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# Cohesive Coalition vs. Fragmented Alliance: Comparing the Class Bases of Right-Wing and Left-Wing Populist Parties

Takeshi Hieda \*

## Abstract

This study compares the attributes of individuals supporting right-wing and left-wing populist parties, relying on a two-dimensional occupational class scheme. To clarify the intervening structure among occupational class, political orientations, and party preferences, this study analysed the cumulative data of the European Social Survey (ESS) Rounds 4-8 (2008-2017) from 22 European countries, using a mixed-effects logit model and a mediation analysis method recently developed for a logit and probit model. Using a rigorous approach, the empirical results reveal that while right-wing populist parties depend on a cohesive coalition among the lower rung of vertical occupational class scheme, the left-wing ones are supported by a fragmented cross-class alliance

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that are divergent in terms of anti-establishment sentiments and political orientations in a socio-cultural dimension. These results imply that the social foundation of right-wing populism is more consolidated than that of left-wing populism.

**Keywords:** populism, political behaviour, party politics, occupation class, mediation analysis

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## 1. Introduction

‘A spectre is haunting Europe—the spectre of populism.’ Spoofing the exordium of *The Communist Manifesto*, people can detect the populism of both left and right sides spreading in the advanced democracies. In the United States, Donald Trump ascended to presidency with a big surprise in 2016. In the 2017 French presidential election, while candidates from the then two major parties—*Parti Socialiste* and *Les Républicains*—did not reach a

run-off election, Marine Le Pen from *Front National* (FN) competed against Emmanuel Macron for the presidency. On the left-side of political spectrum, Syriza and Podemos rode on the momentum generated by the Great Recession and entered a government in Greece and Spain, respectively, during the 2010s.

Reflecting on the growing concern over populism, an immense amount of research on it has accumulated in recent decades.<sup>1)</sup> This study focuses on the class foundations of populist parties in Europe. The literature extensively characterizes the voters of radical and/or populist parties—which overlap each other to significant degree—and extracts the similarities and differences of the radical-left and -right populist party supporters. On one hand, some studies claim that they share Euroscepticism (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2007; Rama and Santana, 2020; van Bohemen et al., 2019; van Elsas et al., 2016), protectionism (van Bohemen et al., 2019; van der Waal and de Koster, 2018), distrust in politics (Kriesi and Schulte-Cloos, 2020; van Bohemen et al., 2019), populist attitudes (Akkerman et al., 2017; Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel, 2018), psychological traits (Bakker et al., 2016; Vasilopoulos and Jost, 2020), and subjective and objective social status (Burgoon et al., 2018; Gidron and Hall, 2020; Rooduijn and Burgoon, 2018). On the other hand, others exemplify that the voters of radical-left and -right populist parties are distinctive in terms of education attainment (Rooduijn et al., 2017; van Elsas, 2017), anti-elitism (Rama and Santana, 2020), anti-immigrant attitudes, and economic egalitarianism (Akkerman et al., 2017; Rooduijn et al., 2017).

The existing literature also clarifies the class foundations of left-wing and right-wing populist parties. A huge number of studies point out that right-

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1) For a review of supply- and demand-side accounts of populism, see Berman (2021).

wing populist parties derive a larger portion of their support from the working class, and then explore the rationale behind this phenomenon (see, e. g., Bornschieer, 2018; Kurer, 2020; Oesch and Rennwald, 2018; Rydgren, 2013). The literature also illuminates that skilled and unskilled manual workers support left-wing populist parties, while the upper middle class—higher educated and/or socio-cultural professionals—favour them as well (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2007; Ramiro, 2016; Rooduijn et al., 2017; van Elsas, 2017).

This study aims to articulate how each individual's class position shapes their political attitudes and leads to their preferences for populist parties. The research on populist mobilisation treated occupational class structure as uni-dimensional and assessed its influences on voters' party preference (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Lubbers et al., 2002; Spies, 2013). This was problematic because the uni-dimensional class scheme does not capture the effects of different task structures in the work process and fully account for an individual's socio-economic and socio-cultural preferences theoretically and empirically (Kitschelt, 2012: 229). To address these shortcomings, more and more empirical studies make use of an occupational class scheme that considers both an individual's horizontal and vertical positions (Bornschieer, 2010; Bornschieer and Kriesi, 2012; Gidron and Hall, 2020; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2007; Oesch, 2008, 2012; Oesch and Rennwald, 2018). However, existing literature does not accurately estimate the extent to which political attitudes—such as anti-establishment sentiment, anti-immigrant attitude, and demands for redistribution—intervene between a voter's occupational class and their preference for right-wing and left-wing populist parties in an adequate manner, due to methodological limitations, as this paper discusses later.

This study appraises the theoretical and empirical connection between occupational class structure and the support for right-wing and left-wing

populism, intervened by individual political attitudes. What common individual attributes drive people to adhere to these two types of populist parties? What are the differences between them? This study analyses data from the European Social Survey (ESS) Rounds 4-8 (2008-2017) from 22 European countries (European Social Survey, 2018), using a mixed-effects logit model, and Karlson and his colleagues' mediation analysis method (Karlson et al., 2012; Kohler et al., 2011). The mediation analyses reveal that while right-wing populist parties are backed by the lower-class coalition reflecting a vertical divide in the society and united through anti-establishment sentiments and socio-cultural preferences, left-wing populist parties are endorsed by the cross-class alliance that contains a potentially severe cleavage within it.

The structure of this study is as follows. Relying on Kitschelt and Rehm (2014), the next section exemplifies how occupational status forms ideological orientations, which lead to preferences for right-wing and left-wing populist parties. Subsequently, it presents the data analysed in this study, and then explains the measurement of variables used in the quantitative analysis and its analytical approach. The following section presents the results of the study's quantitative analyses. The final section highlights the results of the empirical analyses, summarises the entire argument, and discusses implications for comparative politics.

## **2. Occupational Class and Political Preferences: Theory and Hypotheses**

While micro-level analyses of radical right party supporters have scrutinised the relationships between occupational class and party preferences in various ways, there are several inadequacies in the literature. First, few studies inspect and compare the class foundations of left-wing and

right-wing populist party support with a multi-dimensional occupational class scheme. Although most existing quantitative analyses incorporate respondents' social class position as an independent variable while studying the influences of their attributes on their party preference (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Lubbers and Coenders, 2017; Lubbers et al., 2002; Spies, 2013), they do not capture the impacts of an individual's horizontal position in occupational class—i.e., the effects of different task structures in the work process (Kitschelt, 2012: 229). This is because these works rely on the uni-dimensional EGP scale (Erikson et al., 1979), which Goldthorpe and colleagues developed to determine an individual's vertical position in social class. To overcome these shortcomings, it has been becoming common to make use of an occupational class scheme that considers both an individual's horizontal and vertical positions (Bornschieer, 2010; Bornschieer and Kriesi, 2012; Häusermann and Kriesi, 2015; Oesch, 2008, 2012; Oesch and Rennwald, 2018). Nevertheless, previous works do not clarify the class foundation of populism phenomena because they do not explicitly compare the occupational class structures of left-wing and right-wing populist party supporters.

Second, existing literature has not adequately theorised the connection between a voter's horizontal position in an occupational class scheme, their ideological orientation in socio-cultural issues, and their party preference in post-industrial democracies. A citizen's vertical class position has a clear, logical relation with their political preferences in socio-economic issues. While the lower class supports left parties because they prefer more redistribution, the upper class supports right parties because they prefer less taxation. However, political parties are currently competing with each other, not in a uni-dimensional party system concerning the size of redistribution, but in a multi-dimensional party system composed of socio-cultural as well as socio-economic dimensions in post-industrial democracies. How an

individual's occupational class position is related to their party preferences in multi-dimensional party systems is still undertheorised and needs to be examined empirically.

