. Feeling thermometer

Question: Could you answer your feelings about the following politicians and parties?
If you had strongly positive feeling, please move the slider bar at 100 degrees. If you
had strongly negative feeling, please move the slider bar at 0 degrees. If you were
neutral, please move the slider bar at 50 degrees. How do you feel about...(以下の政治
家や政党に対するあなたのお気持ち（好感度）を温度にたとえてご回答くださ
い。最も暖かい場合は 100 度、最も冷たい場合は 0 度とし、温かくも冷たくも
ない中立の場合を 50 度とすると、あなたのお気持ちは何度でしょうか)?

Answer categories: Abe, Shinzo / Renho / Yamaguchi, Natsuo / Shii, Kazuo / Koike,
Yuriko / Liberal Democratic Party / Communist Party / Japan Restoration Party / The
Democratic Party / Tomin First no Kai / Komei Party (安倍晋三 / 蓮舫 / 山口那津男 /
志位和夫 / 小池百合子 / 自民党 / 共産党 / 日本維新の会 / 民進党 / 都民ファース
トの会 / 公明党)

3. Political attitudes

Question: The followings are the statements about politics and society. How much do you agree or disagree with these statements? (以下に政治や社会のあり方に関する意見が示されています。これらについて、あなたはどの程度、同意できるとお考えでしょうか)

＊ Please mark "agree to some extend (「ややそう思う」を選択してください)

＊ Politicians very quickly lose touch with ordinary people (政治家は、すぐに一般人のことを理解できなくなる)

＊ The differences between ordinary people and the ruling elite are much greater than the differences between ordinary people (政治家と一般人の間の考えの違いは、一般人の間のそれよりもずっと大きい)

＊ Politicians are not really interested in what people like me think (政治家は実際のところ、私のような一般人の考えに興味などない)

＊ The people should have the final say on the most important political issues by voting on them directly in referendums (重要な政治的決定については、政治家ではなく、一般人による直接投票によって決めるべきだ)

＊ The people should be asked whenever important decisions are taken (重要な政治的決定を行う時はいつでも、一般人に問われるべきだ)

＊ The people, not the politicians, should make our most important policy decisions (政治家ではなく一般人が重要な政策を形成すべきだ)

＊ Ordinary people share the same values and interests (一般人の多くは同じ関心事や価値観を持っている)

＊ The way of thinking among ordinary people are similar in general (一般の人は、大抵、似通った考え方をしている)

＊ Although the Japanese are very different from each other, when it comes down to it they all think the same (日本は他の国とは大きく異なるが、日本人の中の相違は大きくない)

＊　Freedom cannot be existing without respect to diversity (自由は多様性への尊重無しには存在し得ない)

＊ It is important to listen to the opinion of other groups (自分とは異なる組織や集団の意見を聞くことはとても重要だ)

＊ In a democracy, it is important to make compromises among differing viewpoints (民主主義では、異なる考えを持つ人の中で合意を形成することが重要だ)

＊ Politicians should lead rather than follow the people (政治家は人々に従うのではなく、導いて行くべき存在だ)

＊ Our country would be governed better if important decisions were left up to successful business people (ビジネスで成功したリーダーが重要な政策決定をした方が、日本はよりよく統治される)

＊ Our country would be governed better if important decisions were left up to independent experts (政治家や一般人ではなく卓越した専門家が重要な政策決定をした方が、日本はよりよく統治される)

Answer categories: Disagree (1) – neither agree nor disagree (3) – Agree (5) (同意しない [1]−どちらともいえない [3] – 同意する [5])

4. Residence

Question: Which wards or municipalities do you live? Please choose only one category.

Answer categories: The twenty-three wards of Tokyo and all municipalities in Tokyo prefecture (東京 23 区および東京都下全市町村)

5. Education

Question: What is your final schooling (or schooling now)? please choose indicating the type of final schooling when you were (are) a student (あなたが最後に在籍した（あるいは、現在在籍している）学校は次のうちどれでしょうか。以下の選択肢の中からもっとも適当なものを 1 つ選んでください)

Answer categories: junior high school / high school / Technical school, college or advanced vocational school / undergraduate school / graduate school / No answer (中学校 / 高校 / 短大・高専・専門学校/ 4 年生大学 / 6 年生大学・大学院 / 回答しない)

6. Ideology

Question: Generally speaking, the words of "conservative" and "liberal" are frequently used in the case of explain about the political stance. In the scale, the left end (1) means the most liberal, the middle point (4) means the neutral, and the right end 7 means the most conservative. Please choose the number that best describes your position (政治的立場を表すのに、よく「保守的」「革新的」と言う言葉が使われます。1 が革新的、4 が中間、7 が保守的だとすると、あなたはどの辺りに位置付けられるとお考えでしょうか).

Answer categories: 1 (Liberal) —2—3—4—5—6—7 (Conservative) (1 (革新的) —2—3—4—5—6—7 (保守的)

7. Xenophobia

Question: In the following people, what kinds of people would not you like to have as neighbors? (次にあげるような人々のうち、あなたが近所に住んで欲しくないと思うのは、どのような人でしょうか)

＊ People of a different religion (宗教が異なる人)

＊ Public assistance recipients (生活保護受給者)

＊ People of a different race (自分とは人種の異なる人)

＊ Homosexuals (同性愛者)

＊ People who speak a different language (外国語を喋る人)

＊ Korean people living in Japan (在日韓国・朝鮮人)

＊ Unmarried couples living together (同棲カップル)

＊ Anti-social forces (反社会的団体)

＊ Immigrants/foreign workers (移民・外国人労働者)

Answer categories: mentioned / not mentioned (該当/非該当)

8. Trust in politicians and trust in political institutions
Question: The followings are the statements about political trust or distrust. How much do you agree or disagree with these statements? (以下に政治への不信感あるいは信頼感に関する意見が述べられています。あなたはこれらの意見について、どの程度同意できるとお考えでしょうか)

[Trust in politicians]
＊ Politicians care about big companies and organizations, not all the people (政治家は一般の有権者ではなく、大企業や組織のことばかり考えている)
＊ Politicians are pretty much run by a few their supporters, not for the benefit of all the people (政治家は有権者全体ではなく一部の支持者のために活動している)
＊ Politicians get involved in any corruptions and frauds (政治家は汚職や不正行為ばかりしている)
＊ Politicians are not interested in hearing what people think because of their factional squabbles (政治家は派閥争いばかりで有権者のことなど気にかけていない)
[Trust in political institutions]
＊ The public opinion is reflected on politics by party system (政党制度があるからこそ、有権者の声が政治に反映される)
＊ The public opinion is reflected on politics by electoral system (選挙制度があるからこそ、有権者の声が政治に反映される)
＊ The public opinion is reflected on politics by parliament system (政党制度があるからこそ、有権者の声が政治に反映される)

Answer categories: Disagree (1) – neither agree nor disagree (3) – Agree (5) (同意しない [1]−どちらともいえない [3] – 同意する [5])