Third, and most importantly, because of their methodological limitations, previous works do not fully account for the structure in which a voter's occupational class position is translated into their party preferences through forming their political and ideological orientations.<sup>2)</sup> In the literature, it is a common practice to estimate a logit or probit model with socio-structural variables (e.g., social class and educational attainment), introduce a block of attitudinal variables into the model, and then compare the coefficients of class variables between the models with and without those attitudinal variables in order to comprehend to what extent an individual's political values intervene between their socio-structural position and their preference for a populist party (cf. Bornschieer and Kriesi, 2012; Ivarsflaten and Stubager, 2012; Oesch, 2012; Oesch and Rennwald, 2018). However, this practice is problematic because in nonlinear models such as logit and probit models, including an intervening variable reduces the error variance and alters the coefficient of an explanatory variable, whether or not the latter variable is correlated with the former one (Karlson et al., 2012: 288). Thus, unlike a linear model, a simple comparison across models with and without attitudinal variables does not give us their mediation effects between class positions and party preferences. The literature still needs to be improved in its estimation strategy.

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2) A prominent exception is Emmenegger et al. (2015), which conducts a mediation analysis based on the simulation approach developed by Imai et al. (2010; 2011). This study extends their binary treatment of social class—the labour market disadvantaged or not—to two-dimensional occupational class scheme and their single-country survey analysis to a cross-country and cross-time survey context.



Relying on Kitschelt and Rehm (2014), this section theoretically analyses how occupational class structure constitutes the configuration of political conflicts in post-industrial societies, and presents several hypotheses to be tested with empirical data. According to their work, an individual's work experiences shape their preferences in three dimensions: socio-economic, socio-political governance, and social membership (Kitschelt and Rehm, 2014: 1671). The latter two dimensions have been considered to combine and constitute the socio-cultural dimension. However, some of the contemporary right-wing populist parties promulgate 'ethnopluralism' and—in the name of defending traditional Western liberal values, such as the separation of church and state, gender equality, and libertarian sexual norms—denounce Islam because of its intolerance and masculinism (Halikiopoulou et al., 2013). These parties attempt to isolate social membership issues from socio-political governance issues and extend their standing to constituents with libertarian values. Hence, in analysing the supporters of right-wing populist parties, we should conceptually separate social membership from socio-political dimensions (Kitschelt, 2012).

Kitschelt and Rehm (2014: 1674) claimed that an individual's occupational experiences are generalised and transposed to their policy preferences (see also Kohn, 1994). Occupational experiences are composed of two dimensions: a 'vertical dimension of authority' and a 'horizontal dimension of occupational task structures'. As discussed above, the vertical dimension stipulates an individual's preferences for redistribution. This dimension also influences preference formation in the socio-political governance and the social membership dimensions to some extent. Since a person's lower position in the vertical dimension leads to less discretion and autonomy over their work, they are less likely to embrace universalistic, inclusive, and libertarian values that endorse diversity and esteem autonomy.

The horizontal dimension concerns how an individual solves challenges in their occupational tasks. Their preferences in the socio-political governance and the social membership dimensions vary according to the occupational task structure they face (Kitschelt and Rehm, 2014: 1675-1676). According to how a professional works on their task and how they develop their relationship with clients, we can categorise occupations in the horizontal dimension. For instance, Oesch (2013) classifies occupations into four categories: independent work logic, organisational work logic, technical work logic, and interpersonal work logic. Interpersonal work logic represents one pole of the socio-political governance and the social membership dimensions. In this occupation category, occupational tasks are carried out through interactive communication between professionals and their clients, and those professionals predispose themselves to recognise and accept diversity through their work experiences in which they identify their clients' problems and solve them together with those clients in ambiguity and uncertainty. In contrast, the technical work logic stands for the opposite position. Those occupations engaging in it, especially blue-collar workers who are also positioned lower in the horizontal dimension, nurture their political preferences through their work experiences, which follow established procedures with fewer discretions in less ambiguous environments. They are then less likely to favour ambiguity and uncertainty and more likely to espouse exclusive citizenship and authoritarian values.

The theoretical consideration of the relationship between occupational class positions in the vertical and horizontal dimensions and political preferences in the socio-economic, socio-political governance, and social membership dimensions suggest the following hypotheses to be tested with empirical data.

## 論 說

H1a: In the socio-cultural dimension, while blue-collar production workers have the most authoritarian, particularistic, and exclusive values, socio-cultural professionals have the most libertarian, universalistic, and inclusive values.

H1b: In the socio-economic dimension, while blue-collar production workers and service workers are the most favourable towards redistribution, large employers and business managers are the least favourable.

H1a investigates if an individual's occupational class position in the horizontal and vertical dimensions moulds their ideological positions in socio-cultural issues. It presupposes that while socio-cultural professionals embrace universalistic, inclusive, and libertarian values, blue-collar production workers espouse particularistic, exclusive, and authoritarian values. Other occupational classes in the vertical and horizontal schemes are located between them. By contrast, H1b examines whether a voter's class position dictates their attitudes in socio-economic issues. It supposes that while blue-collar production workers and service workers are more inclined towards redistribution through the welfare state due to their lower class positions, large employers and business managers—who are ranked highest in the vertical scheme—are the least inclined towards it.

Once the relationships between occupation classes and preferences in the socio-economic and socio-cultural dimensions are confirmed, it is to be examined how occupational classes influence party preferences.

H2a: Blue-collar production workers are the most likely to support a right-wing populist party while socio-cultural professionals are the least likely to support it.

H2b: Blue-collar production workers and service workers are the most likely to support a left-wing populist party while large employers and business managers are the least likely to support it.

H2a and H2b should be confirmed if occupational class positions in the vertical and horizontal dimensions influence ideological positions in the socio-cultural and socio-economic dimensions.

Finally, it is to be investigated whether these ideological positions intervene between occupational class and party preferences.

H3a: The occupational categories of blue-collar production workers and service workers raise the likelihood of supporting right-wing and left-wing populist parties via their anti-establishment attitudes in the highest degree.

H3b: The occupational category of blue-collar production workers raises the likelihood of supporting a right-wing populist party via their authoritarian, particularistic, and exclusive preferences in the socio-cultural dimension in the highest degree.

H3c: The occupational categories of blue-collar production workers and service workers raise the likelihood of supporting a left-wing populist party via their redistributive preferences in the highest degree.

H3a assesses whether anti-establishment sentiments mediate between occupational class categories and preferences for populist parties. The two-dimensional class scheme itself does not provide us with a specific observable implication for the relation between occupational class positions and anti-establishment attitudes. However, previous studies reveal that economically disadvantaged citizens have dissatisfaction and anger for the ongoing politics

and vote for a radical party (Arzheimer, 2009; Emmenegger et al., 2015; Lindvall and Rueda, 2014; Marx and Schumacher, 2018). Among them, for instance, Emmenegger et al. (2015) clarify that the economically disadvantaged lower their external political efficacy, which leads to protest voting. Hence, it is expected that the lower occupational class positions in the vertical dimension predispose voters to support either a right-wing or left-wing populist party. H3b confirms that political orientations in the socio-cultural dimension intervene between occupational class positions and preferences for a right-wing populist party. It is expected that authoritarian and xenophobic attitudes are translated into supporting a right-wing populist party, especially among blue-collar production workers. H3c inspects if the demands for redistribution mediate between lower class positions and preferences for a left-wing populist party. These hypotheses deriving from theoretical consideration on class, political ideologies, and party preferences guide this study's empirical analyses.

### 3. Data, Measurement, and Analytical Approach

To test the hypotheses, this study employs the pooled data of the ESS Rounds 4–8 (2008–2017) from 22 European countries. The ESS is an international opinion survey that investigates public attitudes and values with a questionnaire designed and translated to be applicable across more than 30 European countries. Since right-wing and left-wing populist parties have been invigorated after the financial and ensuing sovereign debt crises in Europe, this study analyses the five waves of ESS conducted after 2007.<sup>3)</sup>

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3) In addition, as discussed later, the variables concerning household income level —*hinctnt* and *hintnta*—have a breach and, therefore, they are not comparable before and after ESS Round 4. That is also the reason why this study restricts

### 3.1. *Dependent Variables*

This study's dependent variables are *support for a right-wing populist party* and *support for a left-wing populist party*. To define them, we need to specify the names of right-wing and left-wing populist parties. During this task, we faced difficulties in that we had no established and undisputed dataset that estimates the degree of populism in each party objectively. However, Rooduijn et al. (2019) recently publicised *The PopuList*, a list of populist parties in Europe. Taking it with other sources by experts (March and Keith, 2016; March and Mudde, 2005; Mudde, 2007, 2013; Paolo, 2019), this study identifies right-wing and left-wing populist parties and reports their list in Table 1.

Furthermore, when measuring these dependent variables, we need to define what comprises support for a political party. There are several options, such as a respondent's party identification formed during their life and their voting choice in the latest election. This study regards as a supporter of either a right-wing or left-wing populist party a respondent who raises the name of populist parties in response to the question: '[i]s there a particular political party you feel closer to than all the other parties?'<sup>4)</sup>

### 3.2. *Independent Variables*

To verify hypotheses 1 and 2, we need to measure each respondent's *occupational class* position in the vertical and horizontal dimensions. The ESS asks a respondent about their job and classifies it based on the International

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the samples to ESS Rounds 4-8.

- 4) Some might argue that a respondent's party support should be measured by their actual vote in an election. In fact, the ESS has a question concerning this. However, when we operationalise individuals' party support as their vote, we are unable to distinguish their sincere preferences in ordinary times from their strategic choice at an election.

Table 1. The List of Right-wing and Left-wing Populist Parties

Country	Abbreviation	Party Name	Number of ESS Round				
			4	5	6	7	8
<b>Right-wing populist</b>							
Austria	FPÖ	Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs				x	x
	BZÖ	Bündnis Zukunft Österreich				x	x
Belgium	VB	Vlaams Belang	x	x	x	x	x
	FN	Front National	x	x	x	x	x
Bulgaria	Ataka	Attack	x	x	x		
	VMRO-NFSB-Ataka	United Patriots					
	NFSB	National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria					
	RZS	Order, Lawfulness, Justice	x		x		
Croatia	HDSSB	Croatian Democratic Party of Slavonia and Baranja	x	x			
Czech Republic	Dawn	National Coalition				x	x
	SPD	Freedom and Direct Democracy					
	SPR-RSC	Rally for the Republican Party of Czechoslovakia					
Denmark	DF	Dansk Folkeparti	x	x	x	x	
	FrP	Progress Party					
Finland	Sp-P	Perussuomalaiset	x	x	x	x	x
France	FN	Front National	x	x	x	x	x
Germany	AfD	Alternative für Deutschland				x	x
Greece	LAOS	Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS)	x	x			
Italy	LN	Lega Nord			x		x
	FdI	Fratelli d'Italia			x		x
The Netherlands	LPF	List Pim Fortuyn	x				
	PVV	Partijvoor de Vrijheid	x	x	x	x	x
Norway	FrP	Fremskrittspartiet	x	x	x	x	x
Poland	PiS	Law and Justice	x	x	x	x	x
	Kukiz '15	Kukiz '15					x
	LPR	League of Polish Families	x	x	x		

Cohesive Coalition vs. Fragmented Alliance (Hieda)

Slovakia	SNS	Slovenská Národná Strana	x	x			
	SR	Sme Rodina					
	PSNS	L'udová Strana Naše Slovensko					
Sweden	SD	Sverigedemokraterna		x	x	x	x
Switzerland	SVP/UDC	Schweizerische Volkspartei	x	x	x	x	x
UK	UKIP	UK Independence Party				x	x
<b>Left-wing populist</b>							
France	PG/FI	Parti de Gauche/La France Insoumise			x	x	x
Germany	DL	Die Linke/Party of Democratic Socialism	x	x	x	x	x
Greece	Syriza	Coalition of the Radical Left	x	x			
	DIKKI	Democratic Social Movement					
Ireland	SF	Sinn Féin	x	x	x	x	x
The Netherlands	SP	Socialistische Partij	x	x	x	x	x
Slovenia	ZdLe/L	United Left/The Left				x	x
Spain	Podemos	Podemos					x

Note:

- 1 While the list of right-wing populist parties refers to the political parties categorized as 'Populist' and 'Far right' in The PopuList (Rooduijn et al. 2019), the list of left-wing populist parties draws on the parties categorized as 'Populist' and 'Far left' in it.
- 2 The 'x' mark indicates that the identified party was included in the corresponding wave of ESS.
- 3 Since all of the countries listed do not necessarily participate in each wave of ESS and not all populist parties are active in all the time, the following parties categorized as 'Populist' and either 'Far right' or 'Far left' in The PopuList (Rooduijn et al. 2019) are not included in the analyses: VMRO-NFSB-Ataka and NFSB in Bulgaria, HL-SR/CL-LP in Croatia, SYM / SYPOL in Cyprus, SPD and SPR-RSC in Czech Republic, FrP in Denmark, EKRE in Estonia, DIKKI in Greece, and SR and PSNS in Slovakia.
- 4 The data of Hungary was dropped because combined support for right-wing populist parties—FIDEZ, Jobbik, and MIÉP—exceeds 70% on average across waves and then it makes Stata/SE 15 unable to estimate the initial value in maximum likelihood estimation in the mixed-effects logit model.



**Table 2. Two by Four Occupational Class Scheme**

Independent work logic	Organizational work logic	Technical work logic	Interpersonal work logic
Liberal professionals and large employers	Managers and associate managers	Technical professionals and semi-professionals	Socio-cultural professionals and semi-professionals
Small business owners (if self-employed & less than 10 employees)	Office clerks	Production workers	Service workers

Source: Oesch (2013, Appendix)

Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88 and ISCO-08). This study uses Oesch's (2013) occupational class scheme, which re-groups the ISCO occupation classification into eight categories. In the vertical dimension, it assigns professionals, managers, associate professionals, and associate managers to the upper class, and skilled and unskilled workers to the lower class. In the horizontal dimension, it classifies a respondent's job into independent work logic, organisational work logic, technical work logic, and interpersonal work logic according to the occupational task structure. As shown in Table 2, this study employs eight categories in its analysis. If a respondent has no main job, it substitutes their partner's class position for theirs.<sup>5)</sup>

To assess hypotheses 1 and 3, a respondent's policy positions must be measured in the socio-economic and socio-cultural dimensions. As discussed above, some of the contemporary right-wing populist parties advocate libertarian values such as gender equality and animal rights in the socio-political governance dimension and—under the pretext of safeguarding West

5) When this study converted a respondent's occupational category in ISCO-88 and ISCO-08 into Oesch's class scheme, it used the syntax files made public on the website (Oesch, n.d.).

European values—promote xenophobia and Islamophobia in the social membership dimension. Hence, this study measures a respondent's position on these two elements separately and assesses their effects on their party preferences for either a right-wing or left-wing populist party.

This study operationalises an individual's policy position in the socio-economic axis as their preferences for redistribution through the state. As a respondent's *economic left-right position*, it measures to what extent they disagree with the following statement: 'The government should implement measures to reduce differences in income levels.' While this variable takes a smaller value when a respondent is in a left-side position, it takes a larger value when they are in a right-side one.

To measure a respondent's policy position in the socio-political governance dimension, a composite indicator is used as a measure of *authoritarian orientation*. The ESS contains many questions concerning a respondent's attitude regarding different socio-political governance issues. This study conducted a factor analysis and calculated the average of each respondent's importance evaluations on the following six highly correlated items: (a) secure and safe surroundings, (b) to follow the rules, (c) a strong government to ensure safety, (d) to behave properly, (e) to gain respect from others, and (f) to follow traditions and customs. Since the composite indicator's reliability coefficient (Cronbach's alpha) is 0.72, it is reliable.

This study operationalises an individual's position in the social membership dimension as the degree of *anti-immigrant orientation*. To measure this orientation, it created a composite indicator composed of the questions upon immigrants in the ESS. Since the ESS includes many question items on immigration as well, this study conducted a factor analysis and selected three highly correlated items. It then calculated the average of degree in which each respondent feels against the following three types of immigrants: (a) of

different race/ethnic group from the majority, (b) from poorer countries in Europe, and (c) from poorer countries outside Europe. This indicator's reliability coefficient (Cronbach's alpha) is 0.88.

Finally, to verify hypothesis 3a, the degrees of distrust in established politics and Euroscepticism are measured. The ESS has many questions addressing the extent to which a respondent trusts various political institutions. This study also conducted a factor analysis and calculated the average score of the degree of distrust in the following political institutions: (a) each country's parliament, (b) politicians, and (c) political parties. It uses this score as the degree of *distrust in politics*. This indicator's reliability coefficient (Cronbach's alpha) is 0.92, which suggests that it is reliable. This study measures the degree of *Euroscepticism* by using the question item asking a respondent to evaluate the following statement: 'European unification go further or gone too far.' It re-coded this item so that it takes a larger value when a respondent feels that European unification has gone too far.

These attitudinal variables are standardised to take zero as their minimal and one as their maximal values, because each question item has a different scale in the ESS.

### **3.3. Control Variables**

To test the validity of alternative hypotheses, this study put a battery of control variables into its regression models. As Houtman and his colleagues claim that cultural capital rather than occupational class prescribes each individual's preferences in the socio-cultural dimension (Achterberg and Houtman, 2006; Houtman, 2003a, 2003b; Houtman and Achterberg, 2010; van der Waal et al., 2007), a respondent's degree of cultural capital needs to be controlled. Since cultural capital is attained through education and aesthetic

activities according to them, this study's models control for each respondent's highest level of education as its proxy.

Finally, gender, age, ethnicity, unemployment, income level, trade union affiliation, religiosity, and subjective economic insecurity are put into regression models as control variables. The question items used for constructing these variables and the measurement of dependent, independent, and control variables are all listed in Appendix A.

### **3.4. Method**

This study used a mixed-effects model in its analyses because the data being analysed are hierarchical data that consists of public opinion survey sampling from each participant country across several waves. The mixed-effects model is a statistical model that separately estimates fixed effects, an intercept, and coefficients that shared across and common to lower-level units (e.g., individuals); and random effects, intercepts and coefficients varying across higher-level units (e.g., country in each wave) (cf. Gelman and Hill, 2006). When analysing individual support for a populist party, it is not realistic to assume that individuals' attributes perfectly account for their probability of voting for it. Each populist party has different strengths and momentum according to the political context in which it falls. Even then, identical personal attributes would lead an individual to a different inclination to support a particular party. Ignoring the heterogeneity of prestige and reputation across parties and forcing the hierarchical data structure into a regular OLS model would bias the estimation of various parameters. This study's analytical approach—a mixed-effects model—is to estimate the strength of populist parties which varied across participant countries and survey waves as random intercepts and then evaluate the impacts of occupational class and attitudinal factors on party preferences at the

individual level as fixed effects. Since the ESS has the three-tier nesting structure in which individual respondents are nested within country-waves and these country-waves are further nested in countries, this study estimates random intercepts in the second—country-wave—level and in the third—country—level separately. Furthermore, it puts wave dummy variables into its mixed-effects models to control for heterogeneity across the years where the surveys are conducted (cf. Schmidt-Catran and Fairbrother, 2016; Schmidt-Catran et al., 2019).


In addition, this study uses the method of mediation analysis for logit and probit models, developed by Karlson and his colleagues (Karlson et al., 2012; Kohler et al., 2011). The hypotheses 3a through 3c assume that the effects of each individual's occupational class on their party preference are mediated by their political values. In linear models, as most path analyses suggest, how to assess the mediation effects generated through confounding factors is straightforward: comparing the coefficients of explanatory variables across the models with and without confounding factors gives us those effects. In nonlinear models such as logit and probit models, however, this simple approach is inappropriate, as said before. Including an intervening variable,  $z$ , in a logit or probit model reduces the error variance and alters the coefficient of an explanatory variable,  $x$ , whether or not  $x$  is correlated with  $z$  (Karlson et al., 2012: 288). To avoid this estimation problem and assess the mediation effects of intervening variables, this study estimates the mixed-effects logit model with attitudinal factors (full model) and the same model with those factors residualised by the variables of occupational classes (reduced model), and then compare the coefficients of the full and reduced models. This approach allows us to evaluate to what extent political values mediate between each respondent's occupational class and their support for a populist party.

## 4. Results

To confirm hypotheses 1a and 1b, Figure 1 plots the preferences of eight occupational class categories on the socio-economic and socio-cultural axes. It indicates to what extent each occupational class has positive or negative orientations—compared to the entire mean—in the socio-economic, socio-political governance, and social membership dimensions. This figure demonstrates that occupational class positions stipulate preferences for socio-cultural issues even after controlling for educational attainment (cf. Houtman, 2003a, ch.3). As it shows, preferences in the economic left-right axis follow each respondent's position in the vertical class dimension; while the lower class (production workers and service workers) favours more redistribution, the upper class (technical professionals, managers, and large employers & self-employed professionals) favours less. Socio-cultural professionals and small business owners are exceptional: while the former espouse income equality through government intervention despite their higher class position, the latter do not, despite their lower position. Socio-cultural professionals endorse redistribution through a welfare state probably because these occupations—such as teachers, medical professions, and social workers—bear the burden of service provisions in the public sector. Hypothesis 1b is verified.

Figure 1 illustrates that occupational class positions in the vertical class dimension also dictate preferences in the socio-cultural dimension. Concerning preferences in the socio-political governance dimension, the upper class has a libertarian orientation and the lower class—except small business owners—has an authoritarian orientation. Similarly, each respondent's class position has decisive impacts on their preferences in the

Figure 1. Scatterplot of Socio-Economic and Socio-Cultural Preferences by Occupational Class Categories



Note:

- 1 The left figure plots the coefficients and their 95% confidence intervals attained through regressing either economic left-right position or authoritarian attitudes on each occupational class (a dummy variable) and socio-demographic control variables with a mixed-effect linear model. The right figure replaces the coefficients and their 95% confidence intervals of authoritarian attitudes with those of anti-immigrant attitudes.
- 2 The full results of regression equations are available in Appendix B.

social membership dimension. As expected by hypothesis 1a, while blue-collar production workers have the most particularistic and exclusive views on immigrants, socio-cultural professionals have the most universalistic and inclusive views on them. Nevertheless, despite their class positions in the horizontal dimension, while service workers—who engage in interpersonal work logic—have an anti-immigrant orientation, technical professionals—who engage in technical work logic—have a somewhat pro-immigrant orientation. It can therefore be inferred that occupational class positions in

both vertical and horizontal dimensions influence preferences in the socio-cultural dimension.

To determine the validity of hypotheses 2a and 2b, this study conducted multivariate regression analyses with a mixed-effects logit model. Table 3 shows the detailed results of these analyses. Since it is not feasible to interpret the results of logistic regression models solely from a regression table, this study calculated each occupational class category's probability of supporting either a right-wing or left-wing populist party while controlling for other socio-demographic variables. Figure 2 plots the results as a bar chart.

Figure 2 demonstrates that the electorate of right-wing and left-wing populist parties varies across occupational class categories. Concerning the backers of a right-wing populist party, blue-collar production workers have the highest probability of supporting them, with service workers ranked second. In contrast, socio-cultural professionals have a conspicuously low probability of exhibiting similar support and are the least likely to endorse a right-wing populist party. These results confirm hypothesis 2a.

Conversely, the empirical results do not validate hypothesis 2b. This hypothesis claims that blue-collar production workers and service workers have the highest probability of supporting a left-wing populist party, and large employers and business managers have the lowest probability. However, Figure 2 illustrates that, while socio-cultural professionals are the most likely to support a left-wing populist party, large employers and small business owners are the least likely. These results suggest that occupational class positions in not only the vertical but also the horizontal dimensions shape a respondent's preferences for this party family, mediated by their anti-establishment, socio-economic, and socio-cultural preferences.

To assess hypotheses 3a to 3c, this study conducted a mediation analysis



**Table 3. Regression of Support for a Populist Party on Occupational Class**

Dependent Variable:	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	Support for a right-wing populist party		Support for a left-wing populist party	
Large employers & self-employed professionals		Reference category		
Small business owners	0.348*** (0.128)	0.234 (0.153)	-0.022 (0.182)	0.042 (0.208)
Technical (semi-)professionals	0.295** (0.131)	0.236 (0.157)	0.312* (0.185)	0.397* (0.211)
Production workers	0.776*** (0.126)	0.624*** (0.150)	0.359** (0.175)	0.410** (0.201)
(Associate) managers	0.154 (0.125)	0.193 (0.150)	0.035 (0.176)	0.028 (0.202)
Clerks	0.299** (0.132)	0.364** (0.157)	0.342* (0.180)	0.365* (0.206)
Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals	-0.402*** (0.135)	-0.182 (0.161)	0.577*** (0.175)	0.599*** (0.200)
Service workers	0.555*** (0.127)	0.513*** (0.151)	0.497*** (0.175)	0.577*** (0.200)
Distrust in politics	—	2.560*** (0.108)	—	1.653*** (0.156)
Euroscepticism	—	1.763*** (0.084)	—	0.422*** (0.113)
Anti-immigration orientation	—	2.938*** (0.095)	—	-1.197*** (0.128)
Authoritarian orientation	—	1.140*** (0.134)	—	-0.658*** (0.179)
Economic left-right position	—	0.144* (0.075)	—	-1.874*** (0.135)
Respondent's gender	0.298*** (0.036)	0.328*** (0.044)	0.110** (0.054)	0.157** (0.062)
Age	-0.408*** (0.043)	-0.739*** (0.054)	-0.219*** (0.071)	-0.220*** (0.083)
Education	-0.169*** (0.011)	-0.063*** (0.013)	0.019** (0.009)	0.028*** (0.010)
Income (low)	-0.035 (0.040)	-0.060 (0.050)	0.212*** (0.061)	0.200*** (0.069)


Cohesive Coalition vs. Fragmented Alliance (Hieda)

Income (high)	-0.125*** (0.042)	-0.094* (0.051)	-0.479*** (0.071)	-0.330*** (0.079)
Ethnic minority (Dummy)	-0.883*** (0.106)	-0.659*** (0.124)	0.179 (0.124)	0.297** (0.137)
Subjective economic insecurity	0.238*** (0.025)	0.045 (0.031)	0.285*** (0.035)	0.200*** (0.041)
Unemployment	-0.161*** (0.036)	-0.172*** (0.045)	-0.403*** (0.053)	-0.275*** (0.060)
Religiosity	-0.020*** (0.006)	-0.008 (0.007)	-0.188*** (0.009)	-0.154*** (0.010)
Trade union	-0.076* (0.040)	-0.099** (0.050)	0.324*** (0.066)	0.262*** (0.075)
ESS Round 4 (dummy)	-0.231 (0.218)	-0.057 (0.220)	0.022 (0.218)	-0.002 (0.242)
ESS Round 5 (dummy)	0.075 (0.203)	—	-0.141 (0.218)	—
ESS Round 6 (dummy)		Reference category		
ESS Round 7 (dummy)	0.406** (0.204)	0.356* (0.202)	0.124 (0.199)	0.070 (0.217)
ESS Round 8 (dummy)	0.612*** (0.205)	0.674*** (0.203)	0.118 (0.197)	0.042 (0.216)
Constant	-1.108*** (0.369)	-4.792*** (0.484)	-0.943** (0.416)	-1.145** (0.492)
Random-effects Parameters				
Country (variance)	0.969*** (0.358)	1.961** (0.793)	0.173 (0.109)	0.276 (0.169)
Country × Wave (variance)	0.199*** (0.050)	0.185*** (0.058)	0.069** (0.031)	0.084** (0.041)
Observations	46,382	35,740	18,186	14,873
Number of countries	18	17	7	7
Number of country-waves	60	47	23	19

Note:

1. Standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.
2. Since ESS Round 5 has no questionnaire on 'Euroscepticism', the data of it are dropped in Models 2 and 4.

**Figure 2. Probability of Supporting a Right-Wing or Left-Wing Populist Party by Occupational Class Category**



Note: When calculating these predicted probabilities, average values are assigned to all control variables and constant at the fixed effects and zero to random intercepts at the country-wave and country levels.

using the method developed by Karlson and his colleagues (Karlson et al., 2012; Kohler et al., 2011). Tables 4 and 5 display the coefficients and standard errors of occupational class dummy variables in the full model and the differences of coefficients between the full and reduced models. While the coefficients indicate the direct effects of occupational class variables on support for a populist party in the full model, the differences signify their indirect effects of occupational class position, mediated through attitudinal variables, in the reduced models. The percentages put on the right side of the coefficients in the reduced models designate the mediation percentage of those attitudinal variables listed in the ‘Z-variables’, calculated by the

following equation: Mediation Percentage =  $\frac{\text{Reduced} - \text{Full}}{\text{Reduced}} \times 100$ .

Table 4 clearly shows that anti-establishment sentiments and ideological orientations in socio-cultural issues mediate the effects of occupational class position on support for a right-wing populist party. In the reduced model (a), including all five intervening variables, each of the occupational class categories has positive mediation percentage by no less than 30%. A notable point in the reduced model (b) is that anti-establishment sentiments have more considerable impacts among the lower class in the vertical dimension—small business owners, production workers, clerks, and service workers—than the upper class, as hypothesis 3a suggests. Furthermore, confirming hypothesis 3b, the indirect effects of ideological orientations in the socio-cultural dimension also mirror the vertical divide of occupational class positions. As the reduced model (c) indicates, while those mediation effects have positive and substantial values ( $>0.200$ ) among the lower class, they are negative among the socio-cultural professionals. By contrast, when the intervening variable is limited to the socio-economic factor—economic left-right position—in the reduced model (d), the mediation percentages become small and negative, except among the socio-cultural professionals. The negative figures indicate that these six occupational categories other than the socio-cultural professionals tend to have more leftist views on redistribution than the reference category—large employers & self-employed professionals—and propensity dampens their positive effects on the support for a right-wing populist party among them, even though the mediating effects are small. Taken together, the results of the mediation analyses above suggest that support for a right-wing populist party reflects the classical class struggle in a twisted manner: the lower occupational class positions nurture anti-establishment sentiments and authoritarian, particularistic, and exclusive values in socio-cultural issues, and then the latter predispose the

**Table 4. Mediation Analysis of Support for a Right-wing Populist Party**

Model 2: Support for a right-wing populist party									
	Full model	Reduced model (a)		Reduced model (b)		Reduced model (c)		Reduced model (d)	
		Z-variables:		Z-variables:		Z-variables:		Z-variables:	
		Distrust in politics		Distrust in politics		Anti-Immigration			
		Euroscepticism		Euroscepticism		Authoritarianism			
		Anti-Immigration				Economic Left-Right			
		Authoritarianism							
		Economic Left-Right							
	Direct effects	Indirect effects via Z-variables	Mediation percentage	Indirect effects via Z-variables	Mediation percentage	Indirect effects via Z-variables	Mediation percentage	Indirect effects via Z-variables	Mediation percentage
Large employers & self-employed professionals				Reference category					
Small business owners	0.234 (0.153)	0.631*** (0.035)	72.9%	0.276*** (0.021)	54.1%	0.367*** (0.023)	61.2%	-0.012* (0.006)	-5.4%
Technical (semi-)professionals	0.236 (0.157)	0.205*** (0.034)	46.5%	0.087*** (0.021)	26.9%	0.126*** (0.021)	34.8%	-0.008* (0.004)	-3.5%
Production workers	0.624*** (0.150)	0.815*** (0.037)	56.6%	0.374*** (0.022)	37.5%	0.463*** (0.024)	42.6%	-0.022* (0.011)	-3.7%
(Associate) managers	0.193 (0.150)	0.098*** (0.031)	33.7%	0.022 (0.019)	10.3%	0.083*** (0.020)	30.1%	-0.006* (0.003)	-3.2%
Clerks	0.364** (0.157)	0.449*** (0.035)	55.2%	0.202*** (0.021)	35.8%	0.264*** (0.022)	42.0%	-0.017* (0.009)	-4.9%

Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals	-0.182 (0.161)	-0.114*** (0.033)	38.5%	-0.036* (0.020)	16.5%	-0.062*** (0.020)	25.4%	-0.016* (0.008)	8.1%
Service workers	0.513*** (0.151)	0.552*** (0.034)	51.8%	0.250*** (0.020)	32.7%	0.322*** (0.021)	38.6%	-0.020* (0.010)	-4.0%
Observations					35,740				
Number of countries					17				
Number of country × wave					47				

Note:

1. Standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.
2. 'Z-variables' denote the intervening variables residualised by the variables of occupational classes and then put into the respective reduced model.
3. The column of 'Direct effects' lists the coefficients and standard errors of a full model.
4. While the columns of 'Indirect effects via Z-variables' indicate the differences of coefficients between a reduced model and a full model and their standard errors, the columns of 'Mediation percentage' show the percentage calculated by the following formula:  $\frac{Reduced\ model - Full\ model}{Reduced\ model}$ .

lower class to stand behind this party family despite their preferences for redistribution.

Table 5 illuminates that support for a left-wing populist party has a more complex mediation structure than a right-wing one. At first, it is to be noticed that the indirect effects through five attitudinal variables—indicated in the reduced model (e)—are much smaller in the support for a left-wing populist party than in that for a right-wing populist party. However, it does not necessarily mean that these attitudinal factors have few mediating effects between occupational class positions and the support for a left-wing populist party. As the reduced model (f) suggests, while anti-establishment attitudes have no significant impact among the upper class—managers and socio-cultural professionals—those attitudes indicate positive and substantial intervening effects among the lower class, especially among production workers and service workers. This result confirms hypothesis 3a. In addition, as hypothesis 3c expects, economic left-right positions have substantively positive intervening effects among the lower class—particularly production workers and service workers. The demands for redistribution among the lower class are translated into support for a left-wing populist party. However, as we saw in Figure 4, political orientations in socio-cultural issues have opposite effects in determining preferences for this party family. The lower class tends to have authoritarian, particularistic, and exclusive attitudes, which dampen their support for a left-wing populist party. The mediation effects of political orientations in socio-cultural issues cancel out those of anti-establishment attitudes and preferences for redistribution. The vertical rather than the horizontal dimensions of occupational class play an important role in this respect.

Table 5 also reveals that there is an alternative path to backing a left-wing populist party. As the reduced models (f) and (g) demonstrate, the upper class

**Table 5. Mediation Analysis of Support for a Left-wing Populist Party**

Model 4: Support for a left-wing populist party									
	Full model	Reduced model (e)	Reduced model (f)		Reduced model (g)		Reduced model (h)		
		Z-variables:	Z-variables:		Z-variables:		Z-variables:		
		Distrust in politics	Distrust in politics						
		Euroscepticism	Euroscepticism						
		Anti-Immigration			Anti-Immigration				
		Authoritarianism			Authoritarianism				
		Economic Left-Right					Economic Left-Right		
	Direct effects	Indirect effects via Z-variables	Mediation percentage	Indirect effects via Z-variables	Mediation percentage	Indirect effects via Z-variables	Mediation percentage	Indirect effects via Z-variables	Mediation percentage
Large employers & self-employed professionals				Reference category					
Small business owners	0.042 (0.208)	0.070** (0.032)	62.5%	0.116*** (0.017)	73.4%	-0.192*** (0.021)	128.0%	0.146*** (0.020)	77.7%
Technical (semi-)professionals	0.397* (0.211)	0.096*** (0.028)	19.5%	0.043*** (0.015)	9.8%	-0.056*** (0.014)	-16.4%	0.108*** (0.013)	21.3%
Production workers	0.410** (0.201)	0.223*** (0.038)	35.3%	0.178*** (0.020)	30.3%	-0.230*** (0.024)	-128.5%	0.275*** (0.023)	40.1%
(Associate) managers	0.028 (0.202)	0.017 (0.026)	37.8%	0.006 (0.014)	17.6%	-0.059*** (0.013)	190.3%	0.070*** (0.011)	71.4%
Clerks	0.365* (0.206)	0.148*** (0.031)	28.8%	0.075*** (0.016)	17.0%	-0.125*** (0.017)	-52.3%	0.198*** (0.017)	35.2%



Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals	0.599*** (0.200)	0.164*** (0.028)	21.5%	0.001 (0.014)	0.2%	-0.013 (0.012)	-2.2%	0.177*** (0.016)	22.8%
Service workers	0.577*** (0.200)	0.213*** (0.035)	27.0%	0.147*** (0.019)	20.3%	-0.181*** (0.020)	-45.7%	0.246*** (0.020)	29.9%
Observations					14,873				
Number of countries					7				
Number of country × wave					19				

Note:

- 1 Standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.
- 2 'Z-variables' denote the intervening variables residualised by the variables of occupational classes and then put into the respective reduced model.
- 3 The column of 'Direct effects' lists the coefficients and standard errors of a full model.
- 4 While the columns of 'Indirect effects via Z-variables' indicate the differences of coefficients between a reduced model and a full model and their standard errors, the columns of 'Mediation percentage' show the percentage calculated by the following formula:  $\frac{Reduced\ model - Full\ model}{Reduced\ model}$ .

—technical professionals, managers, and socio-cultural professionals—indicate no significant or much weak mediation effects in anti-establishment sentiments and political values of the socio-cultural dimension. By contrast, as the reduced model (h) shows, socio-cultural professionals—who are located in the upper class and engaged in interpersonal work logic—have significant and substantially positive mediation effects between preferences for government redistribution and support for a left-wing populist party. These mediation effects among socio-cultural professionals are comparable to those among the lower class. Socio-cultural professionals are prone to endorsing a left-wing populist party because of their preferences for redistribution. Their support for this party family does not concern its anti-establishment stance; and is facilitated by their libertarian, universalistic, and inclusive positions in the socio-cultural dimension.

These results of mediation analyses presented in Table 5 imply that the support base of left-wing populist parties consists of the cross-class alliance that holds a serious divide between the lower and upper classes in terms of political values and objectives. On the one hand, production workers and service workers are more likely to give support to these parties because they are frustrated with the ongoing politics and long for more equitable redistribution. They do so despite their authoritarian, particularistic, and exclusive values in a relative sense. On the other hand, the support of socio-cultural professionals for these parties derives from the combination of their favourable attitudes to government redistribution and their libertarian, universalistic, and inclusive orientations in the socio-cultural dimension. Their support does not come from anti-establishment sentiments. The mediation analyses reveal that the alliance supporting the emergence of left-wing populist parties is essentially more fragile than that of right-wing ones because their occupational class bases seek distinct objectives.

## 5. Conclusion

This study explored the class basis of right-wing and left-wing populist parties by analysing an international public opinion survey. In its theoretical consideration, the study argued that the type of populism a constituent is attracted to depends on their preferences in the socio-economic, socio-political governance, and social membership dimensions, and these preferences are further influenced by their occupational class position in the vertical and horizontal dimensions.

The mediation analyses this study conducted illuminate that while the support base of right-wing populist parties reflects the classical class struggle in society, that of left-wing ones consists of the cross-class alliance that contains a cleavage in terms of values and objectives. Right-wing populist parties garner support from the lower rung of the vertical dimension of occupational class. The lower class—especially blue-collar production workers and service workers—are more likely to have anti-establishment sentiments and authoritarian, particularistic, and exclusive orientations in the socio-cultural dimension, and both of these preferences are translated to endorsing these parties. Their egalitarian positions in the socio-economic dimension barely exert influence on their preferences for this party family.

By contrast, left-wing populist parties assemble support from the lower class—blue-collar production workers and service workers—and the upper class—socio-cultural professionals—due to different rationales. Blue-collar production workers and service workers are more likely to support these parties because of their frustration against the political establishment and demand for government redistribution, both of which derive from their lower position in the vertical dimension of occupational class structure. Their

preferences concerning socio-cultural issues diminish their probability of espousing this party family. Socio-cultural professionals are its firm support base since they resonate with its libertarian, universalistic, and inclusive positions in the socio-cultural dimension and its leftist positions in the socio-economic dimension. These constituents of left-wing populist parties from the lower and upper occupational classes do not necessarily share anti-establishment sentiments and are disposed to have opposite orientations in socio-governance and social membership issues.

This study's class-based mediation analyses imply that the social foundation of right-wing populism is more consolidated than that of left-wing populism. As discussed before, the constituencies of right-wing populist parties share with each other anti-establishment sentiments and ideological orientations in socio-cultural issues because they are mainly from the lower rung of the vertical dimension of occupational class. As long as these parties blur their economic policy stances and emphasise the salient issues owned by them, their cohesive supporters adhere to this party family (Rovny and Polk, 2020). Conversely, the support base of left-wing populist parties is a potentially fragile cross-class alliance because they mobilise distinct occupational class categories having divergent and sometimes contradicting values and objectives. When social and economic circumstances allow these parties to focus on inequality and economic policies, as in the Great Recession, they can rally their fragmented support base. However, once socially controversial issues, such as the ones concerning immigrants and lifestyles, emerge in society, these parties might face difficulties in maintaining their momentum. These empirical implications still need to be probed in future studies.

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## Appendix A. List of Variables and Measurement

Variable	ESS variable	Question item	Coding
<b>Party Preferences</b>			
Support for a right-wing populist party	CLSPRTY	Feel closer to a particular party than all other parties	Close to a right-wing populist party (1) or not (0)
Support for a left-wing populist party	CLSPRTY	Feel closer to a particular party than all other parties	Close to a left-wing populist party (1) or not (0)
<b>Social and Demographic Factors</b>			
Malesex	GNDR	Respondent's gender	Male (1), Female (0)
Age	AGEA	Age of respondent	Natural log of years
Ethnic minority	BLGETMG	Belong to minority ethnic group in country (Yes=1/No=2)	Ethnic minority (1), not (0)
Education	EISCED	Highest level of education attainment, ES-ISCED	Categories from low (1) to high (7)
Income (high)	HINCTNTA	Household's total net income, all sources	In the higher 30% of household income strata
Income (low)	HINCTNTA	Household's total net income, all sources	In the lower 30% of household income strata
Unemployment	UEMP3M	Ever been unemployed for a period more than three months	Yes (1), No (0)
	ISCO88 (ESS4-5)	- International Standard Classification of Occupations 1988, ISCO-88	Oesch's 8 class scheme: *1 Self-employed professionals and large employers *2 Small business owners *3 Technical (semi-)professionals *4 Production workers
	ISCO08 (ESS6-8)	- International Standard Classification of Occupations 2008, ISCO-08	
Occupational Class			

			*5 (Associate) managers *6 Clerks *7 Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals *8 Service workers
Trade union	UNION_CUR- RENT	Member of a trade union or similar organization (MBTRU)	Yes, currently (1); otherwise (0)
Religiosity	RLGDGR	Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say you are?	10-pt scale from 'Not at all religious' (1) to 'Very religious' (10)
Subjective economic insecurity	HINCFEL	Subjective economic insecurity: Reported difficulties about living on household's income	4-pt scale from 'Living comfortably on present income' (1) to 'Very difficult on present income' (4)
<b>Attitudinal Factors</b>			
Economic left—right position	GINCDIF	To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement?: 'The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels'	(5-pt scale from 'Agree strongly' (1) to 'Disagree strongly' (5)) — 1 / (5—1)
Authoritarian orientation			6 — (Average of impsafe, ipfrule, ipstrgv, ipbhprp, and imprad (1—6))/(6—1)
	IMPSAFE	Important to live in secure and safe surroundings	Scale 1—6
	IPFRULE	Important to do what is told and follow rules	Scale 1—6
	IPSTRGV	Important that government is strong and ensures safety	Scale 1—6
	IPBHPRP	Important to behave properly	Scale 1—6
	IPRSPOT	Important to get respect from others	Scale 1—6
	IMPTRAD	Important to follow traditions and customs	Scale 1—6

Anti-immigrant orientation			Average of imdfetn, eimpcnt, and impcntr (1—4) — 1 / (4—1)
	IMDFETN	Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority	Scale 1—4
	EIMPCNT	Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries in Europe	Scale 1—4
	IMPCNTR	Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe	Scale 1—4
Distrust in politics			10 — (Average of trstprl, trstplt, and trstprt (0—10)) / (10—0)
	TRSTPRL	Trust in country's parliament	Scale 0—10
	TRSTPLT	Trust in politicians	Scale 0—10
	TRSTPRT	Trust in political parties	Scale 0—10
Euroscepticism	EUFTF (ESS4, ESS6-8)	European unification go further or gone too far	10 — (11-pt scale from 'Unification has already gone too far' (0) to 'Unification should go further' (10)) / (10—0)

**Appendix B. Regression Tables of Scatterplot of Socio-Economic and Socio-Cultural Preferences  
by Occupational Class Categories**

Dependent Variable: Economic left-right position	Model A1	Model A2	Model A3	Model A4	Model A5	Model A6	Model A7	Model A8	Model A9	Model A10
Occupational Class										
Self-employed professionals and large employers	0.068*** (0.005)									
Small business owners		0.027*** (0.002)								
Technical (semi-)professionals			0.027*** (0.003)							
Production workers				-0.033*** (0.002)						
(Associate) managers					0.037*** (0.002)					
Clerks						-0.004* (0.002)				
Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals							-0.019*** (0.002)			
Service workers								-0.019*** (0.002)		
Preference for populist party										

Feel closer to a right-wing populist party									0.012***	
Feel closer to a left-wing populist party										-0.103***
Respondent's gender	0.030***	0.029***	0.029***	0.038***	0.031***	0.030***	0.028***	0.028***	0.041***	0.029***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Respondent's age (ln)	-0.050***	-0.050***	-0.049***	-0.049***	-0.050***	-0.049***	-0.048***	-0.051***	-0.052***	-0.051***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.005)
Education	0.003***	0.004***	0.003***	0.003***	0.003***	0.004***	0.004***	0.003***	0.004***	0.005***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Income (low)	-0.008***	-0.009***	-0.008***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.009***	-0.009***	-0.008***	-0.010***	-0.014***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.005)
Income (high)	0.057***	0.058***	0.058***	0.056***	0.055***	0.058***	0.059***	0.057***	0.065***	0.071***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.005)
Ethnic Minority Dummy	-0.008**	-0.008**	-0.008**	-0.007**	-0.007**	-0.008**	-0.008**	-0.008**	-0.017***	-0.003
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.010)
Subjective economic insecurity	-0.034***	-0.035***	-0.034***	-0.034***	-0.034***	-0.035***	-0.035***	-0.034***	-0.036***	-0.029***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Unemployment	0.025***	0.024***	0.025***	0.024***	0.024***	0.025***	0.025***	0.024***	0.030***	0.026***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Religiosity	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.003***	0.003***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Trade union	-0.035***	-0.034***	-0.037***	-0.035***	-0.036***	-0.036***	-0.034***	-0.037***	-0.046***	-0.044***

Cohesive Coalition vs. Fragmented Alliance (Hieda)

	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.005)
ESS Round 4 (dummy)	0.016*	0.016*	0.016*	0.016*	0.015*	0.016*	0.016*	0.015*	-0.007	0.026
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.016)
ESS Round 5 (dummy)	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.006	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.002	0.010
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.016)
ESS Round 6 (dummy)					Reference Category					
ESS Round 7 (dummy)	0.007	0.007	0.006	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.001	0.002
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.015)
ESS Round 8 (dummy)	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.012	-0.001	-0.013
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.015)
Constant	0.444***	0.444***	0.439***	0.447***	0.442***	0.441***	0.439***	0.456***	0.456***	0.424***
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.033)
Random-effects Parameters										
Country (standard deviation)	0.070	0.070	0.070	0.069	0.070	0.070	0.070	0.070	0.070	0.055
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.016)
Country × Wave (standard deviation)	0.024	0.024	0.024	0.023	0.023	0.024	0.024	0.024	0.021	0.020
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Observations	127,849	127,849	127,849	127,849	127,849	127,849	127,849	127,849	48,197	19,112
Number of countries	22	22	22	22	22	22	22	22	18	7
Number of country-waves	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	60	23

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Dependent Variable: Authoritarian attitudes	Model B1	Model B2	Model B3	Model B4	Model B5	Model B6	Model B7	Model B8	Model B9	Model B10
Occupational Class										
Self-employed professionals and large employers	-0.031*** (0.003)									
Small business owners		-0.005*** (0.001)								
Technical (semi-)professionals			-0.005*** (0.002)							
Production workers				0.010*** (0.001)						
(Associate) managers					0.000 (0.001)					
Clerks						0.002* (0.001)				
Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals							-0.018*** (0.001)			
Service workers								0.010*** (0.001)		
Preference for populist party										
Feel closer to a right-wing populist									0.038***	



party									(0.002)	
Feel closer to a left-wing populist										-0.026***
party										(0.004)
Respondent's gender	0.001	0.001	0.001	-0.002**	0.000	0.001	-0.002*	0.002**	0.006***	0.011***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Respondent's age	0.052***	0.051***	0.051***	0.051***	0.051***	0.051***	0.051***	0.052***	0.048***	0.069***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Education	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.003***	-0.005***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Income (low)	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Income (high)	-0.008***	-0.009***	-0.009***	-0.008***	-0.009***	-0.009***	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.017***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Ethnic minority	0.033***	0.033***	0.033***	0.032***	0.033***	0.033***	0.033***	0.032***	0.033***	0.048***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.006)
Subjective economic insecurity	0.004***	0.004***	0.004***	0.003***	0.004***	0.004***	0.003***	0.003***	0.004***	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Unemployment	0.020***	0.020***	0.020***	0.020***	0.020***	0.020***	0.021***	0.020***	0.023***	0.022***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Religiosity	0.010***	0.010***	0.010***	0.010***	0.010***	0.010***	0.010***	0.010***	0.011***	0.010***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Trade union	-0.004***	-0.004***	-0.003***	-0.004***	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.001	-0.003***	-0.005***	-0.010***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)
ESS Round 4 (dummy)	-0.023***	-0.023***	-0.023***	-0.023***	-0.023***	-0.023***	-0.023***	-0.023***	-0.014***	-0.012

	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.008)	
ESS Round 5 (dummy)	-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.010***	-0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.008)
ESS Round 6 (dummy)											
ESS Round 7 (dummy)											
ESS Round 8 (dummy)	-0.007**	-0.007**	-0.007**	-0.007**	-0.007**	-0.007**	-0.007**	-0.007**	-0.007**	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.007)
ESS Round 8 (dummy)	-0.022***	-0.022***	-0.022***	-0.022***	-0.022***	-0.022***	-0.022***	-0.022***	-0.022***	-0.016***	-0.019***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.007)
Constant	0.406***	0.408***	0.408***	0.406***	0.408***	0.408***	0.408***	0.408***	0.400***	0.396***	0.336***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.027)
Random-effects Parameters											
Country (standard deviation)	0.051	0.051	0.051	0.051	0.051	0.051	0.051	0.051	0.052	0.056	0.059
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.016)
Country × Wave (standard deviation)	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.007	0.009
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Observations	127,266	127,266	127,266	127,266	127,266	127,266	127,266	127,266	127,266	47,935	19,092
Number of countries	22	22	22	22	22	22	22	22	22	18	7
Number of country-waves	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	60	23

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Dependent Variable: Anti-immigrant attitudes	Model C1	Model C2	Model C3	Model C4	Model C5	Model C6	Model C7	Model C8	Model C9	Model C10
Occupational class										
Self-employed professionals and large employers	-0.057*** (0.005)									
Small business owners		0.008*** (0.002)								
Technical (semi-)professionals			-0.020*** (0.003)							
Production workers				0.057*** (0.002)						
(Associate) managers					-0.028*** (0.002)					
Clerks						-0.001 (0.002)				
Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals							-0.071*** (0.002)			
Service workers								0.026*** (0.002)		
Preference for populist party										
Feel closer to a right-wing populist									0.183***	

party										(0.003)	
Feel closer to a left-wing populist party											-0.048***
											(0.006)
Respondent's gender	0.012***	0.011***	0.013***	-0.001	0.011***	0.011***	0.004**	0.015***	0.018***	0.014***	
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	
Respondent's age	0.069***	0.068***	0.068***	0.069***	0.070***	0.068***	0.069***	0.071***	0.074***	0.049***	
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.005)	
Education	-0.009***	-0.009***	-0.009***	-0.008***	-0.009***	-0.009***	-0.008***	-0.009***	-0.008***	-0.013***	
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	
Income (low)	0.016***	0.016***	0.015***	0.013***	0.014***	0.016***	0.014***	0.014***	0.010***	0.027***	
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	
Income (high)	-0.028***	-0.029***	-0.029***	-0.024***	-0.027***	-0.029***	-0.028***	-0.028***	-0.018***	-0.027***	
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	
Ethnic minority	-0.053***	-0.053***	-0.053***	-0.055***	-0.053***	-0.053***	-0.053***	-0.053***	-0.037***	-0.040***	
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.009)	
Subjective economic insecurity	0.030***	0.030***	0.030***	0.028***	0.030***	0.030***	0.029***	0.030***	0.024***	0.031***	
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	
Unemployment	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	0.015***	0.013***	0.013***	0.015***	0.014***	0.015***	0.021***	
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	
Religiosity	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.000**	-0.001***	0.004***	0.002***	
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	
Trade union	-0.020***	-0.018***	-0.019***	-0.021***	-0.020***	-0.019***	-0.012***	-0.019***	-0.025***	-0.033***	
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)	
ESS Round 4 (dummy)	-0.004	-0.005	-0.005	-0.004	-0.004	-0.005	-0.003	-0.004	0.004	-0.002	

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	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.016)
ESS Round 5 (dummy)	0.011	0.011	0.011	0.010	0.011	0.011	0.011	0.011	0.009	0.034**
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.016)
ESS Round 6 (dummy)					Reference Category					
ESS Round 7 (dummy)	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	-0.003	0.011
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)
ESS Round 8 (dummy)	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.012	-0.016
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Constant	0.147***	0.152***	0.152***	0.139***	0.150***	0.151***	0.150***	0.130***	0.066***	0.181***
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.034)
Random-effects Parameters										
Country (standard deviation)	0.075	0.075	0.075	0.075	0.075	0.075	0.075	0.076	0.081	0.064
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.018)
Country × Wave (standard deviation)	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.036	0.037	0.037	0.036	0.037	0.028	0.019
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Observations	127,437	127,437	127,437	127,437	127,437	127,437	127,437	127,437	48,074	19,089
Number of countries	22	22	22	22	22	22	22	22	18	7
Number of country-waves	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	60	23

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.